Disclosure of profit forecasts during takeover bids by Brennan, Niamh
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2353
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to






NIAMH BREN AN 
r B. SC , . FcA* 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at the School of Industrial and Business Studies, 




Hugh, Ross and John 
CONTENTS 
Page 
TITLE PAGE i 
DEDICATION ii 
CONTENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES viii 
LIST OF FIGURES xii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xiii 
ABSTRACT xv 
Chapter 1: RESEARCH PROBLEM, DEFINTITONS AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Research problem 1 
1.2 Motivations for disclosure 2 
1.3 Importance of forecasts 4 
1.4 Research questions 5 
1.4.1 Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts 7 
1.4.2 Influence of market expectations on disclosure 8 
1.4.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts 8 
1.4.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis 9 
1.4.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content 9 
1.5 Research methodology 9 
1.5.1 Interviews 10 
1.5.2 Empirical analysis of disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts 11 
1.5.3 Content analysis of forecasts 11 
1.5.4 Statistical analysis 12 
1.6 Regulatory framework and definitions 12 
1.6.1 Regulatory framework: takeovers 14 
1.6.2 Regulatory framework: profit forecasts 16 
1.6.3 Definitions 19 
1.7 Costs and benefits of disclosure 20 
1.8 Contribution of this research 22 
1.9 Organisation of the thesis 25 
111 
Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW Page 
2.1 Analytical models of disclosure 28 
2.1.1 Voluntary disclosure models 29 
2.2 Signalling theory 41 
2.2.1 Empirical studies of signalling theory 47 
2.3 Agency theory 49 
2.3.1 Empirical studies of agency theory 55 
2.4 The market for corporate control 59 
2.4.1 Corporate control and accounting policy choice 60 
2.4.2 Characteristics of takeover bids and takeover firms 62 
2.5 Empirical research of voluntary disclosure 63 
2.5.1 Empirical research of forecast disclosure 64 
2.5.1.1 Motivations for forecast disclosure 70 
2.5.2 Disclosure and market expectations 72 
2.5.3 Profit forecasts as defences in takeovers 73 
2.5.4 Content analysis of disclosures 76 
2.5.5 News content of forecasts 83 
2.6 Summary and conclusions 88 
Chapter 3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts 94 
3.1.1 Takeover-context variables (Hl-Hs) 94 
3.1.2 Firm-specific variables (H6-H14) 94 
3.2 Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts: market expectations (H15)105 
3.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts (H16-H19) 105 
3.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis 106 
3.4.1 Takeover-context variables (H2o-H21) 106 
3.4.2 Forecast-related variables (H22-H24) 107 
3.4.3 Firm-specific variables (H25-H33) 109 
3.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content (H34) 112 
3.6 Summary and conclusions 114 
Chapter 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Population and selection of sample 115 
4.1.1 Sample 116 
4.1.2 Data collection 119 
4.1.3 Frequency of forecast disclosure 119 
iv 
Chapter 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (CONTINUED) Page 
4.2 Research methodology 122 
4.2.1 Factors influencing disclosure 122 
4.2.1.1 Interviews 122 
4.2.1.2 Quantitative analysis: measurement of variables 123 
4.2.1.3 Dependent variable - forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 123 
4.2.1.4 Independent variables 123 
4.2.1.5 Predicted response of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 
variable to independent variables 127 
4.2.1.6 Summary descriptive statistics - independent variables 128 
4.2.2 Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts: 
market expectations 130 
4.2.2.1 Measurement of market expectations 130 
4.2.2.2 Predicted response of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 
variable to market expectations 131 
4.2.2.3 Summary descriptive statistics - market expectations 131 
4.2.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts 131 
4.2.3.1 Measurement of dependent variables - outcome of bids 131 
4.2.3.2 Predicted response of outcome of bids dependent variables 
to forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 132 
4.2.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content 132 
4.2.4.1 Content analysis of disclosures in forecasts 132 
4.2.4.2 Measurement of forecast-related independent variables 137 
4.2.4.3 Predicted response of content of disclosures in forecasts to 
independent variables 139 
4.2.4.4 Summary descriptive statistics - forecast-related variables 139 
4.2.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content 140 
4.2.5.1 Measurement of news content variables 140 
4.2.5.2 Predicted news content in forecasts 141 
4.2.5.3 Summary descriptive statistics - news in forecasts variables 141 
4.3 Missing values 142 
4.3.1 Analysis of disclosure of forecasts 142 
4.3.2 Content analysis of disclosures in forecasts 142 
4.4 Statistical analysis 143 
4.4.1 Univariate and bivariate statistics 144 
4.4.2 Logit analysis 144 
4.4.2.1 Goodness of fit measures 145 
4.4.2.2 Significance tests 146 
4.4.2.3 Presentation of logit results 146 
4.4.2.4 Multicollinearity and logit analysis 147 
4.4.3 Count data models 147 
4.4.3.1 Negative binomial regression 148 
4.4.3.2 Negative binomial regression evaluation 149 
4.5 Summary and conclusions 150 
V 
Chapter 5: FACTORS INFLUENCING DISCLOSURE: 
EVIDENCE FROM INTERVIEWS Page 
5.1 Objective of interviews 151 
5.2 Sample selection 152 
5.3 Analysis and summary of interviews 153 
5.4 Discussion of interviews 155 
5.4.1 Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts 
(comments 1-103) 155 
5.4.2 Influence of market expectations (comments 104-115) 161 
5.4.3- Defensive role of profit forecasts (comments 116-136) 162 
5.4.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis 
(comments 137-149) 163 
5.4.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content 
(comments 150-162) 164 
5.5 Summary and conclusions 165 
Chapter 6: FACTORS INFLUENCING DISCLOSURE OF FORECASTS: 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
6.1 Disclosure of forecasts (H1-H14) 169 
6.1.1 Bivariate analysis for bidders and targets 169 
6.1.2 Multivariate model 172 
6.1.3 Disclosure by bidders - multivariate analysis 174 
6.1.4 Disclosure by targets - multivariate analysis 176 
6.1.5 Summary of results for bidders and targets 178 
6.1.6 Differences in disclosure between bidders and targets 181 
6.1.7 Disclosure in agreed and contested bids 184 
6.1.8 Disclosure in agreed bids - multivariate analysis 185 
6.1.9 Disclosure in contested bids - multivariate analysis 186 
6.1.10 . Summary of results for agreed and contested bids 186 6.1.11 Differences in disclosure between agreed and contested bids 188 
6.2 Influence of market expectations on disclosure (His) 188 
6.3 Effect of forecast on outcome of bids (H16-H19) 191 
6.3.1 Outcome of bids - bidders (H16-H17) 191 
6.3.2 Outcome of bids - targets (His-1119) 191 
6.4 Discussion of chapter results and conclusions 193 
Chapter 7: FACTORS INFLUENCING DISCLOSURES IN FORECASTS: 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
7.1 Characteristics of forecasts and forecasters 195 
7.2 Content analysis of forecasts 198 
7.3 Multivariate results 200 
7.3.1 Items disclosed in forecasts 200 
7.3.2 Disclosure of assumptions 202 
vi 
Page 
7.3.3 Summary of results of content analysis (H20-H33) 203 
7.3.4 Content analysis of agreed bid and contested bid forecasts 207 
7.3.5 Comparison of content analysis for agreed and contested 
bids 208 
7.4 News in forecasts (H34) 210 
7.4.1 Summary of results of news content analysis of forecasts 213 
7.5 Discussion of chapter results and conclusions 214 
Chapter 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF THE RESEARCH 
8.1 Objectives and summary of research project 216 
8.2 Evidence from interviews 222 
8.3 Summary of empirical results and significance of findings 224 
8.3.1 Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts (Hl-H14) 224 
8.3.1.1 Bivariate analysis 224 
8.3.1.2 Multivariate analysis - bidders and targets 227 
8.3.1.3 Multivariate analysis - agreed and contested bids 233 
8.3.2 Influence of market expectations on disclosure of 
forecasts (Hls) 234 
8.3.3 Strategic role of profit forecasts (H16-HI9) 236 
8.3.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: 
content analysis (H2O-H33) 237 
8.3.4.1 Content of disclosures in forecasts - agreed and 
contested bids 240 
8.3.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: 
news content (H34) 242 
8.4 Limitations of the research 244 
8.5 Suggestions for further research 245 
8.6 Discussion and conclusions 247 
REFERENCES 251 
Appendix 1 INTERVIEW OUTLINE 266 
Appendix 2 EDITED SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 269 
Appendix 3 FULL OUTPUT OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES 287 
Appendix 4 EXAMPLES FROM PROFIT FORECASTS 311 
Appendix 5 FULL LIST OF TAKEOVER BIDS IN THE STUDY 360 
Appendix 6 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 376 
vii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
2.1 Summary of analytical models of disclosure 30 
2.2 Summary of research on signalling theory 43 
2.3 Summary of research on agency theory 51 
2.4 Summary of empirical research on voluntary disclosure 65 
2.5 Summary of content analysis studies and voluntary disclosure 79 
2.6 Summary of empirical research on news content of forecasts 84 
3.1 Model of disclosure of profit forecasts 105 
3.2 Model of content of disclosures in profit forecasts 113 
3.3 Summary of hypotheses 114 
4.1 Summary economic indicators 1988 to 1992 115 
4.2 Analysis of UK listed company takeovers 1988 to 1992 118 
4.3 Analysis of success or failure of bids by targets' initial response 118 
4.4 Incidence of defended takeover bids 118 
4.5 Bids analysed by purchase consideration 119 
4.6 Categorical firm-specific variables 120 
4.7 Year of forecast 122 
4.8 Definition and measurement of variables 124 
4.9 Prediction of impact of independent variables on disclosure 
of forecasts 127 
4.10 Descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables 128 
4.11 Summary of highest bivariate Spearman correlations between 
independent variables 129 
4.12 Prediction of impact of market expectations on disclosure of 
forecasts 130 
4.13 Descriptive statistics of market expectations variables 131 
4.14 Prediction of impact of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure on 
outcome of bids 132 
4.15 Number of times item disclosed in forecasts 135 




4.17 Frequencies of ITEMS and ASS 137 
4.18 Definition and measurement of forecast-related variables 138 
4.19 Prediction of impact of independent variables on content of 
disclosures in forecasts 138 
4.20 Source of forecasts 139 
4.21 Forecasts analysed by forecast period and forecast horizon 140 
4.22 Predicted news content in forecasts 141 
4.23 Descriptive statistics of news variables 141 
5.1 Background of interviewees 152 
5.2 List of companies referred to in interviews 153 
5.3 Summary of interview responses 154 
5.4 Summary of interviews analysed by reference to hypotheses 166 
6.1 Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings between 
forecasters and nonforecasters for each continuous. independent 
variable 171 
6.2 Chi-square statistics for differences between forecasters and 
nonforecasters - categorical variables 172 
6.3 Disclosure model estimated 173 
6.4 Logit estimation of model for bidders - including SSH 174 
6.5 Logit estimation of model for bidders - excluding SSH 175 
6.6 Logit estimation of model for targets - including SSH 176 
6.7 Logit estimation of model for targets - excluding SSH 177 
6.8 Summary of Spearman correlations between size variables 180 
6.9 Analysis to explain anomalous result on size variables 180 
6.10 Summary results of bivariate and multivariate analysis for bidders 
and targets 182 
6.11 Logit estimation of model for agreed bids - including SSH 184 
6.12 Logit estimation of model for agreed bids - excluding SSH 185 
6.13 Logit estimation of model for contested bids - including SSH 186 
6.14 Logit estimation of model for contested bids - excluding SSH 187 
ix 
Page 
6.15 Summary results of logit analysis of agreed and contested bids 187 
6.16 Analysis of deviation from market expectations variables 189 
6.17 Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings between 
forecasters and nonforecasters for deviation from market 
expectations variables 190 
6.18 Analysis of outcome of bids by forecast disclosure - bidders 192 
6.19 Analysis of outcome of bids by forecast disclosure - targets 192 
7.1 Characteristics of forecasters and forecasts 196 
7.2 Descriptive statistics of all forecast-related continuous variables 197 
7.3 Summary of highest bivariate Spearman correlations between 
independent variables for forecasters 198 
7.4 Quantification of forecasts 199 
7.5 Wording used in range forecasts 199 
7.6 Wording used in non-quantified forecasts 199 
7.7 Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ITEMS 
- including SSH 201 
7.8 Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ITEMS 
- excluding SSH 202 
7.9 Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ASS 
- including SSH 203 
7.10 Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ASS 
- excluding SSH 204 
7.11 Summary results negative binomial regression of ITEMS and ASS 205 
7.12 Summary results of content analysis - ITEMS for agreed and 
contested bids 209 
7.13 Summary results of content analysis - ASS for agreed and 
contested bids 210 
7.14 Data availability for news and forecast deviation variables 211 
X 
Page 
7.15 Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings 
between bidders and targets for news in forecasts and forecast 
deviation variables 211 
7.16 Analysis of news content variables between contested and 
agreed bids 213 
8.1 Summary results of bivariate analysis of differences in variables 
between forecasters and nonforecasters (Hi-H14) 225 
8.2 Summary results of logit analysis of disclosure/nondisclosure of 
forecasts (Hi-H14) 228 
8.3 Summary results of negative binomial regression of content of 
disclosures in forecasts (H20-H33) 233 
A3.1 Crosstabs analysis of categorical variables - forecasters and 
nonforecasters 287 
A3.2 Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings between 
forecasters and nonforecasters for each continuous independent 
variables 289 
A3.3 Bivariate Spearman correlations of independent variables - bidders 290 
A3.4 Bivariate Spearman correlations of independent variables - targets 292 
A3.5 Bivariate Spearman correlations of independent variables where 
content of disclosures is the dependant variable 294 
A3.6 Full output of logit regression for bidders - including SSH 295 
A3.7 Full output of logit regression for bidders - excluding SSH 296 
A3.8 Full output of logit regression for targets - including SSH 297 
A3.9 Full output of logit regression for targets - excluding SSH 298 
A3.10 Full output of logit regression for agreed bids - including SSH 299 
A3.11 Full output of logit regression for agreed bids - excluding SSH 300 
A3.12 Full output of logit regression for contested bids - including SSH 301 
A3.13 Full output of logit regression for contested bids - excluding SSH 302 
A3.14 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids 
- dependent variable ITEMS - including SSH 303 
xi 
Page 
A3.15 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids 
- dependent variable ITEMS - excluding SSH 304 
A3.16 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids 
- dependent variable ASS - including SSH 305 
A3.17 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids 
- dependent variable ASS - excluding SSH 306 
A3.18 Negative binomial model results for contested bids 
- dependent variable ITEMS - including SSH 307 
A3.19 Negative binomial model results for contested bids 
- dependent variable ITEMS - excluding SSH 308 
A3.20 Negative binomial model results for contested bids 
- dependent variable ASS - including SSH 309 
A3.21 Negative binomial model results for contested bids 
- dependent variable ASS - excluding SSH 310 
A4.1 Summary of examples 311 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
1.1 Motivations for disclosure of forecasts during takeover bids 3 
3.1 Influence of variables on disclosure 93 
4.1 Sample identification 117 
4.2 Frequency of forecast disclosure 121 
xii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My warmest thanks to those who helped me with this research: 
My supervisor, Professor Sidney Gray, was at all times helpful and encouraging 
and made this research a worthwhile and enjoyable experience. Prof. Anthony 
Steele, Prof. Jack Broyles, Prof. Richard Hyman and Prof. Paul Stoneman of The 
University of Warwick also contributed helpful suggestions. 
The financial support of The Irish Accountancy Educational Trust and the 
Commerce Faculty, University College Dublin is gratefully acknowledged. KPMG 
Peat Marwick, London and Extel Financial Limited provided access to the data 
necessary to carry out this research. 
I thank Ray Ball, S. P. Kothart, Amin Mawani, Dieter Ordelheide, Mike Power, 
Katherine Schipper, Andrew Stark, G. Peter Wilson, Steve Zeff and workshop 
participants at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, 
Brussels and the 1994 European Accounting Association Doctoral Colloquium 
for their helpful suggestions. I also received many useful comments at the 1994 
American Accounting Association Doctoral Consortium, Lake Tahoe, California. 
I thank the British Accounting Association for selecting me as their representative 
to attend the Consortium and Bass Leisure for generously sponsoring my travel 
costs. 
Terence O'Rourke and Catherine Murphy of KPMG Stokes Kennedy Crowley, 
Gerardine Jones of the Irish Stock Exchange, Rory Mason of Riada stockbrokers, 
David McCrossan, Peter Coyne and Walter Hobbs of AIB Corporate Finance 
dealt with my many queries. I thank the interviewees who, because anonymity was 
guaranteed, cannot be acknowledged individually here. 
X111 
My colleagues, Bill Roche and Louis Murray, made useful suggestions during the 
research. Brendan Whelan of the Economic and Research Institute, Dublin, 
Teresa Breathnach, John McCallig, Rodney Thom and Anthony Murphy of 
University College Dublin helped me with the data analysis. In particular, the 
advice on methodology from Anthony Murphy was invaluable. 
I thank my colleagues in the Department of Accountancy, University College 
Dublin for their support and friendship during this project. Kate Marshall provided 
excellent secretarial support. Linden Lee solved all my computing problems. 
Aileen Pierce, Michael McDowell and especially Catherine O'Dea provided 
advice and help with proof-reading and editing this thesis. Claire Marston and 
Imelda Lambkin made useful suggestions on structure and layout. 
Lastly, I thank Mandy Clarke who looked after my three young sons and ensured 
that domestic and family life ran smoothly during the period of this research. 
Without Mandy's support I could not have undertaken this project, particularly as 
it involved extensive travel commitments. 
xiv 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines disclosure of 250 profit forecasts in 701 UK takeover bids in 
the period 1988 to 1992 against five research issues: 
" Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts 
" Influence of prevailing market expectations 
" Effect of disclosure of forecasts on the outcome of bids 
9 Factors influencing disclosure content in forecasts 
" Whether forecasts disclosed convey good news 
Logit analysis and negative binomial regression are the two primary statistical 
techniques used to analyse the results. 
Results show the domination of the takeover-context of the research. Two 
variables accounted for almost all the influence on disclosure of forecasts for both 
bidders and targets: bid horizon and type of bid. Probability of disclosure of a 
forecast is greater the shorter the bid horizon and during contested bids. 
In addition to bid horizon and type of bid, for bidders, year, value of bid and 
purchase consideration were significant, and for targets value of bid and industry 
were significant in one of the two models estimated. 
Evidence supporting the hypothesis that forecast disclosure is more likely when 
market expectations are out of line with actual results is provided. 
There is some evidence that forecasts by targets affect the outcome of bids, but 
there is no such evidence for bidders. 
Takeover-context variables and forecast-related variables were most relevant in 
determining disclosures in forecasts. Disclosure content in forecasts was 
significantly greater during contested bids, in voluntary forecasts and in longer 
period forecasts. Significantly more assumptions were disclosed by target 
forecasters and in longer horizon forecasts. 
Evidence shows a tendency to disclose good news, with some disclosure of bad 
news. Good news forecasts are more likely during contested bids. Targets are 
more likely to disclose bad news forecasts, but when bidders disclose bad news it 
tends to be worse on average than targets' bad news. 
xv 
Chapter 1: RESEARCH PROBLEM, DEFINITIONS AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Research problem 
This thesis is about voluntary financial disclosure by companies. The voluntary 
disclosure decision chosen for study is disclosure of profit forecasts during 
takeover bids. The research is a systematic, empirical study of disclosure of profit 
forecasts and of content of disclosures in profit forecasts disclosed during 
takeover bids. 
Forecasts are rarely disclosed in the UK except in new share issue prospectuses 
and during takeover bids. Thus, most UK research into disclosure of profit 
forecasts is based on disclosures in prospectuses and in takeover documents. 
Most prior research on voluntary disclosure in both the UK and the US examines 
disclosure in routine business settings and does not focus on environmental 
factors facing the firm at the time of disclosure. The choice of specialist setting of 
takeover bids enables study of the effect of the context of disclosure on voluntary 
disclosure decisions. 
Previous studies in the UK, by and large, have considered the topic of profit 
forecasts during takeover bids from the standpoint of accuracy (Carmichael, 1973; 
Dev and Webb, 1972; Westwick, 1972). Since the early 1970s there has been little 
empirical research on profit forecasts released during UK takeover bids. 
Forecast disclosure in UK new issue prospectuses has been studied relatively 
recently by Ferris (1975 and 1976), Keasey and McGuinness (1991) and Firth and 
Smith (1992). These studies focused mainly on accuracy of, and bias in, the 
forecasts. 
Making Corporate Reports Valuable: a survey of corporate reporting practices 
by major UK companies (Gray, Roberts and Gordon, 1991) (MCRV) identified 
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the extent to which companies disclosed financial information on a voluntary basis 
in annual reports and in non-periodic reports such as prospectuses. MCRV 
concluded that, in the context of non-periodic reports, there is often a stimulus to 
disclose additional information voluntarily. The report contends that the provision 
of such voluntary information appears especially common in the case of contested 
takeover bids. In the sample of 52 takeover documents examined, 11 companies 
(21%) disclosed a profit forecast. Eight forecasts (38%) were disclosed in 21 
contested bids; three forecasts (10%) were disclosed in 31 uncontested 
bids/mergers. Thus, there is evidence of greater voluntary disclosures in contested 
bid situations. 
Because there has been little research into disclosure of profit forecasts during 
takeover bids since the early 1970s (especially compared with research into 
forecasts made in new issue prospectuses) and because of the preliminary findings 
in MCRV, takeover bids were chosen as the disclosure context for this research. 
1.2 Motivations for disclosure 
Although profit forecasts are often included in documents issued by companies 
listed on the Stock Exchange, there is no Stock Exchange regulation requiring 
publication of such forecasts. Forecasts are normally made during takeover bids to 
support arguments being put forward by directors. Forecasts may be used by 
target company directors to show that shares are more valuable than the bid price 
or to show that the forecast profits justify their recommendation of the offer. 
Bidding company directors may wish to provide evidence in support of the value 
placed on shares offered as consideration for the acquisition. An unwelcome 
takeover bid is often resisted by financial rather than legal tactics. One important 
tactic is a statement by directors about future prospects and profits in documents 
sent to shareholders either by target or bidder companies. 
Figure 1.1 summarises possible motivations for disclosure during takeover bids. 
Bidders and targets are presumed to behave in a manner designed to achieve 
`success'. In takeovers the dominant motive for disclosure is to achieve success. 
2 
Figure 1.1 Motivations for disclosure of forecasts during takeover bids 
Success 
Target success Bidder success 
To defeat bid To counter Share exchange - to To counter 
In the interest bidder increase perceived target's 
ofmanagemen disclosure value of offer forecast 
To obtain highest value To validate Cash buyout - to To convince targe 
for shareholders representations reassure market management of 
In interests of owner- made in the course and lenders bidder's quality 
manager or shareholders of negotiations with 
allied with management the bidder 
Target motives 
For targets, there are three main possibilities for success: 
(a) To defeat a bid; or 
(b) To optimise the offer price if the bid succeeds; or 
(c) In the event of not defeating the bid, to optimise price. 
Thus, the motive for disclosure may be to resist the offer, or to run up the price or 
a combination of both; (b) is not necessarily an alternative to (a). It might be a fall 
back strategy, in the shareholders' interest. It might also increase the bargaining 
power of a target's management, who can make the takeover more expensive, or 
can threaten to do so, by resisting the bid. 
There is some evidence that bidders in uncontested bids sometimes insist on 
publication of forecasts by targets as a form of reassurance of the terms of the bid. 
This reason for disclosure of a forecast by targets is not inconsistent with motive 
(b) - to optimise the bid price. 
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Bidder motives 
For bidders, `success' is completing the bid at the lowest possible bid price. 
Bidders may disclose information to keep shareholders (in the case of share 
exchange) or lenders (in the case of cash bids) informed. If the takeover is by 
means of share exchange, a profit forecast by the bidder is aimed at target 
shareholders to get them to accept the offer, and at bidder shareholders to ensure 
their approval of the bid. Disclosure of a profit forecast is usually irrelevant if 
there is a cash offer unless disclosure is desirable from the point of view of market 
confidence in the bid. In addition, bidders may disclose information to convince 
management of the target that becoming part of the bidder is an attractive 
proposition. 
If success from the bidder's point of view is defined as completing the takeover at 
minimum cost, and if success from the target's point of view is defined as 
maximising the cost of the takeover so as to prevent it completely or, failing that, 
to maximise the return to target shareholders, than one would imagine a priori 
that any decision to disclose a profit forecast is taken predominantly by reference 
to whether disclosure will materially assist the forecaster's prospect of success. 
1.3 Importance of forecasts 
Although historical financial statements provide valuable information, they alone 
do not meet investors' needs in today's dynamic business environment. Potential 
investors are eager for insights into a company's future performance. Investors 
recognise that future estimates from those most knowledgeable about the business 
are as valuable, if not more valuable, than historical results of the past. 
Studies of users' needs have shown forecast information to be one of the most 
important financial disclosures a company can make (see Courtis (1992) for a 
summary of this research). Existing research supports the claim that investors 
make their decisions primarily based on future expectations. Past studies also 
support the contention that earnings forecasts are utilised in users' decision 
processes (Benjamin and Strawser, 1974). It also appears that users are not misled 
by forecasts (Patell, 1976; Danos, Holt and Imhoff, 1984). Given the perceived 
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importance of future-orientated information, it is surprising that there has not 
been more research examining disclosure of forecasts and content of disclosures 
made therein. 
Although user surveys rank forecast information very highly, practice is for 
companies not to disclose such forecasts. Forecasts are rarely disclosed in annual 
reports (Steele, 1982). Their disclosure is more likely in prospectuses (Gray, 
Roberts and Gordon, 1991). 
The question of whether forecasts should be disclosed has received worldwide 
consideration for many years. The main arguments offered in support of 
disclosure are: 
" Disclosure of forecasts assist investors' decision making. 
" Public disclosure of forecasts helps to ensure more equitable distribution of 
financial information to various users. 
" Comparison of actual and forecast results helps users to evaluate management's 
competence in planning and control. 
" Disclosure of forecasts helps enhance investor-management relations. 
Arguments against disclosure are: 
"A forecast will, by its nature, be uncertain and may be more misleading than 
informative. 
" Disclosure may be detrimental to the firm due to reduced competitiveness 
through disclosure of proprietary information. 
" Management may subsequently try to align actual results to the forecast to the 
detriment of the firm. 
" Failure to achieve the forecast may result in legal liability claims, particularly in 
the US. 
1.4 Research questions 
This thesis examines why some firms voluntarily include a profit forecast in offer 
or defence documents while others do not. The major objective of the study is to 
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analyse factors that help explain management decisions to publish a profit forecast 
during a takeover bid. Since profit forecast disclosure is voluntary, reasons, 
including managerial incentives, why some companies disclose a forecast and 
others do not are analysed. Understanding managers' forecast disclosure choices 
involves considering shareholders' demand for voluntary disclosure and managers' 
incentives to supply such disclosures. 
The literature has not yet produced a consensus on the economic determinants of 
managers' forecast choices, nor on why managers release forecasts. Empirical 
literature on management forecasts has been concerned with information content 
and predictive ability of forecasts, with managers withholding or delaying 
forecasts, and with characteristics of forecasts and of the firms that release them. 
Empirical research on financial reporting has typically followed either an efficient 
markets or costly contracting approach. However, it provides little evidence 
useful to managers in developing disclosure strategies to communicate effectively 
with investors. 
Prior research has considered disclosure choices from the perspective of agency 
theory and signalling theory. Given the specialist setting, the issue arises whether 
signalling theory and agency theory are appropriate as analytical tools in the 
context of takeovers. 
Relevance of agency theory during takeovers 
An information gap generally exists between company insiders and outsiders. This 
view is clearly espoused in agency theory which focuses on the conflict of 
interests between principals and agents. Disclosure of information narrows the 
information gap, consequently decreasing agency costs. 
Agency costs are likely to be particularly high during takeover bids. Thus, agency 
theory motivations are relevant to disclosure during takeovers. Bidders' 
management know more about the bidder than target management and 
shareholders. Bidders may disclose information to reduce information asymmetry 
when shares are being issued as consideration, or to convince target management 
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of bidder's quality. Especially if the bid is for cash that has been financed by 
borrowing, disclosure of a forecast may be motivated by a desire to reduce 
information asymmetry between the bidder and the lender. 
Agency theory is relevant to bid defences, where target management might be 
motivated by personal considerations such as job retention or retention of control 
of the company (in the case of owner managers), at the expense of shareholders. 
Relevance of signalling theory 
Signalling theory issues, similar to those arising on issuing new shares, are 
relevant where the bidder issues shares in consideration for the bid. Disclosure of 
forecasts by targets may signal the target's intention to strongly defend the bid. 
Disclosure of forecasts and choice of advisors may be used as signals of quality by 
both bidders and targets. 
From these general themes, five research questions, which are discussed below, 
are identified: 
" What factors significantly influence voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts? 
" What effects do prevailing market expectations of firm profitability have on 
disclosure? 
" Is forecast disclosure an effective weapon in defence or completion of bids? 
" Does the disclosure content of forecasts vary with external factors? 
" Do forecasts disclosed have identifiable news content characteristics? 
1.4.1 Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts 
The factors are analysed under two headings - the takeover context of disclosure 
and the firm characteristics associated with disclosure. Characteristics of forecast 
disclosing companies compared to nondisclosing firms are analysed to assess 
whether there are any systematic differences between the two groups. It is hoped 
that this will further understanding of voluntary disclosure decisions by analysing 
reasons for any differences found. 
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1.4.2 Influence of market expectations on disclosure 
The research examines the market expectations adjustment hypothesis of Ajinkya 
and Gift (1984) that forecasts are issued by managers in an effort to move 
prevailing market expectations toward management beliefs about future earnings. 
Thus, forecasts are more likely to be disclosed when investor perceptions are 
most out of line with company results. Aligning market expectations is likely to be 
more important, and to have greater economic consequences, during takeover 
bids than in routine disclosure situations examined by other researchers (Ajinkya 
and Gift, 1984; Ruland, Tung and George, 1990; Skinner, 1994). 
1.4.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts 
Takeover activity in the UK generally, and particularly in the late 1980s, is 
characterised by a high level of contested bids. The high level of hostile bids in the 
UK is markedly different from that found in most other industrialised countries 
(DeMott, 1988; Franks and Mayer, 1990). 
Profits announcements represent a very important plank of defence. Forecasts 
above market expectations may render the offer price unattractive and force the 
predator on the defensive. It has frequently been suggested that profit forecasts 
are used as a defence mechanism. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that 
publication of profit forecasts affects the outcome of contested bids. It is assumed 
in takeover literature that publication of forecasts is a strategy in contested 
takeovers that can influence the success or failure of bids, or that can lead to 
increased offers. 
The role played on the outcome of takeover bids by disclosure of profit forecasts 
is examined. Anecdotal evidence that profit forecasts are defensive weapons in 
contested takeover bids is empirically tested - whether disclosure of a profit 
forecast is an effective defence strategy by targets in defending against contested 
takeover bids. In addition, whether disclosure of a forecast by bidders helps 
bidders successfully complete contested bids is also tested. 
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1.4.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis 
There have been many studies into disclosures in annual reports which are mainly 
concerned with reporting past events. Little attention has been given to 
disclosures in forecasts which are more forward-looking, decision-orientated 
statements. Montgomerie and Walker (1992) comment that published profit 
forecasts contain very little information on how the figures are built up. They 
range from being one line statements citing a figure that will be achieved to, at 
the most, three or four lines disclosing key figures with a few accompanying 
notes'. Little guidance is given on the content of forecasts by the Stock Exchange 
or the Takeover Panel. None is provided by the accounting profession. This study 
provides data on current forecasting disclosure practices in the absence of any 
detailed regulation. 
Unlike any previous study into earnings forecast disclosure, not only is the 
incidence of disclosure of forecasts analysed but the content of forecasts, and 
disclosures therein, are also examined to assess whether sufficient information is 
disclosed for the investor to understand and appreciate how the forecast is put 
together. 
1.4.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content 
Many US analytical and empirical studies of disclosure of annual earnings 
forecasts have focused on whether managers are motivated to disclose because of 
the news content of the forecasts. Evidence in the US has been mixed. This 
research examines whether good news or bad news is disclosed in the forecasts. 
The hypothesis is tested that managers are motivated to signal good news about 
superior prospects by disclosing profit forecasts. 
1.5 Research methodology 
Previous empirical research into voluntary disclosure can be divided into two 
categories: share price reaction studies and behavioural studies. 
There are several difficulties in studying share price reactions to disclosure of 
profit forecasts. In some instances share prices will not be available due to 
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suspension of the share quotation during the takeover. Shares are suspended at 
the request of the company if there is a possibility of a false market arising from 
imperfect or unequal information available to the market. There is always a 
suspension of shares in the case of a reverse takeover. 
During a takeover, there are so many other events occurring that it may be 
difficult to isolate the share reaction as related specifically to disclosure of the 
forecast. Variability of newspaper coverage when a forecast is disclosed will also 
affect the share price reaction. Some forecasts are never mentioned whereas 
others receive extensive coverage. 
Alternatively, disclosure decisions can be looked at from a behavioural 
perspective. What are the trade-offs that firms, management and professional 
advisors have to make in deciding to voluntarily disclose? 
This research uses a behavioural approach to analyse disclosure and examines 
factors influencing disclosure using qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques. Three different methodologies are used: (i) interviews, (ii) empirical 
analysis of disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts, and (iii) content analysis of 
disclosures in forecasts. 
1.5.1 Interviews 
Eleven comprehensive, in depth interviews were conducted with senior company 
executives and advisors involved in takeovers in this research to elucidate the 
underlying issues and motivations for disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts 
(including content of disclosures in forecasts) by bidders and targets. It was hoped 
that by exploring in advance the issues considered by this research with those 
involved in real life disclosure decisions, the resulting research design would be 
improved and would be more relevant to real world situations. The results of 
these interviews are linked subsequently to the empirical results. 
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1.5.2 Empirical analysis of disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts 
A cross-sectional analysis, comparing attributes of forecast disclosing and 
nondisclosing firms, was carried out. Three levels of variables were tested: 
takeover-context variables, firm-specific variables and forecast-related variables. 
Takeover-context variables include year of the bid, party to the bid (target versus 
bidder), type of bid (contested versus uncontested), purchase consideration 
(paper, cash and mixed (cash and paper)) and bid horizon. 
Variables suggested by signalling theory (such as quality of advising agent and 
news content of forecasts) and variables suggested by agency theory (such as 
financial leverage and managers' ownership share) were tested. Other firm-specific 
variables examined were size and percentage large shareholdings in the firm. 
Three variables were included for control purposes: listing status, industry and 
nationality of firms. 
Takeover documents were examined for disclosure of profit forecasts. A five year 
period from 1988 to 1992 was chosen. The study represents a complete sample 
(every takeover document was examined) of all 701 UK public company takeover 
bids during the five year period studied. A relatively long period is necessary to 
ensure that there are enough profit forecasts to enable meaningful analysis. It was 
expected that a profit forecast would be disclosed in approximately 20% of 
takeover bids. In all, 250 forecasts (out of 701 - 36%) were obtained. 
1.5.3 Content analysis of forecasts 
A comprehensive, descriptive content analysis of disclosures made in profit 
forecasts was carried out. Disclosure in each profit forecast was measured in two 
ways: (i) the number of items disclosed and (ii) the number of assumptions 
disclosed in each forecast were counted. The content analysis is illustrated with 
examples from individual profit forecasts. 
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1.5.4 Statistical analysis 
Various univariate and bivariate statistical tests are described in chapter 4, 
including Mann-Whitney U tests, Spearman correlations and chi-square statistics 
based on crosstabulation analysis. 
Four multivariate techniques are used to analyse the results: logit analysis, OLS 
regression, Poisson regression and negative binomial regression. Logit analysis 
specifically deals with the violation of the assumptions of regression analysis 
arising from dichotomous dependent variables (being disclosure/nondisclosure of 
a forecast in this research). The technique was applied to test a disclosure model 
to find estimates of regression coefficients which maximise the likelihood that the 
pattern of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure would have occurred. 
Poisson and negative binomial regression are two methods of analysing count 
data, such as the number of items and assumptions disclosed in forecasts. These 
were used, in addition to OLS regression, to analysis content of disclosures in 
forecasts. 
Only logit and negative binomial results are reported; OLS and Poisson regression 
results support the negative binomial results and are not reported separately. 
1.6 Regulatory framework and definitions 
The legal system in the UK and Ireland is predominantly a common-law system 
which includes a large body of case law consisting of legal principles evolved 
through decisions of the higher courts over centuries. From a perusal of the 
standard company law texts (Pennington, 1985, for example), it is unclear what 
common-law duties there are requiring directors to disclose information. 
Regulations concerning disclosure generally (and including disclosure of profit 
forecasts) by publicly quoted companies in the UK are contained in the Stock 
Exchange's Admission of Securities to Listing (the `Yellow Book) (International 
Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Limited, 
1995a), the Stock Exchange's `Guidance on the dissemination of price sensitive 
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information' (International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland Limited, 1995b) and `The City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers' (Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 1993). Briefly, the regulations are as 
follows. 
Under the continuing obligations of the listing rules, a company must notify the 
Company Announcements Office of 'any information necessary to enable holders 
of its listed securities and the public to appraise the position of the company and 
avoid the creation of a false market in its listed securities. ' and of 'any major 
new developments in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge... '. 
Further clarification of this obligation is provided by The Stock Exchange which 
has published guidance notes on the dissemination of price sensitive information 
(International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland 
Limited, 1995b). General principle 3 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
requires that 'Shareholders be given sufficient in formation and advice to enable 
them to reach a properly informed decision and must have sufficient time to do 
so. No relevant information should be withheld from them. ' (Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, 1993). 
As most previous research into forecast disclosure has taken place in the US, it is 
appropriate to briefly compare the regulatory environments in the UK and the US. 
Securities regulation is widely regarded to be more relaxed in the UK (Frost, 
1995). The UK is less litigious than the US - class action suits are not allowed; 
lawyers do not generally work on a contingent fees basis and the loser in a legal 
action must reimburse the victor's legal expenses. Consequently, legal and 
regulatory consequences of disclosure or nondisclosure are less serious in the UK 
than in the US. 
Chapter 2 deals with a number of papers that examine corporate disclosures in the 
context of shareholder litigation (Francis, Philbrick and Schipper, 1994; Skinner, 
1994 and 1995). The litigation referred to in these papers arises under SEC rule 
10b-5 which makes it unlawful for managers `to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
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statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not 
misleading. This rule has been used in fraud on the market' lawsuits to sue 
managers who are alleged to have failed to keep investors appraised of material 
earnings information. Managers in the US have a duty to `correct and update' 
previous disclosures if those disclosures become inaccurate, incomplete or 
misleading. 
Because of the more general wording of the Takeover Code's general principle 3, 
and because litigation by shareholders is more difficult than in the US, there seems 
to be a lesser onus on disclosure by management in the UK. 
1.6.1 Regulatory framework: takeovers 
Normally a takeover is the acquisition by one company of the share capital of 
another company by means of cash, or by issuing loan capital, or by issuing 
shares, or a combination of these. 
This research is restricted to takeovers of public companies quoted on the London 
Stock Exchange. These companies may be acquired by the purchase of shares on 
the Stock Exchange or by an offer to all shareholders for all or part of the target's 
share capital. Acquisition of a listed company by the purchase of shares on the 
Stock Exchange is uncommon because of legal regulations, and because the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers requires a compulsory offer once 30% of shares 
are acquired. 
Methods of takeover in the US, where most empirical research has been 
undertaken, are quite different. There are several types of takeovers, including 
mergers, tender offers and proxy contests. In mergers, the bidder negotiates an 
agreement with the management on the terms of the offer for the target, and then 
submits the proposed agreement to a vote of shareholders. In a tender offer, a 
bidder makes an offer directly to shareholders to buy some or all of the stock of 
the target firm. In a proxy contest, a dissident group attempts, through a vote of 
shareholders, to obtain control of the board of directors. 
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For the purpose of this research, it is not necessary to distinguish between the 
terms merger and takeover; the term takeover is used all the time. This is because 
in many instances it is not clear whether one or the other is occurring. 
In the UK, when a bidder intends to make an offer for a company, notice of that 
fact should be communicated to the board of the target company. The target 
company board must immediately inform target shareholdert by press notice 
followed by postal notification. An offer document must be sent to target 
shareholders within 28 days of the announcement of terms of the offer. The board 
of the target company must circulate its views on the offer to its shareholders as 
soon as possible after despatch of the offer document. 
An offer must initially remain open for 21 days after posting the offer document. 
If the offer is revised, it must be kept open for at least 14 days after posting the 
notice of revision of the offer. 
Once the bidder has acquired, or has agreed to acquire, over 50% of the voting 
shares, the offer becomes `unconditional'. Remaining target shareholders must 
within a few days either sell their shares to the bidder or remain as minority 
shareholders in the company. 
Where the board of the target company is supporting the bid, the offer will be a 
recommended offer. If the directors decide to fight the bid any defending circulars 
must be prepared with the same standards of care as if they were offer documents. 
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1.6.2 Regulatory framework: profit forecasts 
A profit forecast may be included in offer or defence documents. If the bid is 
recommended or agreed by the board of the target company, the offer document 
will be prepared jointly by both parties to the bid. The offer document may 
include a profit forecast by the target, by the bidder or by both. If the bid is 
resisted by the board of the target, defence documents may include a profit 
forecast of the target. 
Generally, the rules relating to publication of profit forecasts apply equally to the 
directors of a target company as to the directors of a bidding company. There are 
few legal regulations affecting disclosure of forecasts. The UK Financial Services 
Act, 1986, outlaws fraudulent or reckless forecasts. The Act also contains 
regulations to safeguard against misleading forecasts. 
The Stock Exchange and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers have published 
regulations governing disclosure of profit forecasts in prospectuses and during 
takeovers in the UK (International Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland Limited, 1995a, Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 1993). 
The Stock Exchange 
The Stock Exchange's Admission of Securities to Listing (the `Yellow Book) 
regulates disclosures in prospectuses for new issues of shares and in connection 
with acquisitions, takeovers and mergers. Chapter 12, paragraphs 12.21 to 12.27 
deal with profit forecasts. The Stock Exchange does not require publication of 
profit forecasts, but sets out certain regulations where a forecast is disclosed. 
Any profit forecast or estimate of results published must be reported on by the 
auditors/reporting accountants and the financial advisors to the bid. The principal 
assumptions must be stated - but only those relating to matters outside the control 
of the directors, and which could have materially affected achievement of the 
forecast. Profit `estimates', which relate to a period expired, may only be subject 
to assumptions in exceptional circumstances. Dividend forecasts must be treated 
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as profit forecasts where the issuer has a known policy of relating dividends to 
earnings, or where the dividend forecast otherwise implies a forecast of profit. 
Where a company has made a profit forecast, and subsequently becomes aware 
that the outcome will be materially above or below the forecast figure, a further 
announcement concerning the forecast should be made (International Stock 
Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Limited, 1995b). 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
The inclusion of profit forecasts in documents relating to takeovers is governed by 
the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which applies to takeovers of listed and 
unlisted public companies, but not to private companies. The Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, set up in 1968 by the Bank of England, interprets and enforces the 
Code. 
The provisions of the City Code relating to publication of profit forecasts are set 
out in section K, Rule 28 of the Code. Neither the City Code nor the Panel, with 
one exception, compels directors to make a forecast. Rule 28.6 (b) states that 
profit forecasts made before the commencement of the offer period should be 
reported on. Thus, some forecasts are included involuntarily in takeover 
documents because of rule 28.6 (b). The City Code also insists (Rule 28.6 (c)) 
that figures already published in relation to a current financial period be reported 
on in the same way as a profit forecast. These are called profit `estimates'. 
The City Code makes it clear that sole responsibility for forecasts rests with 
directors. Nonetheless, forecasts must be reported on by independent accountants 
and the company's financial advisors. 
Under the City Code, offers do not have to stay open for more than 21 days from 
the date of posting the offer document. This usually means the defending side has 
10 to 14 days to issue a reply which may include a profit forecast. Thus, forecasts 
made by targets in contested bid situations are usually done under considerable 
time pressure. There is a danger that defending companies may delay their formal 
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forecasts, while urging shareholders not to take action until they have seen them. 
This is contrary to the Code, which requires shareholders to have information in 
good time. 
Rule 28 contains the requirements in relation to profit forecasts. Rule 28.1 
Standards of Care states `There are obvious hazards attached to the forecasting 
of profits; but this should in no way detract from the necessity of maintaining the 
highest standards of accuracy and fair presentation in all communications to 
shareholders in an offer'. 
All forecasts are subject to an accountant's report, with the exception of a forecast 
made by a bidder offering cash only (rule 28.3(a)). The reporting accountants 
must satisfy themselves that the forecast, so far as the accounting policies and 
calculations are concerned, has been properly compiled on the basis of 
assumptions made. Any financial advisor mentioned in the document must also 
report on the forecast. These reports must, under Rule 28.4, appear in the 
document containing the forecast, together with statements of consent from those 
making the reports. 
The City Code also influences the content of forecasts. Under Rule 28.7, when a 
forecast of profit before taxation appears in a document to shareholders, forecasts 
of taxation, extraordinary items and minority interests must be included (where 
these are expected to be significant). In relation to forecast periods where trading 
has commenced, Rule 28.8 requires that previously published profit figures, which 
are available in respect of any expired portion of that trading period, together with 
comparable figures for the preceding year, must be stated. A forecast of dividends 
is not normally considered to be a profit forecast, but will be where accompanied 
by an estimate of dividend cover. 
Rule 28.2 states that any document in which the forecast appears must reproduce 





The term earnings forecast (commonly used in the US) and profit forecast 
(commonly used in the UK) will be used interchangeably in this research. 
Neither the Stock Exchange's `Yellow Book' nor the City Code define the term 
'profit forecast'. If directors make a statement about prospects of the company, 
that projection, even though not quantified, may be deemed a profit forecast if the 
company subsequently becomes involved in a takeover bid. A profit forecast may 
encompass published but unaudited profit figures (usually referred to as a profit 
estimate). Forecasts made with the publication of interim results may be treated as 
profit forecasts, and may have to be reported on if a bid is subsequently made. 
All statements on earnings in takeover documents formally reported on by 
accountants/financial advisors as profit forecasts or profit estimates are treated as 
profit forecasts in this research. 
Contested bid 
Previous UK studies have used various definitions for 'contested' and 'hostile' bids. 
Newbould (1970) and Buckley (1972) classified takeovers and mergers as 
agreed/unopposed, defended (where the directors oppose the bid and recommend 
its rejection to the shareholders of the target company) and competitive (where 
there are rival bidders). Pickering (1978), Holl and Pickering (1988) and Franks 
and Harris (1989) defined a contested bid as one where there were two or more 
bidders for the same target. Limmack (1993) categorised each acquisition into one 
of three categories ('competing', 'contested', 'uncontested') according to whether 
there was evidence of bid resistance or not. Two potential sources of bid 
resistance were identified: 
" Resistance from target company shareholders that necessitated increased offers 
(internal resistance - called 'contested'). 
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" Acquisitions in which a competing bid was received from a third party (called 
`competing' resistance). 
This research adopts the analysis of bids by Acquisitions Monthly which, until 
recently, categorised bids as uncontested, contested (meaning there was bid 
resistance from the target company or a third party) and other bids (white 
knights). Thus, contested bids are defined in this research as bids that were 
initially rejected by target management on first approach by the bidder. Contested 
bids may involve more than one bidder. More recently, Acquisitions Monthly has 
added a new category for bids initially contested by the target but later agreed. 
This category was formerly classed as a contested bid. 
1.7 Costs and benefits of disclosure 
Understanding costs and benefits of disclosure can assist policy makers in the 
wider disclosure regulation debate. This research attempts to understand the costs 
and benefits of disclosure of profit forecasts during takeover bids. But, as Elliot 
and Jacobson (1994) point out, cost-benefit analysis of disclosure is limited in its 
effectiveness by the complexity of social decision making. They add that research 
on costs and benefits of disclosure could be helpful, but recognise that at present 
there are no agreed measures of costs and benefits. 
Benefits 
Information disclosed affects outsiders' perceptions of firms' economic condition 
and future prospects. Lev (1992) comments that undervaluation of shares (arising 
from non-disclosure) can increase cost of capital but may also draw the attention 
of corporate acquirers, causing managers to spend time and resources averting 
takeover. To support his point, Lev uses the takeover battle for Sea Containers (a 
bid included in this study) by multiple bidders as an example and quotes from the 
1989 annual report, `Investors had not perceived that the shipping recession of 
the mid 1980s had passed and the company was entering a period of excellent 
earnings growth'. Lev comments that undervaluation of the company, and the 
consequent costly fight to defend the takeover, could have been avoided by 
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effective and timely communication to investors of the true value of Sea 
Containers and its favourable prospects. Elliot and Jacobson (1994) also identify 
the benefit of lower cost of capital from disclosure although, in practice, this is 
difficult to prove empirically. 
Agency theory postulates that firms' values are permanently depressed by the cost 
of the agency relationship. The magnitude of these costs and consequent 
depression of market values vary considerably across firms, depending on, among 
other things, the costs and difficulties outsiders encounter in evaluating 
(monitoring) managers' performance. A disclosure strategy can not only narrow 
the information gap, but will create shareholder value by decreasing the agency 
costs which depress values. 
Information disclosure can create value in two ways: (i) directly, by narrowing the 
information gap (asymmetry), thereby decreasing investors uncertainty about the 
firm (agency costs); (ii) indirectly, by enhancing value-creating activities through a 
reduced cost of capital and improved suppliers' and customers' terms of trade. 
Costs of disclosure 
Costs of disclosure fall into two categories: 
" Direct costs of processing and disseminating the information. Information 
(such as profit forecasts in this research) may require independent certification 
and validation. These costs are measurable. 
" Indirect costs, including those arising from the impact of disclosures on 
company decisions and activities, those arising from the impact of disclosures 
on competitors or from potential litigation costs arising from disclosure. These 
can be substantial, yet no systematic evidence exists about the magnitude of 
these costs. 
More recent US research has begun to highlight litigation costs as being 
particularly important (Francis, Philbrick and Schipper, 1994; Skinner, 1994 and 
1995; Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). Costs may vary across types of disclosure, 
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particularly potential legal costs, because certain types of disclosure 
(nondisclosure) may provide a more ready basis for law suits than others (Skinner, 
1994). It is questionable whether a "no voluntary disclosure" policy is a safeguard 
against litigation. While firms are under no general affirmative duty to disclose 
material new developments (except for those specifically required by law and 
regulations) they have a duty to update or correct any previous disclosures made, 
if those disclosures become inaccurate, incomplete or misleading. Thus, a strict no 
disclosure policy is no safeguard against litigation. 
Assessing these parameters is difficult. Information disclosure often exerts 
simultaneous and contradictory effects on various shareholder groups and 
constituents. For example, a favourable forecast will generally have a favourable 
effect on capital markets, yet might adversely affect labour negotiations. Cost- 
benefit analysis of disclosure strategy should simultaneously consider the effects 
of disclosure on all the firms' major stakeholders and constituents. 
Costs and benefits of disclosure are considered throughout this thesis. In chapter 
2, analytical models of disclosure consider benefits from the point of view of 
market value of securities, and costs including direct costs and proprietary costs 
of disclosure. The interviews in chapter 5 and appendix 2 also refer frequently to 
cost and benefit issues. That cost and benefit considerations play a major role in 
the decision to disclose is not disputed. However, it has not been possible to 
empirically test the influences of cost and benefit issues on disclosure. 
1.8 Contribution of this research 
The scope, size, extent and depth of this study will provide a large data base of 
information on takeover bids: on firm characteristics of bidders and targets; on 
views of a variety of participants in takeover bids; on disclosure of profit forecasts 
during takeover bids; and on the form and content of a large group of forecasts. 
This data base will provide valuable information and insights both to researchers 
and to firms, advisors and the business community involved in takeover bids. 
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This research will contribute to existing research on voluntary disclosure in a 
number of ways. The research will extend the scope of previous voluntary 
disclosure studies to a new disclosure situation - that of takeover bids. It is hoped 
that this will provide new insights into the managerial incentives involved in 
providing information in specialist settings. The a priori analysis of motivations to 
disclose profit forecasts, set out in paragraph 1.2, is based on the assumption that 
decisions to disclose forecasts are likely to be influenced by a single dominant 
consideration - namely whether disclosure will materially assist forecasters' 
prospects of success. Given a pattern of very rare routine disclosure of profit 
forecasts in the UK, prior research, largely based on routine disclosure, is 
considered unlikely to fully explain motivations to disclose profit forecasts during 
takeover bids. 
There have been few empirical studies of disclosure in UK academic literature. 
Exceptions are Barrett (1976), Choi (1973), Firth (1979,1980,1984), Gray 
(1978) and Gray and Roberts (1989). All these papers have dealt with voluntary 
disclosure in annual financial statements. 
There has been little research in the UK into voluntary disclosure of earnings 
forecasts. All recent UK research has focused more on the accuracy of profit 
forecasts than on the disclosure decision. Voluntary disclosure theories will, for 
the first time in the UK, be applied to voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts. 
Almost all research to date on voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts has been 
conducted in the US in respect of annual earnings forecasts disclosed voluntarily 
by management and reported in, say, The Wall Street Journal. Frost and Pownall 
(1994) document differences in disclosure practices by firms listed in the US and 
in the UK. They comment that some of the differences are surprisingly large, such 
as the much higher incidence of forecast disclosure in the US. In their study, 
management forecasts were released relatively frequently in the US, by both US 
and foreign (non-US/UK) firms, but rarely by UK firms. Forecasts were disclosed 
much less frequently in the UK. Of 114 forecasts disclosed by cross-listed firms, 
only 19 were disclosed by cross-listed UK firms. These results would suggest that 
US research findings cannot be generalised to the UK. 
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Most US studies of forecast disclosure include only point or range forecasts. The 
present research comprises an exhaustive sample of forecasts disclosed during a 
five year period and includes qualitative and upper/lower bounded forecasts, as 
well as point and range forecasts. 
The importance and relevance of signalling theory and agency theory to the 
takeover-related disclosure decision will be assessed. It is expected that these 
theories will not provide good explanations of motivations for disclosure in the 
specialist context of takeover bids. These two theoretical models have tended to 
be empirically tested separately in the literature. Examining the two theories in a 
single study may provide fresh insights into firms' voluntary disclosure decisions. 
This research will for the first time analyse the content of disclosures in profit 
forecasts. Previous research on profit forecasts (mainly US) has limited analysis to 
the decision to disclose or not to disclose. This study extends previous content of 
disclosure studies from annual reports to forecasts. A large data base of examples 
from profit forecasts has been prepared (included in appendix 4). This data base 
will provide useful precedent material for researchers and practitioners. 
Methodology 
This study will extend previous methodology in a number of ways. 
In addition to empirical quantitative research techniques, this research will explore 
in advance, through interviews, the issues to be empirically researched in an effort 
to make the research design as relevant to real life situations as possible. While 
this does not guarantee that the design is ideal, some effort has been made to 
make it as apposite as possible. 
Because the date of takeover bids can be ascertained, bid horizon can be 
measured and compared for forecasters and nonforecasters. Previous research, 
based on routine disclosures, has only been able to measure forecast horizon. As 
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this cannot be calculated for nonforecasters, the horizon for forecasters and 
nonforecasters has not been compared in most prior research. 
Most studies use a single method of analysing deviations from market 
expectations. This research adopts two methods of analysis: (i) analysis of 
differences in number of firms classified between positive and negative deviations 
from market expectations; and (ii) analysis of rankings of differences in deviation 
from market expectations between forecasters and nonforecasters. 
The definition of outcome of bids is extended to include whether the offer price 
increased during the bid, as well as success/failure of bids. In addition, the effect 
of publication of forecasts on outcome of bids is considered for agreed bids, as 
well as contested bids (the normal focus of takeover defence studies). This study, 
unlike others, also considers whether publication of a forecast by bidders makes 
any difference to the outcome of bids. 
Content of disclosures in forecasts are measured by counting items and 
assumptions disclosed. Statistical methods suitable for count data are applied in 
analysing the results. This is the first time such count data methodology has been 
applied in an accounting study. 
1.9 Organisation of the thesis 
This study is organised as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature 
which is dealt with in two parts. The first part summarises the theoretical research 
on disclosure, taken mainly from information economics literature. This literature 
is concerned with developing models to explain the disclosure of information 
where there is information asymmetry - where managers know more about the 
firm than outside investors. Implications of signalling theory and of agency theory 
to the disclosure decision are outlined. 
The second part of chapter 2 deals with the empirical research to date on 
disclosure. Empirical studies are summarised under the five issues addressed by 
the research: 
25 
" Empirical research on voluntary disclosure, including disclosure of forecasts; 
" Empirical research on the effect of prevailing market expectations on 
disclosure of forecasts; 
" Studies of the role of profit forecasts in defending takeover bids; 
" Content analysis studies, mainly of annual reports; 
" Evidence of news content of forecasts. 
As this thesis is concerned primarily with disclosure and forecasts, only directly 
relevant literature on the market for corporate control and on takeovers is 
reviewed. 
Chapter 3 outlines the research questions to be addressed. From these, 34 
hypotheses are developed and justified. 
The population, sample and data collection are described in chapter 4. The 
research methodology used to carry out the study is outlined. The variables to be 
tested are identified, and a detailed operational definition for each variable is then 
developed. The chapter concludes with details of the statistical tests carried out. 
Chapter 5 presents and summarises eleven interviews conducted in support of this 
research. Chapter 6 presents and summarises the results of analysis of 
disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts. Chapter 7 contains the results of a content 
analysis of disclosures in profit forecasts. Chapter 8 summarises the findings and 
discusses possible implications of the research. The limitations of the research and 
some suggestions for future research are also considered. 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research is concerned with the reasons why firms involved in takeover bids 
(whether bidders or targets) disclose profit forecasts during the bid. Existing 
studies are concerned with motivations for disclosure in on-going business 
situations (including periodic management disclosures and in periodic company 
reports). 
Various rationales have been advanced to explain voluntary disclosure. Two 
predominate: signalling theory and agency theory. Both theories provide 
explanations for voluntary disclosure of information by companies. Takeover bids 
provide a setting for analysing agency relationships since the best interests of the 
principal (shareholders) and agent (management of bidders/targets) are often in 
conflict, particularly for target companies. 
Some analysis of agency theory and signalling theory is considered appropriate to 
this research. However, given the specialist setting of takeover bids, these 
theories are unlikely to provide full explanations of motivations for disclosure of 
profit forecasts. The takeover context is one in which, intuitively, one would posit 
that the dominant motive for disclosure is to enhance the bidder's prospect of 
acquiring the target, or to enhance the target's prospect of resisting the bid or of 
increasing the offer price. 
It is possible that firms modify their disclosure behaviour during a takeover. Firms 
that do not normally disclose information may do so during a takeover bid. 
Alternatively, firms with a pattern of extensive disclosure may rely on previous 
disclosures (thus the market knows enough about the firm) and may not make any 
additional disclosure at the time of a takeover bid. A company in the habit of 
disclosing profit forecasts may be more vulnerable to a bid, as such a company 
would find it difficult to make a more optimistic forecast at the time of a bid. 
In addition to agency and signalling explanations for voluntary disclosure, there is 
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a large body of research contained in information economics literature which 
attempts to explain voluntary disclosure using analytical models. Most of these 
models do not currently provide easy theoretical bases from which testable 
empirical research hypotheses can be developed. Nonetheless, these analytical 
models, while describing overly simplistic scenarios not reflected in the real 
world, provide useful insights into some of the factors that might influence 
management in deciding whether or not to disclose. 
Consequently this chapter begins with a brief summary of information economics 
literature relevant to voluntary disclosure decision-making. This is followed by a 
review of agency theory and of empirical research into voluntary disclosure 
applying agency theory. A review of signalling theory follows, including relevant 
empirical signalling research. 
Takeover literature and the literature on the market for corporate control is not 
reviewed, except to the extent that such research is directly relevant to the thesis. 
The main body of empirical research is reviewed under five headings derived from 
the five research issues considered by this study and outlined in chapter 1. This 
chapter reviews the literature on disclosure; on disclosure of forecasts; on the 
influence of market expectations on disclosure of forecasts; on takeover defence 
strategies; on content of disclosures in forecasts; and on news content of 
forecasts. 
2.1 Analytical models of disclosure 
Various theories exist to explain management disclosure choices in terms of 
social, economic, behavioural and/or technological factors. These theories are not 
mutually exclusive. 
Economic theory suggests that, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, firms will 
disclose information to the extent that marginal benefits will be equal to the costs 
of disclosure. Much of the literature has shown that benefits of disclosure can 
outweigh the costs. The main benefit of disclosure is enhancement of firm value in 
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terms of increased share price. Additional direct and indirect costs arise from 
disclosure. Disclosure may lead to risk of claims from employees, trade unions 
and taxation authorities. Likely indirect costs of disclosure could include the 
provision of proprietary, price-sensitive information to competitors or, 
alternatively, encouragement of a new entrant to an industry. For example, if the 
news is bad the firm may wish to avoid the consequent adverse market reaction, 
but there is also the potential benefit of disclosing bad news as a means of 
discouraging entry to the market by competitors. Thus, voluntary release of 
proprietary information is seen as a strategic decision and must take into account 
the likely reaction of other players. Such direct and indirect costs may be lower in 
the case of large firms. 
2.1.1 Voluntary disclosure models 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of analytical models of voluntary disclosure. 
Full disclosure of private information based on adverse selection arguments 
Early literature on voluntary disclosure, where the firm is only concerned with its 
market price, shows (contrary to observed practice) that there is sequential 
disclosure with full equilibrium (Akerlof, 1970; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). 
If there are no costs associated with disclosure, a manager is always forced to 
disclose what he knows; otherwise external parties anticipate the worst. These 
models assume that the information is common knowledge and that external 
parties are rational. 
Akerlofs (1970) paper was one of the first to investigate the economics of 
unevenly distributed information. He showed how markets break down when 
potential buyers cannot verify the quality of the product they are offered, using 
the used car market as an example. In the market for goods and services, sellers 
adopt a policy of full disclosure because, in the absence of information, buyers 
will assume the least favourable belief possible. Problems of 'adverse selection' 
(or, as Akerlof has called it, the 'market for lemons' problem) arise if there is no 
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same price. If sellers of good quality items cannot distinguish themselves from 
sellers of low quality items, then low quality sellers will tend to hide their quality. 
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) conclude that the possessor of superior 
information is always obliged to follow full disclosure. Grossman (1981) shows 
that the information asymmetry problem can be alleviated somewhat if the seller is 
able to offer some kind of guarantee to the buyer as an indicator of the quality of 
the goods offered. He considers the role of warranties and suggests that 
guarantees against breakdown can serve as a substitute for guarantees regarding 
quality. Milgrom (1981) introduces a notion of 'favourableness' of news and 
applies it to four simple models which show (inner alia) that the arrival of good 
news about a firm's prospects always causes the share price to rise. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) develop a model based on limit pricing. An 
established firm may be able to influence, through its pricing policy, other firms' 
perceptions of the profitability of entering the firm's markets. A firm may thus set 
its prices below the short run maximisation levels in order to deter entry. Potential 
entrants allow for limit pricing in making entry decisions. Thus, in equilibrium, 
established firms practice limit pricing, but entrants are not fooled by this strategy. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) give an account of the 'lemon-like' properties of 
common stock financing under conditions of asymmetry of information to explain 
why, in practice, share prices generally fall after an issue. They consider a firm 
that must issue common stock to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment 
opportunity. Management is assumed to know more (information asymmetry) 
about the firm's value than potential investors. If management know that the value 
of assets is greater than the market capitalisation (because the inside information 
is so favourable), acting in the interests of existing shareholders, management will 
refuse to issue shares even if it means passing up good investment opportunities, 
because the cost to existing shareholders of issuing shares at bargain prices may 
outweigh the project's net present value. If the firm decides not to issue and not to 
invest, then real capital investment is misallocated and firm value reduced. This 
explains why firms might want to have sufficient resources available (raised before 
information arises) so that all investments can be financed internally. 
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Disclosure models including exogenous proprietary costs 
Earlier models of full disclosure equilibrium are not supported by empirical 
evidence. Later articles introduce exogenous disclosure costs into the voluntary 
disclosure model to show that there is never a full disclosure equilibrium and, 
more consistent with actual disclosure practice, there exists partial disclosure 
equilibrium with only favourable information being disclosed. For very high 
exogenous disclosure costs this extends to a nondisclosure equilibrium. 
Verrecchia (1983) developed a model of discretionary disclosure in which 
exogenous disclosure costs are imposed on the firm if competitors, dissident 
shareholders or employees can use the information in a way that harms the firm's 
prospects. Proprietary costs of disclosure increase the range of interpretations 
which can be drawn by investors and others from a decision by a manager not to 
disclose information. There is no longer an unambiguous implication that 
information withheld is unfavourable. The introduction of exogenous disclosure 
costs and gains creates uncertainty as to whether the firm withholding information 
has observed a signal that it prefers to disclose, but disclosure costs are too high, 
or has observed a signal that it wishes to keep private. The existence of a 
proprietary cost has the significance that the rational expectations trader does not 
know whether the information is withheld because it is bad news, or because it is 
good news but not sufficiently good news to warrant incurring the proprietary 
cost. 
The model suggests that as proprietary costs increase, so does the threshold level 
of disclosure. This is because the range of possible favourable interpretations of 
withheld information increases, thereby allowing the manager greater discretion. 
Dye (1986) presents a theory of disclosure which takes into account both 
proprietary and nonproprietary information and which explains selective 
disclosure of management's information. Most previous research concluded that 
full disclosure is optimal. These studies only included nonproprietary information. 
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Dye shows that when managers are endowed with both proprietary and 
nonproprietary information nondisclosure or partial disclosure may be optimal. 
Verrecchia (1990a) shows how a change in quality of information received by a 
manager affects the manager's threshold level and probability of disclosure. 
Previous research dealt with the relation between the manager's incentives to 
disclose and the realisation of the manager's private signal (e. g. whether the 
information is good or bad news) and not the quality of the signal per se. 
Information of higher quality implies more disclosure, holding realisations fixed. A 
manager's incentive to disclose or withhold is motivated in part by the market's 
expectations in the absence of information. As the quality of information 
increases, the market exerts more pressure on the manager to disclose the 
information. This induces the manager to reduce the threshold level of disclosure 
below the one he adopts when the information is of lower quality. 
Reaction of external parties to disclosure 
Other discretionary disclosure theories suggest that a manager's decision to 
voluntarily disclose information is influenced by how external parties without 
access to information (e. g. competitors, shareholders, potential takeover 
specialists) would interpret its absence. 
Dye (1985) notes that the existence of private information is uncertain from the 
perspective of external parties. This uncertainty provides the 'noise' that supports 
the withholding of information in the same fashion that the existence of 
proprietary costs provides 'noise'. Dye (1985) puts forward two suggestions 
(which he calls the `disclosure principle' and the `revelation principle) why 
management might withhold information which is nonproprietary. 
The disclosure principle is based on the argument of adverse selection. 
Shareholders prefer managers to adopt policies that increase the current value of 
their shares. Shareholders will encourage managers to suppress information which 
is unfavourable to the firm's value. But if investors know that managers have 
information which has not been released, they will infer that the current market 
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price overstates the firm's value, based on the (unfavourable) information withheld 
and will revise downward demand for the shares and consequently market price. 
Thus, a manager is encouraged to disclose information to distinguish it from the 
worst information he could possibly have. Managers disclose all of their 
nonproprietary information, good or bad, to prevent the price of the firm's shares 
from plummeting. 
The revelation principle explains the construction of accounting-based contracts 
and states that any contract can be written in such a way that induces full 
revelation of all private information held by the parties to it, without affecting the 
payments they receive. However, it gives rise to a major anomaly when applied to 
voluntary disclosure since it implies that full disclosure is always compatible with 
optimal resource allocation. This model does not explain the nondisclosure of 
information, such as annual forecasts, which investors know that managers 
possess. 
Jung and Kwon (1988) extend Dye's (1985) model to allow, in the absence of 
disclosure, outside investors to revise their probabilities that managers have 
received no private information. Their model enables more general results than 
Dye (1985). If investors believe that the likelihood of managers receiving 
information increases as time elapses then, on average, unfavourable (favourable) 
news is contained in late (early) announcements. They also show that investors' 
information acquisition from independent sources may trigger the release of 
information that would otherwise be withheld by managers. 
Dontoh (1990) provides explanations for seemingly anomalous behaviour 
whereby firms voluntarily disclose unfavourable information that results in 
significant market price declines. This contradicts previous models which suggest 
that firms voluntarily disclose information only when the disclosure is expected to 
have a positive effect on share price. Dontoh considers that this is due to the 
restrictive assumption that firms' objectives are to maximise current stock price 
rather than current cash flow (expected future market value). By allowing for the 
possibility that firms may choose to maximise either expected current stock price 
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or expected future market value (cash flow), Dontoh demonstrates the existence 
of a voluntary disclosure equilibrium where firms voluntarily disclose 
unfavourable and favourable information. 
Dontoh's model suggests that the likelihood of observing a favourable or 
unfavourable earnings forecast depends on the distribution of firm types and the 
level of endogenous and exogenous proprietary costs and gains associated with 
disclosure. The level of endogenous disclosure costs and gains depends on the 
extent of intra-industry information transfers and resulting reactions of firm's 
competitors. The nature of information disclosed depends on the distribution of 
firm types. 
Darrough and Stoughton (1990) develop a model of proprietary information 
which, if disclosed, provides strategic information to potential competitors but can 
be helpful to the financial market in valuing the firm more accurately. A firm with 
favourable information wants to disclose it to raise its market valuation but 
otherwise does not want to make it known to a potential market entrant. A firm 
with unfavourable information would rather not disclose it to the financial market 
but may wish to communicate it to the potential entrant to discourage entry. The 
financial market has rational expectations, taking into account its conjecture on 
the firm's incentives to disclose and the entrant's reaction in the product market. A 
firm may voluntarily disclose unfavourable information to discourage entry, yet 
the financial markets react positively. 
An implication of Darrough and Stoughton's model is that competition through 
threat of entry encourages voluntary disclosure. Verrecchia (1983), however, 
suggested the opposite. More disclosure takes place in less competitive industries 
(because proprietary costs are lower); alternatively, product market competition 
may provide disincentives for voluntary disclosure. Darrough and Stoughton's 
model predicts that competition encourages full disclosure. This apparent 
contradiction may be because Verrecchia might have based his conclusion on 
proprietary disclosure being greater in more competitive situations and that 
competition discourages voluntary disclosure in a market where competitors have 
37 
already entered. Darrough and Stoughton's model only considers pre-entry 
competition. 
Verrecchia (1990b) comments that the possibility of full disclosure is never 
eliminated from Darrough and Stoughton's (1990) model which is at odds with 
the fact that we constantly observe delays and withholdings in the dissemination 
of information. Also, according to Verrecchia, the entry game gives exaggerated 
benefit to bad news in two ways. It exaggerates the usefulness of bad news as a 
signal to discourage market entrants, and it exaggerates the positive effect of bad 
news by ignoring the costs to managers associated with attempts to terminate 
their tenure in the wake of bad news, in the form of hostile takeovers or, 
internally, in the form of shareholder approval. 
Wagenhofer (1990) analyses disclosure strategies which are valuable to both the 
financial market and an opponent. He includes reactions of competitors to 
disclosure which mainly results in partial disclosure equilibrium. In his models he 
also tries to explain observed practice of disclosure of bad news in certain 
circumstances. 
Disclosure is a trade-off between two forces: (i) proprietary cost of an opponent's 
adverse action in response to favourable information and (ii) high market price 
which can be induced by disclosing favourable information. A firm is better off not 
disclosing information until the information is sufficiently favourable so that the 
market price outweighs the proprietary costs. Introducing proprietary costs that 
depend on a strategic action chosen by an opponent may nonetheless result in full 
disclosure equilibrium. The driving force behind this is sceptical beliefs held by the 
opponent and the market. There never exists a nondisclosure equilibrium. 
Teoh and Hwang (1991) claim to enhance existing models by including 
'scepticism of an excessive desire to impart information'. They interpret an over- 
enthusiasm for publication of good news as a possible indicator of the likelihood 
of little further good news in the future. Based on this premise, their model 
suggests that firms may have a preference to withhold favourable, nonproprietary 
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information and disclose bad news voluntarily. Teoh and Hwang's model differs 
from previous models in explaining some empirical observations, such as why 
firms withhold favourable information for no apparent reason. 
Newman and Sansing (1993) consider the reaction of competitors to disclosure 
using 'cheap talk models in which disclosures are no longer constrained to be 
truthful. Their model shows that managers will at times be deliberately inexact in 
their disclosures. 
A key assumption in Gigler's (1994) model is that firms wish to mislead capital 
markets and, consequently, credibility of disclosures is an issue. Disclosures to 
capital markets or competitors cannot be credible. Trading-off the benefits of 
disclosure to capital markets against the proprietary costs of disclosure to 
competitors can make the firm's equilibrium disclosures believable and 
informative to both groups. Gigler shows that proprietary costs provide the 
impetus for disclosure by supplying credibility to unaudited disclosures. 
Dye and Sridhar (1995) develop a model that attempts to explain the `herding' 
behaviour of firms where disclosures by some firms seem to provoke other firms 
to make related disclosures. Managers are assumed to make value-maximising 
disclosures rather than be concerned with product market, proprietary 
considerations. The model shows that the probability that firms will disclose 
information increases as more firms receive the information. 
Models including private information acquisition 
Diamond (1985) develops a model of voluntary disclosure which shows that in 
many circumstances the voluntary release of public information makes all traders 
better off. This occurs because some traders would acquire costly private 
information in the absence of public disclosure. Disclosure is shown to drive out 
private information acquisition. Assuming that the information production cost to 
the firm is no greater than that faced by traders, the optimal policy is to release the 
smallest amount of information which will eliminate private acquisition. The value 
of public release is that it homogenises information and eliminates use of 
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resources to produce private information. All traders are made better off. There 
are two components to the beneficial release of public information to investors. 
Savings of real resources can be made which would be devoted to private 
information acquisition if public information were not released. Secondly, 
improvement in risk-sharing occurs because public information makes traders' 
beliefs more homogeneous and reduces the magnitude of speculative positions 
which informed traders take. 
Bushman (1991) develops a model which, in contrast to Diamond (1985), shows 
that the value of public disclosure to traders varies with the structure of the 
private information market. Whereas Diamond shows that traders unanimously 
demand public release of information, Bushman demonstrates that, in certain 
circumstances, such disclosure can generate adverse risk-sharing effects that 
reduce traders' expected utility overall. 
Alles and Lundholm (1993) show how traders' welfare will change in response to 
public information, taking into account both the direct effect of the public signal 
and its indirect effect due to the change in private information acquisition. They 
show that uninformed traders do not necessarily prefer to use public signals to 
eliminate incentives to acquire information. Uninformed traders prefer this 
solution only when they are in the minority - the loss in risk-sharing opportunities 
that accompany the public signal outweighs the benefit of informational parity. By 
resolving uncertainty prior to the opening of speculative markets, the public signal 
reduces the opportunities to share risk. 
Other models 
Indjejikian (1991) examines how investor ability or sophistication in interpreting 
accounting information affects firm disclosure decisions. These interpretation 
costs are generally not recognised in the theoretical literature, where typically an 
information disclosure is represented as a common information signal costlessly 
observed by all. The analysis suggests that firm disclosure, in conjunction with 
investors' interpretation of the information, can give rise to risk-sharing benefits 
which exceed the costs attributed to a reduction in the level of market-wide 
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consensus. It is shown that less sophisticated investors benefit from better quality 
disclosure. Unsophisticated investors, facing higher costs of information 
interpretation, place greater reliance on common information sources (e. g. prices) 
which implies diminished opportunities for risk-sharing since there will be greater 
market-wide consensus. Increasing the quality of firm disclosure, to the extent 
that it triggers greater private interpretation of the information, implies greater 
reliance on personal sources of information thereby decreasing market-wide 
consensus and potentially improving investor welfare. 
Concluding comments 
Analytical models of disclosure are useful in improving our understanding of costs 
and benefits of disclosure. These models depend on basic assumptions resulting in 
a rather simplistic depiction of the world. For example, theoretical models usually 
involve an individual decision maker. In practice the decision to disclose is made 
by a board of directors or by a group of managers, with input from advisors. The 
interviews in chapter 5 and appendix 2 emphasise that a major cost of disclosure 
is lost reputation if the forecast is wrong. Theoretical models have not included 
these costs and generally consider single period costs and benefits rather than long 
run effects of lost reputation. 
2.2 Signalling theory 
The analytical and empirical literature on signalling theory is summarised in table 
2.2. The signalling literature posits that entrepreneurs of high-quality firms can 
credibly communicate their private information to investors and thereby receive 
above-average market valuation by undertaking actions that lower quality firms 
find too costly to mimic. Managers of higher quality firms have incentives to 
signal to the market their higher quality to distinguish themselves from average or 
lower quality firms. One form of signalling is voluntary disclosure about a firm's 
operations. 
Spence (1974) first introduced the idea that if there is some activity whose 
marginal cost is lower for sellers of a high quality product, those sellers will 
'signal' that they have a superior product by selecting a higher level of the 
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signalling activity. The assumption that the cost of signalling be smaller for those 
with higher quality goods is crucial. 
Stock prices tend to decline on issuing new securities. Leland and Pyle (1977) 
attribute this to the moral hazard problem that managers know more than 
outsiders. Firm management, which is better informed than investors, must 
convince potential investors that it is not selling shares because it knows the price 
is too high. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) consider an entrepreneur seeking additional equity 
financing for a single project. An entrepreneur's willingness to invest in his own 
project is shown to serve as a signal of project quality. The entrepreneur knows 
the project's rate of return but investors do not. Outsiders observe the fraction of 
the entrepreneur's personal wealth committed to the project and set their valuation 
accordingly. The percentage ownership retained serves as a credible signal of firm 
value because it forces entrepreneurs to forego diversification of their portfolios. 
Entrepreneurs normally prefer to spread their risk by selling their shares. 
Signalling is shown to incur welfare costs by inducing entrepreneurs to take larger 
equity proportions in their own firms than they would if information was directly 
transferred. Entrepreneurs of higher quality firms can afford to retain a larger 
proportion of the firm because they can expect compensation for the increased 
risk. 
Bhattacharya and Ritter's (1983) model is based on one set of competing firms 
engaged in research and development activity which involves raising external 
capital in the market. A firm with superior information decides on the level of 
disclosure, taking into account the impact on the market and on rivals' success 
probability in the research and development race. The only way the informed firm 
can communicate its prospects to capital markets is through the disclosure of 
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therefore faces a trade-off between reducing the value of its informational 
advantage and raising finance at better terms that reflect its innovation prospects, 
thus reducing the dilution for existing shareholders who own the research and 
development technology. 
Hughes (1986) extends Leland and Pyle (1977) by considering a setting in which 
an entrepreneur discloses two signals: percentage retained ownership and direct 
disclosure about expected future cash flow. Higher levels of ownership retention 
signal a willingness on the part of risk-averse entrepreneurs to invest a 
disproportionate share of wealth in the firm. The entrepreneur is able to credibly 
disclose information about expected future cash flow because of the assumed 
penalty whereby the proceeds received in the offering are refunded back to 
investors if the direct disclosure is found not to have been made in good faith. The 
two signals are related through their cost structures and are chosen 
simultaneously to minimise the cost of signalling firm value. 
Titman and Trueman (1986) argue that the quality of advising agent chosen by 
the entrepreneur when going public also provides information about the value of 
the firm to investors. An owner with more favourable information will be willing 
to pay the (presumably higher) fee of a high quality advisor. 
Signalling superior management quality 
Trueman (1986) develops a model to explain the disclosure of bad as well as 
good news forecasts. He hypothesises that the act of forecast release itself may 
also provide a positive signal to the market about the firm's value. He argues that 
the firm's value at the end of any period will be a function of investors' 
perceptions about the ability of management to anticipate future changes in the 
firm's economic environment and to choose the firm's optimal production level 
accordingly. Since investors cannot directly observe their ability, managers have 
an incentive to disclose updated earnings forecasts as soon as they observe the 
change. The sooner an earnings forecast is released the more favourably will 
investors be able to assess the manager's ability to recognise changes in the firm's 
economic environment as they arise. Thus, the manager's incentive comes from 
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his desire to inform investors that he has observed changes in the firm's economic 
environment which have caused him to change his expectation of earnings. He 
releases a forecast to signal to investors his ability to anticipate future changes. 
This implies that the end of period market value of the firm will be higher if a 
forecast is released regardless of whether it discloses good news or bad. Trueman 
made two empirical predictions from his model. Forecast release is more likely in 
firms with low competitive costs of disclosure (firms in monopoly positions or 
with a very large share of their product markets; firms where competitors have 
very little excess capacity; capital intensive firms requiring a relatively long time 
to adjust production). Forecast release is also more likely in firms in which there 
is a greater ability to change input levels in response to new information (those 
with unused capacity; those that are labour intensive (relative ease of changing 
amount of labour compared to amount of machinery)). 
2.2.1 Empirical studies of signalling theory 
Boyle (1989), among others, argues that `... attempting to provide an empirical 
base for signalling models is a very challenging task... '. Relationships that have 
been obtained in theoretical signalling models `... are subtle and complex.. difficult 
to test empirically since the combination of signals used will vary in relation to 
their relative costs'. 
Downes and Heinkel (1982) provide empirical support for Leland and Pyle's 
(1977) model and the role of retained ownership as a signal of value. Previous 
research has examined the importance of the reputational signalling of advisors 
(Simunic and Stein, 1987; Beatty, 1989; Balvers, McDonald and Miller, 1988; 
Keasey and McGuinness, 1991; Feltham, Hughes and Simunic, 1991; Firth and 
Smith, 1992; Holland and Horton, 1993, How, Izan and Monroe, 1995). Simunic 
and Stein (1987) found that firms associated with higher reputation (big-eight) 
auditors were able to get higher premiums over book value for initial public 
offering firms compared with other auditing firms. Beatty (1989) and Balvers, 
McDonald and Miller (1988) contend that underpricing is a function of ex ante 
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uncertainty about the value of the issue. Engaging a reputable auditor helps 
reduce this uncertainty. 
Menon and Williams (1991) found, consistent with their auditor credibility 
hypothesis (that the credibility of financial statements, in part, depends on the 
perceived quality of the audit), that firms switching auditors prior to initial public 
offerings leads to small auditors being replaced by larger, better reputed ones. 
Keasey and McGuinness (1991) examine, from the perspective of signalling 
theory, the influence of disclosure of forecasts on the pricing of new issue of 
shares of companies seeking a listing on the Unlisted Securities Market. The act 
of disclosure is hypothesised to result in more favourable pricing of shares. 
Results confirm that disclosure of forecasts affect the offer price at flotation. A 
significant relationship is found between forecast disclosure and share price once 
active trading after placement commenced. Thus, the greater the information 
revealed by the forecasts the greater the increase in traded prices above the initial 
offer price. Results also show that the initial pricing of new issues is not 
significantly related to the signalling variables, retained owners' equity or advising 
agent. 
Feltham, Hughes and Simunic (1991) argue that financial reports attested by 
higher quality auditors should have greater marginal effect on current market value 
than the audited reports of lower quality auditors. They found no support for their 
hypothesis. 
Firth and Smith (1992) examine forecast accuracy during initial public offerings 
against a number of variables, including auditor. They hypothesise that big-eight 
auditors are retained to add credibility to the new issue and will be associated 
with increased forecast accuracy. They found no support for their hypothesis. 
Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1992) examine the role played by two 
signalling devices: percentage retained ownership and direct disclosure in the 
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valuation of initial public offerings in Canada. They found that value is increasing 
in both the percentage of retained ownership and the direct disclosure signal. 
Holland and Horton (1993) test the effect of auditor choice and of financial 
advisors on the level of discount on initial public offerings. They found a 
significant relationship between level of discount and quality of audit firm 
employed. Higher quality audit firms were associated with lower levels of 
discount. No significant relationship was found between quality of financial 
advisor and level of discount. 
How, Izan and Monroe (1995) test the reputation of advisors to the preparation 
of IPO prospectuses, as a proxy for quality of information available to investors. 
Firms with higher reputation underwriters were less underpriced. There was 
evidence of a negative relation between underpricing and reputation of reporting 
accountant but this finding was not significant. 
To signal management's planning ability (Trueman's model) 
Pownall and Waymire (1989) test Trueman's (1986) hypothesis that the act of 
voluntary disclosure conveys favourable information for securities prices. If the 
act of disclosure conveys favourable information for prices, systematic mean shifts 
in returns should be positive. The evidence does not support Trueman's 
hypothesis. Pownall and Waymire (1989) found that it is the forecast itself and 
not the voluntary disclosure that has information content. 
2.3 Agency theory 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that a positive theory for determining 
accounting standards be developed. To develop such a theory it is necessary to 
know why firms choose accounting policies rather than what policies they 
`should' adopt. Agency theory provides the basis for the economic incentives 
approach to accounting policy choice. This research is summarised in table 2.3. 
Agency theory explains managerial motives in firms where ownership of the firm 
is separated from the control function which is carried out by managers acting on 
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behalf of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) developed 
models of the firm as a'nexus of contracts' between suppliers of various factors of 
production with each factor motivated by self-interest. They define an agency 
relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to 
the relationship are utility maximisers, there is good reason to believe that the 
agent does not always act in the best interests of the principal. 
As the amount of outside equity increases agency costs will increase. The agency 
cost of debt will similarly rise as the amount of outside financing increases. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) assert that, as managers' ownership share falls, outside 
shareholders have increased incentives to expend resources to monitor managers' 
behaviour. 
Fama (1980) shows how the separation of ownership and control can be 
explained as an efficient form of economic organisation with a 'set of contracts' 
perspective. The primary disciplining of managers comes from managerial labour 
markets with assistance from a panoply of internal and external monitoring 
devices to stimulate ongoing efficiency, and with the market for outside takeovers 
providing discipline of last resort. 
In most agency relationships, the principal and agent incur monitoring and 
bonding costs. A principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing 
appropriate incentives for the agent, and by incurring monitoring costs designed 
to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. These include auditing, formal control 
systems, budget restrictions and establishing incentive compensation systems 
which serve to more closely identify managers' interests with those of outside 
equity holders. In addition, in some situations it will pay the agent to expend 
resources (bonding costs) to guarantee he will not take certain actions which 
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Expenditure on monitoring can reduce agency costs. The higher the level of 
agency costs the greater the incentive for managers to employ monitoring. 
Managers incur expenditure on one or more monitoring devices such as 
publication of accounting reports, appointment of outside directors and listing 
requirements of stock exchanges (more stringent stock exchanges attract listing 
from firms that value monitoring). Firm disclosures can serve as a monitoring 
mechanism for the agency relationship between managers and shareholders. It is 
in the interest of managers to produce accounting information voluntarily, which 
they can do at a lower cost than if shareholders were to produce the same 
information. Thus, agency theory posits that voluntary disclosure is made to 
reduce agency costs. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) first introduced the notion of positive accounting 
theory to explain accounting practices in terms of managements' voluntary 
choices of accounting procedures. Following agency theory and considerations of 
the conflict between management and shareholders, they argue that managers will 
make accounting choices which increase management wealth. This happens 
through increase in share price (which increases the value of managements' shares 
and stock options) and via incentive cash bonuses. Choice of accounting method 
is hypothesised to increase both of these forms of compensation, directly via 
management compensation plans, and indirectly through taxes, regulatory 
procedures (if the firm is regulated), political costs and information production 
costs. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) predict that size (as a proxy for political costs), 
existence of management compensation plans, tax effects, and whether or not the 
firm was regulated would be related to the lobbying position of firms making 
submissions about inflation accounting. Only size is significant. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) develop their views on the contracting role of 
accounting in monitoring the contract between shareholders and managers and 
between shareholders, debtholders and managers. They review the research on the 
relationship between accounting and compensation plans, debt contracts and the 
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political process. An update on the economics of accounting policy choice from a 
costly contracting perspective is provided in Ball and Smith (1992). 
This research is concerned with the accounting choice to make voluntary 
disclosure. The costly contracting/agency literature referred to in the rest of this 
chapter relates to voluntary accounting disclosure choices. 
2.3.1 Empirical studies of agency theory 
Empirical studies of agency theory have all employed a'derived demand' approach 
in which costs of information disclosure are assumed to be cross-sectionally 
constant, and the disclosure decision is modelled as a response to demand arising 
from increasing agency costs. 
Many studies have hypothesised that firms' voluntary accounting and disclosure 
choices are aimed at controlling interest conflicts amongst shareholders, debt 
holders and management (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Kelly, 1983; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986). Agency theory suggests several variables for explaining 
cross-sectional variation in voluntary accounting and -disclosure choices. 
Managers choose a monitoring package that depends on the costs and benefits of 
the various monitoring devices. Benefits of monitoring depend on items such as 
the asset structure of the firm (e. g. assets in place versus growth opportunities) 
and composition of financial claims (e. g. inside versus outside capital). Firm size, 
financial leverage and proportion of assets in place have been hypothesised to 
affect voluntary financial disclosure by influencing the magnitude of agency costs. 
Salamon and Dhaliwal (1980) examine voluntary segmental disclosure by a group 
of low disclosure firms against a high disclosure group. Following Jensen and 
Meckling's agency theory, they hypothesise that increased disclosure results in a 
reduction of a firm's cost of capital and that voluntary segmental disclosure will be 
related to size and to the extent of public capital issued by the firm. If small firms 
rely less extensively on public capital, then they will have less disclosure than 
large firms. Both size and new capital issues were found to be significantly related 
to voluntary segmental disclosure. 
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Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) investigate managers' incentives to 
provide interim reports voluntarily and, in particular, why managers choose a 
particular reporting frequency for external purposes. The paper explores whether 
the monitoring process associated with issuing capital to parties outside the firm 
can explain why managers exceed minimum reporting requirements, and whether 
the variation is related to variables suggested by agency theory. Results were 
weak. 
Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) investigate the voluntary lease disclosure 
practices of 649 Australian listed companies. Relative frequency of voluntary 
disclosure was found to be related to industry type, firm size, whether the lessee 
was a subsidiary of a foreign parent company and was weakly related to whether 
the lessee entered the Australian Institute of Management good reporting award. 
Frequency of voluntary reporting was unrelated to identity of auditors, existence 
of profit-related bonus schemes and the relative risk of the firm. The multivariate 
tests supported univariate results but overall explanatory power was weak. 
Inclusion of additional variables such as existence of bonus schemes and relative 
risk (as a surrogate for earnings variability) were found to be insignificant. The 
model thus had low explanatory power and the test for predictive ability was only 
marginally significant. 
Verrecchia (1983) argues that, if proprietary costs are relatively homogeneous 
within specific industry groups, then focusing on a specific industry group 
represents a more powerful test of the agency-cost framework. The insights 
developed by Verrecchia are important in developing a robust empirical test of 
agency-based models of information disclosure policy. For example, Bazley, 
Brown and Izan (1985) included industry as an explanatory variable but when 
they found that it was significant they are unable to explain why. If proprietary 
costs are industry specific, the industry effect found is consistent with managers 
facing a trade-off between firm specific agency costs, which act as an incentive to 
disclose information, and industry specific proprietary costs, which tend to 
discourage disclosure of information. 
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Whittred (1987) investigates the economic incentives for Australian corporations 
to voluntarily adopt consolidated forms of financial reporting, following Watts' 
(1977) argument that consolidated accounting is adopted to reduce agency costs. 
Whittred predicts that the presence of cross-guarantees, the smaller the 
managements' share of the equity and the greater the number of subsidiaries, the 
greater the likelihood of consolidation. The likelihood of consolidation was found 
to be a function of the presence of cross-guarantees, managements' share of 
firms' equity and the number and type of subsidiaries. The evidence therefore 
supports the agency cost theory. 
In an attempt to relate political incentives facing managers to their choice of 
accounting procedures, Wong (1988) examines whether New Zealand listed 
companies' voluntary disclosure of current cost financial statements is a product 
of the political process. He predicts that larger companies with higher tax rates, 
lower leverage ratios, larger market concentration ratios, higher historical return 
on assets and higher capital intensity are more likely to voluntarily disclose 
current cost financial statements. Leverage is included by Wong, not as a proxy 
for debt contracting costs, but because only firms with low leverage ratios are 
hypothesised to use current cost accounting to influence tax reform. Higher tax 
rates, lower leverage ratios, larger market concentration and greater capital 
intensity were found to be significant. 
Deegan and Hallam (1991) hypothesise that value added statements have been 
developed and are used as a technique to assist in the reduction of political costs. 
They test variables proxying for political costs. The results indicate that, 
compared with a randomly selected group, firms preparing value added 
statements are larger (in terms of size and concentration), more capital intensive, 
more heavily taxed, and are more likely to come from manufacturing and 
agriculture. 
Bradbury (1992a) found no association between voluntary disclosure of interim 
earnings and either earnings volatility or firm size. Firms with larger annual 
forecast errors disclosed more nonquantified interim earnings results. 
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Bradbury (1992b) examines voluntary segmental disclosures of 29 large New 
Zealand companies. Five firm-specific variables are tested. Only size and leverage 
were found to be significant. Earnings volatility was significant in the opposite 
direction to that hypothesised. Thus, firms with higher earnings volatility were 
found to disclose more. In multivariate tests, only size and leverage were 
significant. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992) apply Verrecchia's (1983) model to develop a robust 
empirical test of agency-based models of information disclosure. They attempt to 
control the potentially confounding effect of proprietary costs by restricting the 
test of the agency model to an industry specific disclosure decision - the 
disclosure of reserves by Australian oil and gas companies. In univariate tests, 
only two of the five variables tested were significantly greater for disclosers - firm 
size and auditor quality. Contrary to the hypothesis, cash flow risk was 
significantly higher for nondisclosers. Under multivariate analysis only auditor 
quality is significant. Thus, univariate and multivariate analysis provide only weak 
support for the hypothesis that the disclosure decision is motivated by costs of 
contracting. 
The impact of agency costs and proprietary costs on voluntary segment disclosure 
is examined in Kelly (1994). Leverage proxies for agency costs and return on 
investment for proprietary costs. The probability of segmental disclosure was 
lower for firms with high return on investment, supporting the argument that 
firms may withhold information to reduce proprietary costs. Leverage was 
insignificant in the probit analysis, suggesting that agency costs associated with 
debt contribute little to explaining voluntary segment disclosures. 
Agency theory and forecast disclosure 
Little published research has addressed management forecasts from the agency 
perspective. This is because evidence suggests that managers are compensated on 
reported, and not forecast, earnings. If forecasts helped to mitigate agency 
problems they would be released on a more regular basis. As forecasts tend to be 
released late in the year it seems unlikely they alleviate agency problems. 
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Only Ruland, Tung and George (1990) have tested agency theory in the context 
of the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts. The only agency theory variable 
tested was ownership structure, being the percentage of voting stock owned by 
the officers and directors. They test the hypothesis that forecast reporting firms 
have a higher proportion of outside ownership than other firms. Inside ownership 
was found to be lower for the reporting firms with differences significant at one 
per cent. Ownership structure was the most important variable in the multivariate 
analysis distinguishing reporting and comparison firms. Inside ownership, 
consistent with predictions of agency theory, was significantly lower for reporting 
firms. 
In a study of forecast accuracy, Firth and Smith (1992) test the effect of debt on 
accuracy. They suggest that the net profits of companies with comparatively high 
levels of debt are traditionally regarded as being more difficult to forecast. They 
use a debt/gross assets measure. The only significant variable they found was size 
and this was in the opposite direction to that predicted. 
2.4 The market for corporate control 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), among others, refer to the takeover market as the 
market for corporate control in which alternative management teams compete for 
the rights to manage corporate resources. Under this view, it is the managers who 
are the primary activists, with shareholders playing a relatively passive role. 
The management team of the successful bidder benefit on average from a 
successful takeover as they finish up managing a larger business, which gives 
them increased status and higher remuneration. The management team of the 
target on average lose in a successful takeover. They therefore have a vested 
interest in fighting a takeover bid, even if the resistance is not in the interests of 
their shareholders. Consistent with agency theory, if managers only own a small 
proportion of the equity, they may have different objectives from those of the 
shareholders. 
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Jensen (1986) argues that one major cause of takeover activity is the agency costs 
associated with conflicts between managers and shareholders over the payout of 
free cash flow. Payment of cash to shareholders reduces the resources controlled 
by management, thereby reducing their power and subjecting them to monitoring 
by capital markets when they need to obtain new capital. There is a problem in 
motivating managers to pay out cash rather than invest it at below the cost of 
capital, or waste it through organisational inefficiencies. 
The control hypothesis put forward by Jensen (1986) suggests that increasing 
debt in a company reduces the agency costs of free cash flow available for 
spending at the discretion of managers. Management of a firm with high gearing 
can be `bonded' to operate efficiently in order to meet debt repayment schedules. 
Acquisitions are another way managers spend cash and reduce free cash flow. The 
free cash flow theory predicts that bidders will tend to have exceptionally good 
performance prior to the takeover (which generates the free cash). Targets are 
predicted to be either firms with poor management or firms that have performed 
exceptionally well with large free cash flow which has not been paid out to 
shareholders. Consistent with the theory, takeovers financed with cash and debt 
create larger benefits than those accomplished through share exchange (Wansley, 
Lane and Yang, 1987). 
2.4.1 Corporate control and accounting policy choice 
Three papers have dealt with the issue of accounting policy choice and the market 
for corporate control. DeAngelo (1988) shows that incumbent management 
manipulate earnings in attempts to avert a control transfer via corporate control 
disciplinary mechanisms. Groff and Wright (1989) and Christie and Zimmerman 
(1994) show that managerial behaviour in takeover targets is more opportunistic 
in choosing income-increasing accounting policies. 
DeAngelo (1988) examines accounting performance measures in 86 proxy 
contests. She finds that sample firms' pre-contest accounting returns were 
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systematically below market, whereas pre-contest stock returns were not. In 66 of 
the 86 sample contests, management released earnings information during the 
contest. For the 43 earnings releases for which there was data, there is evidence 
from accruals of manipulation by management to increase earnings. Results, based 
on a proxy for cash flow, suggest that related real profitability did not increase. 
DeAngelo (1988) concludes that the findings indicate that corporate earnings 
performance plays a role in the process through which alternative managers 
compete for shareholder support. 
Three alternative views on accounting policy choice are discussed in Holthausen 
(1990). The efficient contracting perspective is based on the assumption that 
accounting policy choices are made to minimise agency costs and thus maximise 
shareholder wealth. Another view is that managers are driven by opportunistic 
behaviour and choose accounting policies to maximise their own utility. Thirdly, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) put forward the information perspective 
rationale of accounting method choice. If managers have a comparative advantage 
in providing information about firms, they would expect to be compensated in 
part on the basis of their ability tö provide information about future cash flows of 
the firm. Holthausen (1990) points to the difficulties in empirically devising tests 
that distinguish efficiency and opportunistic choices. 
Groff and Wright (1989) and Christie and Zimmerman (1994) assume that 
managements in takeover targets are less value-maximising and efficient, and are 
more opportunistic, than nontakeover targets. They argue that entrenched 
managers acting in their own self-interest are ultimately disciplined by a threat of 
takeover. 
Using an industry-size-leverage matching approach and multivariate probit 
analysis, Groff and Wright (1989) found that 79 target firms more frequently 
chose income increasing accounting policies than did nontakeover target firms. 
Christie and Zimmerman (1994) use a sample of takeover targets to represent 
opportunistic managers. Three income-increasing accounting choices are 
61 
examined for target and non-target firms. They find that targets select income- 
increasing accounting methods more frequently, but that the upper bound on the 
frequency is small relative to nontargets. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) 
conclude that some accounting opportunism exists but that efficiency is a more 
important explanation of accounting choice. 
These three papers show the importance of financial accounting information in the 
governance of public companies. 
2.4.2 Characteristics of takeover bids and takeover firms 
Economic analysis has identified two very different motivations and types of 
takeover: disciplinary takeovers and synergistic takeovers (Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1988). These two motivations for takeover are often associated with 
either friendly or hostile takeover bids. Participants in takeover bids (bidders and 
targets) are also likely to have different motivations and possibly different 
characteristics. In addition to the nature of the bid (friendly or hostile) and the 
party to the bid (bidder or target), a third factor, the method of payment (cash 
versus shares), may distinguish takeovers. 
There is a substantial literature showing that characteristics of takeover targets 
are different from the general population of firms and from bidding firms 
(Tzoannos and Samuels, 1972; Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Hasbrouck, 1985; 
Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1990; Powell, 1995). Further analysis has shown that the 
characteristics of targets differ depending on whether the takeover bid is friendly 
or hostile (Merck, Shleifer and Vishney, 1988). Some researchers have examined 
factors relating to successful and failed or abandoned mergers (Pickering, 1978 
and 1983; Taffler and Holl, 1991; Limmack, 1994) and have found significant 
differences influencing the outcome of the bid. 
Three theories are put forward to explain choice of method of payment in 
takeovers: taxation, information asymmetires and agency theory. The choice 
affects the capital gains tax liabilities of the acquired firm's shareholders. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) suggest that managers with inside information about firms' 
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assets and investment opportunities will restrict sales of shares to periods when 
these are not undervalued by the market. Shareholders will prefer cash than shares 
that are possibly overvalued by the market. Thus, asymmetries in information 
about the value of the bidder discourage the use of equity finance. Fishman 
(1989) argues that cash bids are likely to be associated with high offers and high 
bid premia which deters other companies from initiating competing offers. 
Carleton, Guilkey, Harris and Stewart (1983) are able to distinguish financial 
characteristics of acquired and nonacquired targets based on method of payment. 
Eckbo and Langohr (1989) find that takeover premiums are significantly higher in 
all-cash than in all-share exchange offers but that method of payment has no effect 
on abnormal stock returns of bidders. Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) examine 
the influence of method of payment in US and UK takeovers. Bid premia to UK 
target shareholders in cash acquisitions were significantly in excess of those in 
equity acquisitions. In the US there were significant positive gains to bidders in 
cash acquisitions and significant losses in equity acquisitions. 
To summarise, the characteristics of takeover bids and takeover firms have been 
found to depend on whether the bid was contested or not, on whether the firm is 
bidder or target and on the method of payment for the acquisition. None of these 
variables have been empirically tested against disclosure of information during 
takeover bids. 
2.5 Empirical research of voluntary disclosure 
Studies on voluntary disclosure come mainly from the US. Most studies are 
concerned with market reaction to disclosure, although more recent research has 
considered disclosure from a strategic perspective. Table 2.4 summarises these 
empirical studies. 
Hoskin, Hughes and Ricks (1986) examine the incremental information content of 
additional firm disclosures released concurrently with announcements of annual 
earnings. They found that additional disclosures have information content beyond 
that contained in earnings. Both qualitative and quantitative disclosures have 
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information content, which is strongly influenced by the prospective nature of the 
message and the degree of its verifiability - point forecasts have greater 
information content than qualitative forecasts. 
Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) analyse firm-specific news reported in the 
Wall Street Journal. They found considerable variation in the type of news 
disclosures. These disclosures had information content for security prices. 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990 and 1992) develop a framework to 
analyse firms' disclosure processes, firms' organisational structures affecting 
disclosure, observed disclosure behaviours and the attributes of disclosure that are 
managed by the firm. Disclosure is looked at from the perspective of management 
of the disclosure process. They conclude that the concept of a corporate 
disclosure position or strategy (i. e. the firm's preference for the way disclosure is 
managed) offers considerable potential for explaining voluntary financial 
disclosure. Lev (1992) also looks at disclosure from a strategic perspective. 
Similarly, Healy and Palepu (1993) argue that managers can improve their 
communications by developing disclosure strategies. 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) examine managements' discretionary disclosures prior to 
large earnings surprises. They found that less than ten percent of large-surprise 
firms disclosed quantitative earnings or sales forecasts, while roughly half the 
firms did not provide any information prior to surprising investors. Bad news 
firms released significantly more information than good news firms. The larger the 
surprise the more quantitative and earnings-related the disclosure. Firm size and 
previous issue of a forecast were associated with issuing a warning. 
2.5.1 Empirical research of forecast disclosure 
Characteristics of forecasters and nonforecasters 
A major research issue is whether voluntarily disclosed forecasts are 
representative of all forecasts. Otherwise research findings using only voluntary 
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Imhoff (1978) was the first to document firm characteristics that were 
systematically different between forecasting and nonforecasting firms. He studied 
three firm characteristics and found that forecasting firms have significantly less 
variable, more stable and smoother earnings. Imhoff also found firms' systematic 
risk to be significantly greater than average, suggesting greater volatility in 
market based returns of forecast firms compared to the market as a whole. 
Analysts' forecasts were significantly less accurate for nonforecast firms. 
Ruland (1979) also found forecasting firms to have lower earnings variability and 
to be larger than nonforecasting firms. However, when size and industry were 
controlled for between forecasting and nonforecasting firms, the earnings series 
did not differ significantly between the two groups. 
Based on a small sample of 80 forecasting and 80 nonforecasting firms, Jaggi and 
Grier (1980) found disclosing firms to have lower variability in historical earnings 
than nondisclosing firms. They found no statistically significant differences in 
expected future performance between the two groups. Following criticisms, Cox 
(1985) re-tests Imhoffs (1978) earnings variability and market risk variables and, 
in addition, firm size which is hypothesised to indirectly influence the information 
content of management forecasts. Cox found, consistent with Imhoff, that 
forecasting firms had significantly lower variability of earnings. However, 
contrary to Imhoff, he found no significant differences in the risk characteristics 
of forecasting and nonforecasting firms. Finally, forecasting firms were 
systematically larger than nonforecasting firms. 
Waymire (1985) investigates the association between firms' earnings volatility 
and the timing and frequency of management earnings forecasts. He argues that 
such a relationship might be expected if earnings volatility is associated with 
either the costs or benefits of publicly disclosing such information. Managers of 
firms with more volatile earnings may be reluctant to disclose their forecasts due 
to increased exposure to costs (legal sanctions) associated with unattained 
projections. On the other hand, managers may perceive benefits of issuing 
forecasts which improve projections of individuals (say, analysts). One would 
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also expect an association between earnings volatility and forecast disclosure 
frequency as earnings volatility will affect managements' ability to generate 
accurate forecasts. 
Waymire (1985) found, consistent with Imhoff (1978) and Ruland (1979), that 
firms that forecast more frequently (repeat forecasters) were characterised by less 
volatile earnings. 
Lev and Penman (1990) also document that large firms have more management 
forecasts in the financial press and they find an association between earnings 
volatility and frequency of disclosure of forecasts. 
Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1992) examine a small number of 
initial public offering prospectuses for firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange between 1984 and 1987. Of these, 58% voluntarily disclose an earnings 
forecast. Year of issue, age, size, financial structure, industry classification and 
retained ownership are not significantly different between forecasters and 
nonforecasters. Audit quality, underwriter prestige and terms of offering are 
significantly different between forecasters and nonforecasters. 
Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) found that forecasters tended to be larger 
than nonforecasters. There were large differences in the proportion of forecasters 
across industry sectors. For the good news subsample, firm size, earnings 
volatility and earnings shock variables were all in the predicted direction and were 
significant at 5%. For the bad news subsample, these control variables were also 
in the predicted direction but only earnings volatility was significant at the 10% 
level. 
2.5.1.1 Motivations for forecast disclosure 
To raise finance 
It is suggested that management earnings forecasts are used to reduce the costs of 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Ruland, Tung and George (1990) and Frankel, McNichols and Wilson 
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(1995) find that the incidence of management earnings forecasts increases prior to 
securities offerings, a situation where the costs of asymmetric information are 
predicted to be particularly severe. 
Ruland, Tung and George (1990) test the hypothesis that forecast reporting firms 
show a greater tendency than other firms to issue new capital. New capital 
offerings of the forecast reporting group and a control group were compared. 
Reporting firms were found to have significantly more capital offerings than 
comparison firms. Multivariate analysis showed that new capital offerings was a 
significant factor in distinguishing forecasting and nonforecasting firms. 
Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995) also find a positive association between 
firms' tendencies to access capital markets and disclosure of management 
earnings forecasts. Firms financing externally are not significantly more likely to 
forecast in the period shortly before an offering than at other times. 
Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) confirm the unconditional financing 
hypothesis of Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995) that disclosure of forecasts 
is directly related to the need for external financing. However, in their study, tests 
of the financing hypothesis are conditioned on the nature of the news (good or 
bad) possessed by the manager. For good news firms the probability of 
forecasting is increasing in the firm's financing requirements (and vice versa for 
bad news firms). 
Threat of competitor entry 
The predictions of Darrough and Stoughton (1990) of the trade-off of value 
maximisation and the need to protect proprietary information from rival firms are 
tested in Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994). They hypothesise that probability 
of forecasting should decrease with threat of competitor entry. When firms are 
partitioned according to the nature of news in the forecasts, results are consistent 
with the product market effects hypothesis. 
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Legal cost hypothesis 
Skinner (1994) investigates incentives for firms disclosing adverse information. 
He argues that shareholders tend only to sue if there is a large negative return at 
an earnings announcement. This creates an incentive for mangers to disclose bad 
news voluntarily, in order to reduce costs of litigation. Skinner provides evidence 
suggesting that firms pre-empt bad quarterly earnings news with voluntary 
disclosures of bad news. However, Francis, Philbrick and Schipper (1994) report 
that forecasts and other pre-emptive disclosures are most often cited by plaintiffs 
as the events which initiated litigation. They conclude that the release of early 
warning of bad news is no deterrent to litigation and can themselves trigger suits. 
Skinner (1995), using a much larger sample than Francis, Philbrick and Schipper 
(1994), finds that more timely disclosure can result in less costly lawsuits. 
2.5.2 Disclosure and market expectations 
The expectations adjustment hypothesis of Ajinkya and Gift (1984) is that 
managers disclose forecasts to induce a revision in investors' expectations of 
future earnings. Managers have incentives to disclose both favourable and adverse 
forecasts. Disclosure of forecasts reduces information asymmetry among investors 
and thus reduces transactions costs. Prior research suggests that these costs are 
greater when opportunities to trade on private information are greater. 
Management disclosures that hasten information arrival to investors serve to pre- 
empt private information acquisition. If investors expect firms to supply credible, 
timely and precise disclosures, the firm will be able to sell new equity shares at 
higher initial prices. 
Ajinkya and Gift empirically test their hypothesis by comparing the management 
forecast with analysts' forecasts prevailing just prior to the release of the 
management forecast (as surrogates for market expectations). The results support 
the hypothesis that forecasts occur in cases in which good news and bad news 
adjustments are called for, and the market responds symmetrically to the direction 
and magnitude of these forecast signals. For the test of 'correcting' prevailing 
market expectations, the management forecast signal provided a significant 
explanation of the capital market reaction in the month of the forecast. The capital 
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market reaction was consistent with the proposition that management forecasts 
were viewed by outsiders as credible efforts to guide prevailing expectations in 
directions that would be more reasonably achieved. 
Ruland, Tung and George (1990) also tested the expectations adjustment 
hypothesis of Ajinkya and Gift (1984). Their results suggest that managers' 
forecasts tend to confirm rather than correct analysts' forecasts. 
Skinner (1994) finds in his classification of disclosure announcements that 
approximately 5% of observations fall into the no news category. This, he 
comments, is consistent with the view that managers disclose information to 
change earnings expectations. Whereas Ajinkya and Gift (1984) only considered 
point and narrowly defined range forecasts, Skinner's findings are based on varied 
types of forecast, including qualitative forecasts. 
2.5.3 Profit forecasts as defences in takeovers 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that publication of profit forecasts affect 
the outcome of contested bids. It is assumed in the takeover literature that 
publication of a forecast is a strategy that can influence the success or failure of 
contested bids or can lead to increased offers. There has been little systematic 
empirical research into the effectiveness of profit forecasts as defence weapons. 
Profits announcements represent a very important plank of defence. Forecasts 
above market expectations will immediately render the offer price unattractive 
and force the predator on the defensive. In many cases, profit forecasts have 
swung the battle the target's way. Forecast reductions in profit can be a successful 
defence. During Godfrey Davis's hostile bid for Sketchley in 1990, Sketchley 
announced a forecast profit reduction of £6 million, which caused Godfrey Davis 
to withdraw its bid. Acquisitions Monthly in its March 1989 edition (p. 78) refers 
to Thompson T-Line's failure to rebuff Ladbroke Group's hostile bid as follows: 
`Ladbroke increased its offer to 90p and won 771's recommendation after 771 
failed to make a profit forecast'. 
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Corporate control and takeover defences 
Two competing hypotheses have been offered concerning the wealth effects of 
takeover defences. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis holds that takeover 
defences raise the cost of displacing inefficient management and reduce 
shareholder wealth. Under the shareholder interests hypothesis, takeover defences 
enable shareholders to secure higher bid prices. 
Providing target management with the power to defend against hostile takeover 
bids might help target shareholders during a control contest. Target management 
can, in some cases, defeat a bid that is `inadequate' or, more importantly, promote 
a takeover auction leading to a higher bid price. On the other hand, shareholders 
may be deprived of a substantial premium if resistance leads to defeat of the offer. 
An additional cost in bid defences is that potential bid resistance and defensive 
tactics may prevent offers being made. The potential for owner-manager conflict 
is especially high in the case of contested bids. Managers who believe the bid is in 
the best interests of the shareholders may nonetheless resist the bid to protect 
their employment positions and to avoid seeking employment elsewhere. Target 
managers may increase inequities by using firm resources in defence of their own 
position. Shleifer and Visney (1989) present a model of managerial entrenchment. 
Managers use a variety of entrenchment schemes, including the use of disclosure 
policies, that make it harder for non-managers to estimate the gains from 
replacing incumbent managers. 
Disclosure of good news may satisfy personal objectives of managers such as job 
retention. Trachtenberg (1989) writes that Avon Products forecast good news 
following a hostile takeover bid, and at least one analyst interpreted this good 
news forecast as a takeover defence consistent with job retention. 
There are generally two approaches to examining the effects of defensive 
measures by targets: event-type studies and outcomes-type studies. Event-type 
studies investigate the impact on market value of, say, adopting a particular 
defence tactic. Outcomes-type studies examine the actual outcomes of contested 
bids using a common kind of resistance. 
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Empirical research in the US 
A number of studies in the US have examined the impact of takeover defence 
strategies on target shareholder wealth, including Linn and McConnell (1983), 
Dann and DeAngelo (1983), DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1987), Malatesta and Walking (1988), Ryngaert (1988), Netter and Poulsen 
(1989), Lauterbach, Malitz and Vu (1991), MacMinn and Cook (1991) and 
Bojanic and Officer (1994). The evidence has been mixed. 
Walking and Long (1984) analyse the relationship between bid resistance and 
managerial wealth and find empirical support for the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis. Takeover bid resistance was significantly related to the potential share 
and option value changes to officers and directors arising from the bid.. The 
potential wealth change to officers and directors of targets was significantly and 
substantially lower in contested bids. 
Empirical research in the UK 
Target companies defending against hostile bids have a wide variety of potential 
defence strategies to choose from. Jenkinson and Mayer (1991) classified nine 
defence tactics and Sudarsanam (1991) 24 (9 pre-bid and 15 post-bid). 
Jenkinson and Mayer (1991) studied takeover defence strategies in 42 hostile 
takeover bids in the UK. Defence tactics were divided into five categories: 
financial responses, corporate restructurings, white knights, poison pills and 
legal/political defences. Profit forecasts were the most prominent financial 
response, followed by dividend forecasts and asset revaluations (particularly 
common amongst property companies, breweries and retail chains). 
Using case study methodology, Jenkinson and Mayer found that there was very 
little relation between the success of defence and the type of defence employed. 
However, they found a clear pattern when they distinguished between different 
classes of bid. In the case of paper or mixed consideration offers, the nature of the 
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defence put up by the target is of crucial importance. Most firms in these non- 
cash bids succeeded in repelling the bidder. 
Sudarsanam (1994) reports the results of a survey of takeover defence strategies 
in 238 contested bids for UK public companies. Profit forecasts were the most 
commonly used defence (45% of targets made a profit forecast) after `knocking 
copy' (i. e. attack of bid terms). Sudarsanam found that only four of the 23 
defence strategies identified in the research contributed to a successful defence. 
Surprisingly, profit forecasts made a slightly negative impact on bid defence. He 
suggests that profit forecasts do not cover a long period ahead and, thus, do not 
provide substantial new information to target shareholders. In addition, they are 
not highly regarded by investment managers, and the scepticism with which they 
are received may have blunted their effectiveness as a defence strategy. 
Empirical research in Australia 
Casey and Eddey (1986) studied takeover defence strategies of 122 Australian 
defended bids. Nineteen defence strategies were identified. Disclosure of 
favourable information (profit forecasts and asset revaluations) was the most 
popular defence strategy (after claims that the bid was inadequate). The extent to 
which each strategy was associated with successful takeover defences was 
analysed, and percentage success rates were ranked in descending order. 
Disclosure of favourable information ranked fifth out of six defence category 
strategies. By including profit forecasts in the `Disclosure of favourable 
information' defence category, Casey and Eddey (1986) implicitly assume that 
profit forecasts disclose good news. 
2.5.4 Content analysis of disclosures 
Content analysis of annual report disclosures 
There have been many studies of disclosures in annual reports. These are 
summarised in table 2.5. In the first such study, Cerf (1961) found asset size, 
listing status and number of shareholders to be related to disclosure levels. 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) found a relationship between higher levels of disclosure 
and size, listing status, number of shareholders, accounting firm, rate of return 
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and earnings margins. Buzby (1975) found that extent of disclosure was positively 
associated with size but not with listing status. 
Choi (1973) argues, in his capital need hypothesis, that companies competing for 
scarce capital resources as cheaply as possible are motivated to disclose more 
information to investors. Benefits of disclosure outweigh disadvantages 
(disclosure of sensitive information to competitors). Choi tested the effects of 
entry to the European capital market on the disclosure practices of a sample of 
Eurobond participants against a control group of nonparticipants. He applied a 
disclosure index to measure the level of disclosure. He concluded that firms 
examined significantly improved their financial disclosure on entry to the market. 
Gray (1978) examined financial reporting practices of the 100 largest quoted 
industrial companies in the EEC in 1972/73 to assess the extent to which financial 
ratios and statistics are included in annual reports. He found support for the 
suggestion that the extent of disclosure is related to the state of development of 
the national equity market. 
Firth (1979) examined three groups of companies: 40 listed and 40 unlisted 
companies (paired on the basis of size and industry) and a separate sample of 100 
listed companies. He found that companies with a stock market listing disclosed 
significantly more information. A significant association between size and levels of 
disclosure was also found. Auditors were found to have very little influence on 
the levels of disclosure made by companies. 
Firth (1980) compares the improvement in levels of disclosure of companies who 
had made new issues or rights issues with a matched-pairs control group which 
had not raised any new capital. Smaller firms increased their voluntary disclosure 
levels significantly when raising new capital. Raising finance on the equity market 
had no impact on disclosure levels of large firms. Firth suggested that there may 
be less scope for larger firms to improve significantly the extent of financial 
information in their annual reports. 
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Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) investigate the extent of disclosure in the annual 
reports of 70 banks in 18 countries. Disclosure adequacy is measured by the 
extent to which 30 selected information items are presented in annual reports. 
They found considerable variance in extent of disclosure internationally, and 
found firm size to be moderately significant. 
In examining discretionary disclosure practices of New Zealand companies, 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982) found only company size to be a significant 
variable. 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) attempt to explain differences in disclosure levels 
in the context of an agency-cost model. They examine the voluntary disclosure 
practices of 52 Mexican companies against three variables suggested by agency 
theory: firm size, financial leverage and proportion of assets in place. The 
disclosure scores were significantly related to size and were marginally correlated 
with leverage. Correlation with assets in place was not significant. 
Cooke (1989) examines the extent of disclosure by Swedish companies against 
the variables: quotation status, parent company relationship, annual sales, total 
asset size and number of shareholders. He found significant differences between 
unlisted, only listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and multiple listed firms. 
He also found size to be a significant explanatory variable. 
Meek and Gray (1989), in their study of the voluntary disclosure practices of 
European companies on the London Stock Exchange, found companies exceed 
the stock exchange requirements through a wide range of, and often substantial, 
voluntary disclosures. They suggest that this disclosure in excess of the minimum 
is necessary if these companies are to compete in the international capital market. 
Bradbury (1992b) tests Choi's capital need hypothesis. He predicts that the 
presence of overseas funding to a firm could influence its decision to disclose 
segment data. The results do not support this prediction. He finds that the dummy 
variable for the presence or absence of overseas debt is not significant. 
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In a study of Japanese corporations, Cooke (1992) finds size and listing status to 
be important explanatory variables. He considers eight size variables: capital 
stock, turnover, number of shareholders, total assets, fixed assets, current assets, 
shareholders' funds and bank borrowings. Cooke found manufacturing 
corporations disclosed significantly more information than other types of Japanese 
corporations. The interaction between industry type and quotation status was also 
found to be significant. In a related study of disclosure in two different types of 
Japanese accounts, Commercial Code and Securities and Exchange Law 
accounts, Cooke (1993) found no difference in disclosures between the two types 
of accounts and, with one exception, no difference in disclosure and listing status. 
Disclosures in Commercial Code unlisted and domestic listed accounts differed 
significantly. 
Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) attempt to control for differences in disclosure 
across industries by studying extent of disclosure in 125 oil and gas firms. Of ten 
independent variables, only four were found to be significant at the 20% level: 
exchange listing status, audit firm size, ratio of debt to equity and number of 
shareholders. 
Disclosures in 50 Spanish annual reports are examined by Wallace, Naser and 
Mora (1994). Their disclosure index (called an index of comprehensive 
disclosure) is constructed differently from previous studies. The index is based on 
16 mandatory items of disclosure. In addition, the depth of disclosure of each 
item is also measured and includes both qualitative and quantitative disclosure. 
Nine variables were tested, but only the two size variables and liquidity were 
found to be significant. The relation between liquidity and disclosure was 
negative, contrary to expectations. Findings of this study are limited by the small 
size of the sample studied. 
Content analysis of forecasts 
There have been few previous studies of disclosure practices in profit forecasts. 
Dev (1973) gives some examples of the variety of wording used in forecasts (the 
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meaning of which, in some cases, was unclear). Dev also finds that none of the 
forecasts in her study included a statement of assumptions. 
Hartnett (1990) examines disclosure frequency, form and content (including the 
period forecast), manner of presentation and location in the listing document of 
22 forecasts from a sample of 50 second board company new listing prospectuses 
on the Sydney Stock Exchange. Hartnett, like Dev (1973), found considerable 
variation in the terminology used in the forecasts. 
Montgomerie and Walker (1992), a descriptive study, examine accounting 
policies and disclosure of components and items in a selection of profit forecasts. 
They show, using examples from prospectuses, the subjective nature of 
forecasting, focusing particularly on choice and application of accounting policies 
in forecasts. Montgomerie and Walker comment that published profit forecasts 
contain very little information on how the figures are built up. They range f om 
being one line statements citing a figure that will be achieved to, at the most, 
three or four lines disclosing key figures with a few accompanying notes'. 
2.5.5 News content of forecasts 
Table 2.6 summarises research into news content of forecasts. Early analytical 
studies of disclosure suggest that information will be disclosed when there is good 
news to report. Many US empirical studies have tested this prediction. The 
evidence has been mixed and does not support the hypothesis that managers are 
more likely to disclose good news forecasts to convey favourable earnings 
information. Empirical studies provide evidence of disclosure of bad news. More 
recent analytical models have included competitors to account for disclosure of 
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Empirical evidence of the role of good news in motivating forecast disclosure is 
mixed. Patell (1976), Penman (1980), Waymire (1984) and Lev and Penman 
(1990) find that earnings forecasts are in general associated with positive returns, 
and that firms with good news appear more willing to reveal their forecasts. Lev 
and Penman (1990) consider forecast disclosure from a signalling perspective. 
They predict that firms with above average values of the signalled attribute - 
annual earnings - will distinguish themselves by releasing a forecast. They find, 
consistent with their signalling hypothesis, that while there is some release of bad 
news, firms with good news do voluntarily release forecasts in order to 
distinguish themselves from firms with worse news. Forecasting firms exhibited 
higher earnings changes than firms in general, but also had on average higher 
stock value appreciations. Forecast disclosure was thus associated with an above- 
average valuation of the attribute forecasted - annual earnings. 
As there were several bad news forecasts in the samples, there must be some 
incentives for management to publish these forecasts even though they result in 
downward revaluation. Thus, while firms typically publish earnings forecasts 
when they have good news, this is not always so. 
The results of these studies suggest that such a disclosure characterisation (mainly 
good news forecasts disclosed) does not fully capture actual practice. This may be 
because results are based on average figures. 
Research based on later time periods indicates that firms are as likely to issue 
good news forecasts as bad news forecasts. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) and Waymire 
(1984) did not observe an overall tendency to report good news. They show that 
incentives exist for management to disclose both good and bad news; thereby 
implying a relatively full symmetric disclosure of private information on a 
voluntary basis. In the case of the management forecast signal, the summary 
statistics provide evidence of an adequate representation of negative or bad news 
signals disclosed voluntarily. 
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Consistent with much of the recent empirical literature, Ruland, Tung and George 
(1990) found no significant differences between errors in analysts' forecasts for 
forecasting and nonforecasting firms. Consequently, they do not support the 
hypothesis that managers primarily release good news. 
Recent US research had focused more on bad news disclosures and on different 
types of forecast disclosures. Baginski, Hassell and Waymire (1994), Pownall, 
Wasley and Waymire (1993) and Skinner (1994) provide evidence that firms are 
more likely to disclose bad news than good news. Baginski, Hassell and Waymire 
(1994) document significant negative mean abnormal returns associated with 
disclosure of preliminary estimates. They also find the median return to be 
negative but not significantly so. There were 251 bad news disclosures in Skinner 
(1994) compared with 191 good news disclosures. 
One explanation for the variations in US findings is that most studies examine 
only point and range forecasts of annual earnings (e. g. Penman, 1980; Ajinkya 
and Gift, 1984; Waymire, 1984; McNichols, 1989; Pownall and Waymire, 1989) 
or very quantitative forecasts (e. g. Patell, 1976). Lev and Penman (1990) and 
Skinner (1994) consider point and range forecasts and, in addition, open ended 
(i. e. bounded from either above (upper-bound) and below (lower-bound)) and 
qualitative forecasts. Similarly, Baginski, Hassell and Waymire (1994) consider 
minimum, maximum and `general impression' estimates as well as point and range 
estimates. Pownall, Wasley and Waymire (1993) find no significant differences in 
stock returns for different forecast types, although point forecasts were 
associated with more positive and more significant returns. Point and range 
forecasts comprised less than 20 percent of their sample. 
Research in jurisdictions other than the US support the good news hypothesis. In 
a study of disclosure of forecasts in initial public offering prospectuses in Canada, 
Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1992) found that the mean value of the 
good news measure for forecasters significantly exceeded nonforecasters. 
Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) examined the inclusion of forecasts in 
annual reports. Using three methods of classifying news they find, irrespective of 
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approach used, that the proportion of forecasters with good news earnings 
prospects is significantly greater than the proportion of nonforecasters with good 
news earnings prospects. However, when financial market and product market 
considerations are included, Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) find, 
consistent with more recent US literature, that the good news hypothesis offers 
only partial explanation for the decision to forecast. 
2.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has summarised the theoretical literature dealing with voluntary 
disclosure of information by firms, particularly in circumstances where there is 
information asymmetry. Much of the information economics literature is 
concerned with signalling theory where firms attempt to signal their superior 
quality by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. 
Influences on disclosure of forecasts 
Signalling theory, and empirical studies applying signalling theory, were reviewed. 
Nearly all signalling research examines the effect of various signals on pricing of 
new issues. Signalling variables such as retained ownership, choice of auditor and 
choice of advisors were generally found to be related to less underpricing of 
IPOs, but the findings are not unanimous. There has been no support for 
Trueman's (1986) hypothesis that the act of disclosing a forecast is a signal of 
value. 
Empirical evidence of agency theory explanations of cross-sectional variation in 
voluntary accounting and disclosure choices has been weak and inconclusive. In 
the only agency theory study of forecast disclosure, ownership structure was 
found to be the most important factor distinguishing disclosing and nondisclosing 
firms. Various other empirical studies on voluntary disclosure, and especially on 
voluntary disclosure of forecasts, are reviewed. 
Forecasting and nonforecasting firms were found to differ most on size and 
earnings variability. Motivations explored by previous research to account for 
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forecast disclosure include raising finance, threat of competitor entry and in 
response to legal pressures. 
Influence of market expectations 
Ajinkya and Gift (1984) found support for their hypothesis that forecasts are 
disclosed to correct prevailing market expectations, as did Skinner (1994). 
Ruland, Tung and George's (1990) findings suggest that forecasts tend to confirm 
rather than correct analysts' forecasts. 
Profit forecasts as defences 
Studies of defences strategies are of two types. Most examine the effect of the 
use/adoption of a defence strategy on shareholders' wealth. A minority (mainly 
UK and Australian) analyse the effect of defence strategies on outcome of bids, 
where outcome is defined as success/failure of the bid. These studies also analyse 
the frequency of adopting different defence tactics. The research finds disclosure 
of profit forecasts to be one of the most popular methods of defence. However, 
evidence on its effectiveness is weak. In the most comprehensive study, 
Sudarsanam (1994) found profit forecasts made a slightly negative impact on bid 
defences. 
Content of disclosures in forecasts 
Studies analysing disclosure content (mainly in annual reports) are not well 
grounded theoretically. A variety of variables have been tested. Size and listing 
status were most commonly related to extent of disclosure in annual reports. 
News content in forecasts 
The chapter concluded by considering news content of forecasts disclosed. 
Previous research (almost entirely North American) has shown that predominantly 
good news forecasts are disclosed, with some disclosure of bad news. More 
recent studies have included range forecasts and non-quantified forecasts as well 
as point forecasts of earlier studies. This is thought to account for the increasing 
evidence of bad news forecasts. 
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Application to current study 
Actual disclosures take place in an environment that is substantially more complex 
than the ones assumed in many of the models described in this chapter. Managers 
may be concerned with how disclosures about their firms' financial performance 
impinge on their reputations, influence their firms' negotiations with labour unions 
and other suppliers of inputs, affect their firms' relationships with governmental 
and other authoritative bodies, change the behaviour of competitors and so on. 
Almost all the empirical literature reviewed in this chapter relates to disclosure of 
information in a general context (such as in annual reports). The takeover context 
of this research is very specialist. Companies have very specific reasons during a 
takeover why they might want to disclose information. Signalling theory and 
agency theory have been advanced to explain the impact of corporate 
characteristics on voluntary disclosure. This research will extend the application 
of signalling theory and agency theory to a new disclosure situation - that of 
disclosures made during takeover bids. There is some doubt, however, on their 
relevance to the takeover context of the research. 
Most studies consider agency theory and signalling theories separately. Morris 
(1987) analysed the logical relationship between signalling and agency theories 
and concluded that the two are consistent - that if one is 'correct' then the other 
may also be'correct'. 
Morris suggested that this `opens up the possibility of joining the two theories to 
provide fresh insights into the principal-agent problem, and into firms' 
accounting policy choices'. Morris also suggested that it may be possible to 
combine the two theories to yield predictions about accounting choices not 
obtainable from either theory alone. This study will be one of the few empirical 
research studies that test the two theories together. 
Most of the takeover literature is concerned with shareholder wealth effects 
resulting from takeovers, with profitability of mergers, with financial 
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characteristics of firms involved in takeovers, with predicting takeover targets and 
with the effect of medium of exchange on takeovers. No prior research has 
examined the theories of voluntary disclosure in the context of takeovers. 
More recent disclosure literature in the US is concerned with the influence of 
litigation on disclosure. The legal environment in the UK is wholly different. The 
risk of being sued is much less in the UK; class action suits are not possible. As 
confirmed by the interviews in chapter 5, threat of litigation is not as significant a 
factor in the UK. Management are more concerned with loss of reputation if 
forecasts go wrong than with fear of litigation. There has been little litigation in 
the UK on profit forecast disclosure during takeover bids. 
This study extends to the UK North American research on the influence of market 
expectations on forecast disclosure and of the news content of forecasts to the 
UK. Similar methodology is employed. 
The effectiveness of a single defence strategy, disclosure of profit forecasts is 
examined. The outcome of bids based approach of previous research is extended 
to include a new definition of outcome, based on whether the offer price increased 
during the bid. 
Content analysis methodology applied in previous research to annual reports is 
adapted and applied in a content analysis of disclosures in profit forecasts. 
Previous research has measured disclosure content using a disclosure index. It is 
not possible to develop an index of disclosure for profit forecasts. This research 
uses a counting approach to measure disclosure and applies suitable statistical 
methods to analyse count data. 
The research study that follows attempts to explain disclosure of forecasts during 
takeover bids by considering the rich and complex environment in which 
disclosure takes place and the wide variety of variables suggested by the 
literature, summarised in this chapter, that might influence disclosure. 
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Chapter 3: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The major objectives of this research are, firstly, to examine the influences on 
disclosure of profit forecasts in the context of takeover and, secondly, to examine 
the influences on the content and presentation of forecasts disclosed. Influences 
on disclosure are examined under the five research headings outlined in chapter 1: 
" What factors, including firm characteristics, significantly influence voluntary 
disclosure of profit forecasts? 
" What effects do prevailing market expectations of firm profitability have on 
disclosure? 
" Is forecast disclosure an effective weapon in defence or completion of bids? 
" Does disclosure content of forecasts vary with external factors? 
" Do the forecasts have identifiable news content characteristics? 
Chapter 2 has outlined the theories and empirical research on disclosure by firms. 
The variables hypothesised to influence the disclosure decision, and discussed in 
more detail in chapter 2, are summarised in Figure 3.1. Two theories, signalling 
theory and agency theory, provide the basis for hypothesising that some variables 
are related to disclosure of forecasts and information in forecasts. In addition, 
other variables found to be related to voluntary disclosure decisions in prior 
empirical research are also tested, as are a number of control variables. The 
takeover context of the research suggests additional factors for testing. 
The research tests as many of these variables as possible against forecast 
disclosure decisions, subject to the practical limitations of the necessary data 
being reasonably available. Thus, a large number of variables are included in the 
study. For convenience, and to provide a structure in presenting the hypotheses 
and empirical results, the variables tested in the research are categorised under 
three headings: (i) takeover-context variables, (ii) firm-specific variables, and (iii) 
forecast-related variables. These three headings are used to present the 
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3.1 Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts 
The reasons why and incentives for management of some companies to disclose a 
profit forecast during a takeover bid, and the factors underlying the decision to 
disclose/not disclose, are examined. The characteristic differences between 
disclosing and nondisclosing firms are highlighted. 
3.1.1 Takeover-context variables (Hi-Hs) 
Economic conditions 
Forecasting is expected to be more difficult during changeable economic periods. 
Economic conditions have been found to affect forecast accuracy (McDonald, 
1973; Porter, 1982; Mak, 1989). In addition to the effect on forecast accuracy, 
which in turn influences disclosure, economic conditions may also affect whether 
companies have good news to disclose. During recessionary periods there may be 
less good news. Thus, economic conditions may affect the disclosure decision, 
and the five year period chosen for study needs to be controlled for. Year is taken 
to proxy for economic conditions. As there is no a priori expectation of the 
direction of the influence of year on disclosure, the hypothesis is expressed in null 
format. 
HI: There is no difference in the disclosure of forecasts in any year of the study. 
Party to the bid 
Previous research has shown the characteristics of bidders and targets to differ 
(Tzoannos and Samuels, 1972; Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Hasbrouck, 1985; 
Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1990; Powell, 1995). Motivations for disclosure by bidders 
and targets during takeover bids may differ substantially. Consequently there may 
be differences in disclosures between these two groups. For example, bidders and 
targets may differ in terms of the forecastability of profits. Hence, variation in 
disclosure could be due to variation in the features of the company, rather than 
variation in disclosure issues. 
More targets are expected to disclose forecasts than bidders. Evidence from 
informal interviews of advisors, directors and management of companies involved 
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in takeovers (see chapter 5 for details) suggests that the benefits of disclosing 
forecasts are much greater for target companies than for bidders. Bidding 
companies control the timing of an approach and are more likely to make a bid 
when market conditions are favourable to the bidder. Bidders will therefore have 
less need to communicate with shareholders. Target companies have no such 
control over events and therefore have a greater need to signal information to 
shareholders to adjust market expectations. Consequently, the disclosure of 
forecasts by bidders is analysed separately from disclosure by targets. A 
comparison of the results between the two groups is then made. 
H2: Target companies are more likely to voluntarily disclose forecasts than 
bidders 
Type of bid 
Characteristics of target firms differ depending on whether they are the subject of 
contested or uncontested bids (Morck, Shleifer and Vishney, 1988). The type of 
bid may also influence the propensity of firms to disclose information. There is 
evidence from MCRV (Gray, Roberts and Gordon, 1991) that more forecasts are 
voluntarily disclosed during contested bids. Contested bids are characterised by 
attacks on the performance of management. Bidders suggest that their 
management would improve the performance of the target company-Targets try 
to show that they have managed the company well and that bidders' management 
have run the bidding company badly. Managements defending their performance, 
especially target company managements, are attacked when they do not disclose a 
forecast to support their claims of good performance (see examples 4 to 7 in 
appendix 4). 
The effect of competitive environments on disclosures in annual reports has been 
examined previously by Choi (1973). Choi found that firms competing for scarce 
capital upgraded and increased financial disclosure. Choi's competitive 
disclosure/capital need hypothesis is particularly relevant in the competitive 
environment of takeover bids, especially contested bids. Following this theory, in 
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contested bid situations one would hypothesise that more forecasts would be 
disclosed. 
H3: More forecasts are disclosed during contested bids than during agreed bids. 
Purchase consideration 
Purchase consideration ranges from cash to paper to a mixture of both. Previous 
research has shown purchase consideration to be an important influence on the 
outcome of takeover bids (Carleton, Guilkey, Harris and Stewart, 1983; Franks, 
Harris and Mayer, 1988; Eckbo and Langohr, 1989). The influence of method of 
payment on disclosure has not be tested in prior research. 
The interviewees (see chapter 5) frequently referred to this as influencing 
disclosure, especially in the case of bidders. If the consideration is cash, a forecast 
by bidders may not be as relevant. From a bidder's point of view, one of the main 
reasons for disclosing a forecast is to add credibility to the value of the shares 
being issued in consideration for the target. 
A forecast may be disclosed, however, in cash only bids because bidding company 
shareholders may need to approve the bid. Bidders' average share prices fall at 
the announcement of bids (Limmack, 1991) hence, even in cash underlined bids, a 
forecast is potentially useful. Also, legal considerations may prompt disclosure of 
forecasts by bidders. In summary, forecasts are hypothesised to be disclosed by 
bidders primarily during paper bids. 
H4: Forecasts by bidders are more likely during paper bids. 
: No relation is expected between forecast disclosure by targets and purchase 
consideration. 
Bid horizon 
Disclosure of forecasts has been found to increase towards the end of reporting 
periods. Evidence from the US suggests that the frequency of forecasts increases 
as the end of the reporting period approaches (McNichols, 1989). The closer the 
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year end the less risk there is of the forecast being wrong. Thus, forecasts are 
hypothesised to be more likely the shorter the bid horizon. 
Hs: Fewer forecasts are disclosed in bids with longer than with shorter bid 
horizons. 
3.1.2 Firm-specific variables (H6-H14) 
Size of firm 
There are various reasons why size might be related to disclosure. It is less costly 
for larger companies, with more sophisticated accounting and forecasting 
systems, to disclose forecasts. The cost of assembling the information is greater 
for small firms than large firms (SEC, 1977). This is particularly likely in the 
context of publishing a formal profit forecast (within the fairly tight time 
constraints of a takeover bid) which would need reliable forecasting systems. 
Financial advisors indicated (see chapter 5) that they would be unwilling to report 
on a forecast from an unreliable forecasting system. 
Agency theory predicts that larger firms with greater political visibility (and 
therefore greater political `agency' costs) will disclose more to reduce agency 
costs. Voluntary disclosure may be encouraged by expectations of positive effects 
in political attitudes. Beneficial effects are unlikely if disclosures reveal situations 
of monopoly advantage, tax anomalies or social inequality which encourage 
political intervention. Political costs in the context of a takeover might be 
investigation of the bid by the Takeover Panel or the Mergers and Monopolies 
Commission. Firm size has generally been used as a proxy for political costs. 
Also, `Large companies will disclose more information since they benefit most... 
If the initial information asymmetry is large, reducing it will increase the current 
share price of the security' (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Leftwich, Watts 
and Zimmerman (1981) have suggested that the proportion of outside capital 
tends to be higher for larger firms, and they include a size variable to proxy for 
the agency costs of outside capital. 
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Another possible explanation relating size to disclosure is that large firms have a 
greater need for disclosure as their shares are more widely traded. Small firms are more 
reluctant to disclose because this may place them at a competitive disadvantage. 
Verrecchia (1979) suggests that accounting reports are more valuable to investors in 
smaller firms and therefore smaller firms may supply accounting reports prior to 
disclosure laws. Bradbury (1992a) tested size for this reason but did not find any 
relation between it and voluntary disclosure of interim earnings. 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) and Bradbury (1992b) included size to proxy 
for agency costs of capital held by outsiders. Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985), Wong 
(1988) and Craswell and Taylor (1992) used size to proxy for political costs. 
Results of prior research have been inconclusive. Wong (1988) and Deegan and 
Hallam (1991) found size to be a significant variable in the disclosure of current cost 
accounts and value added statements. A positive association between size and 
voluntary segment disclosures (Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980; Bradbury, 1992b) has 
been found. Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), Bradbury (1992a) and Craswell 
and Taylor (1992) found no support for size as an explanation of disclosure. 
In support of Verrecchia's (1979) hypothesis, Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) found 
that the mean asset size of the firms voluntarily adopting lease disclosure (prior to their 
being made mandatory) was smaller than for nondisclosing firms. 
Cox (1985) included firm size because of its potential ability to indirectly influence the 
amount of information content in management forecasts. Underlying theory posits that 
larger firms disclose more external information so that there is less of a difference 
between the market expectations and the information revealed when the item is 
disclosed. The greater the amount of pre-disclosure information production and 
dissemination, the greater the ability of market participants to anticipate the content of 
regularly issued disclosures such as earnings forecasts (in the US). 
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Cox (1985), Waymire (1985) and Lev and Penman (1990) reveal that firm size 
differentiates between forecasting and nonforecasting firms. They point out that this 
could be due to bias in the reporting practices of the Wall Street Journal (source of 
their forecasts). Large firms are reported more often in the press. Clarkson, Kao and 
Richardson (1994) also found size to distinguish Canadian forecasters and 
nonforecasters. 
Economies of scale in disclosure and litigation deterrence (larger firms are more 
exposed to litigation as they are seen to have `deeper pockets') are two reasons put 
forward by Kasznik and Lev (1995) explaining why size might be related to disclosure. 
They found firm size to be a significant explanatory variable for their group of good 
news firms as well as bad news firms. 
Size proxies for many variables. As Ball and Foster (1982) point out, results 
confirming a size hypothesis may have alternative explanations. Care must be taken in 
interpreting the results of tests including this variable. Larger bidders and targets are 
hypothesised to be more likely to disclose a forecast. 
H6: Larger firms voluntarily disclose more forecasts compared with smaller 
firms. 
Leverage 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979) have observed that agency 
costs are higher for firms with proportionally more debt in their capital structure. As 
the proportion of debt increases, shareholders, and managers acting on behalf of 
shareholders, have greater incentives to transfer wealth from bondholders. This implies 
that the greater the proportion of debt in a firm's capital structure, the higher the 
probability of the firm adopting contracting and monitoring activities. As leverage 
increases, lenders and shareholders may demand more information in order to assess 
the probability of a firm meeting its debt obligations. Thus, the demand for information 
by shareholders and debtholders will increase with level of debt. This suggests a 
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positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and high leverage. 
Watts (1977) hypothesised that 'the larger the absolute amount of corporation's 
outside risk debt, the greater the likelihood the corporation presented financial 
statements' (i. e. voluntarily). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that the potential for 
conflict between shareholders, debtholders and management is high in firms with large 
outside capital. This suggests a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary 
disclosure and leverage. 
Under the free cash flow model of Jensen (1986) the lower the free cash flow, the 
higher the debt and, consequently, the lower the monitoring costs between 
shareholders and management. The firm's management is to some extent controlled and 
disciplined by the providers of debt. In situations like this, shareholders are supposed 
to have superior monitoring and bonding facilities in contrast to all equity financed 
firms. Thus, the direction of the relationship between leverage and disclosure is not 
clear from the literature. 
A positive association between financial leverage and voluntary segment disclosures 
(Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980; Bradbury, 1992b) and financial leverage and voluntary 
current cost disclosures (Wong 1988) has been found, but the evidence is not 
unanimous (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman, 1981; Bazley, Brown and Izan, 1985; 
Kelly, 1994). Given the weight of evidence linking leverage with increased disclosure, 
firms with greater financial leverage are hypothesised to be more likely to disclose a 
forecast. 
H7: Firms with high debt-equity ratios voluntarily disclose more forecasts than 
firms with low debt-equity ratios. 
Management ownership 
Agency theory posits that firms will voluntarily disclose information to reduce agency 
costs. The degree of conflict between managers and shareholders is predicted to 
increase inversely with managers' ownership share (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Therefore, as managers' ownership share falls, monitoring and bonding costs will 
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increase. Firms with lower percentage management ownership will have a higher level 
of monitoring and are more likely to disclose forecasts. 
Whittred (1987) found ownership control to be a significant variable in determining 
whether firms prepared consolidated accounts (prior to this being mandatory). 
Craswell and Taylor (1992), in the context of oil and gas reserves disclosure, found no 
such support. Ruland, Tung and George (1990) tested agency theory in the context of 
the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts. The only agency theory variable 
examined was ownership structure, being the percentage of voting stock owned by 
officers and directors. Consistent with expectations, they found management 
ownership to be significantly lower for forecast disclosing firms. 
H8: More forecasts are voluntarily disclosed by firms with a lesser percentage of 
management ownership than firms with a greater percentage of management 
ownership. 
Substantial shareholdings 
Firms with higher concentrations of large shareholders are more likely to be able to 
communicate information to shareholders privately. Consequently, firms with higher 
substantial shareholdings are less likely to publicly disclose forecasts. 
There is evidence from prior research, confirmed by the takeover documents examined 
and from the interviews conducted as part of this research, that there is considerable 
private disclosure of financial information to interested parties - see examples 69 to 71 
in appendix 4. Since the period of this study, new insider trading legislation has 
discouraged such private disclosure. Firms with a larger proportion of share capital 
concentrated amongst a few large shareholders are likely to find disclosure of such 
private information easier than firms with more dispersed shareholdings and so can 
avoid public disclosure of information. 
Schipper (1981) argues this point from an agency perspective by stating `monitoring 
problems that could be solved by issuing public accounting reports would be 
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increasing in the number of owners... '. The variable, percentage substantial 
shareholdings, attempts to measure dispersion in shareholdings of firms. 
'H9: Firms with a larger percentage of substantial shareholdings disclose fewer 
forecasts than firms with a smaller percentage of substantial shareholdings. 
Auditor/reporting accountant 
Choice of auditor is expected to influence disclosure for a number of reasons. 
DeAngelo (1981) found that `high quality' audit firms with greater reputations are 
likely to encourage clients to follow high quality reporting practices. Auditor status is 
hypothesised as a means of signalling firm quality. Firms with higher reputation big-six 
auditors/reporting accountants are more likely to disclose forecasts. Titman and 
Trueman (1986) suggest that selection of a quality auditor is a signal to the market that 
the information disclosures of the firm are high quality. 
Choice of `high quality' auditors may reflect high agency costs which are expected to 
induce greater disclosure (Chow, 1982). High quality auditors may be chosen to 
minimise monitoring costs. Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) tested auditor influence on 
lease accounting practices and found no significant influence. Craswell and Taylor 
(1992) studied voluntary disclosure of reserves by oil and gas firms and found, of the 
five variables examined, only auditor identity was significant. 
H, o: Firms engaging big-six auditors are more likely to disclose forecasts than 
firms with other auditors. 
Financial advisor 
Financial advisor is included as a variable in the research for similar reasons to the 
auditor/reporting accountant variable. Financial advisors are also required to formally 
report on forecasts. Financial advisor prestige is hypothesised as a means of signalling 
firm quality. Firms with higher reputation financial advisors are more likely to disclose 
forecasts. In addition, the interview data in chapter 5 suggest that financial advisors 
greatly influence disclosure of forecasts. 
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H»: Firms that engage higher reputation financial advisors are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose forecasts than firms with other financial advisors. 
There are many events surrounding a takeover bid which make it difficult to devise a 
clean, controlled experiment in this context. The takeover context is a very `muddy 
pond', surrounded by a lot of noise. There are many control issues to be dealt with. 
Three control variables are included in this research: listing status, industry and 
nationality of firms. 
Listing status 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) tested exchange listing as a signal for the 
intensity of monitoring of managers by the firm. They expected some natural selection 
among firms in choosing the exchange to list on. Companies from two exchanges, the 
New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange, were examined. The 
New York Stock Exchange is more stringent and therefore offers investors more 
intensive monitoring. They did not find the variable to be significant. 
All the target firms in this research are listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
However, bidders range from individuals, consortiums of individuals, private 
companies to foreign listed companies. 
H12: Bidding firms listed on the London Stock Exchange are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose forecasts than other firms 
Industry 
Industry is predicted to be related to disclosure for a number of reasons. Different 
industries have different proprietary costs of disclosure. Proprietary costs arise when 
competitors and potential market entrants gain advantage from information disclosed 
by firms. Also, profits in some industries are easier to forecast than in others. Industry 
membership has been found to be related to the accuracy of forecasts disclosed (Jaggi, 
1978). Regulated industries in the US, such as electric utilities, have been found to 
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have more accurate forecasts. Bailey, Brown and Izan (1985) included an industry 
variable because previous research found it to be correlated with accounting method 
choice. They found industry to be significantly related to frequency of voluntary 
disclosure of lease obligations. There is a need to control for industry in any study of 
voluntary disclosure. As the direction of the relationship between disclosure and 
industry is unknown, the hypothesis is expressed in null form. 
H, 3: Voluntary disclosure of forecasts is not affected by the industry of the firm. 
Nationality 
All targets are listed on the London Stock Exchange and are either UK or Irish 
companies. Many of the bidders are foreign. Consequently the sample of firms is made 
up of a mixture of nationalities. International accounting research has documented 
differences in disclosure practices by firms from different countries. In a recent study, 
Frost and Pownall (1994) find that voluntary disclosures are substantially more 
frequent in the US than in the UK. Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) compared disclosure 
rankings of eight countries in three prior studies and conclude that the US followed by 
the UK were consistently ranked highest on comprehensiveness of disclosure levels. 
Thus, UK firms are expected to disclose forecasts more frequently than other 
nationality firms. A dummy variable is included to control for the effect of nationality. 
The hypothesis is expressed in null form. 
H, 4: Voluntary disclosure of forecasts no different for UK firms than for other 
nationalityfirms 
In summary, it is hypothesised for both bidders and targets that disclosure of forecasts 
is a function of the various explanatory variables described above, as shown in table 
3.1: 
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Table 3.1 Model of disclosure of profit forecasts 
Disclosure =f (YEAR + BT + BID + CON + BHOR + SIZE + LEV + MO + SSH + AUD + MB + 
QUOTED + IND + NAT) 
where: 
YEAR = Year of bid MO 
BT = Party to the bid SSH 
BID = Type of bid AUD 
CON = Purchase consideration MB 
BHOR = Bid horizon QUOTED 
SIZE = Size IND 
LEV = Leverage NAT 
= Management ownership of firm 
= Substantial shareholdings in firm 
= Auditor/reporting accountant 
= Financial advisor 
= Whether quoted 
= Industry sector of firm 
= Nationality of firm 
3.2 Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts: market expectations (1115) 
The expectations adjustment hypothesis of Ajinkya and Gift (1984) posits that firms 
are motivated to disclose information to align investors' expectations of future 
earnings. Support for this hypothesis is provided by Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Ruland, 
Tung and George (1990) and Skinner (1994). Thus, forecasts are more likely to be 
disclosed when investor perceptions are most out of line with company results. This 
point is mentioned by most interviewees in chapter 5. 
His: Forecast disclosure is more likely when market expectations diverge most 
, 
from actual performance. 
3.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts (H16-H19) 
Disclosure of profit forecasts is analysed to see whether: 
" Target companies issuing profit forecasts are more likely to successfully defend or 
obtain a price increase in contested bids. 
" Bidding companies issuing profit forecasts are more likely to successfully complete 
contested bids. 
Anecdotal evidence (for example, the interviews in chapter 5) suggests that disclosure 
of profit forecasts during takeovers has a significant effect on the outcome of bids. 
Empirical evidence, however, has been mixed. Whether disclosure of profit forecasts 
has strategic value is tested by the following four hypotheses: 
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H16: Successful bidders are more likely to have disclosed afore cast. 
H»: Disclosure of a forecast by bidders makes no difference to whether the 
offer price was increased 
H18: Successful defenders are more likely to have disclosed a forecast. 
H19: An increase in offer price is more likely where the target has disclosed a 
forecast. 
3.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis 
A content analysis of the disclosures in profit forecasts is made to assess whether the 
content varies with variables in the research.. 
3.4.1 Takeover-context variables (H2o-H21) 
Paqy to the bid/forecaster 
Previous research has shown the characteristics of bidders and targets to differ 
(Tzoannos and Samuels, 1972; Levine and Aaronovitch, 1981; Hasbrouck, 1985; 
Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1990; Powell, 1995). Consequently, motivations for disclosure 
by bidders and targets during takeover bids may differ substantially. Consequently 
there may be differences in forecast disclosure content between these two groups. 
Targets are expected to disclose more in their forecasts than bidders. Bidding 
companies control the timing of an approach and are more likely to make a bid when 
market conditions are favourable to the bidder. Bidders will therefore have less need to 
communicate with their shareholders. Target companies have no such control over 
events and therefore have a greater need to signal information to shareholders to adjust 
market expectations. In contested bids, the target company under attack by the bidder 
will have greater incentives to counter adverse comment from the bidder and publicity 
concerning the quality of its earnings. Advisors to target companies are more likely to 
be sued in the event of problems arising after a takeover. Consequently advisors will be 
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urging caution on directors of target companies and this more cautious, litigation- 
conscious approach may encourage extra disclosures in forecasts. 
Hio: Content of disclosures in target company forecasts are greater than bidder 
forecasts. 
Type of bid 
Characteristics of target firms differ depending on whether they are the subject of 
contested or uncontested bids (Merck, Shleifer and Vishney, 1988). The type of bid 
may also influence the propensity of firms to disclose information. 
When a forecast is disclosed in a contested bid, invariably the forecast and its contents 
are attacked by the other side. Predators closely examine the basis of the profit 
forecast. Any short term device, such as reduced research and development spending 
or pension holidays, as well as creative accounting, will be highlighted to the target's 
discomfort. Examples 56 to 59 in appendix 4 illustrate this point. Consequently, 
additional disclosures are expected during contested bids to avoid attack by the other 
side and to underpin the reliability of the forecast. 
The effect of competitive environments on disclosures in annual reports has been 
examined previously by Choi (1973). Choi found that firms competing for scarce 
capital upgraded and increased financial disclosure. 
H21: Content of disclosures in contested bid forecasts are greater than in agreed 
bid forecasts 
3.4.2 Forecast-related variables (H22-H24) 
Previous research recognises that some forecast-related characteristics influence 
accuracy. These forecast-related variables are also expected to have an effect on 
disclosures in forecasts. 
107 
Circumstances of making the forecast 
Under the rules of the Takeover Code, any forecast or statement made before the 
commencement of the offer that could be construed as a forecast must be published in 
takeover documents and be formally reported on. Such forecasts are not made 
voluntarily (see examples 8 to 10 in appendix 4). 
As the act of disclosing such forecasts is involuntary and reluctantly made by 
management, it is expected that the disclosures in these forecasts will also be made 
reluctantly, and consequently that there will be less disclosure in involuntary forecasts 
compared with voluntary forecasts. 
H22: Content of disclosures in voluntaryforecasts are greater than in 
involuntary forecasts. 
Forecast horizon and forecast period 
The forecast horizon (days from the date of the forecast to the forecast period end 
date) and the period forecast (mostly six month forecasts or annual forecasts) are 
highly correlated and are therefore dealt with together. In particular, longer forecast 
horizons are related to longer period forecasts. 
Forecast horizon and period forecast are expected to influence content of disclosures 
in forecasts for a number of reasons. Interim reports disclose considerably less detail 
than annual reports. Similarly interim (six month or shorter) profit forecasts are 
expected to disclose less information than annual forecasts. 
Forecast horizon has been found to be an important determinant of forecast accuracy 
(Dev and Webb, 1972; Hagerman and Ruland, 1979; Brown, Foster and Noreen, 1985; 
Mak, 1989; Keasey and McGuinness, 1991). The interviews in chapter 5 suggest that 
forecasters attempt to deal with uncertainty in forecasts through disclosure of 
assumptions. The longer the forecast horizon and the longer the forecast period, the 
greater the uncertainty in the forecast. Therefore, greater disclosure (particularly of 
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assumptions) is expected to deal with the greater uncertainty inherent in long horizon, 
longer period forecasts. 
H2, j: Content of disclosures is greater in long horizon than in short horizon 
forecasts. 
H24: Content of disclosures is greater in longer period than in shorter period 
forecasts. 
3.4.3 Firm-specific variables (1125-H33) 
Size of firm 
Previous content analysis studies have suggested many reasons why large companies 
might disclose more information than other companies (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Firth, 
1979). Some of these reasons are outlined in paragraph 3.1.2 earlier in this chapter. 
Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), Buzby (1974,1975), Firth (1979), Chow and 
Wong-Boren (1987), Cooke (1989 and 1992) and Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994) 
have all documented that there is greater disclosure of financial accounting information 
by larger firms. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) included size as a proxy for agency 
costs. Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) found size to be moderately significant in explaining 
the extent of bank reporting practices internationally. McNally, Eng and Hasseldine 
(1982) found size to be the only significant firm specific characteristic in relation to 
disclosure practices of New Zealand listed manufacturing companies. 
H25: Content of disclosures is greater in forecasts of larger compared with 
smaller firms 
Leverage 
The reasons why leverage may be linked to voluntary disclosure have been outlined 
earlier in this chapter. Only Firth (1984) and Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) have 
tested leverage in a content analysis study of disclosure. Firth included leverage as a 
control variable in his study of amount of disclosure and stock market risk. Chow and 
109 
Wong-Boren test leverage for agency cost reasons. Neither study found the variable to 
be significant in explaining levels of voluntary disclosure. 
H26: Firms with high debt-equity ratios disclose more in their forecasts than 
firms with low debt-equity ratios. 
Management ownership 
No previous content analysis study has tested management ownership and level of 
disclosure. Reasons for a relationship between level of disclosure and management 
ownership are derived from agency theory outlined in connection with Hs earlier in this 
chapter. 
H27: Firms with a lower percentage management ownership disclose more in 
their forecasts than firms with a higher percentage management 
ownership. 
Substantial shareholdings 
Firms with a larger proportion of share capital concentrated amongst a few large 
shareholders are likely to find disclosure of private information easier than firms with 
more dispersed shareholdings. This prediction applies not only to forecast disclosure 
but also to the details disclosed in the forecasts. The variable, percentage substantial 
shareholdings, attempts to measure the dispersion of shareholders in firms. 
H28: Firms with a larger percentage substantial shareholdings disclose less 
in their forecasts than firms with a smaller percentage substantial 
shareholdings. 
Auditor/reporting accountant 
The expectation of auditor influence on disclosure outlined earlier has generally not 
been found in previous content analysis studies. Firth (1979) found that choice of 
auditors had very little influence on the levels of disclosure made by companies. 
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982) found no significant differences in disclosure for 
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big-eight audit firms compared with smaller audit firms. Following DeAngelo's (1981) 
finding that `high quality' audit firms are likely to encourage clients to follow high 
quality reporting practices, it is hypothesised that there will be more disclosures in 
forecasts reported on by big-six auditors. 
H29: Firms engaging big-six auditors disclose more in their forecasts than firms 
with other auditors. 
Financial advisor 
Financial advisor is tested for a similar reason to auditor/reporting accountant. 
Financial advisors are also required to formally report on forecasts. In addition, the 
interview data suggest that financial advisors greatly influence disclosures in forecasts. 
Hjo: Firms engaging higher reputation financial advisors disclose more in their 
forecasts than firms with other financial advisors. 
Listing status 
Prior research has examined the influence of listing status on disclosures in annual 
reports with mixed results. Singhvi and Desai (1971), Firth (1979), Cooke (1989, 
1992), Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) and Wallace, Naser and Mora (1994) found 
listing status to be significant, whereas Buzby (1975) did not. Cooke (1993) obtained 
mixed results. Meek and Gray (1989) found that quoted companies with a listing on 
more than one stock exchange disclosed more information than companies with a 
single listing. All target firms in this research are listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
However, bidders range from individuals, consortiums of individuals, private 
companies to foreign listed companies. 
Hw Bidders listed on the London Stock Exchange disclose more in their 
forecasts than unlisted bidders. 
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Industry 
Industry is predicted to be related to disclosure for a number of reasons. Different 
industries have different proprietary costs of disclosure. Stanga (1976) found industry 
type to be a significant variable, whereas McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982) and 
Malone, Fries and Jones (1993) did not. Cooke (1992) found that manufacturing 
corporations in Japan disclosed significantly more information than non-manufacturing, 
regardless of quotation status. These studies indicate the need to control for industry. 
As the direction of the relationship between disclosure and industry is unknown, the 
hypothesis is expressed in null form. 
H32: Content of disclosures in forecasts are not related to the industry of the 
forecasting firm. 
Nationality 
All targets are listed on the London Stock Exchange and are either UK or Irish 
companies. Many of the bidders are foreign. Consequently the sample of firms is made 
up of a mixture of nationalities. Variation in the level of disclosures in annual reports of 
different nationality firms has been well documented (Gray, 1978; Kahl and Belkaoui, 
1981; Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1993). A dummy variable is included to control for the 
effect of nationality. Again the direction of the relationship is unknown so the 
hypothesis is expressed in null form. 
Hjj: Content of disclosures in forecasts is no different for UKfirms than for 
other nationality firms. 
In summary, it is hypothesised that content of disclosures in profit forecasts is a 
function of the various explanatory variables described above, as shown in table 3.2. 
3.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content (H34) 
Signalling theory suggests that firms are motivated to signal good news and are more 
likely to disclose a forecast. The empirical evidence of the role of good news in 
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motivating forecast disclosure is mixed and seems to depend on the time period of the 
study and on the type of forecasts studied (point or narrow range forecasts versus 
more qualitative forecasts). Patell (1976), Penman (1980), Waymire (1984) and Lev 
and Penman (1990) find that earnings forecasts are in general associated with positive 
returns and that firms with good news appear more willing to reveal their forecasts. 
Results are based on average figures and a number of bad news forecasts were found in 
the samples. 
I Table 3.2 Model of content of disclosures in profit forecasts 
Disclosures =f (BT + BID + CIRC + FHOR + PER + SIZE + LEV + MO + SSH + AUD + MB 
+ QUOTED + IND + NAT) 
where: 
BT = Forecaster MO 
BID = Type of bid SSH 
CIRC = Circumstances of the forecast AUD 
FHOR = Forecast horizon MB 
PER = Period of the forecast QUOTED 
SIZE = Size IND 
LEV = Leverage NAT 
= Management ownership of firm 
= Substantial shareholdings in firm 
= Auditor/reporting accountant 
= Financial advisor 
= Whether quoted on London S/E 
= Industry sector of firm 
= Nationality of firm 
Ajinkya and Gift (1984), Waymire (1984) and Ruland, Tung and George (1990) did 
not observe an overall tendency to report good news. They show that incentives exist 
for management to disclose both good and bad news. Baginski, Hassell and Waymire 
(1994), Pownall, Wasley and Waymire (1993) and Skinner (1994) provide evidence 
that firms are more likely to disclose bad news than good news. Clarkson, Dontoh, 
Richardson and Sefcik (1992) and Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) found that 
the mean value of the good news measure for Canadian forecasters significantly 
exceeded nonforecasters. As the weight of evidence supports the disclosure of good 
news, it is hypothesised that more good news than bad news forecasts will be 
disclosed. 
H34: Forecasts disclosed are mainly good news forecasts 
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3.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter developed 34 hypotheses for testing. As agency theory and signalling 
theory are the primary theoretical background to the study, they provide the basis for 
some of the hypotheses tested. The situation specific nature of the research gave rise to 
a number of hypotheses testing the effect of takeover-context on disclosure. Prior 
empirical voluntary disclosure research suggested additional control variables. 
Table 3.3 summarises the 34 hypotheses under the five research headings identified at 
the beginning of this chapter. There may seem to be a large number of hypotheses, but 
many are repetitive as there are two primary dependent variables: 
disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts (Hl-H14) and content of disclosures in forecasts 
(H20-H33). Thus, there is considerable duplication in these two groups of hypotheses. 
Chapter 4 describes the research methodology applied to test these hypotheses, and 
how the dependent and independent variables were measured. Results of analysis of 
Hl-H19 are reported in chapter 6. Results of analysis of content of disclosures in 
forecasts and news content in forecasts (H2o-H34) are reported in chapter 7. 
Table 3.3 Summary of hypotheses 
Research issue 
Factors influencing disclosures of 
forecasts 
Influence of market expectations 
Forecast effective weapon? 
Factors influencing content of 
disclosures in forecasts 
News content of forecasts 
Hypotheses Dependent variable 
H1-H14 Disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
His Disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
H16-H19 Success/failure of bid 
Offer price increased/not increased 
H20-H33 Content of disclosures in forecasts: No. of 
items and assumptions disclosed 
H34 Good news/bad news 
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Chapter 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes population and sample, data collection methods, definition 
and measurement of the variables and the statistical techniques used to examine 
influences on disclosure of profit forecasts and on content of disclosures in the 
forecasts. 
4.1 Population and selection of sample 
The sample chosen for study covers all takeover bids for companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange during the period 1988 to 1992. A relatively long period 
of study is necessary to ensure that the sample contains enough profit forecasts to 
provide sufficient data to ensure meaningful statistical analysis. At the 
commencement of the research, it was expected that a profit forecast would be 
disclosed in approximately 20% of takeover bids. 
In addition, by choosing such a long experimental period, an analysis of the effect 
of economic conditions on disclosure can be undertaken. There were considerable 
differences in economic conditions prevailing, and in the level of takeover activity, 
during this five year period. Takeover activity was particularly high in 1988 and 
1989, falling off in 1990, to very low levels in 1991 and especially in 1992. 
Table 4.1 Summary economic indicators 1988 to 1992 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GDP (1990=100) 97.3 99.4 100 97.9 97.4 
Volume of retail sales (1990=100) 97.3 99.3 100 98.9 99.5 
UK unemployment 2.4m 1.9m 1.5m 1.8m 2.5m 
Share prices FT-SE Actuaries: 147 177 173 190 199 
`500' shares (1985 FT=100) 
Interest rates (LIBOR) 13.0 15.0 14.0 10.5 7.0 
(End of year % p. a. ) 
Sources: Annual abstract of statistics 1995. Central Statistics Office: 
HMSO: London. 
Main economic indicators. January 1993 and April 1994. 
Statistics Directorate, OECD. 
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Some economic indicators for the period are shown in table 4.1. These show 
1990 to have been a buoyant year economically. Lower share prices in 1988 
(particularly), 1989 and 1990 would be a factor in the high level of takeover 
activity in these three years. Equally, the very high share prices in 1991 and 1992 
would be related to the very low level of takeover activity in these years, 
especially in 1992. 
Acquisitions Monthly was used to obtain a list of all public company takeovers in 
the UK over the five year period of the study. The January edition of the journal 
publishes a summary of all UK public company takeovers completed and failed 
for the previous year. This includes takeovers of UK and Irish public companies 
by other UK and Irish public companies, by unlisted UK companies and by listed 
and unlisted foreign companies. 
4.1.1 Sample 
In total, 705 completed and failed bids were listed for 1988 to 1992. Four bids 
listed have been excluded from the research (reference numbers 7-1990,125- 
1990,91-1991 and 29-1992 in appendix 5). Two bids, occurring in late 
December, were included twice in two different years by Acquisitions Monthly. In 
one further case, the target had previously been taken over by a public company 
and was therefore a private company at the date of the second bid. No takeover 
documents were publicly available for this bid. The fourth bid excluded, although 
reported by Acquisitions Monthly, did not take place (this was confirmed in a 
telephone conversation with the bidder - an individual). 
This study of forecast disclosure is unique in that it includes the full population of 
701 bids (involving 1,402 bidders and targets). No bids, bidders or targets have 
been excluded from the study other than those mentioned in the previous 
paragraph which are not properly part of the population. 
Figure 4.1 summarises the sample details. 
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Figure 4.1 Sample identification 
Successful and failed public 
company takeovers 1988 to 
1992 per Acquisitions Monthly 
(705) 
Bids excluded due to 




F Forecast not disclosed Forecast disclosed 
during takeover during takeover 
Takeover bids are analysed by type in tables 4.2 and 4.3. There were 528 agreed 
bids, 158 contested bids and 15 white knight bids. For the ensuing analysis, the 15 
white knight bids are categorised as agreed bids. Of the 158 contested bids, 80 
failed (51%). There were also 41 agreed bids which were not completed, resulting 
in a total of 121 failed bids in the study. The main reason why agreed bids did not 
complete is competing bids from other bidders (23 of the 41 agreed uncompleted 
bids were the subject of alternative bids). 
Table 4.4 shows that there was little change in trend in the proportion of defended 
takeover bids during the period. As publication of a profit forecast is one means 
of defending a takeover, any change in the defence ratio would be expected to 
affect the number of profit forecasts disclosed in a period. 
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Table 4.2 Analysis of UK listed company takeovers 1988 to 1992 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total 
Completed bids 
Agreed bid 135 123 107 76 48 489 
Contested bid 23 21 13 14 8 79 
White knight 0 7 3 2 12 
158 151 123 90 58 580 
Failed bids 
Agreed bid 11 10 3 10 4 38 
Contested bid 22 24 14 14 6 80 
White knight 2 1 3 
33 36 17 25 10 121 
Total bids 121 112 144 ill (a 2U 
Table 4.3 Analysis of success or failure of bids by targets' initial response 
Agreed Contested White knight Total 
Completed bids 489 ( 93%) 79 ( 30%) 12 ( 80%) 580 ( 83%) 
Failed bids 38 L 7%) 80 ( 50%) 3 %) 121 ( 27%) 
21 (1&%) 1(W%) IIU W%) 2U U&%) 
Table 4.4 Incidence of defended takeover bids 
Year Bids Defended bids Defended ratio 
1988 191 45 24% 
1989 187 45 24% 
1990 140 27 19% 
1991 115 28 24% 
1992 68 14 21% 
2u m 23% 
The purchase consideration ranged between cash, paper and various combinations 
of cash and paper. Table 4.5 shows that nearly half were cash bids, with the 
remainder fairly evenly divided between paper or a mixture of cash and paper 
bids. 
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Table 4.5 Bids analysed by purchase consideration 
Cash 338 ( 49%) 
Paper 192 ( 28%) 
Cash and paper 163 23%) 
693 (jW%) 
Missing values 8 
Table 4.6 summarises some characteristics of bidders and targets. The majority 
are advised by higher reputation financial advisors and auditors. All target firms, 
and a majority of bidders, are UK quoted companies. A good spread of industries 
is represented in the population. The majority of firms are UK firms, with a small 
pocket of Irish firms and a substantial group of foreign companies. There are a 
large number of missing values on the variables, financial advisor and industry. 
4.1.2 Data collection 
Forecasts were obtained from an examination of the takeover documents for the 
entire sample of 701 bids. These were obtained from three sources. Extel 
Financial's microfiche service contains microfiche copies of all documents issued 
by companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Takeover documents are 
available on the C fiche service. This service was made available by KPMG Peat 
Marwick, London. Subsequently, Extel Financial allowed access to their hard 
copy and microfiche files to obtain documents not available in KPMG Peat 
Marwick. Finally, any remaining missing documents were obtained by writing 
directly to bidders, targets or their financial advisors. 
4.1.3 Frequency of forecast disclosure 
Frequency of forecast disclosure is shown in figures 4.1. and 4.2. Figure 4.1 
shows that a forecast was disclosed in 197 out of 701 bids: a frequency of one 
forecast in every 3.5 bids. Figure 4.2 shows that 226 firms, out of 1,402, 
disclosed a forecast: a frequency of one forecast for every six firms. 
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Table 4.6 Categorical firm-specific variables 
Total 
Auditor/reporting accountant 
Big-six auditors 716 ( 69%) 
Other auditors 317 ( 31%) 
1033 (1&/o) 
Missing values 369 
14Q2 
Financial advisor 
Higher reputation financial 
advisors 848 ( 62%) 
Other financial advisors 520 ( 38%) 
1368 (IQQ%) 
Missing values 34 
1442 
Listing status 
Quoted 1032 ( 74%) 
Unquoted 370( %) 
1442 a %i 
Indust 
Capital goods 216 ( 22%) 
Durable goods 131( 14%) 
Non-durable goods 260 ( 27%) 
Banks and financial 147 ( 15%) 
Other 214 (22%) 
968 (1&%) 
Missing values 434 
1492 
Nationality 
UK companies 1192 ( 85%) 
Irish companies 27 ( 2%) 
Other nationalities 183 ( 13%) 
im (W/O) 
More than one forecast was disclosed in some bids. There was a forecast 
disclosure frequency of almost one forecast in every three bids (250 forecasts in 
701 bids). Westwick (1972) found a similar frequency of disclosure. He reports 
figures from the Takeover Panel annual reports for the years ending 31 March 
1970 (363 bids) and 1971 (296 bids) in which 245 forecasts were disclosed. 
These figures would suggest an average of at least one forecast in every three bids 
- similar to this study. Gray, Roberts and Gordon (1991) in MCRV found a 
smaller proportion of forecasts: 11 from 52 takeover documents (21%). 
120 
Figure 4.2 Frequency of forecast disclosure 
Bidders and targets 
in the sample 
(1402) 
(1176) (226) 
Forecast not disclosed Forecast disclosed 
during takeover during takeover 
(534) (642) (167) (59) 
Target Bidding Target Bidding 
com an company company company 
(456) (78) (504) (138) (86) (81) (38) (21) 
Agreed Contested Agreed Contested Agreed Contested Agreed Contested 
The frequency of disclosure in prospectuses issued in other business situations has 
been higher. Ferris (1976) found 58% new issue prospectuses disclosed forecasts. 
More recently, Keasey and McGuinness (1991) found 121 forecasts (62%) in 194 
prospectuses issued in connection with placement flotations in the unlisted 
securities marked in the UK between 1984 and 1986. 
In a three year study, Platt (1979) found that 39% and 34% of annual reports 
disclosed a profit forecast in 1973/74 and 1974/75 but none was disclosed in 
1975/76 due, he conjectured, to adverse political and economic conditions. In 
addition, Platt found between 62% and 72% of interim reports disclosed a profit 
forecast. 
Frequency of forecast disclosure also varies with jurisdiction. Clarkson, Dontoh, 
Richardson and Sefcik (1992) found that 58% initial public offering prospectuses 
on the Toronto Stock Exchange in the period 1984 to 1987 voluntarily included 
an earnings forecast. Meek and Gray (1989) were surprised to find six out of 14 
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Swedish firms in their study disclosing a quantitative forecast. Dutch firms gave 
vague indications of future financial information, while French and German firms 
in the study disclosed no forward-looking information. 
In all, 250 forecasts were disclosed. Table 4.7 analyses forecast disclosure by 
year. As the level of takeover activity was greatest in the late 1980s compared 
with the early 1990s, there were more forecasts in the earlier years of the study, 
particularly in 1988. The economic conditions prevailing in 1988, as shown in 
table 4.1, do not appear to account for the higher incidence of forecasts in that 
year, nor does the level of contested bids. The incidence of contested bids in 1988 
(shown in table 4.4) is not very different from other years in the study. 
Table 4.7 Year of forecast 
Forecasts Bids %Forecasts/Bids 
1988 82( 33%) 191( 27%) 43% 
1989 60( 24%) 187( 27%) 32% 
1990 52( 21%) 140( 20%) 37% 
1991 32( 13%) 115( 16%) 28% 
1992 24 ( 9%) 68 ( 9%) 35% 
a W%) 2u (IW%) 
4.2 Research methodology 
Research methodology is dealt with under five headings, derived from the five 
research issues outlined in chapter 1. 
4.2.1 Factors influencing disclosure 
4.2.1.1. Interviews 
In order to understand the disclosure process better and to validate the research 
hypotheses and design against the practice and opinions of those involved in the 
disclosure decision, eleven participants in the disclosure decision were 
interviewed. These interviews are analysed in chapter 5 and are reported in detail 
in appendix 2. Selection of interviewees is described in chapter 5. 
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Interview method 
There are three basic approaches to collecting data through interview ranging 
from informal conversational to interview guide approach to standardised open- 
ended interview (Patton, 1990). This research followed a semi-structured 
approach whereby an outline interview guide (shown in appendix 1) was sent to 
each interviewee in advance of the interviews. This gave interviewees some 
advance notice of interview questions and also provided the interviews with a 
framework and focus. The interview outline was used to ensure that the 
interviewee described in detail the unfolding of the disclosure process during the 
bid. This ensured that the research issues addressed by the hypotheses were 
discussed. Otherwise the interviews developed in response to the answers given 
by the interviewees to the questions. Generally during interview this outline was 
expanded on in the course of the discussion. 
Each interview lasted one and a half to two hours. In one case there was a follow 
up interview. Interviews were recorded in note form or on tape. 
4.2.1.2 Quantitative analysis: measurement of variables 
Variables are summarised in table 4.8 (except for forecast-related variables which 
are shown in table 4.18). 
4.2.1.3 Dependent variable - forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 
The primary dependent variable is forecast disclosure (F). All takeover documents 
were examined for disclosure of a forecast. The variable is a dummy variable with 
the value 0 for nondisclosure, or for disclosure of an involuntary/repeat forecast, 
and I where one or more forecasts are disclosed voluntarily. 
4.2.1.4 Independent variables 
There are three levels of independent variable. Takeover-context variables are 
first described, followed by firm-specific variables. Forecast-related independent 
variables are dealt with in section 4.2.4.2. 
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Table 4.8 Definition and measurement of variables 
Dependent variables 
" Forecast (F): 1= Voluntary forecast, 0= No voluntary forecast 
" Success of bid (SUC): 1= Successful bid, 0= Failed bid 
" Increase in offer (I. OFFER): 1= Offer increased 0= No increase 
Independent variables 
Takeover-context variables 
" Economic conditions (YEAR): By year 
" Party to the bid (BT): Bidder = 0, Target =1 
" Type of bid (BID): 0= Agreed bid, 1= Contested bid 
" Bid horizon (BHOR): Measured in days from date of the bid to the following year end 
" Purchase consideration (CON): 1= Cash, 2= Paper, 3= Cash and paper 
" Size (VAL): Value of the bid 
Firm-specific variables 
" Size (REV): Turnover of bidder/target from the most recent accounts prior to the bid 
" Size (TAl): Total assets of bidder/target 
" Size (TA2): Owners' equity of bidder/target 
" Leverage (LEV): Long term debt + Total assets of bidder/target 
"% Management Ownership (MO): Management voting shares + Total voting shares 
"% Substantial shareholdings (SSH): Total % equity of the company held by substantial 
(>5%) shareholders 
" Number of substantial shareholdings (NO. SSH): Number of substantial (>5%) shareholders 
" Auditor/reporting accountant (AUD): 1= Big-six auditors, 0= Others 
" Financial advisor (MB): 1= Higher reputation, 0= Other 
" Listing status (QUOTED): 0= Unquoted, 1= Quoted 
" Industry sector (IND): 1= capital goods, 2= consumer durable goods, 
3= consumer non-durable goods, 4= other, 5= banks and financial 
" Nationality (NAT): 0= UK, 1= Irish, 2= Other 
" Deviation from market expectations (ME): Difference between consensus analysts' forecasts 
and subsequent actual results 
Takeover-context variables 
There are six bid-related variables: year, party to the bid, type of bid, value of bid, 
bid horizon and purchase consideration. Year of the bid (YEAR) is a proxy for 
economic conditions. Party to the bid (BT) is either the bidder or target, coded 0 
and 1 respectively. Type of bid (BID) is given a value of 0 for agreed bids and 1 
for contested bids. As there were so few white knight bids, they are classified as 
agreed bids. Value of the bid (VAL), which is in £millions, proxies for firm size. 
Bid horizon (BHOR) is measured in days from the date of the bid to the year end 
for which accounts have not been published. Acquisitions Monthly discloses the 
date of the most recent published accounts. For the purpose of logit analysis this 
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variable is scaled by the number of days in the year (365). Purchase consideration 
(CON) offered during the bid is coded 1 for cash, 2 for paper and 3 for various 
combinations of cash and paper. Data on all these variables were obtained from 
Acquisitions Monthly or from the takeover documents. 
Firm-specific variables 
In all, there are ten firm-specific variables: size, leverage, percentage management 
ownership, substantial shareholders, auditor/reporting accountant, financial 
advisor, listing status, industry, nationality and deviation from market 
expectations. 
Three proxies for size (in addition to value of the bid (VAL)) are used: turnover 
(REV), total assets (TAl) and owners' equity (TA2), all measured in £thousands 
(logit analysis) or £millions (in negative binomial regression analysis). Statistical 
analysis is run separately on these variables in all analyses. 
Amounts were extracted from the most recent full set of accounts in each 
takeover document. Total assets (TA1) is taken as fixed assets plus net current 
assets. Owners' equity (TA2) is total assets less all liabilities. In some cases, 
particularly financial institutions, total assets could not be calculated from the 
balance sheet as current liabilities and long term liabilities are not disclosed 
separately. 
Leverage (LEV) is based on the latest balance sheet amounts in the takeover 
documents and is calculated as long term debt divided by total assets. 
Foreign currency amounts for the above variables are translated at the rates ruling 
on balance sheet dates. Monthly foreign exchange rates were obtained from 
Datastream. 
Percentage management ownership (MO) is taken from Crawford's Directory of 
City Connections and is the percentage of ordinary shares held by members of the 
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board, their families and associates. Crawford's Directory is an annual 
publication. The directory for the same year as the bid was consulted. Where this 
information is not available in Crawford's Directory, beneficial interests of the 
directors and their families, as disclosed in the takeover documents, are used. 
Where the bidder is an individual, a consortium of individuals or a family 
company, percentage management ownership (MO) is recorded as 100 per cent. 
Substantial shareholdings is measured in two ways: number of substantial 
shareholders (NO. SSH): those holding 5% or more of the company, and 
percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH): the percentage equity of the 
company held by substantial (>5%) shareholders. This information is also 
obtained from Crawford's Directory. 
Auditor/reporting accountant (AUD), a dummy variable, is recorded as 1 for big- 
six auditors and 0 for other firms. Big-six firms are: KPMG Peat Marwick; Price 
Waterhouse; Arthur Andersen; Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte; Ernst & Young; 
Touche Ross (including their predecessors). Information on company auditors 
was obtained from Crawford's Directory and from forecasts where these were 
disclosed. 
Financial advisor (MB) is also a dummy variable with a value of 1 for higher 
reputation merchant banks and 0 for other firms. Higher reputation merchant 
banks were taken to be top 15 firms of advisors listed in Acquisitions Monthly's 
eight year league table of financial advisors on UK public company takeovers in 
the period 1985 to 1992 (Acquisitions Monthly, February 1993). 
Listing status (QUOTED) is a dummy variable with the value 0 for companies not 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange and 1 for quoted companies. 
Industry codes (IND) are obtained from Crawford's Directory. Crawford's 
industry index is based on categories used by the Financial Times and used by the 
FT-Actuaries All-Share Index. These were re-coded to 1 for capital goods, 2 for 
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consumer-durable goods, 3 for consumer non-durable goods, 4 for other and 5 
for banks and financial. 
Nationality of bidder/target (NAT) is available from Acquisitions Monthly. There 
were 26 nationalities in the sample. These were re-coded 0 for UK, 1 for Irish and 
2 for other nationalities. 
4.2.1.5 Predicted response of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 
variable to independent variables 
Table 4.9 summarises the predicted response of the primary dependent variable, 
disclosure of a forecast, to each independent variable (Hl-H14). 
Table 4.9 Prediction of impact of independent variables on disclosure of forecasts 
Independent variable Impact on disclosure 
Takeover-context variables 
YEAR ? More changeable economic conditions make forecasting 
difficult. There will be fewer forecasts in recessionary periods 
BT B? Targets are more likely to disclose forecasts than bidders 
T+ 
BID + Contested bids will have a positive effect on disclosure 
BHOR - The longer the bid horizon the greater the uncertainty and the 
less likely forecasts will be disclosed 
CON B+ Bidders are more likely to disclose forecasts during a paper bid 
T? Purchase consideration will not have an effect on disclosure of 
forecasts by targets 
Firm-specific variables 
VAUREV/TAl/TA2 + Larger firms are more likely to disclose forecasts 
LEV + Higher leverage results in higher agency costs and therefore 
greater disclosure of forecasts 
MO - Lower management ownership results in higher agency costs 
and consequently greater disclosure of forecasts 
SSH/NO. SSH - Substantial shareholders can be informed privately 
AUD + Better quality auditors are more likely to encourage disclosure of 
forecasts 
MB + Better quality financial advisors are more likely to encourage 
disclosure of forecasts 




4.2.1.6 Summary descriptive statistics - independent variables 
Summary descriptive statistics for all continuous variables are shown in Table 
4.10. The mean of bid horizon (BHOR) is 118 days from the date of the bid to the 
following year end date. This variable is only slightly negatively skewed. The size 
variables, value of bid (VAL), turnover (REV), total assets (TAl) and owners' 
equity (TA2), are highly positively skewed. Leverage (LEV) is also positively 
skewed, as are, to a lesser extent, percentage management ownership (MO), 
number of substantial shareholders (NO. SSH) and percentage substantial 
shareholdings (SSH). 
Missing values are a problem with some variables, especially number of 
shareholders (NO. SSH) and percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH) which 
are missing in 53% and 47% of cases. Percentage management ownership (MO) 
is missing in 20% and bid horizon (BHOR) in 19% of cases. Missing values are 
particularly a problem with bidders as these include individuals, consortiums, 
private companies and foreign companies. 
Table 4.10 Descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables 
Variable Mean Median Skewness Standard No. Missing Total 
deviation values 
Takeover-context variables 
BHOR 118 117 -0.26 117 571 130 (19%) 701 
VAL 169 25 12.92' 666 698 3 (0.4%) 701 
Firm-specific variables 
REV 745 56 11.69' 3275 1210 192 (14%) 1402 
TAl 372 29 24.361 2238 1204 198 (14%) 1402 
TA2 302 23 31.15' 2801 1260 142 (10%) 1402 
LEV 0.37 0.21 12.37' 1.42 1201 201 (14%) 1402 
MO 25.36 11.55 1.22' 30.82 1127 275 (20%) 1402 
NO. SSH 2.06 2.00 0.96' 1.15 661 741(53%) 1402 
SSH 0.35 0.26 1.131 0.29 739 663 (47%) 1402 
These values (compared with values given in tables by Kanji (1993)) would indicate that assumptions that 
the variables are distributed normally are inappropriate. 
Spearman bivariate correlations for all independent variables were calculated 
separately for bidders and targets and are shown in tables A3.3 and A3.4 in 
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appendix 3. The highest correlations (down to 0.40) are summarised in table 4.11 
- the top six relate to correlations between the four size variables. There are also 
high correlations between the size variables and management ownership, between 
the size variables and financial advisors (for targets only), and among the dummy 
variables for purchase consideration. 
Thus, except for the size variables, there are few highly correlated independent 
variables in the sample. In any event, high correlations between the independent 
variables are not a problem for the multivariate statistical technique (logit 
analysis) used to analyse disclosuretnondisclosure of forecasts. 
Table 4.11 Summary of highest bivariate Spearman 
correlations between independent variables 
Correlation 
Relationship Bidders Targets 
TA1-TA2 0.96** 0.98** 
REV-TAI 0.76** 0.70** 
REV-TA2 0.71** 0.68** 
VAL-REV 0.45** 0.73** 
VAL-TAI 0.53** 0.82** 
VAL-TA2 0.52** 0.81** 
DCASH-DMIXED 0.45** 0.45** 
DPAPER-DMIXED 0.52** 0.52** 
MO-VAL -0.40** -0.40** 
MO-REV -0.49** 
MO-TAI. -0.59** -0.47** 











** Significant at < 0.01 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 
A3.3 and A3.4 in appendix 3. 
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4.2.2 Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts: market expectations 
4.2.2.1 Measurement of market expectations 
Deviation from market expectations (ME) measures the difference between 
subsequent actual profit before taxation and consensus analysts' forecast of profit 
before taxation for the year. Consensus analysts' forecasts are taken from The 
Earnings Guide. This is a monthly publication; the data are extracted from the 
issue closest to and prior to the bid date. Subsequent actual results are also 
obtained from The Earnings Guide. The variable is scaled as follows: 
ME =Consensus 
analysts' forecast -Actual results 
Actual results 
Only 261 readings are available for deviation from market expectations (ME). 
This is for two reasons: (i) the coverage of The Earnings Guide is limited to UK 
publicly quoted companies widely followed by analysts; (ii) subsequent results for 
many target firms in the study were unavailable because the target had been taken 
over and its results were included in the overall results of the bidder. 
Coverage of target companies by The Earnings Guide is not as good as for 
bidders - probably because targets are on average smaller and may be not as 
important to follow. 
Deviation from market expectations is analysed between positive (POSME) and 
negative (NEGME) deviations. A positive deviation is one that is greater than 
zero; a negative deviation is less than or equal to zero. 
Table 4.12 Prediction of impact of market expectations on disclosure of forecasts 
Independent variable Impact on disclosure 
ME + The more out of line actual results are with 
expectations, the more likely a forecast will be disclosed 
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4.2.2.2 Predicted response of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure variable to 
market expectations 
Table 4.12 summarises the predicted response of the dependent variable, 
disclosure of a forecast, to market expectations (His). 
4.2.2.3 Summary descriptive statistics - market expectations 
Descriptive statistics for market expectations are shown in table 4.13. The 
positive and negative subsamples are also analysed. The means for positive 
(POSME) and negative (NEGME) deviations do not appear dissimilar. The value 
of deviation from market expectations (ME) is not very different from zero. 
Skewness statistics indicate that none of the variables is distributed normally and 
consequently nonparametric methods are used in analysing market expectations in 
chapter 6. 
Table 4.13 Descriptive statistics of market expectations variables 
Variable Mean Median Skewness' Standard No. Missing Total 
deviation values 
ME 0.03 0.02 1.37 0.73 261 1141(81%) 1402 
POSME 0.26 0.09 5.78 0.68 153 
NEGME -0.31 -0.11 . 4.32 0.67 108 
Coefficients are all outside the range specifi ed in Kanji (1993) for the variables to be 
considered normally distributed. 
4.2.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts 
4.2.3.1 Measurement of dependent variables - outcome of bids 
Outcome of bids is published by Acquisitions Monthly and is measured in two 
ways. Success of bid (SUC) is a dummy variable with the value 1 for successful 
bids and 0 for failed bids. Increase in offer (I. OFFER) is also a dummy variable 
with the value 1 where there has been an increase and 0 for no increase. Whether 
or not there was an increase in the offer was obtained from Acquisitions Monthly 
and from whether increased offer documents were issued. 
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4.2.3.2 Predicted response of outcome of bids dependent variables to 
forecast disclosure/nondisclosure 
The predicted effect of disclosure of a forecast on outcome of bids is summarised 
in table 4.14 (H16-H19). 
Table 4.14 Prediction of impact of forecast disclosure/nondisclosure on outcome of bids 
Independent variable impact on outcome of bid 
F T+ Disclosure of forecasts will result in more bids being successfully 
defended by targets and in higher offer prices for targets 
B+ Disclosure of forecasts will result in more bids being successfully 
completed by bidders and will not affect the price being offered 
4.2.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content 
4.2.4.1 Content analysis of disclosures in forecasts 
A comprehensive content analysis of all forecasts (whether voluntary or 
involuntary/repeat forecasts) was carried out. Wording used in forecasts, their 
presentation, location in takeover documents and the circumstances of making the 
forecast were analysed, as were the period forecast, quantification in the forecast, 
and the forecast horizon. Examples from forecasts to illustrate issues raised by the 
research are shown in appendix 4. 
Disclosures in the forecasts are measured using a counting method. Statistical 
problems arising from using a counting approach are addressed later in this 
chapter. 
Counting method 
Previous research has measured the quantity of disclosure using a disclosure index 
(see Marston and Shrives (1991) for a review article). Courtis (1992) questions 
the reliability of results generated from the use of such instruments. Marston and 
Shrives state that `The validity of disclosure indices as a measure of information 
disclosure cannot be accepted without question. However, no other method for 
measuring disclosure has been developed. ' Ball and Foster (1982) comment that 
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the `more disclosure the better' framework appears to guide this kind of research, 
and superior disclosure is operationalised as a higher index score. 
All previous research using disclosure indices applied them to disclosures in 
annual reports. In these studies it is possible to specify an upper disclosure limit 
based on mandatory disclosures and on expected voluntary disclosures. Problems 
arise in constructing a disclosure index for disclosures in forecasts. Firstly, it is 
more difficult to select a list of items that should be disclosed in forecasts as there 
are few legal, regulatory or professional guidelines as to what should be 
disclosed. Secondly, in addition to disclosing financial information about firms' 
results, forecasts will contain assumptions which, on the one hand, provide more 
information on how the forecast is arrived at, but, on the other hand, may qualify 
the certainty of achieving the forecast. For these reasons, a counting approach is 
used to measure disclosure. Regression methods suitable for count data are 
applied to analyse the results. 
It was apparent from the interviews that motivations for disclosure of financial 
items in profit forecasts differ greatly from those influencing disclosure of 
assumptions. Assumptions are chosen to give the best results for the company 
and act as caveats to forecasts. They therefore introduce doubt. Consequently, 
disclosures are measured by two variables: number of items (ITEMS) and number 
of assumptions (ASS) disclosed in forecasts. 
All items and assumptions disclosed were examined and counted. Each item 
disclosed counted for a value of one, except for subtotals generated which were 
generally ignored. A dividend forecast counted for one even when it was not 
included in the forecast (dividend forecasts are rarely reported on by 
accountants). Notes amplifying disclosure in forecasts were counted as one (even 
if the note disclosed more than one item). Thus, earnings per share in forecasts 
counted as one and notes describing earnings per share calculations also counted 
as one. A similar approach was used for counting assumptions. 
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It is not possible to take account of whether nondisclosure of items or 
assumptions arises because they are not relevant to firms (e. g. where no interest 
charge is disclosed because the firm does not have borrowings). Most disclosure 
studies suffer to some extent from this limitation, although many attempt to 
identify whether or not particular disclosure items are applicable to firms. This 
would be very difficult in the context of the non-standard and entirely voluntary 
nature of content of disclosures in profit forecasts. 
Disclosures were given equal weightings, which assumes each item of disclosure 
is equally important. In practice, users may attach different importance weightings 
to items disclosed. However, estimating these subjective weightings is 
methodologically difficult. Results of user surveys are unreliable and depend on 
individual user group preferences, which may change over time (Dhaliwal, 1980). 
In this research, a user survey (on which the weightings would have been based) 
would have been carried out some time after the forecasts were published. 
Another criticism of user surveys is that attaching weights does not result in real 
economic consequences for those whose opinions are surveyed (Chow and 
Wong-Boren, 1987). 
Marston and Shrives (1991) quote Spero (1979) as reporting that attaching 
weightings to disclosure scores is irrelevant, as firms that are better at disclosing 
`important items' are also better at disclosing `less important items'. Adding 
support to this conclusion, Firth's (1980) results were similar, using both 
weighted and unweighted disclosure scores. Robbins and Austin (1986) and 
Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) provide additional evidence that there may be no 
significant difference between weighted and unweighted disclosure indices. 
The example below illustrates the approach used and the way in which assessing 
the forecasts involves some subjective judgement. PML's profit forecast disclosed 
three items and three assumptions. Two items (pre-tax profits and extraordinary 
charges) are shown in the forecast. In addition, a statement that `... there will still 
be a liability to taxation which may well absorb a significant proportion of the 
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pre-tax profit... ' elsewhere in the recommended offer document was counted as 
one disclosure, even though the amount of the tax liability was not quantified. The 
three assumptions are historical cost convention, consistent accounting policies 
and no industrial disputes. 
Example: Content analysis of forecast 
Rapallo - PML takeover 1991 
Extract from recommended offer document 
PML GROUP PROFIT FORECAST 
Bases and Assumptions 
The profit forecast of less than £400,000 on ordinary activities before taxation and the 
forecast net extraordinary charges of more than £550,000 for the year ending 31 
December 1990 have been prepared under the historical cost convention on the basis of 
the accounting policies normally adopted by the PML Group. The profit forecast includes 
results shown by the unaudited interim results for the six months ended 30 June . 1990, 
unaudited management accounts for the three months ended 30 September 1990 and a 
forecast of the PML Group's results for the three months ending 31 December 1990. 
In the preparation of the profit forecast the Directors have assumed that trading will not 
be affected by industrial unrest or other events causing disruption to the PML Group's 
operations or those of its major suppliers or customers. 
Table 4.15 Number of times item disclosed in forecasts 
Turnover 26 
Exceptional items 58 
Profit for the year (variously defined) 231 
Taxation 71 
Extraordinary items 48 
Earnings per share 132 
Forecast dividends 91 
Sundry other disclosures 97 
Notes to forecasts expanding on disclosures 
Earnings per share note 45 
Exceptional and extraordinary items notes 31 
Sundry other notes 79 
Total number of items disclosed in all forecasts 2Q2 
Average per forecast 3.64 
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 list the types of items and assumptions disclosed and 
frequency of their disclosure. The number of items disclosed in each forecast 
varied considerably, as did the variety. Most forecasts disclosed an amount for 
135 
profit (variously defined as profit before taxation, after taxation, before taxation 
and extraordinary items etc. ). Earnings per share was frequently disclosed, as was 
forecast dividends. The average number of assumptions disclosed is greater than 
the average number of items disclosed. The variety of assumptions disclosed was 
considerable. Some assumptions appeared regularly in forecasts and used fairly 
standard wording. 
Table 4.16 Number of times assumption disclosed in forecasts 
No change/consistent accounting policies used 146 
No industrial disputes, wars etc. 116 
No change in interest rates 94 
No change in the rates or bases of taxation 89 
Expenses in connection with the takeover excluded 82 
No change in exchange rates 81 
No change in legislation (except for... ) 71 
No change in fiscal/political/economic environment 70 
Continuation of present management 66 
No change in composition of the group 48 
No change in the rate of inflation 46 
No severe weather conditions 44 
No change in commercial/operating policies 39 
Trading volumes/sales margins consistent with previous/current 34 
Planned transactions to go ahead 33 
Consistent accounting policies except for.... 29 
(Modified) historic cost convention followed 26 
No change in product/raw material prices 18 
No disruption to arrangements with suppliers 16 
No adjustments for post balance sheet events 11 
Other assumptions 112 
Total number of assumptions disclosed 122,1 Average per forecast 5.08 
Frequencies of disclosure of number of items (ITEMS) and number of 
assumptions (ASS) are shown in table 4.17. ITEMS is highly skewed towards 
lower numbers disclosed. ASS has a bimodal distribution, with a peak at zero and 
another peak at nine assumptions disclosed. 
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Table 4.17 Frequencies of ITEMS and ASS 
ITEMS ASS 
No. Number Total Number Total 
disclosed forecasts disclosures forecasts disclosures 
0 36 0 37 0 
1 42 42 31 31 
2 31 62 25 50 
3 30 90 20 60 
4 32 128 17 68 
5 24 120 14 70 
6 13 78 11 66 
7 13 91 16 112 
8 9 72 18 144 
9 6 54 23 207 
10 5 50 9 90 
11-15 7 87 28 357 
16-18 2 35 1 16 
2 52 222 21Q 1211 
4.2.4.2 Measurement of forecast-related independent variables 
There were five forecast-related independent variables: circumstances of the 
forecast, forecast horizon, forecast period, news in the forecast and forecast 
deviation. Two of the independent variables relate to news content of the 
forecasts and are dealt with in section 4.2.5. Definition and measurement of 
forecast-related variables are summarised in table 4.18. 
Circumstances of forecast (CIRC) ranged from voluntary, to involuntary, to 
repeat forecasts. Forecast horizon (FHOR) was measured in days from date of the 
forecast to forecast period end. Forecast period (PER) is the period forecast 
which is usually six months or one year, but varied from 18 weeks to five years. 
This variable was coded 0 for forecasts of six months or less and 1 for forecasts 
of more than six months. 
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Table 4.18 Definition and measurement of forecast-related variables 
Dependent variables 
" Items disclosed (ITEMS): Number of items disclosed in forecast 
" Assumptions disclosed (ASS): Number of assumptions disclosed in forecast 
Independent variables 
" Circumstances of forecast (CIRC): 1= Voluntary, 2= Involuntary, 3- Repeat forecast 
" Forecast horizon (FHOR): Days from date of forecast to forecast period end 
" Forecast period (PER): 0=6 months or less, 1= More than 6 months 
" News in the forecast (NEWS): Difference between forecast and previous year's actual results 
" Forecast deviation (FD): Difference between forecast results and market expectations 
Table 4.19 Prediction of impact of independent variables on content of disclosures in 
forecasts 
Independent variable Impact on disclosures in forecasts 
Takeover-context variables 
BT B? Targets will disclose more than bidders 
T+ 
BID + Contested bids will have a positive effect on content of 
disclosures 
Forecast-related variables 
CIRC - Involuntary forecasts will disclose less than voluntary 
forecasts 
FHOR + The longer the forecast horizon, the greater the 
uncertainty and the greater the need for disclosure 
PER The longer the forecast period, the greater the uncertainty 
and the greater the need for disclosure 
Firm-specific variables 
VAL/REV/TAI/TA2 + Larger firms are more likely to disclose more 
LEV + Higher leverage results in higher agency costs and 
therefore greater disclosure 
MO - Lower management ownership results in greater agency 
costs and consequently greater disclosure 
SSH/NO. SSH - Substantial shareholders can be informed privately 




4.2.4.3 Predicted response of content of disclosures in forecasts to 
independent variables 
The expected impact of each independent variable on disclosures in forecasts (H20 
- H33) is shown in table 4.19. 
4.2.4.4 Summary descriptive statistics - forecast-related variables 
Nearly all (210 out of 250) forecasts were made voluntarily. In 27 cases, Stock 
Exchange rules required that a statement made prior to the bid by the company be 
formally reported on as a forecast. There were 13 forecasts which were repeats of 
forecasts made in previous bids. 
Table 4.20 analyses the source of the forecasts. Location in the takeover 
document depended on whether the target or bidder made the forecast and on 
whether the bid was contested or not. Thus, all forecasts by target companies in 
contested bids were disclosed in defence documents. 
In most cases, forecasts were disclosed in an appendix to the takeover document 
(either offer document, listing particulars (where shares were offered as 
consideration) or defence document). Occasionally they were in the body of the 
document (especially defence documents which do not follow as predictable a 
format as stock exchange documents). 
Table 4.20 Source of forecasts 
Offer document 82 
Listing particulars 46 
Offer document & listing particulars 25 
Defence document 91 
Other 6 
2Q 
Table 4.21 analyses forecast disclosure by forecast horizon and forecast period. 
The forecast horizon is the number of days between issuing the forecast and the 
forecast period end date. A substantial number of forecasts were published after 
139 
the forecast period end. Only a few were published more than six months before 
the forecast period end. 
Table 4.21 Forecasts analysed by forecast period and forecast horizon 
6 Months or More than 6 Total 
less months 
After forecast period end 17 ( 68%) 64 ( 28%) 81(32%) 
Within 30 days 5( 20%) 36 ( 16%) 41(17%) 
31-90 days 3( 12%) 50 ( 22%) 53 (21%) 
91-180 days 0( 0%) 53( 24%) 53 (211/o) 
>180 days 0( 0%) 22 10%) 22 ( 9%) 
21 (IQQ%) 2 (W/O) 2Q (Q%) 
Pearson chi-square 20.53 (d. f. 4) Significance 0.00 
Usually, the forecast was annual, although there were a number of half year 
forecasts. In one case, the forecast was for a five year period. The forecast period 
was significantly related to the forecast horizon. The longer the forecast horizon, 
the longer the period forecast. 
4.2.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content 
News in forecasts is measured using two variables, depending on whether the 
forecast results are compared with analysts' forecasts at the time the forecast is 
disclosed, or are compared with previous period's results. It is not possible to 
compare the forecast results with subsequent actual results as these are only 
available in a small number of cases. This is because most forecasts were 
disclosed by targets, most of which were successfully taken over. Consequently 
results are not separately available for these companies. 
Each of the two news variables is analysed between good news and bad news, 
depending on whether the forecast was greater or less than analysts' 
forecasts/previous period's results. 
4.2.5.1 Measurement of news content variables 
News in the forecast (NEWS) is measured as the difference between forecast 
results and previous year's actual results, scaled by previous year's results. 
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NEWS = 
Forecast profit before tax - Previous year's profit before tax 
Previous year's profit before tax 
Forecast deviation (FD) is the difference between forecast results and market 
expectations, as measured by consensus analysts' forecasts from The Earnings 
Guide. Consensus analysts' forecasts were obtained from the issue of the guide 
closest to and prior to the bid date. The difference was scaled as follows: 
FD = 
Forecast profit before tax - Consensus analysts' forecast profit before tax 
Consensus analysts' forecast profit before tax 
4.2.5.2 Predicted news content in forecasts 
Table 4.22 shows the predicted direction of the news content of the forecasts - 
whether they report good news or bad news (H34). 
Table 4.22 Predicted news content in forecasts 
Independent variable Impact on disclosure 
" News in the forecast (NEWS) Forecasts will mainly report good news 
" Forecast deviation (FD) Forecasts will mainly report good news 
4.2.5.3 Summary descriptive statistics - news in forecasts variables 
Table 4.23 Descriptive statistics of news variables 
Variable Mean Median Skewness' Standard No. Missing Total 
deviation values 
NEWS 0.49 0.28 2.24 1.17 153 97 (63%) 250 
GOODNEWS 0.76 0.34 3.13 1.10 123 
BADNEWS -0.62 -0.51 -2.32 0.64 30 
FD 0.06 0.03 -0.43 0.66 117 133 (53%) 250 
POSFD 0.35 0.16 2.48 0.54 69 
NEGFD -0.37 -0.17 -3.63 0.59 48 
Coefficients are all outside the range specified in Kanji (1993) for the variables to be 
considered normally distributed. 
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Table 4.23 reports descriptive statistics for the news content variables. The good 
news variables (GOODNEWS/POSFD) are not dissimilar to the bad news 
variables (BADNEWS/NEGFD). As one would expect, the mean of forecast 
deviations is close to zero and the mean of news in the forecasts is positive. 
4.3 Missing values 
Missing values reduce the number of cases available for analysis. One variable, 
substantial shareholdings (SSH), has a large number of missing values. Models 
were run both including and excluding this variable to increase the number of 
cases for analysis. 
4.3.1 Analysis of disclosure of forecasts 
Excluding SSH increases the cases analysed to 302 (from 181) for bidders and to 
523 (from 375) for targets. There are a large number of missing cases for bidders 
- 399 (57%) out of 701. Of the 399 missing cases, 350 are individuals, 
consortiums of individuals, private companies and foreign quoted companies. 
These types of bidders are unlikely to disclose a forecast. Only 49 (out of 331 
quoted bidders (15%)) bidders quoted on the London Stock Exchange were 
missing cases excluded from the analysis. The effect of these missing values 
would be, if anything, to understate the results. 
4.3.2 Content analysis of disclosures in forecasts 
Excluding substantial shareholdings (SSH) increases the number of forecasts 
analysed to 205 (from 141), out of a maximum of 250 forecasts. The 
characteristics of the smaller samples (141/205 forecasts) and their descriptive 
statistics were compared with the full sample of 250 forecasts. There was no 
significant difference in characteristics or descriptive statistics of the group of 205 
forecasts, except that a substantial number of repeat/involuntary forecasts were 
excluded. There were 40 out of 250 in the full sample, compared with only 11 out 
of 205 involuntary/repeat forecasts in the smaller sample. 
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There were more significant differences in the smaller group of 141 forecasts: the 
firms in this group were significantly smaller than for the full 250 sample of 
forecasts; only 28 (19%) of this group were bidder forecasts compared with 67 
(27%) out of 250 forecasts in the full sample; only 10 forecasts were 
involuntary/repeat forecasts compared with 40 in the full sample; only one firm 
was quoted in this group compared with 13 in the full sample. 
In summary, there are some differences in the restricted groups available for 
analysis compared with the full sample. These differences are significant in the 
case of the smaller group of 141 forecasts. 
4.4 Statistical analysis 
Raw data were first recorded on a Lotus spreadsheet. A number of procedures 
were carried out to ensure the accuracy of extraction of the data from original 
sources, and to check the accuracy of inputting the data to Lotus. All data 
extracted originally from Acquisitions Monthly were rechecked against 
Acquisitions Monthly. It was not possible to recheck data extracted from 
takeover documents and from Crawford's Directory. However, validation tests 
were carried out to pick up errors. For example, the variable, total assets (TAl), 
was compared with owners' equity (TA2) to ensure that owners' equity was not 
greater than total assets; value of bid (VAL) was compared with owners' equity 
(TA2) to ensure that value of bid was greater than, or was not materially different 
from, owners' equity. 
Statistical analysis was performed using statistical analysis software, Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS/PC), and Time Series Package (TSP) 
which read the data directly from the spreadsheet. The conventional 5% level is 
used for all significance tests. 
Basic descriptive univariate and nonparametric bivariate statistics were calculated, 
including chi-square tests of independence of two variables and Mann-Whitney U 
tests of differences in mean rankings of variables. 
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Four multivariate techniques were used. Logistic regression (logit analysis) was 
used to test the dichotomous dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a 
forecast. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, Poisson regression and 
negative binomial regression were used to test disclosures in forecasts. OLS 
regression and Poisson regression results are not shown as they were broadly 
consistent with negative binomial regression results, and as negative binomial 
regression is clearly the most appropriate statistical technique for the data. 
4.4.1 Univariate and bivariate statistics 
As tables 4.10,4.13 and 4.23 show, nearly all of the variables are very skewed 
and assumptions of normality are inappropriate. Consequently, nonparametric 
bivariate statistical tests (which require no assumptions about the form of 
distribution of the variables) are used in this research. Spearman rank correlations 
examine the correlation between the independent variables and are reported in 
appendix 3. Mann-Whitney U tests are applied to continuous variables for 
forecasters and nonforecasters, and bidders and targets, to test the hypothesis that 
the two independent samples come from populations having the same distribution. 
Simple two-way crosstabulations are performed to calculate bivariate correlations 
between categorical variables. Related Pearson chi-square statistics are reported. 
4.4.2 Logit analysis 
Probit and logit analysis specifically deal with violation of assumptions of 
regression analysis arising from a dichotomous dependent variable (forecast 
disclosure/nondisclosure in this research). There is little to choose between logit 
and probit models. In probit analysis, a normal distribution is assumed. The data 
in this study are not all multivariate normal. 
The estimating technique adopted to test models of the determinants of disclosure 
of forecasts is logit analysis. The object of the logit model is to find estimates of 
regression coefficients which maximise the log likelihood that the observed 
pattern of disclosure/nondisclosure would have occurred. The dependent variable 
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in the logit model is the probability of disclosure given values of the independent 
variables. Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate logit parameters that 
imply the highest probability or likelihood of having obtained the observed 
sample. 
For categorical independent variables (YEAR, CON, IND, NAT) with more than 
two categories, categories are calculated by reference to the average effect of all 
categories rather than compared to a reference category. 
Logistic regression is estimated using forward stepwise selection (Norusis, 1990). 
First, variables with the smallest Rao's efficient score statistic (cutoff 0.05) are 
entered into the model. Both the Wald statistic and likelihood-ratio test were used 
to determine the variables to be removed from the model. Variables with the 
largest Wald statistic/likelihood ratio statistic are removed provided they exceed 
the cutoff value (0.10). The reported results are based on removal using the Wald 
statistic. 
4.4.2.1 Goodness of fit measures 
There are various ways of assessing whether the model fits the data. A good 
model is one that results in a high likelihood of the observed results. This 
translates into a small value of -2LL (if the model fits perfectly, the likelihood is 1, 
and -2 times the log likelihood is 0). -2LL is a measure of how well the estimated 
model fits the data or is a comparison of the model with the `perfect' model. A 
large significance level for -2LL indicates that the model does not differ 
significantly from the `perfect' model. Another statistic that tests how well the 
model fits is the goodness-of-fit statistic. A high significance indicates a good fit. 
Model chi-square is comparable to the F-test for regression and tests the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients for all the terms in the model, except the constant, 
are zero. 
The R statistic measures partial correlation between the dependent variable and 
each independent variable. It ranges from -1 to +1. A positive value indicates that, 
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as the variable increases in value, so does the likelihood of the event occurring. 
Small values of R indicate that the variable has a small partial contribution to the 
model. 
Logit analysis has the advantage that the analysis and interpretation are quite 
similar to multiple regression. However, with logit analysis there is no good 
measure of explained variation such as R2. Various pseudo R2 measures have been 
suggested. McFadden's pseudo R2 is reported in this research. 
McFadden's R2 =1- 
L 
0 
where LLo and LL, are the values of the log likelihood when the model contains a 
constant, and all the explanatory variables, respectively. 
4.4.2.2 Significance tests 
The significance level for each coefficient indicates the confidence with which the 
result can be generalised beyond the sample. There are two approaches to testing 
the significance of the coefficients. The first is to compare the log likelihood of 
the estimated coefficient (L) to the log likelihood that the coefficient is zero (the 
restricted coefficient LR). The likelihood ratio test is as follows: 
2(L - LR) 
where L and LR are log likelihood values with and without the explanatory 
variables. It can be shown that if the null hypothesis is true, the likelihood ratio 
2(L - LR) has a chi-square distribution. 
The second approach to hypothesis testing is to compare estimated coefficients to 
their standard errors. The test that the coefficients are 0 is called the Wald 
statistic which has a chi-square distribution. This significance statistic is reported 
in the research. 
4.4.2.3 Presentation of logit results 
For ease of interpretation, the logit coefficients for each variable are presented in 
the chapters in exponential form. Thus, each coefficient estimates the 
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multiplicative effect of the associated variable on the odds of disclosure of a 
forecast, controlling for the effects of the other variables in the model. Where the 
coefficient in greater than 1, the odds of disclosure are raised by the factor 
represented by the coefficient; where the coefficient is less than 1 the odds are 
reduced by the factor shown. 
4.4.2.4 Multicollinearity and logit analysis 
Model fitting with logistic regression is sensitive to - collinearities among 
independent variables (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). Aberrantly large estimated 
standard errors are an indication of multicollinearity. Schaefer (1986) suggests a 
number of alternative estimators which reduce the effect of collinearity. 
In order to avoid as much as possible problems of collinearity, the four size 
variables (the most highly correlated independent variables) are included in the 
logit models separately. 
4.4.3 Count data models 
Disclosures in forecasts were measured using a counting approach. Resulting 
variables are non-normal, non-negative integer variables. Consequently the 
statistical techniques (mainly OLS regression) applied in previous studies 
measuring disclosure content are not suitable for this kind of data because they 
assume that error terms are normally distributed. 
The standard statistical model for analysing count data is Poisson regression. The 
Poisson model, and variations thereon, have been used in many contexts in 
applied economics. These statistical models were recently reviewed in 
Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1995). The use of Poisson distribution for 
modelling non-negative integer values often involves empirically questionable 
assumptions. The Poisson regression model is restrictive in several ways: 
" It assumes that the mean and variance of the counts are equal. This fails to 
account for the overdispersion (variance exceeding the mean) that 
characterises many data sets. 
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" It assumes that events occur independently over time. 
The assumption that events occur independently over time is generally not a 
major problem in empirical studies, and is not a problem in this research given the 
type of data analysed. However, overdispersion is frequently a problem and may 
be a problem in this research. 
4.4.3.1 Negative binomial regression 
In the Poisson model, the mean and variance of the counts are constrained to be 
equal. This is very restrictive since the variance is normally greater than the mean. 
Negative binomial regression is an extension of the Poisson regression model 
which allows the variance to differ from the mean. Thus, the negative binomial 
model is a more flexible model for count data than the more common Poisson 
model. It allows for overdispersion by the introduction of a random disturbance 
in the definition of the parameters of the Poisson distribution. 
Estimation of the model is based on maximum likelihood methods. Unlike least 
squares estimation, this method of estimation takes account of the non-negative 
integers in count data and uses the information more efficiently. 
Cameron and Trivedi (1986) compared five different count data models using the 
same empirical data: OLS, normal, Poisson and two negative binomial models. 
They concluded that relatively few coefficients were sensitive to the choice of 
model, and those that were had relatively small t-ratios. Winkelmann and 
Zimmermann (1995) compared three different models: Poisson, hurdle Poisson 
and negative binomial regression. Negative binomial predictions outperformed 
the other two models. It parameterised more parsimoniously and also had a 
higher log-likelihood. The authors concluded that one would therefore 
unanimously choose the negative binomial model. 
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4.4.3.2 Negative binomial regression evaluation 
Three tests were performed to determine whether the fitted negative binomial 
model is adequate and well specified: goodness of fit - chi-square test, pseudo R2 
and likelihood ratio test. 
A generalised Pearson chi-square statistic (Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1995) 
was used as a measure of the goodness of fit of the negative binomial model, 
calculated as follows: 
" (yr -A 1)2 
where: y, = actual count; A, = estimated or expected count mean. 
Pseudo R2 is a measure of the extent to which alternative models (negative 
binomial regression in this research) outperform primitive ones (Poisson model) 
(Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1995). Pseudo R2, like R2 in linear regression, is 
bounded to the interval [0,1]. It is 0 if no improvement occurred and 1 if the 
alternative model has a perfect fit. Pseudo RZ is calculated as follows: 
1-salt PseudoR2 = 
where: 
s°" = sum of the squared deviations of the alternative (negative binomial) model 
s'"° = sum of the squared deviations of the `primitive' (Poisson) model. 
The negative binomial model is one example of a generalised Poisson model 
which relaxes some of the restrictions of the Poisson model. Because the negative 
binomial model and the Poisson model are nested, a direct test assessing the 
validity of the restriction can be examined by a likelihood ratio test. The 
likelihood ratio test compares the more general negative binomial model with the 
more restricted Poisson model. 
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4.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter described the population and sample on which the research is based. 
Data collection techniques were outlined and details were given of the 
measurement of the variables tested in the research. Summary descriptive 
statistics for the variables were presented. The chapter finished by outlining the 
statistical techniques used in analysing the data. 
Chapter 6 reports the results of analysis of the influences hypothesised to be 
related to the primary dependent variable, disclosuretnondisclosure of forecasts. 
The influence of market expectations on disclosure of forecasts is examined. 
Chapter 6 concludes with an examination of the effect on the outcome of bids of 
disclosing a forecast. 
Results of content analysis of disclosures in forecasts are reported in Chapter 7 
News content of forecasts is also analysed between reporting good news and bad 
news. 
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Chapter 5: FACTORS INFLUENCING DISCLOSURE: 
EVIDENCE FROM INTERVIEWS 
5.1 Objective of interviews 
To understand the disclosure process better, and to validate the research 
hypotheses and design against the practice and opinions of those involved in the 
disclosure decision, 11 participants in the disclosure decision were interviewed. In 
addition, the interviews provide some background on the strategic issues 
underlying disclosure. It was hoped that by exploring in advance the issues 
considered by this research with those involved in real life disclosure decisions, 
the resulting research design would be improved and would be more relevant to 
real world situations. 
The interview method applied is described in chapter 4 (paragraph 4.2.1.1). 
Interviews suffer from a number of limitations (Patton, 1990). Interviewees may 
have incentives to disguise their true motives. Interviewees may rationalise past 
decisions. There is a problem in deciding who makes the specific disclosure 
decision and, therefore, who to interview in the organisation. In attempting to 
avoid some of these limitations, a broad range of persons involved in the 
disclosure decision were interviewed from as wide a variety of takeover contexts 
as possible. 
I 
A semi-structured interview method was used whereby every interviewee was sent 
an outline interview guide (reproduced in appendix 1) which ensured that the 
same information was covered in each interview. Each interview was allowed to 
develop beyond the interview guide according to individual responses. This type 
of interview is structured in terms of issues addressed by the research (the 
interview guide is cross-referenced to the research hypotheses being tested) yet 
the informal conversational approach allows respondents to introduce material not 
anticipated by the interviewer (Whyte, 1984). Following the interviews, and 
taking into account the responses obtained, the hypotheses for testing were 
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refined. Thus, the interview guide does not probe answers for all hypotheses, 
some of which were added/expanded on as a result of the interview data. 
Brenner (1982) identifies three sources of interviewer bias with this interview 
approach which may influence interviewee responses. Firstly, the outline interview 
guide might give interviewees some insights into the responses expected by the 
interviewer. Secondly the behaviour of the interviewer may evoke certain 
responses from interviewees. Thirdly, interviewer expectations may affect the 
data. Moser and Kalton (1971) state `Tighter control is needed over probing with 
opinion questions because of the ease with which slight wording variations can 
affect the respondent's opinions. On no account must the interviewer give an 
indication of her own views. An additional source of interviewer bias is in editing 
of interview material. As this research relies on other methodologies in addition to 
interview data, it is hoped that the effects of interview bias will be limited. 
Table 5.1 Background of interviewees 
A Merchant banker who has advised in many takeover bids 
B Merchant banker who has advised in many takeover bids 
C Merchant banker who has advised in many takeover bids 
D Merchant banker who has advised in many takeover bids 
E Corporate finance partner in a big-six accounting practice 
F Deputy director general of the Takeover Panel 
G Director of a target forecasting (X2 p1c) company in an uncontested bid 
H Director of a target forecasting company (X1 p1c) in a contested bid 
I Director of a nonforecasting target (X6 plc) in a contested bid 
J Director of a forecasting bidder (X7 p1c) in a contested bid 
K Director of a forecasting bidder (X3 plc) in an uncontested bid 
5.2 Sample selection 
Interviews were conducted in Dublin and London. Interviewees were selected 
through contacts of the researcher, subject to there being a wide variety of 
backgrounds, firm positions and takeover contexts represented in the sample, so 
that all the relevant issues could be explored. All interviewees were involved in 
takeover bids which are part of the research sample. Eleven interviews were 
deemed sufficient, as a point of saturation (whereby no additional points were 
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coming out of the interviews) had been reached. Interviewees were promised 
confidentiality and are therefore designated by letter only, as are any companies 
they referred to. Table 5.1 briefly describes the relevant background of each 
interviewee. 
The companies referred to in the interviews are shown in table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 List of companies referred to in interviews 
X, Forecasting target in a contested bid 
X2 Forecasting target in an uncontested bid 
X3 Forecasting bidder in an uncontested bid 
X4 Nonforecasting target in an uncontested bid 
X5 Forecasting target in an uncontested bid 
X6 Nonforecasting target in a contested bid 
X7 Forecasting (involuntary) bidder in a contested bid 
Xg Forecasting target in an uncontested bid 
X9 Forecasting bidder in an uncontested bid 
X10 Nonforecasting target in a contested bid 
X» Forecasting target in an uncontested bid 
5.3 Analysis and summary of interviews 
Initially each interview was typed in full, using the interview outline as a structure 
to arrange the responses in some common sequence. Subsequently, the responses 
from all interviewees were grouped together under the interview outline structure. 
Table 5.3 summarises some of the responses. Importance of market expectations 
on disclosure is emphasised by the number of interviewees referring to this 
influence. The effect of purchase consideration on disclosure in the case of bidders 
was frequently cited - interviewees mentioned paper consideration as the foremost 
influence on disclosure of forecasts by bidders. Motivations described to account 
for targets disclosing forecasts were more varied, but tended to relate to bid price. 
A number of interviewees made the point that disclosure of forecasts by targets is 
often imposed as a condition of the offer by bidders. 
153 
Table 5.3 Summary of interview responses 
Reasons for disclosing a forecast 
To correct market perceptions 
To back up share valuation 
Length of time since last disclosure to the market 
Ease of forecasting 
Reasons for disclosing a forecast - bidders 
To support value of paper consideration 
Reasons for disclosing a forecast - targets 
To get the best value for the shareholders 
Beat off the bid 
Get an increase in price 
Condition of the bidder 
Justifying the offer (especially low offer) 
Reasons for not disclosing a forecast 
Cost 
Management time involved 
Risk of getting the forecast wrong 
Downward revision of profit involved 
Forecast profit does not justify price being offered 
Too far from year end 
Unreliable systems 
Difficulty with forecasting profits of the company 
Market perceptions are correct 
Reasons for not disclosing a forecast - bidders 
Where cash is the consideration 
Reasons for not disclosing a forecast - targets 
Will not result in a better price for the target 
If the bid can be defended without a forecast 
Influences on the disclosure decision 
Advisors 
Other party to the bid 
Board of directors 
Whether bid contested 
Market expectations 
Ability to increase shareholder value 
News in the forecast 
Quality of management 




Period to financial year end 
Size of firm 
Forecasting systems 
Leverage 
Not influences in the disclosure decision 
Management 
Size of company 
Economic conditions 

















































A variety of influences on disclosure were suggested, with advisors being the 
most frequently mentioned. Variability of earnings and economic conditions were 
considered important influences also. Related to economic considerations, the 
news content of the forecasts was also referred to. 
The main reason offered why companies would not disclose a forecast is 
downward revision of profit. A variety of other reasons were suggested mainly 
related to cost (direct costs and management time involved) and risk of getting 
the forecast wrong. 
5.4 Discussion of interviews 
The full text interviews have been edited and summarised from 60 to 20 pages of 
text to remove colloquialisms and repetition, and to focus on the main issues 
coming from the interviews. The edited summary is included in appendix 2. For 
ease of reference, the interview comments have been numbered 1 to 162 and the 
reference numbers are included to the left of the comments in appendix 2. 
The interviews are discussed under five headings following from the five 
questions addressed by this research and outlined in chapter 1. 
5.4.1 Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts (comments 1-103) 
Case histories (comments 1-17) 
The case histories illustrate how varied the motivations are for disclosing profit 
forecasts during takeover bids. They are self explanatory but a number of points 
are worth highlighting. Xl plc's forecast appears as a voluntary forecast, even 
though it was first prompted by the managing director's statement prior to the bid 
and might not have been made otherwise. It is interesting to see how influential 
the advisors were in advising and planning for the profit forecast months before 
the bid was made. That good news was being reported to the market was also 
crucial to the disclosure decision. 
The length of time since results had been given to the market appears to have 
been a major factor in X2 plc disclosing a forecast. Ease of forecasting the profits 
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of X3 plc, the length of time since results had been announced to the market, as 
well as obtaining a listing for the first time, were influential in a forecast being 
disclosed. X. plc's story illustrates circumstances where a forecast might not be 
disclosed - the bid was agreed, and from the target's point of view the price 
offered was generous. Interviewee B is vague about why Xs plc disclosed a 
forecast. Interviewee I brings out the issue of costs versus benefits of disclosure - 
in X6 plc's case the benefits could not be identified but the cost of disclosure (risk 
of getting the forecast wrong) was clearly recognised. X7 plc's story illustrates 
just how involuntary the forecast was and how unhappy the company was to be in 
a forecast situation. Comments 12 and 13 bring out the costs of disclosing a 
forecast, which include management's time and disruption to the business, as well 
as payment of fees to advisors. 
Xl plc, X3 plc and X9 plc all had good news to report to the market. Had the 
news been bad it is doubtful whether a forecast would have been disclosed. X8 
plc, on the other hand, disclosed a forecast because of the bad news contained 
therein. The directors felt it was necessary for shareholders to know this to 
persuade them to accept the offer (which the directors were recommending) as 
reasonable, given company prospects as shown by the forecast. 
Reasons for disclosing forecasts (comments 18-20) 
The responses to this issue are summarised in Table 5.3. Comments 18-20 all 
emphasise the importance of share value. In the case of bidders, the forecast may 
support the value of shares being issued in consideration for the bid. For targets, 
the forecast should ensure that the shareholders get the best value for their shares. 
Directors in agreed bids need to show shareholders they have obtained the best 
price, and this may be done with a profit forecast. Such was the reason given in 
comment 8 for a forecast by Xs plc. Publication of a forecast was also a condition 
of the bidder: `Xs plc was a recommended offer and probably issued a forecast to 
convince shareholders that the price was fair and reasonable, to convince the 
shareholders not to expect too much and to advise shareholders to accept the 
bid It was a paper offer so the bidder's forecast was probably to support their 
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share price. The issuing of a forecast by Xf plc was not instigated by the 
financial advisors. The bidder would not make the bid without a forecast. ' 
Reasons bidders disclose forecasts (comments 21-26) 
Interviewees say that bidders normally only disclose a forecast where paper is 
included in the purchase consideration. The effect of purchase consideration on 
disclosure of forecasts is tested in chapter 6. Other reasons suggested for 
disclosure by bidders are publicity value of disclosing a forecast, to shut out 
another predator and the contested nature of the bid. 
Reasons targets disclose forecasts (comments 27-32) 
A variety of reasons why targets might disclose forecasts are offered. Sometimes, 
as mentioned earlier, in recommended bids it is a condition of the offer by the 
bidder. Obtaining the best price for the shares and provision of up to date 
information to shareholders are primary reasons offered for disclosure. Strategic 
motivations for disclosure are illustrated by comment 32: `Forecasts are disclosed 
to talk up the price and possibly encourage a third party to the arena 
Reasons for not making a forecast (comments 33-41) 
Most of the reasons given for not disclosing are related to cost - cost of preparing 
the forecast, management time involved and risk of getting the forecast wrong. 
Comment 13, in the context of an involuntary forecast, emphasises cost: `The 
original statement would never have been made had the consequences been 
foreseen at the time. The paperwork involved to do a profit forecast is huge. Line 
management had to get involved in the bid This is very disruptive to the 
business. There is a greater cost in taking up management time. ' 
Interviewees A and J, in comments 33 and 41, say that cost of forecasting is a 
consideration. Presumably the higher the cost of forecasting, the less likely a 
forecast will be disclosed. Measuring the costs of making a forecast is difficult. 
Size might proxy for cost. It could be argued that it would be less costly for larger 
companies with more sophisticated forecasting systems to make a forecast. 
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Interviewee D suggests that, if it is too early in the financial year, a forecast will 
not be published. Interviewee G adds the point that if it is early in the financial 
year there is little new information to communicate to shareholders. The effect of 
bid horizon on forecast disclosure is tested in chapter 6. 
Reasons bidders do not disclose forecasts (comments 42-45) 
Purchase consideration is a major influence on whether bidders disclose forecasts. 
In cash bids forecasts by bidders are considered unlikely by interviewees. 
Interviewee B makes the very valid point, in comment 42, that bidders control and 
choose the timing of the bid, and therefore have less reason to disclose a forecast 
to prop up the share price: `Bidding companies do not normally make a forecast, 
especially if cash is offered unless they want to keep the share price up or for 
reasons of credibility. In a paper bid, a forecast may be issued to support the 
price of the shares being offered and to value the bid higher. The bidder is 
always in control of the situation so it picks the best time to make the bid and 
therefore has less reason to make a forecast. It is a poor bidder that has to prop 
up its own share price. ' 
Reasons targets do not disclose forecasts (comments 46-47) 
Various reasons why targets would not disclose forecasts are suggested, including 
length of forecast horizon (which can be altered by choosing a shorter forecast 
period), level of uncertainty and because the forecast will not benefit the takeover 
deal - as comment 9 illustrates: `A profit forecast was strongly considered Our 
mentality was that, unless we could establish a clear benefit for publishing a 
profit forecast, there was no point in doing one. There was a lot of accountants 
around the table. One automatically associates a forecast with risk And the 
automatic tendency is to stay away from a forecast unless clear benefits are 
obvious. If we had felt that a profit forecast would have led to any reasonable 
chance of the offer being increased or being overtaken by anyone else, then we 
would have published a forecast. But we believed neither. The bidder had gone 
to the top of its range. ' 
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Why do more targets than bidders disclose forecasts? (comments 48-49) 
Comment 48, that bidders tend to be larger and have firmer market ratings, is very 
relevant to whether they disclose a forecast. On the other hand, comment 49 makes the 
point that target companies are not in control of the timing of the bid and may have a 
greater need to inform the market. 
Who or what is most influential in the disclosure decision? (comments 50-58) 
The board, as advised by its financial advisors and accountants, seems to be the biggest 
influence on whether a forecast is disclosed, subject to obtaining the best value for 
shareholders. 
Factors within companies influencing disclosure (comments 59-66) 
Size per se is not felt to be a significant influence, except that larger companies with 
good public relations will be more correctly perceived by the market and will not have 
to disclose a forecast to align market expectations, as comment 112 illustrates: 
`Companies with characteristics such as good PR, where the management are able to 
sell themselves, will not need to make a forecast as market perceptions will be 
generally correct. These are likely to be larger companies. So that larger companies 
are less likely to make a forecast. ' 
On the other hand, larger companies will usually have better forecasting systems and 
may find it easier, and less costly, to forecast. The variable, size, is tested in chapters 6 
and 7 but these comments show that size can proxy for many factors (as pointed out in 
chapter 3). 
Variability of earnings is referred to by most interviewees as influencing disclosure. 
Interviewee A in comment 112 suggests that the more variable the earnings the more 
imperative it is, and at the same time the more difficult it is, to make a forecast. 
Variability of earnings is not tested in this study. 
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Forecasting systems (comments 67-70) 
Good systems seem to be a pre-requisite in making a forecast. 
Advisors/accountants (comments 71-75) 
Most interviewees disagreed that advisors recommend the making of a forecast to 
boost their fees, or that choice of advisor influences whether a forecast is made. 
Influence of choice of advisor is tested in chapters 6 and 7. 
Other influences (comments 76-77) 
Interviewee G refers to the proprietary cost of disclosure of information to competitors 
(or equivalent - dominant customer in the case of comment 77). This is the only 
reference to proprietary costs of disclosure by any interviewee, notwithstanding the 
extensive theoretical analytical literature on this issue, summarised in chapter 2. 
However, none of the analytical literature deals with disclosure during takeover bids 
when proprietary cost considerations may be less important. 
Disclosure of private information (comments 78-87) 
These comments tease out the extent to which information is disclosed privately during 
bids and why, if information is disclosed privately, information is also disclosed 
publicly, especially in recommended offers. 
Influence of the fear of getting forecasts wrong (comments 88-94) 
What is most feared if the forecast is wrong? (comments 95-103) 
There are mixed views on these issues. Loss of reputation (of the advisors especially) 
seems to be the greatest fear, with threat of litigation and investigation by the 
Takeover Panel being more distant fears. 
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5.4.2 Influence of market expectations (comments 104-115) 
Most interviewees consider market expectations to have a considerable influence 
on disclosure of forecasts. To align shareholder expectations is the main 
explanation offered for this influence. Reference is made to disclosing forecasts 
that are both below, as well as above, market expectations. The relation between 
publication of forecasts and market expectations is tested in chapters 6 and 7. 
Some specific comments are worth noting. Interviewee E guesses that 80% of 
brokers' estimates are `in the right ballpark' and that there is no need to publish 
a forecast in these circumstances. He adds the interesting point that a general 
description of the company's circumstances, rather than a formal profit forecast, 
can be used to align market expectations. This is done very frequently by 
companies - examples 67 and 68 in appendix 4 are good illustrations. 
Reasons for not making forecasts (comments 110-111) 
Interviewee D remarks that the requirement for a contingency in making a 
forecast might reduce forecast profits below market expectations, such that a 
forecast would not be disclosed. Interviewee G makes the point that a bidder 
(especially if it is large) has a wider audience of its own shareholders, as well 
target company shareholders, to consider if it discloses a forecast in a paper bid. 
Factors within companies influencing disclosure (comment 112) 
This comment, together with comment 105, suggests that larger companies' 
market ratings will be more correct and that larger companies have less need to 
disclose forecasts to align market expectations. Interviewee A in comment 105 
remarks that: `Bidding companies tend to be bigger and therefore tend to have 
firmer market ratings. Their market expectations are more accurate. ' 
Disclosure of private information (comments 113-115) 
New (since the period of this study) insider trading rules make disclosure of 
information privately to, say, brokers more difficult. It is now harder to align 
market expectations privately. Comment 115 illustrates the point: A company's 
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market expectations depend on how well you guide them. This has become a very 
tricky area since the legislation relating to insider information being disclosed 
selectively to selective groups. It is much more difficult now to manage brokers' 
forecasts. This has now become a blunt instrument. How can you guide market 
expectations without giving insider information? 
5.4.3 Defensive role of profit forecasts (comments 116-136) 
Is the forecast an effective weapon? (comments 116-132) 
Forecasts are generally seen as effective weapons, although there is no agreement 
on their specific benefit. Interviewees comment that forecasts have an effect on 
price and on `sending off a bid. The five advisors (interviewees A to E) are 
particularly strongly of the opinion that forecasts have strategic value. This is 
hardly surprising as advisors may have vested interests in advocating forecasts. 
This was denied by interviewees, who generally stated they incurred very high risk 
and earned little from their association with forecasts. This is illustrated by 
comment 72: `Merchant banks, by signing off on forecasts, take a lot of 
responsibility. Under the Takeover Code there is a lot of responsibility. Bankers 
don't normally like to take on additional responsibility for the fun of it. They are 
not driven by fees The fees charged aren't necessarily governed by the presence 
of a profit forecast during a bid' Interestingly, interviewee C (a merchant 
banker) goes on to say: `However, the fees that the accountants charge will 
increase significantly if a profit forecast is involved 'Comments 73 and 74 make 
similar points. 
Other strategic reasons for disclosure of forecasts (comments 133-136) 
Reference is made to disclosure of forecasts being made for tactical reasons. As 
comment 135 illustrates, the timing of disclosure is important for PR and 
information management reasons: `The timing of the forecast depends on the 
circumstances. If you have a choice of arguments, you won't use them all at 
once. The shareholders will get bored after the first one or two documents. A 
drip feed approach is used which can be quite useful to keep peoples' attention. 
You issue new stories at regular intervals. During the bid, the timing of 
disclosure was measured The forecast was not included in the first defence 
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document. I think it was in about the third circular. Each circular had a different 
theme. We kept these themes going for public and shareholders' attention. We 
decided to keep our powder dry and to keep points back for the full period of the 
bid which was approximately 60 days. '. 
5.4.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis 
(comments 137-149) 
Detail in forecasts (comments 137-139) 
There is no consensus on whether it is better or worse to disclose numerous 
items. Disclosing many items may give: `a better explanation to readers', `is only 
a matter of optics', or `leaves you wide open to attack from the other side'. One 
interviewee added: `the only number that counts is the bottom line'. In addition, 
interviewees are concerned at the extent to which caveats (i. e. assumptions) are 
included in the forecast. 
Assumptions (comments 140-149) 
There seems to be an aversion to disclosing too much detail in forecasts. At the 
same time, assumptions are carefully chosen to give the greatest protection to 
forecasters, as comment 64 illustrates: `You cannot use economic conditions as 
an excuse for not making a forecast. You can build some into the assumptions. If 
the bid had taken place during the currency crisis, a forecast would have been 
very difficult. We would have had to put in assumptions about exchange markets. 
This would not stop the making of a forecast, but might result in including as 
benign assumptions as possible in the forecast. ' 
The conflict between advisors and management on what assumptions should be 
disclosed is shown in comment 147: `We always had major problems with the 
advisors in this area. All our first draft forecasts spelled out the real material 
assumptions but by the time the forecast got published, these assumptions had 
become meaningless and were converted to fairly standard assumptions. The real 
assumptions affecting the company get compromised and standardised The 
advisors go to great trouble to standardise the assumptions. This makes it very 
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hard for investors to understand and appreciate the forecast. For our own 
security, we went to great lengths to spell out the assumptions in detail but the 
advisors watered down everything, and by doing so created risk If a forecast 
goes wrong, one has a problem if one can't point to which assumptions failed By 
using conservative assumptions, we could have made the forecast look as bad as 
we liked in order to persuade the shareholders to accept the bid I would have 
more confidence in a forecast with no assumptions. I would regard no 
assumptions as being an underwriting of the forecast. Assumptions are caveats, 
get-outs ' 
5.4.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content 
(comments 150-162) 
The news content of forecasts is of paramount importance in the disclosure 
decision. Mixed views are expressed on disclosure of bad news and good news, 
although comments tend to indicate that bad news will not be disclosed as readily 
as good news, especially in the case of targets. 
The following comments are illustrative: `Good news can be relative. If the 
market, for example, is saying that profits will be halved and if the drop is not so 
much, you might make a forecast. ; 'The news contained in the forecast is 
definitely important. The company will want to get poor performance news into 
the market. It might have to make a formal profit forecast justifying reasons why 
the board recommends shareholders to accept the offer. ; 'I think the forecast 
would either be giving good news, or trying to contain bad news. If there is such 
uncertainty surrounding the circumstances, then a forecast would not be the way 
in which a company would go. The company would deal with the matter through 
discussion of the actions that would be taken to contain the problem. Directors 
would not wish there to be an incorrect impression as to the true position of the 
company, even if there is had news to be disclosed Whether good news or bad 
news was disclosed in the forecasts is tested in chapter 7. 
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5.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has analysed and discussed 11 in depth interviews with senior 
advisors and management of companies which are part of the research sample. 
The interviews are considered under five headings derived from the issues 
considered by this research. 
Factors influencing disclosure of forecasts are complex and varied, and depend 
especially on the particular circumstances of takeover bids. However, some 
factors were regularly commented on by interviewees - bid horizon, whether the 
bid is contested or not, whether the potential forecaster is a bidding or target 
company. Purchase consideration was referred to as being particularly influential 
on whether bidders disclose forecasts. 
Costs of making forecasts are a deterrent to disclosure. These include the direct 
costs of disclosure and the risk of getting the forecast wrong. 
Advisors were considered especially influential. Size of firm was regularly referred 
to, but the direction of the relationship between size and disclosure varied. On the 
one hand, larger companies have better forecasting systems to facilitate making a 
forecast. On the other hand, market expectations are likely to be more correct for 
larger firms, reducing the need for disclosure. 
The second research issue is whether market expectations influence disclosure of 
forecasts. The interviewees were unanimous on this point. Market expectations 
are a very important influence on disclosure, both when expectations are above as 
well as below forecasts. 
Most interviewees agreed that disclosure of a forecast is an effective weapon in a 
takeover bid, but there was no consensus on what the effect of disclosure is, or on 
how disclosure of a forecast benefits the forecaster. 
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Table 5.4 Summary results of interviews analysed by reference to hypotheses 
Hypothesis Interview findings 
Influences on disclosure 
H, (YEAR) Supported 
H2 (BT) Supported 
H3 (BID) Supported 
114 (CON) Supported: Bidders will only disclose forecasts during paper bids 
Hs (BHOR) Supported 
1-6 (Size) Neither supported nor rejected: Size is important but direction of 
influence on disclosure is unclear 
H7 (LEV) Not supported 
H8 (MO) Not supported 
H9 (SSH) Hypothesis not probed in interview 
H, o (AUD) Supported 
H (MB) Supported 
H12 (QUOTED) Hypothesis not probed in interview 
H13 (IND) Hypothesis not probed in interview 
H14 (NAT) Hypothesis not probed in interview 
His (ME) Supported: Market expectations most important influence on 
disclosure 
Influence on outcome of bid 
H16 (Success-bidders) Supported 1 There was no consensus 
H17 (Offer price-bidders) I on how disclosure 
His (Success-targets) Supported I of a forecast 
H19 (Offer price-targets) J benefits the forecaster 
Influence on disclosure content 
H2O (BT) 1 
H21 (BID) I 







H29 (AUD) I 
H30 (MB) I 
Individual hypotheses were not 
discussed in interviews. 
Views varied on whether 
it is better to disclose 
more/less items in forecasts. 
More assumptions were taken 




H33 (NAT) J 
H34 (News) Mixed views on whether the news disclosed will be good or bad, 
with support for a tendency to disclose good news 
Views on the disclosures contained in forecasts were mixed. There seemed to be a 
preference for detailed forecasts but, at the same time, a concern that more 
detailed forecasts include more caveats, making achievement of the forecasts less 
certain. 
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The last research issue, news content of forecasts, was also the subject of mixed 
views. There was no clear agreement on whether good news rather than bad news 
forecasts are disclosed. 
In summary, the findings of the interviews are related to the hypotheses tested by 
the research in table 5.4. 
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Chapter 6: FACTORS INFLUENCING DISCLOSURE OF FORECASTS: 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This chapter reports empirical results of testing three of the five research issues 
identified in chapter 1. Chapter 3 outlined the development of hypotheses to test 
these as follows: 
" What factors significantly influence voluntary disclosure of profit forecasts? 
(H1-H14) 
" What effects do prevailing market expectations of firm profitability have on 
disclosure? (H15) 
" Is disclosure of a forecast an effective weapon in defence or completion of a 
bid? (H16-H19) 
Analysis of bidders and targets 
As motivations for disclosing forecasts are different for bidders and targets, the 
incidence of disclosure is expected to be different for the two groups. Evidence 
from informal interviews with advisors, directors and management of companies 
involved in takeovers (see chapter 5 for details) suggests that benefits of making a 
forecast are much greater for target companies than for bidders. Bidding 
companies control the timing of the approach and are therefore more likely to 
make a bid when market conditions are favourable for them. Target companies 
have no such control over events and therefore have a greater need to signal 
information to shareholders to adjust market expectations. Consequently, 
disclosure of forecasts by bidders is analysed separately from disclosure by 
targets. A comparison of bidder and target results is then made. 
Analysis of agreed and contested bids 
Prior research in developing takeover prediction models has found that targets 
differ according to whether the takeover was friendly or hostile (Merck, Shliefer 
and Vishny, 1988; Powell, 1995). Thus, in addition to analysing forecast 
disclosure between bidders and targets, disclosure of forecasts is also analysed 
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between agreed and contested bids. Agreed and contested bid results are then 
compared. 
6.1 Disclosure of forecasts (HI-H14) 
There were 250 forecasts disclosed in 197 bids (out of 701 bids - 28%). A second 
forecast by a bidder or target is ignored for the purposes of the ensuing analysis, 
as are involuntary and repeat forecasts, leaving 188 bidders/targets (47 bidders 
and 141 targets) voluntarily disclosing a forecast. Of the 188 voluntary forecasts, 
99 were disclosed during agreed bids and 89 during contested bids. 
6.1.1 Bivariate analysis for bidders and targets 
Bivariate analysis is summarised in tables 6.1 and 6.2. Full statistics are shown in 
tables A3.1 and A3.2 in appendix 3. Table 6.1 reports Mann-Whitney U test 
differences in mean rankings of the continuous variables (except for deviation 
from market expectations (ME) which is dealt with in section 6.2) of the two 
groups: forecasting and nonforecasting firms. Analysis of categorical variables 
between forecasters and nonforecasters, for bidders and for targets, is summarised 
in table 6.2. As expected, a forecast is significantly more frequent in the case of 
targets (141 forecasts (20%) out of 701) compared with bidders (47 forecasts 
(7%) out of 701). 
Bivariate analysis - full sample 
For the full sample, forecasters and nonforecasters differ significantly on bid 
horizon (BHOR), value of bid (VAL), management ownership (MO) and type of 
bid (BID). Forecasters have shorter bid horizons, are party to larger value bids 
and have lower management ownership. Significantly more forecasts are disclosed 
during contested bids. Bivariate results for bidders are very different from the 
results for targets. 
Bivariate analysis - bidders 
Bidders' mean rankings differ significantly on bid horizon (BHOR) , value of bid 
(VAL), turnover (REV) and percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH). The 
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mean rankings for bid horizon (BHOR) and percentage substantial shareholdings 
(SSH) are significantly lower for forecasting bidders. The mean rankings for value 
of bid (VAL) and turnover (REV) are significantly higher for forecasting bidders. 
As expected for bidders, forecast disclosure is related to purchase consideration. 
Forecast disclosure is significantly greater in paper bids especially, and also in 
mixed (cash and paper) bids. Very few (only four) bidders disclosed a forecast 
during cash bids. These four cash bids were examined to identify possible reasons 
for forecast disclosure by bidders. In two cases, shares were issued to raise cash 
for the bid. The forecast was motivated by the sale of shares rather than the 
takeover. In the remaining two bids, the contested nature of the bid seems to be 
the motivation for disclosure, even though the consideration is cash. Disclosure of 
a forecast might have been made to influence target shareholders (or possibly 
bidder shareholders) concerning the competence of bidder's management ability. 
Forecasting and nonforecasting bidders differ significantly on listing status 
(QUOTED) and nationality (NAT). Listed bidders and UK bidders disclosed 
significantly more forecasts. Only two foreign bidders disclosed a forecast. Both 
were Dutch quoted companies. These results are all in the directions predicted in 
chapter 3. 
There is no support in the case of bidders for the influence of economic conditions 
(proxied by year) (H1), leverage (H7), percentage management ownership (Hg), 
auditor/reporting accountant (Hio) and financial advisor (H11). The null hypothesis 
of no industry influence, H13, is supported. 
Bivariate analysis - targets 
Mann-Whitney mean rankings of targets differ significantly on all variables except 
number (NO. SSH) and percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH). The mean 
rankings for bid horizon (BHOR) and percentage management ownership (MO) 
are significantly lower for forecasting targets. The mean rankings for value of bid 
(VAL), turnover (REV), total assets (TAl), owners' equity (TA2) and leverage 
(LEV) are significantly higher for forecasting targets. Type of bid (BID), financial 
advisor (MB), auditor/reporting accountant (AUD) and industry (IND) are 
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significantly different for forecasting and nonforecasting targets. As predicted, the 
frequency of forecast disclosure by targets is significantly greater in contested bids 
and where higher reputation firms of financial advisors and big-six auditors are 
involved in the bid. The industry profile for target company forecasters and 
nonforecasters is also significantly different. There are fewer forecasts in the 
durable goods sector and the banking and financial sector. These results are all in 
the directions predicted in chapter 3. 
There is no support in the case of targets for the influence of economic conditions 
(H1), purchase consideration (Ha), percentage substantial shareholdings (H9) and 
nationality (H14). 
Table 6.1 Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings 
between forecasters and nonforecasters for each continuous 
independent variable 
Full sample Bidders only Targets only 
Z-etat. Two-tailed Z-etat. Two-tailed Z-etat. Two-tailed 
prob. prob. prob. 
BHOR -5.69 0.00** -3.42 0.00** -4.57 0.00** 
VAL -7.01 0.00** -3.85 0.00** -6.03 0.00** 
REV -1.62 0.11 -1.96 0.05* -6.26 0.00** 
TAI -1.48 0.14 -1.86 0.06 -5.56 0.00** 
TA2 -1.18 0.24 -1.83 0.07 -5.38 0.00** 
LEV -1.42 0.16 -0.08 0.93 -3.19 0.00** 
MO -4.08 0.00** -1.61 0.11 -3.96 0.00** 
NO. SSH -0.08 0.94 -0.70 0.49 -0.47 0.64 
SSH -1.50 0.13 -2.35 0.02* -0.53 0.59 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.2 in appendix 3. 
As all the variables are variously significantly related to forecast disclosure in 
bivariate analysis, the choice of these variables to be tested in the research is 
validated (this is not to say that an exhaustive set of variables was tested). 
These initial results show the dominance of takeover-context variables. Four of 
the five takeover-context variables were significant in the bivariate analysis. For 
bidders, firm-specific variables were not significantly different between forecasters 
and nonforecasters. In the case of targets, all firm-specific variables, except for 
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substantial shareholdings and nationality, were significantly different between 
forecasters and nonforecasters. 
Table 6.2 Chi-square statistics for differences between forecasters and 
nonforecasters - categorical variables 
Full sample Bidders only Targets only 
Variable d. f. Chi- Signif. Chi- Signif. Chi- Signif. 
square square square 
YEAR 4 6.52 0.16 7.23 0.12 2.24 0.69 
BT 1 54.28 0.00** 
BID 1 75.28 0.00** 5.23 0.02* 81.07 0.00** 
CON 2 5.44 0.07 32.63 0.00** 3.53 0.17 
MB 1 7.16 0.01* 0.33 0.56 12.18 0.00** 
AUD 1 2.37 0.12 0.20 0.65 5.42 0.02* 
QUOTED 1 52.16 0.00** 22.86 0.00** N/A N/A 
IND 4 5.24 0.26 6.22 0.18 12.67 0.01 
NAT 2 27.75 0.00** 13.20 0.00** 0.52 0.77 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :90.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.1 in appendix 3. 
As number of substantial shareholders (NO. SSH) is so insignificant, this variable 
is excluded from all subsequent analysis. 
6.1.2 Multivariate model 
The model specified in chapter 3, estimated using logit analysis, is shown in table 
6.3. To avoid potential collinearity problems, size variables are included 
separately and alternatively in the model. Reported results are based on the size 
variable, value of the bid (VAL). Results vary depending on which size variable is 
included in the model. This is analysed in more detail in table 6.9. 
Logistic regression is estimated using forward stepwise selection. The tables 
below and in appendix 3 report the results when the Wald statistic was used to 
remove variables from the models (with a cutoff of 0.10). The logit coefficients 
for each of the variables in the models are presented in exponential form in the 
chapter tables. Thus, each coefficient estimates the multiplicative effect of the 
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associated variable on the odds of disclosure of a forecast, controlling for the 
effects of the other variables in the model. Two statistics are reported in the tables 
to assess whether the model fits the data: -2LL (a large significance level 
indicates that the model does not differ significantly from the `perfect' model); the 
goodness-of-fit statistic (a high significance indicates a good fit). Model chi- 
square tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the terms in the model, 
except the constant, are zero. 
Table 6.3 Disclosure model estimated 
Disclosure =f (YEAR + BID (or BT)+ CON + BHOR + SIZE + LEV + MO + SSH+ AUD + 
MB + QUOTED + IND + NAT) 
Expressing this in log form: 
log [P(F) / P( NF)] = Bo+ BIDYEAR + BZBID (or BT) + B3DCON +B, BHOR + 
BSVAL (or REV or TAl or TA2) + B6LEV + B7MO + BBSSH + 
B9AUD + B10MB + B11QUOTED + BI2DIND + BI3DNAT 
where: 
P(F) and P(NF) = Probability of a forecast/of no forecast. 
DYEAR = Dummy variables for each year of the study 
BID = Type of bid (only in model for bidders and targets) 
BT = Party to the bid (only in model for agreed and contested bids) 
DCON = Dummy variables for three types of purchase consideration 
BHOR = Bid horizon 
VAL = Value of bid 
REV = Turnover of the firm 
TAl = Total assets of the firm 
TA2 = Owners' equity of firm 
LEV = Leverage of firm 
MO = Percentage management ownership of firm 
SSH = Percentage substantial shareholdings in firm 
AUD - Auditor/reporting accountant 
MB = Financial advisor 
QUOTED = Whether quoted 
DIND = Dummy variables for five categories of industry 
DNAT = Dummy variables for three groups of nationalities 
Tables 6.4 to 6.7 and tables 6.11 to 6.14 summarise the results and only report 
coefficients for the significant variables remaining in the models after forward 
stepwise selection. Full results of all variables, both included and excluded, are 
reported in appendix 3. These full output tables show the standard regression 
coefficients (i. e. not in exponential form). 
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6.1.3 Disclosure by bidders - multivariate analysis 
In order to increase the number of cases analysed it was decided that percentage 
substantial shareholdings (SSH) should be excluded from the model as this 
variable has a large number of missing values. The exclusion of SSH increases the 
number of cases analysed from 186 to 308 (out of a maximum of 701 cases). 
Model including substantial shareholdings (SSH) (Table 6.4) 
Three variables in the model are significant: bid horizon (BHOR), year (YEAR) 
and type of bid (BID). As predicted, the probability of disclosure increases as bid 
horizon decreases and during contested bids. Forecasts are also more likely in the 
earlier years of the study. 
lk 
Table 6.4 Logit estimation of model for bidders 
- including SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BHOR 0.01 0.00** -0.34 
YEAR (1988) 13.09 0.66 0.00 
YEAR (1989) 3.66 0.83 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 7.12 0.74 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 3.14 0.85 0.00 
BID 5.41 0.00** 0.21 
-2 Log likelihood 87.95 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 143.88 Significance 0.97 
Model chi-square 47.27 (d. f. 6) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo RZ 0.35 
Number of observations 186 cases (22 F; 164 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.6 
in appendix 3. 
Model excluding substantial shareholdings (SSH1) (Table 6.5) 
Five variables are included in this model: bid horizon (BHOR), size (VAL), year 
(YEAR), type of bid (BID) and purchase consideration (CON). The probability 
of disclosure increases as bid horizon decreases, increases for larger companies 
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and during contested bids. Significantly more forecasts are probable in paper bids 
and significantly fewer in cash bids. Significantly more forecasts are disclosed in 
1988 1990. 
In both models, bid horizon (BHOR) has considerably more explanatory power 
(R) than the other significant variables included in the models. However, the 
effect of type of bid (BID) on probability of disclosure is greater. The 
multiplicative coefficients indicate that the odds of disclosing a forecast are 
5.41/3.34 times greater during contested bids. The odds of disclosing a forecast in 
years 1988 and 1990 are also high. 
Table 6.5 Logit estimation of model for bidders 
- excluding SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BHOR 0.03 0.00** -0.29 
VAL 1.00 0.05* 0.09 
YEAR (1988) 2.57 0.01* 0.15 
YEAR (1989) 0.61 0.33 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 2.26 0.05* 0.09 
YEAR (1991) 0.62 0.34 0.00 
BID 3.34 0.01* 0.15 
CON (CASH) 0.25 0.01 -0.15 
CON (PAPER) 2.83 0.00 0.18 
-2 Log likelihood 160.72 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 250.68 Significance 0.98 
Model chi-square 57.37 (d. f. 9) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo RZ 0.26 
Number of observations 308 cases (35 F; 273 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.7 
in appendix 3. 
The explanatory power (pseudo R) of the model excluding substantial 
shareholdings (SSH) is lower (0.26) than that of the model including substantial 
shareholdings (0.35). There is very little difference in the goodness of fit statistic. 
175 
6.1.4 Disclosure by targets - multivariate analysis 
In order to increase the number of cases analysed, the variable with the most 
missing values, percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH), was dropped from 
the model. This increased the number of cases for analysis from 382 to 530 (out 
of a maximum of 701 cases). 
Model including substantial shareholdings (SSH(Table 6.6) 
Only two variables in the model are significant: bid horizon (BHOR) and type of 
bid (BID). As predicted, the probability of disclosure increases as bid horizon 
decreases and during contested bids. 
Table 6.6 Legit estimation of model for targets 
- including SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BHOR 0.33 0.02* -0.10 
BID 5.72 0.00** 0.32 
-2 Log likelihood 360.24 Significance 0.75 
Goodness of fit 360.42 Significance 0.75 
Model chi-square 49.68 (d. f. 2) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.12 
Number of observations 382 cases (87 F; 295 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.8 
in appendix 3. 
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Table 6.7 Logit estimation of model for targets 
- excluding SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BHOR 0.18 0.00** -0.16 
VAL 1.00 0.03 * 0.07 
BID 6.63 0.00** 0.32 
IND (CAPGDS) 1.64 0.03* 0.06 
IND (DURGDS) 0.84 0.56 0.00 
IND (NONDUR) 1.18 0.43 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 1.52 0.07 0.05 
-2 Log likelihood 456.61 Significance 0.98 
Goodness of fit 496.12 Significance 0.79 
Model chi-square 105.43 (d. f. 7) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.19 
Number of observations 530 cases (118 F; 412 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at . -9 0.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.9 
in appendix 3. 
Model excluding substantial shareholdings (Table 6.7) 
In addition to the two variables significant in the previous model (bid horizon 
(BHOR) and type of bid (BID)), value of bid (VAL) and industry (IND) are also 
significant in this model. As predicted, the probability of disclosure increases as 
value of the bid increases. A forecast is significantly more likely in the capital 
goods industry. 
The effect of type of bid (BID) on disclosure is substantial. The probability of 
disclosing a forecast is 5.72/6.63 times greater during a contested bid. Type of bid 
(BID) also contributes considerably more explanatory power (R) to the model 
than bid horizon (BHOR), value of bid (VAL) and industry (IND). 
The exclusion of percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH) improves the 
explanatory power of the model (pseudo R) from 0.12 to 0.19 and improves the 
goodness of fit statistic from 0.75 to 0.79. 
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6.1.5 Summary of results for bidders and targets 
The analysis in this section examined various influences on disclosure of profit 
forecasts to test hypothesises Hl-H14 outlined in chapter 3. Initially bivariate 
relationships were analysed, followed by multivariate logit analysis. As predicted 
by H2, forecast disclosure is significantly greater for targets than for bidders (see 
table A3.1 in appendix 3 for details). 
Bivariate results - bidders 
Mann-Whitney U tests of the differences in mean rankings of continuous variables 
were examined. These tests showed that bidders' mean rankings differ 
significantly on bid horizon (BHOR), value of bid (VAL), turnover (REV) and 
percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH). The mean rankings for bid horizon 
(BHOR) and percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH) are significantly lower, 
and the mean rankings for value of bid (VAL) and turnover (REV) are 
significantly higher, for forecasting bidders. The frequency of disclosure is 
significantly greater during contested bids (BID), in bids where the purchase 
consideration is paper or mixed (cash and paper) (CON), and by listed 
(QUOTED) and UK bidders (NAT). 
Thus, in the case of bidders, initial tests support the hypotheses that fewer 
forecasts are disclosed when the bid horizon is longer (H5), that large bidders 
voluntarily disclose more forecasts (H6) (subject to two of the four size variables 
tested not being significant) and that firms with larger percentage substantial 
shareholdings disclose fewer forecasts (H9). In the case of bidders there is no 
support for the hypotheses that disclosure of forecasts is influenced by leverage 
(H7) or by percentage management ownership (Hg). 
Again, in the case of bidders, simple crosstabulations provide initial support for 
the hypotheses that more forecasts are disclosed during contested bids (H2), in 
bids which include paper consideration (H3), by quoted companies (H12) and by 
UK listed companies (H14). There is no support for the influence of year (HI), 
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auditor/reporting accountant (Hlo) and financial advisor (Hu). The null hypothesis 
of no industry influence, H13, is supported. 
Bivariate results - targets 
Mann-Whitney U test mean rankings of targets differ significantly on all variables 
except number and percentage substantial shareholdings (NO. SSH/SSH). The 
mean rankings for bid horizon (BHOR) and percentage management ownership 
(MO) are significantly lower, and the mean rankings for value of bid (VAL), 
turnover (REV), total assets (TAl), owners' equity (TA2) and leverage (LEV) 
are significantly higher, for forecasting targets. The frequency of forecast 
disclosure by targets is significantly greater during contested bids (BID), and 
where big-six auditors (AUD) and higher reputation firms of financial advisors 
(MB) are involved in the bid. The industry profile (IND) for target company 
forecasters and nonforecasters is also significantly different. 
Thus, in the case of targets, initial tests support the hypotheses that fewer 
forecasts are disclosed when the bid horizon is longer (Hs) and that larger (H6), 
higher leveraged (H7) targets with lower percentage management ownership (H8) 
disclose more forecasts. In the case of targets, there is no support for the 
hypothesis that disclosure of forecasts is influenced by percentage substantial 
shareholdings (H9). There is initial support for the hypotheses that more forecasts 
are disclosed during contested bids (113) and where big-six firms of auditors (Hio) 
and higher reputation firms of financial advisors (Hll) are involved in the 
takeover. The null hypothesis that industry has no effect on disclosure of forecasts 
(H13) is not supported. 
Multivariate logit results 
Two variables are significant in all logit models: bid horizon (BHOR) and type of 
bid (BID). The probability of disclosure of a forecast is greater, for both bidders 
and targets, where bid horizon is shorter and in contested bids. Bid horizon is 
more influential for bidders than for targets; type of bid is more influential for 
targets than for bidders. 
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For bidders, year (YEAR) is significant in the model including substantial 
shareholdings (SSH). In the model excluding substantial shareholdings (SSH) 
value of bid (VAL) and purchase consideration (CON) are also significant. For 
targets, value of bid (VAL) and industry (IND) are significant in the model 
excluding substantial shareholdings (SSH). 
Table 6.8 Summary of Spearman correlations 
between size variables 
Relationship Bidders Targets 
Correlation Correlation 
TA1-TA2 0.71** 0.98** 
VAL-TA1 0.53** 0.82** 
VAL-TA2 0.52** 0.81** 
VAL-REV 0.45** 0.73** 
REV-TAI 0.76** 0.70** 
REV-TA2 0.71** 0.68** 
** Significant at < 0.01 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in 
tables A3.3 and A3.4 in appendix 3. 
Table 6.9 Analysis to explain anomalous results on size variables 
Bidders Targets 
Model No. Significant variables No. Significant variables 
cases cases 
Including SSH 
All variables 181 BHOR, YEAR, BID 375 BHOR, BID 
Excluding TA2 181 BHOR, YEAR, BID 375 BHOR, BID 
Excluding LEV 181 BHOR, YEAR, BID 379 BHOR, BID 
Only one size variable: VAL 186 BHOR, YEAR, BID 382 BHOR, BID 
Only one size variable: REV 182 BHOR, YEAR, BID 376 BHOR, BID 
Only one size variable: TAl 184 BHOR, YEAR, BID 383 BHOR, BID 
Only one size variable: TA2 185 BHOR, YEAR, BID 383 BHOR, TA2, BID 
Excluding size 186 BHOR, YEAR, BID 383 BHOR, BID 
Excluding SSH 
All variables 302 BHOR, VAL, YEAR, BID, CON 523 BHOR, TA2, BID, IND 
Excluding TA2 302 BHOR, VAL, YEAR, BID, CON 523 BHOR, BID, IND 
Excluding LEV 302 BHOR, VAL, YEAR, BID, CON 527 BHOR, TA2, BID, IND 
Only one size variable: VAL 308 BHOR, VAL, YEAR, BID, CON 530 BHOR, VAL, BID, IND 
Only one size variable: REV 303 BHOR, YEAR, BID, CON 524 BHOR, BID, IND 
Only one size variable: TA1 306 BHOR, YEAR, BID, CON 531 BHOR, TAI, BID, IND 
Only one size variable: TA2 307 BHOR, YEAR, BID, CON 531 BHOR, TA2, BID, 11 41) 
Excluding size 308 BHOR, YEAR, BID, CON 531 BHOR, BID, IND 
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The results for the size variables are anomalous. The four size variables, value of 
bid (VAL), turnover (REV), total assets (TAl) and owners' equity (TA2) are 
expected to be similar. However, results vary depending on which size variable is 
included in the model. Bivariate Spearman correlations between size variables, 
summarised in table 6.8, show almost identical(targets)/close(bidders) correlations 
for total assets (TAl) and owners' equity (TA2). 
To try to explain the anomalous results on the size variables, logit models of 
various combinations of variables were analysed. The results are reported in table 
6.9. Firstly, owners' equity (TA2) was excluded. Then leverage (LEV) was 
excluded. This is because the difference between owners' equity (TA2) and total 
assets (TAl) is debt and, therefore, the anomalous findings may be related to 
leverage (LEV). Next, each of the four size variables was included individually in 
the model. Finally, no size variable was included. 
For bidders, only one size variable, value of bid (VAL), is significant and only in 
some models (for this reason, as stated earlier, the reported results are based on 
value of bid (VAL)). For targets, value of bid (VAL), total assets (TA! ) and 
owners' equity (TA2) are included in some models. 
These analyses do not explain why some size variables were significant when 
others were not. Excluding leverage did not change the results. Generally the 
results were not affected when size variables were excluded, although total assets 
(TAl) and value of bid (VAL) were significant in some cases. Thus, in 
conclusion, there seems to be no obvious explanation for the anomalous results on 
size. 
6.1.6 Differences in disclosure between bidders and targets 
Target firms are significantly more likely to disclose a forecast. The frequency of 
voluntary forecast disclosure by targets (141 - 20%) is significantly greater than 
by bidders (47 - 7%). This is not surprising. If the bidder is offering cash, there is 
little advantage in making a forecast. There were 338 cash bids (48%) in the 
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research. As one interviewee stated (comment 21) `There is no negative PR about 
the share price in an uncontested bid so it is less likely the bidder will have to 
make a forecast'. Interviews with advisors suggest that the benefits of disclosure 
are much greater for targets. Bidding companies will have less need to 
communicate results to shareholders as they control the timing of the bid and are 
more likely to make a bid when market conditions are favourable to them. 
Table 6.10 Summary results of bivariate and multivariate analysis for bidders and 
targets 
Bivariate analysis Logit analysis 
Bidders Targets Bidders Targets 
Including Excluding Including Excluding 
SSH SSH SSH SSH 
186 cases 308 cases 382 cases 530 cases 
YEAR ** 
* ** ** * ** ** BID 
CON ** 
BHOR ** ** ** ** * ** 
VAL ** ** 











** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 6.1,6.2 and 6.4 to 6.7 
Table 6.10 compares the results of bivariate and multivariate analysis of variables 
for bidders and targets. Bid horizon (BHOR) and type of bid (BID) are significant 
for both bidders and targets in all analysis performed. As with the initial bivariate 
analysis, multivariate analysis shows the dominance of the takeover-context of the 
research. For bidders, two other takeover-context variables, year and purchase 
consideration, were significant in one model. 
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Bid horizon is more influential for bidders than for targets; type of bid is more 
influential for targets than for bidders. This is not surprising. Bidders have greater 
discretion in disclosing forecasts compared with targets which are under much 
more pressure during a bid, especially contested bids. Bidders will disclose 
forecasts if the circumstances are conducive to disclosure. Whether conditions are 
conducive is likely to be related to length of bid horizon. Longer bid horizons are 
likely to be considered adverse to forecast disclosure by bidders especially, 
The finding in all models that bid horizon is significantly shorter for forecasters is 
to be expected. The closer the bid date to the forecast period end, the less risk of 
getting the forecast wrong. If the bid date is very close to the year end (in 86 
cases (15%), out of 571 readings, bid horizon was after the year end) there is 
probably less work and management time necessary to bring out a forecast. . 
For bidders (in addition to bid horizon (BHOR) and type of bid (BID)), bivariate 
analysis shows that size (only two (VAL and REV) of the four variables), 
percentage substantial shareholdings (SSH), purchase consideration (CON), 
listing status (QUOTED) and nationality (NAT) are significantly related to 
disclosure of forecasts. Only year (YEAR), value of bid (VAL) and purchase 
consideration (CON) are significant in multivariate logit analysis. 
For targets (in addition to bid horizon (BHOR) and type of bid (BID)), bivariate 
analysis shows that size (all four (VAL, REV, TAI, TA2) measures thereof), 
leverage (LEV), percentage management ownership (MO), auditor/reporting 
accountant (AUD), financial advisor (MB) and industry (IND) are related to 
disclosure of forecasts. Only size (VAL) and industry (IND) are significant in the 
logit model. 
Table 6.10 highlights the discrepancy in findings between bivariate analysis and 
multivariate analysis. It is difficult to explain this discrepancy. The Spearman 
correlations between the independent variables for bidders and targets (in tables 
A3.3 and A3.4 in appendix 3) do not suggest that there are very high correlations 
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that would explain why variables significant in bivariate analysis are not in 
multivariate analysis. 
In summary, the comparison of disclosure by bidders and targets reveals the 
following: 
" Bivariate analysis indicates that forecast disclosure is generally related to firm- 
specific variables for targets but not for bidders; 
" Purchase consideration is an important influence on disclosure for bidders. 
6.1.7 Disclosure in agreed and contested bids 
The preceding analysis has focused on bidders and targets. Analysis between 
agreed and contested bids follows. To avoid data overload, bivariate analysis was 
not performed (nor was it considered necessary). A forecast is significantly more 
likely in contested bids. There were 99 (18%) voluntary forecasts in 542 agreed 
bids and 89 (56%) forecasts in 159 contested bids. 
Table 6.11 Logit estimation of model for agreed bids 
- including SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BHOR 0.05 0.00** -0.27 
VAL 1.00 0.01* 0.13 
-2 Log likelihood 273.47 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 383.32 Significance 0.91 
Model chi-square 38.16 (d. f. 2) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.12 
Number of observations 424 cases (51 F; 373 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table 
A3.10 in appendix 3. 
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6.1.8 Disclosure in agreed bids - multivariate analysis 
There were 542 agreed bids, comprising 1,084 bidders and targets. Out of 1,084 
firms, 424 were available for analysis when substantial shareholdings (SSH) was 
included in the model, which increased to 626 when substantial shareholdings 
(SSH) was excluded. 
Table 6.12 Legit estimation of model for agreed bids 
- excluding SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BHOR 0.05 0.00** -0.30 
VAL 1.00 0.01* 0.11 
-2 Log likelihood 394.30 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 583.17 Significance 0.87 
Model chi-square 52.51(d. f. 2) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.12 
Number of observations 626 cases (72 F; 554 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table 
A3.11 in appendix 3. 
Agreed bids - model including substantial shareholdings (SSH) (Table 6.11) 
Table 6.11 shows two variables to be significant in determining disclosure of 
forecasts in agreed bids - bid horizon (BHOR) and value of bid (VAL). Disclosure 
is significantly more likely the shorter the bid horizon and for larger firms. 
Agreed bids - model excluding substantial shareholdings (SSH) (Table 6.12) 
The results in table 6.12 are similar to those in table 6.11. 
In both models, bid horizon (BHOR) had considerably more explanatory power 
(R) than value of bid (VAL). The effect of bid horizon (BHOR) on probability of 
forecast disclosure is much smaller than for value of bid (VAL) (as indicated by 
multiplicative coefficients). 
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6.1.9 Disclosure in contested bids - multivariate analysis 
There are 159 contested bids, comprising 318 bidders and targets. Out of 318 
firms, 144 are available for analysis when substantial shareholdings (SSH) is 
included in the model. When substantial shareholdings (SSH) is excluded, the 
number of cases increases to 212. 
Contested bids - model including substantial shareholdings (SSH) (Table 6.13) 
Table 6.13 shows that only one variable, whether the firm is bidder or target, is 
related to disclosure in contested bids. Targets are significantly more likely to 
disclose forecasts in contested bids. 
Table 6.13 Logit estimation of model for contested bids 
- including SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BT 2.99 0.01* 0.16 
-2 Log likelihood 186.41 Significance 0.01 
Goodness of fit 144.00 Significance 0.44 
Model chi-square 7.74 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.04 
Number of observations 144 cases (58 F; 86 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at _, 5 0.05 
Dependent variable: disclosure/nondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients a Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table 
A3.12 in appendix 3. 
Contested bids - model excluding substantial shareholdings (SSH) (Table 6.14) 
The results in table 6.14 are similar to those in table 6.13. 
6.1.10 Summary of results for agreed and contested bids 
Lo, git results 
The factors related to disclosure of forecasts are very different for contested and 
agreed bids. In agreed bids a forecast is more likely the shorter the bid horizon 
and for larger bids. In contested bids, forecasting by targets is the dominant 
factor. 
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Table 6.14 Logit estimation of model for contested bids 
- excluding SSH 
Explanatory variables Coeff. Signif. R 
BT 4.38 0.00** 0.25 
-2 Log likelihood 259.22 Significance 0.01 
Goodness of fit 211.99 Significance 0.45 
Model chi-square 22.74 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo RZ 0.08 
Number of observations 212 cases (81 F; 131 NF) 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Dependent variable: disclosurelnondisclosure of a forecast 
Coefficients = Multiplicative logistic regression estimates 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table 
A3.13 in appendix 3. 
Table 6.15 Summary results of logfit analysis of agreed and 
contested bids 
Agreed bids Contested bids 
Including Excluding Including Excluding 
SSH SSH SSH SSH 
424 cases 626 cages 144 cases 212 cases 
YEAR 
BT * ** 
CON 













** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 6.11 to 6.14 
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6.1.11 Differences in disclosure between agreed and contested bids 
A forecast is significantly more likely in contested bids. There were 99 (18%) 
voluntary forecasts in 542 agreed bids and 89 (56%) forecasts in 159 contested 
bids. Table 6.15 compares the results of agreed and contested bids. The factors 
influencing disclosure of profit forecasts are very different. Bid horizon and value 
of bid influence disclosure in agreed bids. In contested bids, whether the firm is a 
target is the single dominant influence. 
In agreed bids, forecasts are probably disclosed by bidders and targets to increase 
the likelihood of the bid succeeding: of the bid being accepted by target 
shareholders (and possibly bidder shareholders where paper is issued). However, 
if the circumstances prevailing at the time of the bid are not conducive to a 
forecast, other methods of persuading shareholders to accept the bid are likely. 
Long bid horizons are not conducive to forecast disclosure. Thus, it is not 
surprising that this variable is related to forecast disclosure in agreed bids. 
There were 17 bidder forecasters (out of 47 - 36%) and 72 target forecasters (out 
of 141 - 51%) in contested bids. In contested bids, it was expected that a 
relationship would be found between forecast disclosure and target (rather than 
bidder) firms. However the strength of the finding is surprising - that it was the 
single and main influence on disclosure. 
6.2 Influence of market expectations on disclosure (His) 
This section examines the hypothesis that, where market expectations are out of 
line with current management estimates of profitability, firms are more likely to 
disclose a forecast. Deviation from market expectations is the difference between 
consensus analyst forecasts at the date of the bid and actual results. As explained 
in chapter 4, only 261 readings are available for deviation from market 
expectations (ME). The variable has been analysed between positive and negative 
deviations. Descriptive statistics for market expectations in table 4.13 show that 
the means for positive (POSME) and negative (NEGME) deviations do not 
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appear dissimilar. The value of deviation from market expectations (ME) is not 
very different from zero. 
Table 6.16 analyses deviations from market expectations (ME) for bidders and 
targets between forecasters and nonforecasters. Significantly more targets (for 
which there is a reading for market expectations) made a forecast. Twenty-two 
targets (out of 49 - 45%) made a forecast compared with 23 bidders (out of 212 - 
11%). 
As expected, there is a higher incidence of forecast disclosure where actual results 
are greater than market expectations. A forecast is disclosed in 31 cases (out of 
153 - 20%) with positive deviations from expectations (POSME) and in only 14 
cases (out of 108 - 12%) with negative deviations (NEGME). However, chi- 
square statistics indicate that this difference in frequency is not significant. 
Table 6.16 Analysis of deviation from market expectations variables 
Forecasters Nonforecasters Total 
ME - Bidders 23 ( 51%) 189( 88%) 212( 81%) 
ME - Targets 22 ( 49%) 27 12%) 49 19%) 
41 W/0) 2 (IQQ%) 21 (W/O) 
Pearson chi-square 32.34 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.00 
POSME 31( 69%) 122 ( 56%) 153 ( 59%) 
NEGME 14 ( 31%) 94 ( 44%) 108(410/6) 
(W/O) 2 (W16) 2I (W%) 
Pearson chi-square 2.36 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.12 
Mann-Whitney U test results in table 6.17 show that the mean rankings of 
differences in deviation from market expectations (ME) and of the positive 
subsample (POSME) are significantly different for forecasters and nonforecasters. 
As predicted, for deviation from market expectations (ME) and for positive 
deviations (POSME), mean rankings are significantly higher where a forecast was 
disclosed. There is no difference in mean rankings for the negative deviations 
(NEGME) subsample. 
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Table 6.17 Mann-Whitney test of differences in mean rankings between 
forecasters and nonforecasters for deviation from market 
expectations variables 
Mean rank 
F NF Z-statistic Two-tailed probability 
ME 155 126 -2.30 0.02* 
POSME 93 73 -2.21 0.03* 
NEGME 52 55 -0.27 0.79 
* Significant at :50.05 
A logit model including deviation from market expectations (ME) is estimated. 
Because of the small number of readings for this variable, a single model is run 
including both bidders and targets. Deviation from market expectations is not 
significant (or even nearly significant) in the model. (Results are not shown in 
detail because they do not add anything to those shown earlier, other than to 
show that ME is not significant. ) 
Overall, these results provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that forecast 
disclosure is more likely when market expectations are out of line with actual 
results. The evidence also suggests that firms are more likely to disclose a forecast 
where market expectations are pessimistic and where actual results are greater 
than expectations. 
These results must be interpreted with caution. The sample of 261 firms with a 
value for deviation from market expectations (ME) is dominated by bidders. The 
evidence in chapter 5 indicates that bidders are more likely to disclose bad news 
voluntarily than targets, particularly targets in contested bids. In addition, bidders 
tend to be larger. Larger firms, with PR departments, may be better at guiding 
market expectations through analysts' forecasts. Thus, market expectations are 
less likely to be out of line for bidders, who are less likely therefore to disclose a 
forecast. The evidence in table 6.16 for bidders and targets is consistent with this 
interpretation. 
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6.3 Effect of forecast on outcome of bids (H16-H19) 
This section tests a number of hypotheses on the strategic value of disclosing 
forecasts during takeover bids. The effect of disclosing forecasts on the outcome 
of bids is assessed. Outcome of bids is measured in two ways: whether the bid 
succeeded/failed or whether the offer price was increased/not increased. 
As confirmed by the interviews, the relationship between success (however 
defined) and disclosure of forecasts is difficult to test. For example, in agreed bids 
the published bid price may not have increased. However, at an earlier stage, there 
may have been a price increase conditional on publication of a forecast prior to 
the bid being announced. It is impossible to test events occurring during the 
negotiation phase of bids using empirical research techniques. In contested bids it 
is difficult to know whether it is publication of a forecast, or some other event, 
that influences the outcome. It is also difficult to isolate the extent to which a 
price increase relates directly to the publication of a forecast. 
C 
6.3.1 Outcome of bids - bidders (H16-H17) 
This section examines whether successful bidders are more likely to have 
disclosed a forecast and whether disclosure of a forecast by bidders makes any 
difference to whether the offer price increases. 
Table 6.18 analyses disclosure of forecasts by bidders and outcome of bids. There 
is no significant association between outcome of the bid, however defined, and 
forecast disclosure for bidders. 
6.3.2 Outcome of bids - targets (H18-H19) 
This section tests whether successful defenders are more likely to have disclosed 
a forecast and whether an increase in offer price is more likely where the target 
has disclosed a forecast. 
Table 6.19 analyses disclosure of forecasts by targets and outcome of bids. For 
agreed bids there is a significant positive association between disclosure of a 
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forecast and success of bid. This may be because some agreed bids fail before 
there is time to make a profit forecast. 
There is no significant association between forecast disclosure and success/failure 
for contested bids. There is a significant association between disclosure of a 
forecast and increase in offer price for contested bids only. 





473 ( 94%) 39 ( 95%) 
28( 6%) 2( 5%) 
QI %) 41 (W%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.04 
(d. f. 1) Significance 0.85 
Contested 
Successful Failed 
72 ( 91%) 70( 87%) 
-7(--21/0) 
10( 13%) 
22 (W%) B. Q (W%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.55 
(d. f. 1) Significance 0.46 
Increased No increase 
offer 
38 ( 90%) 104( 89%) 
4 10*/0) 13 (JI I %) 
42 %) 1.12 (1&%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.08 
(d. f. 1) Significance 0.78 
Total 
654 ( 93%) 
47(- %) 
zu (im/. ) 
Increased No increase 
offer 
No forecast 12 ( 92%) 500 ( 94%) 
Forecast 1( 8%) 29 ( 6%) 
y1 (1Q4%) 2Q (1QQ%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.12 
(d. f. 1) Signifi cance 0.73 
Total 
654 ( 93%) 
47 ( 7%) 
2Q1(LQQ%) 





433 ( 86%) 40 ( 98%) 
68 (14%) 1 (--10/0) 
IU (1&%) 41 UW%) 
Pearson chi-square 4.23 
(d. f. 1) Significance 0.04 
Contested 
Successful Failed 
46 ( 58%) 41( 51%) 
33 (42%) 39 49%) 
22 %) N (1Q%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.78 





Increased No increase Increased No increase Total 
offer offer 
No forecast 11( 85%) 462 ( 87%) 14 ( 33%) 73 ( 62%) 560 ( 80%) 
Forecast 2( 15%) 47 ( 13%) 28 67%) 44 ( 38%) 141 (20%) 
13 (1&/0) 122 (14Q%) 42 (14Q%) 111(144%) 221(144%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.08 Pearson chi-square 10.53 
(d. f. 1) Significance 0.77 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.00 
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6.4 Discussion of chapter results and conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine three research issues. The results are summarised 
below. 
Influences on disclosure of forecasts - bidders and targets 
Targets disclosed significantly more forecasts than bidders. All variables were 
variously significantly related to disclosure of forecasts in bivariate analysis. This 
confirms the prior expectation that the variables selected for testing would all be 
related to forecast disclosure. In multivariate analysis, two variables accounted for 
almost all influences on disclosure of forecasts for both bidders and targets: bid 
horizon and type of bid. In support of H3 and Hs, significantly more forecasts 
were disclosed the shorter the bid horizon and during contested bids. 
For bidders, there was evidence, in support of Hl and 114, that year of the forecast 
and purchase consideration influenced disclosure. More forecasts were disclosed 
in the earlier years of the study and during bids that included paper consideration. 
For targets, there was evidence, in support of H6, that size was a significant 
influence on disclosure of a forecast. This result is somewhat anomalous as only 
one of the four size variables, owners' equity, was significant and in only one of 
the two models estimated for targets. No explanation for this anomalous result 
could be found. 
Influences on disclosure of forecasts - agreed and contested bids 
The factors influencing disclosure of forecasts were very different in agreed bids 
compared with contested bids. In agreed bids, significantly more forecasts were 
disclosed the shorter the bid horizon (H3) and in earlier years of the study (Hl). In 
contested bids whether the firm was a target (H2) was the dominant determinant 
of forecast disclosure. Industry (H13), and to a lesser extent size (H6) (as 
measured by total assets only), were significant. 
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Chapter 3 developed hypotheses to test influences on disclosure of forecasts 
derived from agency theory, signalling theory and from the takeover context of 
the research. These results provide little support for either agency theory or 
signalling theory motivations for disclosure. Instead, the takeover context of 
disclosure dominated the disclosure decision. 
Influence of market expectations on disclosure of forecasts 
The hypothesis that forecasts are more likely to be disclosed when market 
expectations are out of line with results was supported. This result appeared to be 
driven by over pessimistic market expectations, where subsequent actual results 
were greater than expectations. This supports the belief that forecasts are more 
likely when there is good news to disclose. 
These results must be interpreted with caution for two reasons. Firstly, there were 
limited data available on market expectations so the number of cases analysed was 
only 261. This small sample is dominated by bidders, so the results may be 
dominated by motivations of bidders. 
Strategic value of forecasts 
There is some evidence that forecasts have strategic value for targets, but there is 
no such evidence for bidders. Disclosure of forecasts in contested bids was 
significantly related to increased offer price. Consistent with previous studies, 
disclosure of a forecast had no effect on success or failure of contested bids. 
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Chapter 7: FACTORS INFLUENCING DISCLOSURES IN FORECASTS: 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyses the factors influencing content of disclosures in forecasts 
and the news content of forecasts disclosed. In all, 250 forecasts are analysed. 
Five research issues were identified in chapter 1, two of which are dealt with in 
this chapter. Chapter 3 outlined the development of hypotheses to test these two 
research issues as follows: 
" Does disclosure content of forecasts vary with external factors? (H2O-H33) 
" Do the forecasts disclosed have identifiable news content characteristics? (H34) 
7.1 Characteristics of forecasts and forecasters 
Table 7.1 summarises the characteristics of forecasts and forecasters. 
In all, 250 forecasts were obtained - 61 made by bidders, 183 by targets and 6 
other (either group forecasts of target and bidder, or forecasts by subsidiary 
companies - all were subsequently reclassified as bidder forecasts). There were 
123 forecasts disclosed in agreed bids, 121 in contested bids and 6 during white 
knight bids (subsequently reclassified as agreed bid forecasts). 
Nearly all (210 out of 250) forecasts were made voluntarily. In 27 cases, Stock 
Exchange rules required that a statement made by the company prior to the bid be 
formally reported on as a forecast. There are 13 forecasts which are repeats of 
forecasts made in previous bids. In almost all cases, the forecasts are annual, 
although there are a sizeable number of half year forecasts. In one case, the 
forecast is for a five year period. 
A majority of forecast firms have big-six auditors/reporting accountants and have 
higher reputation financial advisors. Nearly all forecasters are UK public listed 
companies. There is a reasonable spread of forecasters between the five industry 
sectors of the study. 
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Bidder 67 ( 27%) 
Target 183 (73%) 
2Q (1%) 
Type of bid 
Agreed bid 129 (52%) 
Contested bid 121(48%) 
Circumstances of forecast 
Voluntary 210 ( 84%) 
Involuntary/repeat 40 ( 16%) 
2Q (ý%) 
Period of forecast 
> six months 225 ( 90%) 
Six months or less 25 (10%) 
(IQQ%) 2Q 
Auditor/reporting accountant 
Big-six auditors 186 ( 75%) 
Other auditors 62 ( 25%) 
248 (W lo) 
Missing values 2 
Financial advisor 
Higher reputation financial advisor 180 ( 73%) 
Other financial advisor 68 ( 27%) 
248 (W%) 
Missing values 2 
2Q 
Listing status 
Quoted 237 ( 95%) 
Unquoted 13 (%) 
Indust 
Capital goods 50 ( 23%) 
Durable goods 29 ( 13%) 
Non-durable goods 62 ( 29%) 
Banks and financial 22 ( 10%) 
Other SS 25%) 
218(1 %) 
Missing values 32 
214 
Nationality 
UK companies 239 ( 96%) 
Irish and other companies 11 %) 
2Q (IQQ%) 
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Table 7.2 summarises the descriptive statistics of continuous variables relating to 
forecasting firms. The standard deviation of all, except percentage substantial 
shareholdings (SSH), is very high. All the size variables are highly positively 
skewed, as is leverage (LEV). 
Forecast horizon (FHOR) is the number of days between the issuance of the 
forecast and the forecast period end date. A substantial number of forecasts were 
published after the forecast period end and only a small number were published 
more than six months before.. 
The number of assumptions disclosed (ASS) is greater than the number of items 
(ITEMS) disclosed. Both the mean and median for ASS are greater compared 
with ITEMS. 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics of all forecast-related continuous variables 
Variable Mean Median Skew Standard No. Missing Total 
deviation values 
Dependent variables 
ITEMS 3.64 3.00 1.36 3.24 250 0( 0%) 250 
ASS 5.08 4.00 0.54 4.21 250 0( 0%) 250 
Independent variables 
Takeover- context variables 
VAL 382 73 8.18 1063 249 1( 0%) 250 
Forecast-related variables 
FHOR 59 31 6.95 144 250 0( 0%) 250 
Firm-specific variables 
REV 567 106 9.21 2242 238 12 ( 5%) 250 
TAl 301 44 12.00 1348 245 5( 2%) 250 
TA2 203 32 10.44 671 249 1( 0%) 250 
LEV 0.34 0.22 14.76 1.29 244 6( 2%) 250 
MO 14.48 3.10 1.62 20.65 233 17 ( 7°/a) 250 
SSH 0.28 0.25 0.70 0.16 156 94 (38°/a) 250 
Bivariate Spearman correlations between all independent variables for forecasters 
are shown in table A3.5. The highest correlations (down to 0.40) are summarised 
in table 7.3 - the top six relate to correlations between the four size variables 
(which are included in the regression models alternately). The highest correlations 
among other independent variables varied between -0.64 and -0.55 for 
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management ownership (MO) and the four size variables (VAL, REV, TAI, 
TA2), and 0.43 for financial advisor (MB) and two size variables (TAI and 
TA2). Thus, except for the size variables, there are few highly correlated 
independent variables in the sample of forecasters, and high correlations are 
absent from the data. In any event, high correlations between the independent 
variables are not a problem for the multivariate statistical technique (negative 
binomial regression) used to analyse content of disclosures in forecasts. 
Table 7.3 Summary of highest bivariate Spearman 
















** Significant at < 0.01 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in table A3.4 
in appendix 3. 
7.2 Content analysis of forecasts 
A comprehensive content analysis of the profit forecasts, including the wording 
used, is reported in the tables that follow. Types of and frequency of disclosure of 
items and of assumptions were shown in tables 4.15 and 4.16. Appendix 4 
contains 72 examples taken from forecasts (or in some cases from takeover 
documents) as backup material to this content analysis of disclosures in forecasts. 
As shown in table 7.4, most forecasts are quantified. Forecasts generally indicate 
a range of profits rather than a specific point forecast. Range forecasts use 
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wording such as forecast profit in excess of LX' or forecast profit 'not less than 
EX and are summarised in table 7.5. 
Table 7.4 Quantification of forecasts 
Not quantified 41( 16%) 
Point forecasts 61 24%) 
Range forecasts 148 60%) 
2Q%) 
Table 7.5 Wording used in range 
forecasts 
Profit will not be less than 111 
Profit will be in the region of 10 
Profit will be in excess of 11 
Profit is unlikely to reach 3 
Profit will be at least 2 
Profit will not exceed 2 
Loss will be not greater than 8 
Loss will be greater than 1 
14$ 
Table 7.6 Wording used in non-quantified forecasts 
Profit less than previous period 5 
Profit greater than previous period 15 
Profit not greater than previous period 1 
Profit not different from previous period 1 
Continued further growth 3 
Loss forecast 9 
Improvements in profit 1 
Profit in line with stock market expectations 2 
Return to profit 3 
Wording not stated 1 
41 
Table 7.6 summarises the wording used in non-quantified forecasts. Of the 41 
non-quantified forecasts, 15 forecast poorer results than the previous period, 22 
forecast better results and three forecast results not different fron line with 
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expectations. Most non-quantified forecasts (23 - 56%) are made involuntarily 
under the rules of the Takeover Code. 
7.3 Multivariate results 
Three multivariate techniques were applied to analyse the dependent variables, 
number of items (ITEMS) and number of assumptions (ASS) disclosed. The three 
statistical techniques were: OLS regression, Poisson regression and negative 
binomial regression. All gave similar (but not exactly the same) results. As 
explained in chapter 4, negative binomial regression is the most appropriate 
technique, given the dependent variables. In addition, in all negative binomial 
models the alternative Poisson specification is rejected by likelihood ratio tests. 
Consequently, negative binomial results are reported in tables 7.7 and 7.10 to 
follow and in tables A3.14 to A3.21 in appendix 3. 
The tables report three tests to determine whether the fitted negative binomial 
model is adequate and well specified: goodness of fit - chi-square test, pseudo R2 
and likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test compares the unrestricted 
negative binomial model with the restricted Poisson model. 
Substantial shareholdings (SSH) has a large number of missing values. When this 
variable is included, 141/144 cases are available for analysis (depending on the 
size variable); 205/209 cases are available for analysis when the variable is 
excluded. 
Models are run including only one of the four size variables. The results are 
similar regardless of size variable used. The reported results use turnover (REV) 
as the size variable. 
7.3.1 Items disclosed in forecasts 
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 report negative binomial model results, where the dependent 
variable is number of items disclosed (ITEMS). Four explanatory variables are 
significant in both models: type of bid (BID), circumstances of making the 
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forecast (CIRC), period forecast (PER) and forecast horizon (FHOR). 
Significantly more items were disclosed during contested bids, in voluntary 
forecasts, and in longer period, shorter horizon forecasts (contrary to 
expectations). In the model excluding substantial shareholdings, forecaster (BT), 
percentage management ownership, auditor/reporting accountant (AUD) and 
financial advisor (MB) are significant. More items are disclosed by targets, where 
percentage management ownership is lower and where big-six auditors and higher 
reputation financial advisors are involved in the bid. 
Table 7.7 Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ITEMS 
- including SSH 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 141 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -291.89 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (123 d. f. ) 229.71 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R20.92 
Likelihood ratio test 18.48 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 36.96 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic p value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -0.76E-02 0.50 -0.02 0.99 
BID 0.48 0.17 2.84 0.01* 
BT 0.22 0.20 1.08 0.28 
CIRC -1.31 0.22 -6.02 0.00** 
PER 1.00 0.36 2.74 0.01* 
FHOR -0.95E-03 0.39E-03 -2.36 0.01* 
REV -0.89E-04 0.18E-03 -0.48 0.63 
LEV -0.44 0.39 -1.12 0.26 
MO -0.72E-02 0.64E-02 -1.13 0.26 
SSH -0.29 0.41 -0.71 0.48 
MB 0.17 0.19 0.90 0.37 
AUD 0.11 0.19 0.61 0.54 
DCAPGDS -0.01 0.32 0.37 0.97 
DDURGDS -0.15 0.35 -0.43 0.67 
DNONDUR 0.01 0.33 0.03 0.97 
DOTHER -0.31 0.30 1.03 0.30 
NAT -0.05 0.51 -0.10 0.92 
Only one case was unquoted, so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table 7.8 Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ITEMS 
- excluding SSH 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 205 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -442.32 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (188 d. f. ) 464.14 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.93 
Likelihood ratio test 69.88 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 139.76 S ignificance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic p value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept 0.21 0.22 0.97 0.33 
BID 0.51 0.08 6.67 0.00** 
BT 0.28 0.10 2.80 0.01* 
CIRC -0.89 0.08 -10.80 0.00** 
PER 1.42 0.09 4.90 0.00** 
FHOR -0.68E-03 0.24E-03 -2.81 0.01* 
REV -0.10E-04 0.11E-04 0.90 0.37 
LEV -0.28 0.18 -1.57 0.12 
MO -0.83E-02 0.25E-02 -3.28 0.00** 
MB 0.20 0.09 2.21 0.03* 
AUD 0.16 0.07 2.25 0.03* 
DCAPGDS 0.12 0.17 0.72 0.47 
DDURGDS -0.14 0.18 -0.75 0.45 
DNONDUR 0.24 0.16 1.49 0.14 
DOTHER 0.25 0.16 1.55 0.12 
NAT -0.36 0.43 -0.85 0.39 
Only one case was unquoted, so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
7.3.2 Disclosure of assumptions 
Tables 7.9 and 7.10 report negative binomial model results for the number of 
assumptions disclosed (ASS). Two variables are significant in both models: type 
of bid (BID) and forecast horizon (FHOR). More assumptions are disclosed in 
contested bid forecasts and in longer horizon forecasts. In addition, in the model 
including substantial shareholdings (SSH), circumstances of making the forecast 
(CIRC) and period forecast (PER) are significant. Significantly more assumptions 
are disclosed in voluntary forecasts and in longer period forecasts. 
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Table 7.9: Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ASS 
- including SSH 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 141 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -360.28 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (123 d. f. ) 462.48 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.77 
Likelihood ratio test 84.68 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 169.35 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -0.03 0.53 -0.06 0.95 
BID 0.42 0.19 2.20 0.03* 
BT 0.37 0.24 1.55 0.12 
CIRC -0.54 0.21 -2.60 0.01 
PER 0.54 0.26 2.03 0.04* 
FHOR 0.18E-02 0.37E-03 -4.97 0.00** 
REV -0.23E-03 0.23E-03 -1.00 0.32 
LEV -0.10 0.34 -0.28 0.78 
MO 0.16E-02 0.65E-02 0.25 0.80 
SSH 0.72 0.58 1.24 0.22 
MB 0.89E-03 0.24 0.36E-02 0.99 
AUD 0.29 0.21 1.39 0.17 
DCAPGDS 0.02 0.28 0.06 0.95 
DDURGDS 0.17 0.34 0.49 0.62 
DNONDUR 0.22 0.26 0.85 0.39 
DOTHER 0.19 0.27 0.70 0.48 
NAT 0.06 0.77 0.07 0.94 
Only one case was unquoted, so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
7.3.3 Summary of results of content analysis (H2o-H33) 
Table 7.11 summarises the content analysis results. Type of bid and forecast 
horizon are significant in all models. However, forecast horizon is significant in 
opposite directions for number of items and number of assumptions disclosed. 
Takeover-context variables-W & 2 -, 
a =H 
Forecaster (BT) is associated with the number of assumptions disclosed but not 
with the number of items. There is no difference between bidders and targets in 
the number of items disclosed. As predicted in H20, targets disclose significantly 
more assumptions than bidders. The increased disclosure of assumptions by 
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targets may be due to increased fear of litigation by target company directors and 
their advisors. Target company advisors are most likely to be sued if litigation 
follows a takeover. The greater the number of assumptions the greater the 
protection offered to those associated with the forecast. 
Table 7.10: Negative binomial model results - dependent variable ASS 
- excluding SSH 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 205 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -519.44 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (188 d. f. ) 4046.91 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.83 
Likelihood ratio test 177.06 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 354.12 Si gnificance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -0.22 0.42 0.52 0.60 
BID 0.36 0.17 2.17 0.03* 
BT 0.32 0.20 1.61 0.11 
CIRC -0.32 0.17 -1.82 0.07 
PER 0.37 0.22 1.71 0.09 
FHOR 0.37E-02 0.51E-03 7.48 0.00** 
REV -0.56E-05 0.32E-04 -0.18 0.86 
LEV -0.11 0.33 0.34 0.73 
MO 0.15E-02 0.47E-02 0.32 0.75 
MB -0.03 0.22 -0.16 0.88 
AUD 0.21 0.17 1.26 0.20 
DCAPGDS 0.14 0.26 0.55 0.59 
DDURGDS 0.06 0.31 0.20 0.84 
DNONDUR 0.23 0.25 0.91 0.36 
DOTHER 0.24 0.25 0.96 0.34 
NAT -0.28 0.61 -0.45 0.65 
Only one case was unquoted, so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
Type of bid (BID) is significant in the direction predicted by H21 in all models 
estimated. Significantly more items and significantly more assumptions are 
disclosed in contested bid forecasts. This is consistent with the competitive 
environment of contested bids. Forecasts may be attacked by the other side for 
inadequate disclosure, prompting greater disclosure of items. The greater chance 
of litigation arising from contested bids is likely to encourage those associated 
with forecasts (mainly advisors) to look for greater protection through the 
inclusion of more assumptions/caveats. 
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Table 7.11 Summary results of negative binomial regression of 








141 F 205 F 
* BID ** 
BT 
CIRC ** ** 
PER * ** 










** Significant at < 0.01 * Si gnificant at 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 7.7 to 7.10 
In summary, the two takeover-context hypotheses, H2o and H21, are supported by 
the research results. 
Forecast-related variables (Hzz-Hi4) 
Circumstances of making the forecast (CIRC) is significant in three of the four 
models estimated (CIRC is significant at 7% in the fourth model). The number of 
items disclosed and the number of assumptions disclosed are significantly lower in 
involuntary forecasts. These results support H22 in the direction predicted. As 
involuntary forecasts are made reluctantly by management, it is to be expected 
that there will be fewer disclosures in such forecasts. The result is much weaker in 
the case of assumptions disclosed. A greater reluctance to disclose financial 
information, and at the same time a tendency to include caveats or assumptions in 
involuntary forecasts, is consistent with management reluctance to publish the 
forecast. 
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Forecast horizon (FROR), hypothesis Ham, is supported in all models but in 
opposite directions for number of items disclosed (ITEMS) and number of 
assumptions disclosed (ASS). Fewer items, but more assumptions, were disclosed 
in longer horizon forecasts. This finding is as predicted for assumptions. The 
longer the forecast horizon the greater the uncertainty in the forecast. More 
caveats or assumptions in the forecast are expected the greater the uncertainty. 
Contrary to expectations, significantly fewer items are disclosed in longer horizon 
forecasts. This may be because forecasts disclosed after the forecast period end 
(estimates), with very short forecast horizons, are more in the nature of 
preliminary earnings announcements and therefore follow a fuller annual accounts 
type presentation. 
Period of the forecast (PER) was significant in three of the four models estimated 
(it was significant at 9% in the fourth model). In support of Hs, significantly more 
items and assumptions are disclosed in longer period forecasts. Shorter period 
(six months or less) forecasts are expected to disclose less, in the same way that 
interim reports disclose less than annual reports. This finding is not as strong for 
assumptions disclosed compared with items disclosed, for similar reasons 
probably to involuntary forecasts just discussed. 
In summary, the three hypotheses concerning forecast-related variables were 
supported in some or all of the regressions estimated. 
Firm-specific variables (HZH. ) 
Firm-specific variables are significant in only one of the four models estimated. 
The number of items disclosed in the model excluding substantial shareholdings 
(SSH) is significantly related to percentage management ownership (MO), 
auditor/reporting accountant (AUTO) and financial advisor (MB) in the directions 
predicted by H27, H29 and H30. Significantly more items are disclosed where the 
percentage management ownership is lower and where big-six auditors and higher 
reputation financial advisors are involved in the bid. 
0 
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There is no support for H25 (size), H26 (leverage), His (substantial shareholdings), 
H32 (industry) and H33 (nationality). H31 (listing status) could not be tested as 
there were so few unquoted forecasters. 
7.3.4 Content analysis of agreed bid and contested bid forecasts 
There are 129 agreed bid forecasts and 121 contested bid forecasts. Depending on 
whether substantial shareholdings (SSH) are included in the model, 62/94 agreed 
bid forecasts and 79/111 contested bid forecasts are available for analysis. 
In order to avoid information overload in this chapter, the eight tables analysing 
content of disclosures in agreed bid and contested bid forecasts are included in 
tables A3.14 to A3.21 in appendix 3. Tables 7.12 and 7.13 summarise the results. 
Agreed bids (tables A3.14 to A3.17) 
Circumstances of the forecast (CIRC) and forecast horizon (FHOR) are 
significantly related to the number of items disclosed in agreed bid forecasts. 
Significantly more items are disclosed in voluntary and in shorter horizon agreed 
bid forecasts. Size (REV) is also significant in the model excluding substantial 
shareholdings. Significantly more items are disclosed by larger firms forecasting in 
agreed bids. 
Forecast horizon (FROR) is significantly related to number of assumptions 
disclosed. Significantly more assumptions are disclosed in longer forecast 
horizons. Industry (IND) is significant in the model including substantial 
shareholdings and size (REV) is significant in the model excluding substantial 
shareholdings. The direction of the finding of a relationship between size (REV) 
and disclosure of assumptions in agreed bids is contrary to expectations. 
Significantly fewer assumptions are disclosed in larger company forecasts (for one 
model only). It is hard to find an explanation for this contrary finding. 
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Contested bids (tables A3.18 to A3.21) 
Circumstances of making the forecast (CIRC) and period forecast (PER) are 
significant in both models of number of items disclosed. Significantly more items 
are disclosed in voluntary and in longer period contested bid forecasts. Forecast 
horizon and substantial shareholdings are significant in the model including 
substantial shareholdings. Significantly more items are disclosed in shorter 
horizon contested bid forecasts and where substantial shareholdings are lower. 
In contested bids, the number of assumptions disclosed is significantly related to 
the forecaster (BT), circumstances of the forecast (CIRC), period forecast (PER), 
and industry (IND). Significantly more assumptions are disclosed by targets, in 
voluntary forecasts and in longer period forecasts. In the model excluding 
substantial shareholdings, forecast horizon is also significant. More assumptions 
are disclosed in longer horizon contested bid forecasts. 
7.3.5 Comparison of content analysis for agreed and contested bids 
The content analysis of agreed bid and contested bid forecasts is summarised for 
ITEMS and ASS in tables 7.12 and 7.13. 
Number of items disclosed (Table 7.12) 
Circumstances of the forecast (CIRC) is significant in all models for number of 
items disclosed. Forecast horizon (FROR) is significant in three of the four 
models estimated. Period forecast (PER) is significantly related to number of 
items disclosed for contested bids only. The number of items disclosed is 
significantly greater in voluntary forecasts, in shorter horizon forecasts and in 
longer period forecasts (in contested bids). Turnover (REV) and percentage 
substantial shareholdings (SSH) are significant in only one model. There is some 
evidence that larger firms, with lower percentage substantial shareholdings, 
disclose more items in forecasts. 
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Number of assumptions disclosed (Table 7.13) 
The factors influencing disclosure of assumptions in forecasts are very different 
between agreed bid and contested bid forecasts. Forecast horizon (FROR) is the 
dominant influence and is significant in three of the four models estimated. In 
agreed bid forecasts, turnover (REV) and industry (IND) are also significant. 
More assumptions are disclosed in longer horizon forecasts and by larger 
forecasters. In contested bid forecasts, the number of assumptions disclosed is 
significantly related to the forecaster (BT), the circumstances of the forecast 
(CIRC), the period forecast (PER) and industry (IND). Forecast horizon (FHOR) 
is significant in one of the two contested bid models. The number of assumptions 
disclosed is significantly greater by targets, in voluntary forecasts, in longer period 
forecasts and in longer horizon forecasts (for one model only). 
Table 7.12 Summary results of content analysis - ITEMS 
for agreed and contested bids 
Agreed bids Contested bids 
Including Excluding Including Excluding 
SSH SSH SSH SSH 
62 cases 94 cases 79 cases 111 cases 
BT 
CIRC ** ** ** ** 
PER ** * 










** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables A3.14, 
A3.15, A3.18 and A3.19 
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Table 7.13 Summary results of content analysis - ASS 
for agreed and contested bids 
Agreed bids Contested bids 
Including Excluding Including Excluding 
SSH SSH SSH SSH 
62 cases 94 cases 79 cases 111 cases 
BT ** * 
CIRC ** ** 
PER * ** 








IND ** ** 
NAT 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables A3.16, 
A3.17, A3.20 and A3.21 
7.4 News in forecasts (H34) 
News in forecasts is measured by two variables. News in the forecast (NEWS) is 
the difference between the forecast and previous year's actual results. Forecast 
deviation (FD) is the difference between forecast results and market expectations 
(as measured by consensus analysts' forecasts from The Earnings Guide). 
Hypothesis H34 predicts that more good news forecasts will be disclosed - that the 
news in the forecast (NEWS) will be positive and that forecast deviation from 
market expectations (FD) will be positive. 
Out of 209 quantified forecasts, the news (NEWS) variable is only calculable in 
153 (73%) and the forecast deviation (FD) variable in 117 (56%) cases. Table 
4.23 reported descriptive statistics for the news content variables. The good news 
variables (GOODNEWS/POSFD) are not dissimilar to the bad news variables 
(BADNEWS/NEGFD). As one would expect, the mean of forecast deviations is 
close to zero and the mean of news in the forecasts is positive. 
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Both variables are analysed between good/bad or positive/negative depending on 
whether the difference between the forecast results and previous year's actual 
results/analysts' forecasts is positive or negative. Out of a total of 153 readings 
for news in the forecasts (NEWS), only 30 (20%) are classified as bad news. Out 
of a total of 117 readings for forecast deviation (FD), only 48 (42%) are classified 
as negative deviations. Thus, as predicted in H34, there were more good 
news/positive deviations than bad news/negative deviations forecasts. 
Table 7.14 Data availability for news and forecast deviation 
variables 
Bidders Targets Total 
GOODNEWS 34 ( 97%) 89 ( 75%) 123 ( 80%) 
BADNEWS 1( 3%) 29( 25%) 30 (20%) 
NEWS 1(1 %) il U W/O) 1(I W%) 
Pearson chi-square 8.08 (d. £ 1) Signifi cance 0.00 
POSFD 18 ( 64%) S1( 57%) 69 ( 59%) 
NEGFD 10 ( 36%) 38 Li %) 48 (. 41%) 
FD 21 (IQQ%) B2 (IQQ"/o) 112 (ýQQ"/o) 
Pearson chi-square 0.43 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.51 
Table 7.15 Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings 
between bidders and targets for news in forecasts and 
forecast deviation variables 
Mean ranks Z-statistic Two-tailed 
Bidders Targets probability 
NEWS 96 71 -2.90 0.00** 
GOODNEWS 68 60 -1.24 0.21 
BADNEWS 14 16 -0.17 0.86 
FD 66 67 -1.19 0.23 
POSFD 32 36 -0.72 0.47 
NEGFD 40 20 -3.87 0.00** 
News variable (NEWS) 
Table 7.14 shows that there is a significant difference between bidders and targets 
in the frequency of good news over bad news forecasts. Targets are significantly 
more likely to disclose bad news compared with bidders. This is to be expected. 
211 
Bidders are likely to be successful companies whose results are improving from 
year to year. Targets, on the other hand, are more likely to be experiencing 
trading difficulties (consequently, they are subject to takeover bids) giving rise to 
profits less than previous periods. 
Mann-Whitney results in table 7.15 show that the mean rankings of differences in 
news content of forecasts (NEWS) are significantly different for bidders and 
targets. The mean rankings for bidders are significantly higher than for targets, 
suggesting that bidders' forecast results are better, compared with previous 
performance, than are targets' forecast results. There is no significant difference 
in mean rankings for the good news (GOODNEWS) and bad news (BADNEWS) 
subsamples. 
Forecast deviation (FD) 
No significant difference between bidders and targets was found in the frequency 
of positive and negative deviations. The mean rankings of negative forecast 
deviation (NEGFD) are significantly higher for bidders than for targets. This 
suggests that, when bidders disclose bad news, the bad news is worse than that 
for targets. There is no significant difference in the mean rankings between 
bidders and targets for forecast deviation (FD), nor for the positive deviations 
(POSFD) subset. 
Agreed and contested bids 
The news content variables are analysed between agreed and contested bids in 
table 7.16. The frequency of forecasts with positive deviations (POSFD) is 
significantly greater during contested bids. No significant difference was found for 
the news in the forecast (NEWS) variable. There is no significant difference in 
Mann-Whitney mean rankings for agreed and contested bids (consequently results 
are not reported here). 
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7.4.1 Summary of results of news content analysis of forecasts 
In support of H34, a tendency to disclose good news was observed. Out of a total 
of 153 readings for news in the forecasts (NEWS), only 30 (20%) are classified as 
bad news. Out of a total of 117 readings for forecast deviation (FD), only 48 
(42%) are classified as negative deviations. 
Table 7.16 Analysis of news content variables between 
contested and agreed bids 
Agreed Contested Total 
GOODNEWS 53 ( 78%) 70 ( 82%) 123 ( 80%) 
BADNEWS 15 22%) 15( 18%) 30( 20%) 
NEWS fi$ (LQQ%) $. I (IQQ%) M (19T%) 
Pearson chi-square 0.46 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.49 
POSFD 21( 47%) 48 ( 67%) 69 ( 59%) 
NEGFD 24 53%) 24 ( 33%) 48 41%) 
FD 4. (I Q%) 22 (IQQ%) 112 (IQQ%) 
Pearson chi-square 4.58 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.03 
A significant difference between bidders and targets was found in the frequency of 
good news over bad news forecasts. Targets are significantly more likely to 
disclose bad news compared with bidders. No significant difference was found 
between bidders and targets in the frequency of positive and negative deviations. 
This result is confirmed by Mann-Whitney results which show that bidders' 
forecasts disclose results that are significantly better, compared with previous 
results, than targets'. 
Based on Mann-Whitney analysis of negative forecast deviations (NEGFD), the 
results suggest that when bidders disclose bad news, the bad news is worse than 
that for targets. 
Finally, a greater proportion of forecasts disclosed during contested bids 
contained positive forecast deviations compared with agreed bids. 
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To summarise, there is evidence that more good news is disclosed in forecasts 
than bad news. Targets are more likely to disclose bad news, but when bidders 
disclose bad news it tends to be worse, on average, than targets' bad news. 
7.5 Discussion of chapter results and conclusions 
This chapter analysed content of disclosures in profit forecasts to assess whether 
disclosure is related to takeover-context variables, forecast-specific variables and 
firm-specific variables. In addition, the news content of the forecasts was 
analysed. 
Content analysis of disclosures 
For the two dependent variables measuring disclosures in forecasts, and in all 
regression models, type of bid and forecast horizon were significant. Due to 
increased competition and to increased risk of litigation, disclosures in forecasts 
were significantly greater during contested bids. The findings for horizon forecast 
were in opposite directions for items disclosed and assumptions disclosed. Fewer 
items (contrary to expectations), but more assumptions, were disclosed in longer 
horizon forecasts. The greater number of items disclosed in short horizon 
forecasts may be because forecasts disclosed after the forecast period end 
(estimates), with very short forecast horizons, are more in the nature of 
preliminary earnings announcements and therefore follow a fuller annual accounts 
type presentation. 
Significantly more items and assumptions (only in one model) were disclosed in 
voluntary compared with involuntary forecasts. It is to be expected that forecasts 
made reluctantly by management will contain fewer disclosures. Significantly 
more items and assumptions were disclosed in longer period forecasts. Shorter 
period (six months or less) forecasts are often similar to interim reports which 
disclose less than annual forecasts/annual reports. Significantly more assumptions 
were disclosed by target forecasters, probably because targets and their advisors 
are more likely to be sued in the event of litigation. Thus, greater protection from 
assumptions is looked for in these forecasts. 
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Firm-specific variables were only significant in one of the four models estimated. 
Significantly more items were disclosed (in one model only) where the percentage 
management ownership was lower and where big-six auditors and higher 
reputation financial advisors were involved in the bid. 
Thus, the takeover-context variables and forecast-specific variables appear to be 
most relevant in determining disclosures in forecasts. Firm-specific variables have 
less explanatory power in the regressions. 
Content analysis for agreed and contested bids 
The analysis for agreed and contested bids produced quite different results. The 
number of items disclosed depended on the circumstances of making the forecast 
for both agreed and contested bids. Forecast horizon also had an influence on 
disclosure of items for both agreed and contested bids. Period forecast was 
significant only in contested bids. 
For disclosure of assumptions, forecast horizon was the dominant influence in 
agreed bids. In contested bids, disclosure of assumptions was influenced most 
strongly by circumstances of making the forecast, by whether the forecaster was a 
target and by the period forecast. That targets are a significant influence on 
disclosure content in contested bids mirrors the finding for 
disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts in contested bids. 
News content in forecasts 
In summary, in support of H34, a tendency to disclose good news was observed. 
There is evidence that more good news was disclosed in forecasts than bad news. 
Evidence from an analysis of the news content of the forecasts is consistent with 
research findings in the US. While there is a tendency to disclose good news in 
forecasts, there is evidence of disclosure of bad news in some forecasts. Good 
news forecasts are, as expected, more likely during contested bids compared with 
agreed bids. 
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Chapter 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
RESEARCH 
8.1 Objectives and summary of research project 
This section is considered under the five research issues outlined in chapter 1. 
Influences on disclosure of forecasts 
The major objective of this study is to analyse factors which help to predict or 
explain management decisions to publish profit forecasts during takeover bids. 
Forecasts are rarely disclosed in the UK. Exceptions are their disclosure in initial 
public offering prospectuses and in takeover documents. Studies of users' needs 
have shown forecast information to be one of the most important financial 
disclosures a company can make (Courtis, 1992). Given the perceived importance 
of forecasts, it is surprising that more research in the UK has not been devoted to 
examining their disclosure, and content of disclosures therein. Previous UK 
studies on forecasts have tended to analyse the accuracy of the forecasts rather 
than the disclosure decision (Dev and Webb, 1972; Westwick, 1972; Ferris, 1975 
and 1976; Keasey and McGuinness, 1991; Firth and Smith, 1992). Since the early 
1970s, UK research has focused on forecast accuracy in initial public offering 
prospectuses. Thus, takeover bids were chosen as the disclosure environment for 
this research. 
The dominant motive in disclosing forecasts during takeovers is related to the 
ability of the forecast to help the bidder or target achieve `success'. Success for 
the bidder is to complete the bid at the best possible price. Success for the target 
in agreed bids is to optimise the offer price. Success for the target in contested 
bids may be to defeat the bid, or, in the event of not defeating the bid, to optimise 
the offer price. It follows that any decision to disclose a profit forecast is taken 
predominantly by reference to whether disclosure will materially assist the 
forecasters' prospects of success. 
216 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature on disclosure. That literature, which is 
concerned with general or periodic disclosure, has not yet produced a consensus 
on the economic determinants of managers' forecast choices, nor on why 
managers release forecasts in routine disclosure situations. Empirical research on 
financial reporting has typically followed either an efficient markets or costly 
contracting approach. However, it provides little evidence useful to managers in 
developing disclosure strategies to communicate effectively with investors. 
Signalling theory and agency theory are the primary theoretical bases for nearly all 
empirical research on disclosure and offer explanations of incentives for voluntary 
disclosure by management. Consequently, this research applied them to analyse 
firms' forecast disclosure choices. Empirical evidence supporting agency 
incentives for disclosure has been weak, as has been the evidence concerning the 
signalling value of forecast disclosure. 
Agency costs are likely to be particularly high during takeover bids. Bidders' 
management know more about the bidder than target management and 
shareholders. Agency theory is relevant to bid defences, where target 
management might be motivated by personal considerations such as job retention 
or retention of control of the company (in the case of owner managers), at the 
expense of shareholders. Signalling theory issues, similar to those arising on 
issuing new shares, are relevant where the bidder issues shares in consideration 
for the bid. Disclosure of forecasts by targets may signal the target's intention to 
strongly defend the bid. Disclosure of forecasts and choice of advisors may be 
used as signals of quality by both bidders and targets. 
Some analysis of agency theory and signalling theory was considered appropriate 
to this research. However, given the specialist setting of takeover bids, these 
theories were unlikely to provide full explanations of motivations for disclosure of 
profit forecasts. 
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Incentives for disclosure of profit forecasts have been examined in previous 
studies in North America (see table 2.4 for a summary), but not in the UK. No 
clear picture has emerged from that research. In any event, there is evidence that 
the findings of US research may not be applicable to the UK (Frost and Pownall, 
1994). 
Most disclosure research is set in routine business situations. Choosing specialist 
settings in which to study disclosure decisions may provide valuable new evidence 
and insights on incentives to disclose. The examination of disclosure in the 
specialist context of takeover bids is expected to add insights into disclosure 
decisions by managements. 
Influence of market expectations on disclosure 
Ajinkya and Gift (1984) found that forecasts are disclosed to align analysts' 
expectations with actual results. Ajinkya and Gift's expectations adjustment 
hypothesis, together with the interview evidence from chapter 5, suggested that 
forecast disclosure would be more likely when market expectations are out of line 
with actual results. Aligning market expectations is likely to be more important, 
and to have greater economic consequences, during takeover bids than in routine 
disclosure situations examined by other researchers (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; 
Ruland, Tung and George, 1990; Skinner, 1994). 
Profit forecasts as defence weapons 
Disclosure of profit forecasts has long been considered as an effective defence 
strategy, although empirical evidence has not supported this conjecture. Of the 
many papers on takeover defence strategies, only a small number relate to the 
UK, and of those, only two (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1991; Sudarsanam, 1994) are 
comparable to this research. These two papers examined a number of defence 
strategies. This study tested the effectiveness of a single defence strategy, 
disclosure of profit forecasts. It is more comprehensive than the previous two UK 
studies. Jenkinson and Mayer (1991) used an in-depth, case study approach of 42 
hostile bids. Sudarsanam examined 238 hostile bids (versus 701 bids - 542 agreed; 
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159 hostile in this research) and covered a different time period (1988-1992 
versus 1983-1989). 
Content of disclosures in forecasts 
There are few regulations governing content of disclosures in forecasts. This 
study extended prior content of disclosure studies from annual reports to profit 
forecasts. Most prior literature is not comparable to this study as it deals with 
disclosures in annual reports (see table 2.5 for a summary). The few papers that 
studied content of disclosure in profit forecasts (Dev, 1973; Hartnett, 1990; 
Montgomerie and Walker, 1992) did not conduct an empirical statistical analysis 
of content. Empirical research findings may be valuable in assisting policy makers 
to develop better regulations governing content of disclosures in forecasts. 
News content of forecasts 
Most theoretical research (based on firms making decisions in normal routine 
business settings) suggests that information will be disclosed when firms have 
good news to convey. However, empirical findings are inconsistent with this 
prediction, and generally show a preponderance of good news disclosure, with 
some bad news (see table 2.6 for a summary). More recent theoretical literature 
has included proprietary costs, and the reactions of third parties to disclosure, to 
account for firms disclosing bad news. 
Motivations for disclosing good or bad news are likely to be quite different in the 
specialist setting of takeover bids. This research considered the news content of 
forecasts and examined whether they contained good or bad news. 
Data 
This study provides, in terms of scope, size, extent and depth, a large data base of 
information on takeover bids: on firm characteristics of bidders and targets; on 
views of a variety of participants in takeover bids; on disclosure of profit forecasts 
during takeover bids; and on the form and content of a large group of forecasts. 
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This data base provides valuable information and insights both to researchers and 
to firms, advisors and the business community involved in takeover bids. 
Most US research is based on forecast disclosure by management in routine 
business settings (such as annual forecast disclosures). US forecasts are collected 
from news reporting sources such as The Wall Street Journal (Patell, 1976; 
Imhoff, 1978; Jaggi and Grier, 1980; Cox, 1985; Penman, 1980; Ajinkya and Gift, 
1984; Waymire, 1985; Pownall and Waymire, 1989; Lev and Penman, 1990), 
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service (McNichols, 1989; Ruland, Tung and George, 
1990; Baginski, Hassell and Waymire, 1994; Skinner, 1994; Frankel, McNichols 
and Wilson, 1995; Skinner, 1995), both The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones 
News Retrieval Service (Pownall, Wasley and Waymire, 1993) and from data 
bases such as Compustat (Ruland, 1979). Thus, the data for these studies are 
limited by the coverage of the data base accessed. 
Confirming limited coverage by the financial press, a search of the Financial 
Times for the period covered by this research produced relatively few references 
to forecasts disclosed during takeover bids. 
In this research, forecasts were collected directly from takeover and defence 
documents. Few researchers studying forecast disclosure have collected forecasts 
directly. Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) and Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson 
and Sefcik (1992) are exceptions (probably because they are Canadian rather than 
US studies). This research differs from the Canadian studies in the greater number 
of takeover documents examined. In addition, the study represents a complete 
sample (every takeover document was examined) of all 701 UK public company 
takeover bids during the five year period studied. 
Most US studies of forecast disclosure include only point or range forecasts. The 
present research comprises an exhaustive sample of forecasts disclosed during a 
five year period and includes qualitative and upper/lower bounded forecasts, as 
well as point and range forecasts. 
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A large data base of examples from profit forecasts has been prepared (included in 
appendix 4). This data base provides useful precedent material for researchers and 
practitioners. 
Methodology 
The methodology included qualitative and quantitative research techniques. 
Eleven interviews were conducted with participants in the decision to disclose a 
forecast in takeover bids that are part of this study. Quantitative analysis included 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques. Empirical data was 
analysed initially using nonparametric statistics such as Mann-Whitney U tests and 
Pearson chi-square statistics. Hypotheses concerning disclosure/nondisclosure of 
forecasts were tested in multivariate models using logit analysis. Content of 
disclosures in forecasts was analysed using OLS regression, Poisson regression 
and negative binomial regression. Content analysis results based on negative 
binomial regression were reported. 
This study has extended previous methodology in a number of ways. 
In an effort to be relevant to real life situations this research explored in advance, 
through interviews, the issues to be empirically researched. While this does not 
guarantee that the empirical research design is ideal, some effort has been made to 
make it as relevant as possible. 
Because the date of takeover bids could be ascertained, bid horizon could be 
measured and compared for forecasters and nonforecasters. Previous research, 
based on routine disclosures, has only been able to measure forecast horizon. 
Forecast horizon cannot be calculated for nonforecasters so the horizon for 
forecasters and nonforecasters has not been compared in most prior research. 
Waymire (1985) examined forecast horizon for repeat (i. e. regular) forecasters 
compared with nonrepeat forecasters in an attempt to see whether this variable 
was related to disclosure of forecasts. 
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Most studies use a single method of analysing deviations from market 
expectations. Similar to this research, Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik 
(1992) and Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) compare market expectations 
with subsequent actual results for forecasters and nonforecasters. Clarkson, 
Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik (1992) analysed differences in means. Clarkson, 
Kao and Richardson (1994) analysed differences in numbers of firms categorised 
between good news firms and bad news firms. The present research adopted two 
methods of analysis: (i) analysis of differences in numbers of firms classified 
between positive and negative deviations from market expectations; and (ii) 
analysis of rankings of differences in deviation from market expectations between 
forecasters and nonforecasters. 
The definition of outcome of bids was extended to include whether the offer price 
was increased during the bid, as well as success/failure of bids. In addition, the 
effect of publication of forecasts on outcome of bids was considered for agreed 
bids as well as contested bids. This study, unlike others, also considered whether 
publication of forecasts by bidders made any difference to the outcome of bids. 
Content of disclosures in forecasts was measured by counting items and 
assumptions disclosed. Statistical methods suitable for count data were applied in 
analysing the results. This is the first time such count data methodology has been 
applied in an accounting study. 
8.2 Evidence from interviews 
Eleven interviews were conducted as background to this study. The complexity of 
the disclosure environment, especially during takeovers, was emphasised by 
interviewees. 
Factors influencing disclosure 
The most important factors influencing disclosure of forecasts, and regularly 
commented on by interviewees, were bid horizon, whether the bid was contested 
or not and whether the potential forecaster is a bidding or target company. 
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Purchase consideration was frequently mentioned as being particularly influential 
on whether bidders disclosed forecasts. These factors were generally confirmed in 
the subsequent empirical analysis. 
Advisors were considered especially influential, as were economic conditions. 
Size of firm was regularly referred to, but the direction of the relationship 
between size and disclosure of forecasts varied. Generally, empirical results did 
not support advisors, year or size as important influences on disclosure. 
Market expectations 
Interviewees were unanimous that market expectations are very influential on 
disclosure, both when expectations are above, as well as below, forecast results. 
This was subsequently confirmed by empirical findings. 
Strategic value of forecasts 
Forecasts were generally seen by interviewees as effective financial weapons. Not 
surprisingly (given vested interests), this was particularly the expectation of the 
five advisors interviewed. Empirical findings showed forecasts to be related to 
outcome of bids but the findings were weak compared with interviewees' 
expectations of their effectiveness. 
Content of disclosures in profit forecasts 
Interviewees were not agreed on whether it is better or worse to disclose 
many items in forecasts. They were generally averse to disclosing too much 
detail in the forecasts and, at the same time, wanted to carefully choose 
assumptions to give the greatest protection to the forecaster. Consistent with 
this view, empirical analysis showed a significantly greater number of 
assumptions disclosed compared with items disclosed. 
News content of forecasts 
News content of forecasts was considered of paramount importance in the 
disclosure decision, with mixed views being expressed on disclosure of bad news 
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and good news. Comments tended to indicate that bad news would not be 
disclosed as readily as good news, especially in the case of targets in contested 
bids. These comments are consistent with the findings of this research. 
8.3 Summary of empirical results and significance of findings 
The results that follow are summarised under the five research issues being 
addressed by this research. 
8.3.1 Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts (Hl-H, 4) 
Chapter 3 developed hypotheses to test influences on disclosure of forecasts 
derived from agency theory, signalling theory and from the takeover context of 
the research. The variables hypothesised by agency theory and signalling theory to 
influence disclosure received little support from the analysis, supporting the 
conjecture in chapters 1 and 2 that these theories do not provide good 
explanations of motivations for disclosure in specialist contexts such as takeover 
bids. The findings highlight the dominance of context on disclosure. 
8.3.1.1 Bivariate analysis 
Differences between forecasting and nonforecasting firms were analysed using 
Mann-Whitney U tests of differences in mean rankings of continuous variables 
and chi-square analysis of differences between categorical variables. 
As predicted by H2, the frequency of forecast disclosure was significantly greater 
by targets than by bidders. As motivations for disclosing forecasts are different for 
bidders and targets, disclosure by bidders was analysed separately from disclosure 
by targets. Table 8.1 summarises the results. 
Bivariate analysis - Bidders (HL-Hte) 
More forecasts were disclosed by bidders during contested bids (H3) and when 
paper was included in the consideration (H4). Bivariate analysis supported the 
hypotheses that fewer forecasts are disclosed when the bid horizon is longer (H5), 
that large bidders voluntarily disclose more forecasts (H6) (subject to two of the 
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four size variables tested not being significant), and that firms with larger 
percentage substantial shareholdings disclose fewer forecasts (H9). More forecasts 
were disclosed by quoted bidders (H12) and by UK listed companies (H14). 
Table 8.1 Summary results of bivariate analysis 
of differences in variables between 
forecasters and nonforecasters (H1-H14) 
Hypothesis Bidders Targets 
H1 YEAR YEAR 
H2 BT** 
H3 BID* BID** 
H4 CON** CON 
Hs BHOR** BHOR** 
H6 VAL** VAL** 
H6 REV* REV** 
H6 TAl TAI** 
H6 TA2 TA2** 
H7 LEV LEV** 
HB MO MO** 
H9 SSH* SSH 
H, o AUD AUD* 
H11 MB Mg** 
H12 QUOTED** N/A 
H13 IND IND* 
H14 NAT** NAT 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 
6.1 and 6.2 and in tables A3.1 and A3.2 in appendix 
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There was no support in the case of bidders for the influence of economic 
conditions (proxied by year) (HI), leverage (H7), percentage management 
ownership (H8), auditor/reporting accountant (Hio) and financial advisor (Hit). 
The null hypothesis of no industry influence, H13, was supported. 
Bivariate analysis - Targets Hj j) 
There was initial support from bivariate analysis for the hypotheses that more 
forecasts are disclosed by targets during contested bids (H3), that fewer forecasts 
are disclosed when the bid horizon is longer (H5), and that large (H6), more highly 
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leveraged companies (H7), with lower percentage management ownership (HS), 
voluntarily disclose more forecasts. 
More forecasts were disclosed by targets where big-six firms of auditors (Hio) 
and higher reputation firms of financial advisors (Hii) were involved in the 
takeover. The null hypothesis that industry has no effect (H13) was not supported. 
Industry profile for target company forecasters and nonforecasters was 
significantly different. There were fewer forecasts in the durable goods sector and 
the banking and financial sector. 
There was no support in the case of targets for the influence of economic 
conditions (H1), purchase consideration (H4), percentage substantial 
shareholdings (H9) and nationality (H14). 
Initial conclusions 
The choice of variables tested in the research, and the expectation of their 
relevance to the disclosure decision, is validated by them all being variously 
significant in bivariate analysis (this is not to say that an exhaustive set of 
variables was tested). 
Bivariate results are all in the directions predicted by hypotheses Hl-H14. These 
initial results enable a number of preliminary observations. The dominant effect of 
takeover-context variables is apparent. Four of the five takeover-context variables 
were significant in the initial analysis. Type of bid, party to the bid, forecast 
horizon and purchase consideration (only in the case of bidders, as predicted) 
were significantly different for forecasters and nonforecasters. There was no 
support for year as an influence on disclosure of forecasts (this finding was not 
borne out in subsequent multivariate analysis). 
For bidders, firm-specific variables were not significantly different between 
forecasters and nonforecasters. In the case of targets, all firm-specific variables, 
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except for substantial shareholdings and nationality, were significantly different 
between forecasters and nonforecasters. 
Initial results on size of bidder and disclosure are anomalous. Only two of the four 
size variables were significantly different between forecasters and nonforecasters. 
Most studies that include different size variables report consistent results for all 
measures of size. 
These initial results are consistent with the discussion of motivations for 
disclosure in chapters 1 and 2. The specialist context of the research was expected 
to be more relevant to disclosure than the theories developed to describe 
disclosure in more general settings. The present research questions whether 
agency theory and signalling theory are appropriate tools to analyse or predict 
disclosure in the context of takeovers. These initial results support the conjecture 
that takeover-context considerations are of more importance. 
8.3.1.2 Multivariate analysis - bidders and targets 
Multivariate analysis was carried out separately on bidders and targets. The 
results are summarised in table 8.2. Results differed depending on whether the 
variable, substantial shareholdings, was included or excluded from the model. 
Multivariate analysis - Bidders (Hi-H1 
In the model including percentage substantial shareholdings, the probability of 
bidders disclosing forecasts was significantly related to two variables: bid horizon 
and type of bid. As predicted, probability of disclosure increased as bid horizon 
decreased and during contested bids. Forecasts were also significantly more likely 
in the earlier years of the study. In addition, the model included a third variable, 
year, but the coefficients were not significant. 
Five variables, bid horizon, value of bid, year, type of bid and purchase 
consideration were significant in the model excluding percentage substantial 
shareholders. Probability of disclosure increased as bid horizon decreased, 
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increased for larger bids and during contested bids. A forecast is significantly less 
likely in cash bids and significantly more likely in 1988,1990 and in paper bids. 
Table 8.2 Summary results of logit analysis of disclosure/nondisclosure of 
forecasts (HI-H, 
4) 
Hypothesis Bidders Targets 
Logit analysis Legit analysis Logit analysis Logit analysis 
Hypotheses including SSH excluding SSH including SSH excluding SSH 
186 cases 308 cases 382 cases 530 cases 
HI YEAR(included YEAR* YEAR YEAR 
in model; but 
not significant) 
H2 
H3 BID** BID* BID** BID** 
H4 CON CON* CON CON 
HS BHOR* * BHOR** BHOR* BHOR** 
116 VAL VAL* VAL VAL* 
H7 LEV LEV LEV LEV 
Hs MO MO MO MO 
H9 SSH SSH 
H10 AUD AUD AUD AUD 
HI , MB MB MB MB 
H12 QUOTED QUOTED QUOTED QUOTED 
H13 IND IND 1ND IND* 
H14 NAT NAT NAT NAT 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Signifi cant at -,! 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 6.4,6.5,6.6 and 6.7 and in tables 
A3.6. A3.7, A3.8 and A3.9 in appendix 3 
In both models, bid horizon had considerably more explanatory power than type 
of bid. However, type of bid had a much higher influence on the odds of 
disclosing a forecast compared with bid horizon. 
Multivariate analysis - Targets (Hi-H, 4) 
In the model including substantial shareholdings, probability of disclosure of a 
forecast by targets increased as bid horizon decreased and during contested bids. 
Value of bid and industry also became significant when substantial shareholdings 
were excluded from the model. As predicted, the probability of disclosure 
increased as value of bid increased. Type of bid contributed more explanatory 
power to the model, as well as having a greater effect on the probability of 
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disclosure. Dropping percentage substantial shareholdings improved the 
explanatory power of the model and improved the goodness of fit statistics. 
Conclusions from multivariate analysis for bidders and targets 
Two variables accounted for almost all the influences on disclosure of forecasts 
for both bidders and targets: bid horizon and type of bid. These two variables 
were significant in all logit models. In support of H3 and Hs, probability of 
forecast disclosure was greater the shorter the bid horizon and during contested 
bids. Year was also included in both bidders' models, although the coefficients 
were only significant in one of the two models. Probability of forecast disclosure 
was higher in 1988 and 1990. Value of bid and purchase consideration were 
significant in the one of the two bidders' models. Value of bid and industry were 
significant in one of the two models for targets. 
As with the initial analysis, multivariate analysis shows the dominance of the 
takeover-context of the research, with the variables, type of bid and bid horizon, 
significant in all models. For bidders, two other takeover-context variables, year 
and purchase consideration, were significant in one model. 
These results are consistent with the expectation, expressed in chapter 1, that the 
takeover context would be the dominant influence on disclosure. In contested 
bids, both bidders and targets have to make greater efforts to ensure success. The 
advisors interviewed suggested that making a profit forecast is always on the 
agenda during a takeover bid. It is not surprising that more profit forecasts are 
disclosed in the competitive environment of contested bids, when managements 
on both sides are defending their performance and are attacking the other side's 
performance. Disclosure in contested bids may be motivated by considerations of 
the direct effect of the information in the forecast on, say, offer price and by other 
indirect effects of disclosure. One advisor commented on the value of disclosure 
of forecasts, not because of the information in the forecast per se, but because of 
its PR value. 
229 
The closer the bid date to the forecast period end, the less risk of getting the 
forecast wrong. If the bid date is very close to the year end less work and 
management time is necessary to bring out a forecast. The finding in all models 
that bid horizon was significantly shorter for forecasters is therefore to be 
expected. 
Purchase consideration was expected to be very influential on bidders' disclosure 
decisions. In cash bids, there seems little reason for bidders to disclose forecasts, 
and it is hard to see how forecasts by bidders would influence the outcome of 
bids, except in exceptional circumstances. A forecast was only disclosed in four 
cash bids: either because shares were separately issued to raise cash for the bid or 
because of the contested nature of the bid. There was no a priori expectation that 
economic conditions would be related to forecast disclosure. However, intuition 
suggested they might be, as economic conditions prevailing at the time of the bid 
would affect the news content of the forecasts and the forecastability of earnings. 
Thus, the finding that year is associated with disclosure of forecasts for bidders is 
not surprising, but explaining the finding is problematic. More forecasts were 
disclosed by bidders in the earlier years of the study. Table 4.1 summarised the 
economic conditions prevailing during the period studied. A variety of economic 
statistics are included in the table. These do not suggest that economic conditions 
were more attractive in the earlier, rather than later, years of the study. From a 
1995 perspective, it is difficult to identify the economic factors that might explain 
why bidders disclosed more forecasts in the earlier years of the study. 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990,1992) describe firms' disclosure 
positions. In this context, ritualism was defined as the propensity toward 
uncritical adherence to prescribed norms for disclosure of financial information. 
Applying a similar argument, it may have been more `fashionable' to disclose a 
forecast in the 1980s compared with the 1990s. Alternatively, maybe fear of 
litigation has increased during the 1990s, whereby companies are more averse to 
disclosing forecasts. Nothing in the interviews suggested a change in attitude 
toward disclosure of forecasts or towards litigation in the five year period. 
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Anomalous results on size measures, found in the initial bivariate analysis, were 
also apparent in multivariate analysis. Only one of the four size measures, value of 
bid, is significant in only some multivariate analysis for bidders. Value of bid, total 
assets and owners' equity are variously significant in logit models for targets. It is 
not clear what value of bid (for bidders) and value of bid/total assets/owners' 
equity (for targets) measures that is not measured by the other size variables. 
Further analysis to explain this anomaly was unsuccessful. 
Comparison of bivariate and multivariate results 
As shown by tables 8.1 and 8.2, the results of bivariate analysis are very different 
from multivariate results. Bivariate results for bidders show turnover, substantial 
shareholdings, listing status and nationality to be significantly different for 
forecasters and nonforecasters, yet in multivariate analysis none of these variables 
were significant. Conversely, year was not significant in bivariate analysis but was 
significant in multivariate analysis. 
The difference between bivariate and multivariate results for targets is even more 
extreme. Turnover, leverage, percentage management ownership share, auditor 
and financial advisor were significantly different for target forecasters compared 
with nonforecasters but these were not significant in multivariate analysis. 
It is not clear why there were such differences between bivariate results and 
multivariate results. The most obvious explanation, correlations between the 
independent variables, is not supported by Spearman correlations reported in 
tables A3.3 and A3.4 in appendix 3. With few exceptions, correlations between 
independent variables were not high, except for correlations between the four size 
variables. 
Comparison with previous research findings 
Most previous research into forecast disclosure has focused on a more limited and 
different range of variables than this research. Of the limited range covered in 
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previous research, three variables, size, management ownership and bid horizon 
(forecast horizon in prior research), were included in this study. Ruland (1979), 
Cox (1985), Lev and Penman (1990), Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) and 
Frankel, McNichols and Wilson (1995) (for utilities only) found size to be 
significantly different between forecasters and nonforecasters. No significant 
difference in size between the two groups was found by Waymire (1985). In the 
bivariate analysis in this study, forecasting targets were significantly larger than 
nonforecasting targets. Forecasting and nonforecasting bidders differed on only 
two of the four size variables included in the research. The weaker findings of a 
relationship between size and forecast disclosure for bidders may be because 
bidders are on average larger than targets. This might account for the findings for 
size being stronger for targets. In multivariate models only one measure of size, 
owners' equity, was significant for targets only and in just one of the four models 
estimated. Thus, size on its own did not generally explain differences in 
forecasting. The anomalous results on size, compared with the mixed results of 
previous research, are not inconsistent. 
Ruland, Tung and George (1990) found ownership structure to be the most 
important variable in multivariate analysis explaining forecast reporting and 
nonreporting firms. There was no support for percentage management ownership 
as an explanation of forecast disclosure in the multivariate models tested in the 
present research. 
Because of the dominance of the takeover environment, it is not surprising that 
results for nontakeover variables, such as size and management ownership, are 
weak in this research compared with previous research findings. 
Previous research has only been able to measure forecast horizon. The takeover 
context of this research enables bid horizon to be measured for all firms. 
Forecasters and nonforecasters could then be compared. The findings in this 
research for bid horizon are opposite to those in Waymire (1985). Waymire found 
that the forecast horizons for regular repeat forecasters were longer than for 
232 
nonrepeat forecasters. In addition, he found that earnings of repeat forecasters are 
significantly less volatile than nonrepeat forecasters. Waymire suggests that 
nonrepeat forecasters, with highly volatile earnings, disclose forecasts closer to 
year end to reduce the risk of making an erroneous forecast. In this research, bid 
horizon for forecasters is, as one would expect, shorter than for nonforecasters. 
8.3.1.3 Multivariate analysis - agreed and contested bids 
When hypotheses were formulated it was intended to apply them to bidders and 
targets. The findings in Powell (1995), showing characteristics of hostile and 
friendly targets to differ significantly, prompted an analysis of the hypotheses by 
agreed and contested bids. This level of analysis produced quite different (but not 
inconsistent) results with the earlier analysis for bidders and targets. 
Table 8.3 Summary results of logit analysis of disclosure/nondisclosure of 
forecasts for agreed and contested bids (lil-H, 4) 
Hypothesis Agreed bids Contested bids 
Logit analysis Logit analysis Logit analysis Logit analysis 
Hypotheses including SSH excluding SSH including SSH excluding SSH 
424 cases 626 cases 144 cases 212 cases 
H, YEAR YEAR YEAR YEAR 
H2 BT BT BT* BT** 
H3 
H4 CON CON CON CON 
H5 BHOR** BHOR** BHOR BHOR 
H6 VAL* VAL* VAL VAL 
H7 LEV LEV LEV LEV 
Hs MO MO MO MO 
H9 SSH SSH 
Hio AUD AUD AUD AUD 
Hi l MB MB MB MB 
H12 QUOTED QUOTED QUOTED QUOTED 
H13 IND IND IND IND 
H14 NAT NAT NAT NAT 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Significant at 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 6.11,6.12,6.1 3 and 6.14 and in 
tables A3.10. A3.11, A3.12 and A3.13 in appendix 3 
The results for agreed and contested bids are summarised in table 8.3. Disclosure 
of forecasts in agreed bids was strongly influenced by bid horizon and by value of 
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bid. In contrast, in contested bids, one factor, whether the firm is a target (rather 
than a bidder), was highly significant. 
In agreed bids, forecasts are probably disclosed by bidders and targets to increase 
the likelihood of the bid succeeding: of the bid being accepted by target 
shareholders (and possibly bidder shareholders where paper is issued). However, 
if the circumstances prevailing at the time of the bid are not conducive to a 
forecast, other methods of persuading shareholders to accept the bid are likely. 
Long bid horizons are not conducive to forecast disclosure. Thus, it is not 
surprising that this variable is related to forecast disclosure in agreed bids. 
In contested bids, it was expected that a relationship would be found between 
forecast disclosure and target (rather than bidder) firms. However the strength of 
the finding is surprising - that is was the single and main influence on disclosure. 
Industry was marginally significant in only one of the two models for contested 
bids. 
8.3.2 Influence of market expectations on disclosure of forecasts (His) 
Some support for signalling theory is provided in testing the influence of market 
expectations on disclosure of forecasts. It was hypothesised that the more 
expectations deviate from actual results, the more likely the disclosure of a 
forecast. 
Mean rankings of differences in deviations from market expectations, and of its 
positive subsample, were significantly higher for forecasters than nonforecasters. 
There was no difference in rankings for the negative deviations from market 
expectations subsample. This is consistent with Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson 
and Sefcik (1992) who found the mean value of their good news measures for 
forecasters exceeded that for nonforecasters. 
As expected, based on number of firms with positive/negative deviations from 
market expectations, there was a higher incidence of forecast disclosure where 
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subsequent actual results were greater than market expectations. However, chi- 
square statistics indicated that this difference in frequency was not significant. No 
relationship was found between the decision to forecast and classification between 
positive and negative deviations for market expectations. These results are 
inconsistent with Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994) who found support for 
their good news hypothesis that disclosure of a forecast is related to whether 
firms are classified as having positive deviations from market expectations/good 
news to disclose. 
A logit model of disclosuretnondisclosure of forecasts, including deviation from 
market expectations, was estimated. Deviation from market expectations was not 
significant (or even nearly significant) in the model. 
These results must be interpreted with caution for two reasons. Firstly, there were 
only 261 cases available for analysis. This small sample is dominated by bidders so 
the results may be dominated by motivations of bidders. The interview evidence in 
chapter 5 indicated that bidders are more likely to disclose bad news voluntarily 
than targets, particularly targets in contested bids. In addition, bidders tend to be 
larger. Larger firms, with PR departments, may be better at guiding market 
expectations through analysts' forecasts. Thus, market expectations are less likely 
to be out of line for bidders, who are less likely therefore to disclose a forecast. 
The evidence for bidders and targets is consistent with this interpretation. 
In conclusion, these results provide weak evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
forecast disclosure is more likely when market expectations are out of line with 
actual results. The evidence suggests that firms are more likely to disclose a 
forecast where market expectations are pessimistic and where subsequent actual 
results are greater than expectations. 
It is likely that the dominance of the takeover environment resulted in weaker 
findings in this research compared with previous studies. 
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8.3.3 Strategic role of profit forecasts (H16-Hi9) 
As stated earlier, forecast disclosure seems to be motivated with a view to 
maximising the prospects of success, viewed from the perspectives of bidders and 
targets. The influence of disclosure of forecasts on outcome of bids for both 
bidders and targets was tested. 
As confirmed by the interviews, the relationship between success (however 
defined) and disclosure of forecasts is difficult to test. For example, in agreed bids 
the published bid price may not have increased. However, at an earlier stage, 
there may have been a price increase conditional on publication of a forecast prior 
to the bid being announced. It is impossible to test events occurring during the 
negotiation phase of bids using empirical research techniques. In contested bids, it 
is difficult to know whether it is publication of a forecast, or some other event, 
that influences the outcome. It is also difficult to isolate the extent to which a 
price increase relates directly to the publication of a forecast. 
No association between outcome of bids, however defined, and forecast 
disclosure was found for bidders. One would expect bidders' forecasts to be of 
value in persuading target shareholders of the value of an offer, where the 
proposed consideration is bidder shares or a mixture of shares and cash. No 
statistical evidence supported the proposition that bidders making forecasts were 
more likely to succeed than nonforecasting bidders. This does not necessarily 
mean that forecasts by bidders are ineffective; this research, however, has not 
identified what the effect is. Bidders may resort to forecasts when, owing to other 
perceived weaknesses in the bid, they feel motivated to do so. Bidder forecasts 
might be used (especially in less generous offers, where target management are 
not persuaded by price alone to accept the bid) to impress/persuade wavering 
target management. Thus, bidders may disclose forecasts in marginal rather than 
generous bids. This conjecture could be tested by examining the relationship 
between takeover premium and forecast disclosure. 
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For agreed bids, there is a significant positive association between disclosure of 
forecasts by targets and success of bids. This may be because some agreed bids 
fail before there is time to issue a takeover document/disclose a forecast. For 
contested bids, there is no association between disclosure of forecasts by targets 
and success of bids. There is a significant association between disclosure of a 
forecast and increase in offer price for contested bids only. There is clear evidence 
that the use of forecasts by targets in contested bids is effective in obtaining 
increased offer prices. 
In conclusion, there is some evidence that forecasts have strategic value for 
targets, but there is no such evidence for bidders. In particular, disclosure of 
forecasts in contested bids is significantly related to the incidence of increased 
offer price. 
Consistent with Sudarsanam (1994), publication of a forecast by targets was not 
found to be related to the success/failure of contested bids. However, where 
outcome is defined as increase in offer price, publication of a forecast was 
significant. 
8.3.4 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis (1120-1133) 
The issue of whether disclosure of forecasts should be mandatory was extensively 
debated in the US in the 1970s. The consensus is against mandatory disclosure. 
However, the content analysis of forecasts in this research has highlighted the 
extreme variability of disclosures in forecasts and the need for more 
guidance/standardisation on the content of disclosures in forecasts. 
In general, forecasts disclosed more assumptions than items. 
Negative binomial regression results 
Negative binomial regression results are summarised in table 8.4. One variable, 
type of bid, was significant in the direction predicted by H21 in all content of 
disclosures models estimated. Significantly more items and significantly more 
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assumptions were disclosed in contested bid forecasts. This is consistent with the 
competitive environment of contested bids. Forecasts may be attacked by the 
other side for inadequate disclosure, prompting greater disclosure of items. The 
greater chance of litigation arising from contested bids is likely to encourage 
those associated with forecasts (mainly advisors) to look for greater protection 
through the inclusion of more assumptions/caveats. 
Table 8.4 Summary results of negative binomial regression of content of disclosures 
in forecasts (H2rH33) 
ITEMS ASS 
Hypothesis Including SSH Excluding SSH Including SSH Excluding SSH 
141 cases 205 cases 141 cases 205 cases 
H, BT BT* BT BT 
H21 BID* BID** BID* BID* 
Hu CIRC** CIRC** CIRC* CIRC 
H23 FHOR* FHOR* FHOR** FHOR** 
H24 PER* PER** PER* PER 
Hu REV REV REV REV 
H26 LEV LEV LEV LEV 
H27 MO MO** MO MO 
H2s SSH SSH 
H29 AUD AUD* AUD AUD 
H3o MB MB* MB Na 
H31 QUOTED - Insufficient number of cases for analysis to be performed 
H32 IND IND IND IND 
H33 NAT NAT NAT NAT 
** Si gnificant at < 0.01 * Significant at :50.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables 7.7,7.8,7.9 and 7.10 
Forecast horizon was also significant in all content of disclosure models but not in 
the directions predicted by H. Significantly more assumptions were disclosed in 
longer horizon forecasts, as predicted. Contrary to expectations, significantly 
fewer items were disclosed in longer horizon forecasts. This may be because 
forecasts disclosed after the forecast period end (estimates), with very short 
forecast horizons, are more in the nature of preliminary earnings announcements 
and therefore follow a fuller annual accounts type presentation. 
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Circumstances of making the forecast and period forecast were significant in three 
of the four models estimated. Fewer items and assumptions were disclosed in 
involuntary forecasts and in shorter period forecasts, supporting Hn and H24 in 
the directions predicted. As involuntary forecasts are made reluctantly by 
management, it is to be expected that there will be fewer disclosures in such 
forecasts. This result is much weaker in the case of assumptions disclosed. A 
greater reluctance to disclose financial information, and at the same time a 
tendency to include caveats or assumptions in involuntary forecasts, is consistent 
with management reluctance to publish the forecasts. Shorter period (six months 
or less) forecasts were expected to disclose less, in the same way that interim 
reports disclose less than annual reports. This finding is not as strong for 
assumptions disclosed compared with items disclosed, for similar reasons 
probably to involuntary forecasts just discussed. 
Three firm-specific hypotheses, H27 (percentage management ownership), H29 
(auditor/reporting accountant) and H3o (financial advisor) were supported in only 
one of the four models estimated. In the model excluding substantial 
shareholdings, significantly more items were disclosed where percentage 
management ownership was lower, and where big-six auditors and higher 
reputation financial advisors were associated with the forecasts. 
There was no support for H2O (forecaster), H25 (size), H26 (leverage), H28 
(substantial shareholdings), H32 (industry) and H33 (nationality) in any of the 
content of disclosure models tested. Thus, takeover-context variables and 
forecast-related variables appeared to be most relevant in determining content of 
disclosures in forecasts. Firm-specific variables had little explanatory power in the 
regressions. 
These content analysis results are not comparable with previous studies which are 
based on annual report disclosures. Those studies have found various firm- 
specific variables to be related to disclosure content (see table 2.5 for a summary), 
which findings have generally not been supported in this research. The takeover 
context again has dominated the results. 
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8.3.4.1 Content of disclosures in forecasts - agreed and contested bids 
For reasons stated earlier in this chapter, the content analysis was repeated for 
agreed and contested bids. The results differ somewhat from (but are not 
inconsistent with) the analysis for the entire group of forecasts. The results for 
agreed bids are summarised in table 8.5. 
Table 8.5 Summary results of negative binomial regression of content of disclosures 
in agreed bid forecasts (H=rH) 
ITEMS ASS 
Hypothesis Including SSH Excluding SSH Including SSH Excluding SSH 
62 cases 94 cases 79 cases 111 cases 
H2o BT BT BT BT 
H21 
Hu CIRC** CIRC** CIRC CIRC 
H23 FHOR* FHOR* FHOR** FHOR** 
H24 PER PER PER PER 
Hu REV REV** REV REV* 
H26 LEV LEV LEV LEV 
H27 MO MO MO MO 
H2z SSH SSH 
H29 AUD AUD AUD AUD 
H3o MB MB MB MB 
H,, QUOTED - Insufficient number of cases for analysis to be performed 
H32 IND IND IND* IND 
H33 NAT NAT NAT NAT 
** Si gnificant at < 0.01 * Signifi cant at 5 0.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables A3.14 to A3.17 in appendix 3 
Agreed bids 
Forecast horizon was significant in all models for agreed bids for both number of 
items and number of assumptions disclosed. Similar to earlier results, significantly 
fewer items and significantly more assumptions were disclosed in long horizon 
agreed bid forecasts. Circumstances of the forecast was significant for disclosure 
of items only, with significantly fewer items disclosed in involuntary forecasts. 
There was some evidence, for both items and assumptions, that disclosure content 
is related to size in agreed bids. However, in the case of assumptions, the 
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direction of the finding was contrary to expectations. Significantly more items, 
but fewer assumptions, were disclosed in larger company forecasts (for one model 
only, respectively). It is difficult to say what causes this contrary finding. In the 
case of assumptions, industry was marginally significant in one model only. 
Table 8.6 Summary results of negative binomial regression of content of disclosures 
in contested bid forecasts (H2(-H33) 
ITEMS ASS 
Hypothesis Including SSH Excluding SSH Including SSH Excluding SSH 
62 cases 94 cases 79 cases 111 cases 
H2o BT BT BT** BT* 
H21 
Hu CIRC** CIRC** CIRC** CIRC** 
H23 FHOR** FHOR FHOR FHOR** 
H24 PER** PER* PER* PER** 
Hu VAL VAL VAL VAL 
H25 REV REV REV REV 
Hu TAI TAI TAI TAI 
Hu TA2 TA2 TA2 TA2 
H26 LEV LEV LEV LEV 
H27 MO MO MO MO 
H2g SSH* SSH 
H29 AUD AUD AUD AUD 
H3o MB MB MB MB 
H31 QUOTED - Insufficient number of cases for analysis to be performed 
H32 IND IND IND* IND** 
H33 NAT NAT NAT NAT 
** Significant at < 0.01 * Si gnificant at :50.05 
Full statistical output for this table is shown in tables A3.18 to A3.21 in appendix 3 
Contested bids 
The results for contested bids are summarised in table 8.6. Circumstances of the 
forecast and forecast period were significant in all contested bid content of 
disclosure models. Significantly more items and assumptions were disclosed in 
longer period forecasts and in voluntary forecasts. Forecast horizon was 
significant for items and assumptions disclosed in only one of the two models 
respectively. Similar to the results for disclosure/nondisclosure in contested bids, 
the number of assumptions disclosed were related to forecaster and industry. 
Targets disclosed significantly more assumptions than bidders. This is not 
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surprising because targets company advisors are more likely to be sued if 
litigation follows the takeover and will therefore want to include more 
assumptions in contested bid forecasts. Also, litigation is more likely after 
contested bids, as in agreed bids the bidder and the bidder's advisors will have 
access to private information during the negotiation stage. 
It is interesting to note that forecast period is not significant in any of the agreed 
bid models but is significant in all contested bid models. 
8.3.5 Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: news content (1134) 
Two methods of measuring news content in forecasts were used. Following 
Clarkson, Kao and Richardson's (1994) `mechanical' approach, forecast results 
were compared with historic, previous year's earnings. The more common 
methodology of comparing forecast results and consensus analysts' forecasts was 
also applied. Both variables were analysed between good/bad or positive/negative 
depending on the difference between the forecast results and previous year's 
actual results/analysts' forecasts. There seemed to be a tendency to disclose good 
news. 
News variable 
Based on the `mechanical' approach; and consistent with Clarkson, Kao and 
Richardson (1994), this research finds evidence of voluntary disclosure bias in 
favour of good news forecasts (20% classified as unfavourable, compared with 
17.5% in Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1994)). 
There was a significantly different pattern between bidders and targets in the 
frequency of good news over bad news. Only 3% of bidders' forecasts were 
classified as bad news forecasts, compared with 25% of targets' forecasts. 
Targets were significantly more likely to disclose bad news compared with 
bidders. This is to be expected. Bidders are likely to be successful companies 
whose results are improving from year to year. Targets, on the other hand, are 
more likely to be experiencing trading difficulties (consequently, they are subject 
to takeover bids), giving rise to profits less than previous periods. 
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The rankings of differences in news content of forecasts were significantly higher 
for bidders than for targets, which suggests that bidders' forecast results are 
better, compared with previous performance, than targets' forecast results. There 
was no significant difference in mean rankings for the good news and bad news 
subsamples. 
Forecast deviation variable 
Based on forecast deviations, this research finds evidence of voluntary disclosure 
bias in favour of good news forecasts (only 42% classified as unfavourable). No 
significant difference was found in the frequency of positive and negative forecast 
deviations between bidders and targets. There was no significant difference in the 
mean rankings between bidders and targets for the forecast deviations variable as 
a whole, nor for the positive deviations subset. Mean rankings of negative 
forecast deviations were significantly higher for bidders than for targets. Thus, 
although targets are more likely to disclose bad news forecasts, when bidders 
disclose bad news (as measured by forecast deviation), it tends to be worse on 
average than targets' bad news. 
Agreed and contested bids 
News content variables were analysed between agreed and contested bids. 
Frequency of forecasts with positive deviations is significantly greater in 
contested bids. Good news forecasts are, as expected, more likely in contested 
bids than agreed bids. No significant difference was found for the news in the 
forecast variable (but forecast deviation is a better measure of news in the 
forecast). 
In summary, in support of H34, a tendency to disclose good news was observed. 
There was evidence that more good news was disclosed in forecasts than bad 
news. These results are consistent with US research findings. While there was a 
tendency to disclose good news in forecasts, there was evidence of disclosure of 
bad news in some forecasts. 
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8.4 Limitations of the research 
Findings of this research study are limited by the very specific context of the 
research, namely takeovers, and are not directly applicable to more routine 
business situations. In addition, this research, like all research, is limited by the 
period and sample studied. Forecasting practices may change over time. There is 
evidence of a reduction in frequency of forecast disclosure in the later years of the 
study compared with earlier years. 
Disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts 
This research provides useful data to firms involved in takeover bids. These firms 
may not be a representative sample of all firms in the population. The literature on 
prediction of takeover targets (for example, Palepu, 1986; Barnes, 1990) suggests 
that target firms have different characteristics from the population as a whole. 
Thus, the results of this study may not be applicable to a wider group of firms. In 
addition, one must consider the possibility that firms that forecast are not a 
random selection of firms. Thus, conclusions based on forecasting firms cannot be 
extended to nonforecasting firms. 
Previous disclosure behaviour of firms may affect interpretations of 
disclosure/nondisclosure of forecasts in subsequent takeover bids. Whether or not 
a firm is a regular forecaster, and the quality of its previous forecasting, may 
affect how disclosures during takeover bids are received. As the tendency of UK 
firms is not to disclose forecasts, this limitation is not as great a problem as it 
would be in other jurisdictions. 
Firms may differ on the forecastability and ease of forecasting of their profits (for 
example, bidders versus targets, larger versus smaller firms, firms in different 
industries). This, rather than disclosure decisions per se, may influence disclosure. 
244 
Content of disclosures in forecasts 
When ranking firms on the quality of disclosure, it is assumed that the demand for 
disclosure is the same for all firms and that differences in disclosure are due solely 
to management's disclosure choices. However, the nature of a business and its 
complexity will also influence content of disclosures. Consistent with this view, 
the findings in this research provide some evidence of different levels of disclosure 
of assumptions for different industries in agreed and contested bids. 
No adjustment is made in the research for items and assumptions in forecasts not 
disclosed because they were not applicable to those forecasting firms. Were it 
possible to identify items and assumptions applicabletnot applicable to firms, a 
more accurate measure of disclosure content of forecasts would result. 
Notwithstanding the obvious practical difficulties, this has been claimed to have 
been done in annual report studies. Whether it is possible to properly cater for 
nonapplicability of items in annual reports is questionable; in the case of entirely 
voluntary profit forecast disclosure, it appears to be impossible to deal with 
nonapplicability of disclosures. 
No distinction is made in the research between profit estimates (forecasts 
published after the forecast period end) and profit forecasts even though the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers says that a profit estimate relating to a period 
expired may only be subject to assumptions in exceptional circumstances. Most 
profit estimates included assumptions and are therefore treated similarly to profit 
forecasts in this research. 
8.5 Suggestions for further research 
The focus of this research is behavioural and supply-orientated, focusing on what 
motivates management to disclose forecasts. A shareholder perspective is an 
alternative approach. A share price reaction study could be undertaken to examine 
the relative share price behaviour before/after the takeover, using the market 
model and abnormal returns to identify whether the share price behaviour has 
been any different where there has been disclosure of profit forecasts. There are 
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difficulties, however, with share price studies. Share prices will not be available if 
the share quotation has been suspended during the takeover. There may be so 
many other events occurring during the bid that it may be difficult to isolate the 
share reaction as related specifically to disclosure of the forecast. Variability of 
newspaper coverage will also affect the share price reaction. 
Agency costs during takeovers are likely to increase substantially, especially in 
target companies. Shareholders will be most concerned about the value of their 
shares whereas management will be most concerned about their job prospects, 
their earnings post-takeover and, to a lesser extent, the value of the shares. An 
analysis of the relationship between target management's job outcome after 
takeover and forecast disclosure could be undertaken to see if forecasts are used 
by management as an entrenchment tool. 
Voluntary disclosure is one potential management response to valuation problems 
in public markets. Further research is needed to understand which voluntary 
disclosures are credible and how voluntary disclosure affects analyst and 
institutional investor interest in the firm. Usefulness to recipients of the 
information disclosed in profit forecasts, and the format of its disclosure, could be 
examined. 
This research could be developed using the kind of case study methodology 
followed by Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990,1992). There could be a 
more participative research approach, whereby the researcher would take a role 
(either actively or as an observer) during a takeover, and at the same time observe 
the actions/decisions of management in relation to disclosure of profit forecasts. 
The interviews in this research were a more practical alternative to case studies in 
attempting to understand the motivations for disclosure during takeover bids. 
Future research might extend the definition of outcome of bids to include 
shareholding structure in the target, methods of payment and bid premium. 
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Another researchable question is whether the forecasts disclosed are accurate. 
Measuring the accuracy of forecasts disclosed during takeovers is difficult. Dev 
and Webb (1972), amongst others, have pointed out the difficulty of examining 
forecast accuracy because of non-comparability of forecast results with actual 
results after the takeover. New managements are likely to adopt new operating 
policies and different accounting assumptions. In addition, they are unlikely to 
disclose separately the results of the companies taken over. Dev and Webb (1972) 
suggest that it is only when bids fail that forecast and actual profits are likely to be 
on a comparable basis. There were 12 forecasts made in respect of failed bids. A 
development of this thesis could examine the accuracy of these forecasts, subject 
to the additional caveat that there is evidence that management may attempt to fit 
actual results to the forecast after the takeover (Ferris, 1975). 
Because the findings of the research are specific to the takeover context of the 
study and may not apply to nontakeover situations, future research might examine 
forecast disclosures in other contexts to re-examine some of these findings. The 
dominance of the takeover context on the results suggests that more research is 
needed to study disclosures in specialist settings. Frost (1995) has begun to look 
at disclosure choices by stressed firms in the UK. 
8.6 Discussion and conclusions 
This research is concerned with profit forecast disclosure during UK takeover 
bids. By choosing UK data, the research was constrained by the fact that UK 
companies rarely disclose periodic routine profit forecasts in, for example, their 
annual reports. Most research to date on profit forecast disclosure comes from 
the US and is based on routine management disclosure. It was to be expected that 
there would be a difficulty in making a direct comparison of these research results 
with research of factors affecting disclosure of profit forecasts in nontakeover, 
routine situations. If it had been possible to contrast UK data relating to routine 
forecast disclosure with forecast disclosure during takeovers, it might have been 
possible to demonstrate that different factors determine the decision to disclose, 
depending on the context. 
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The very fact that there is a significant level of profit forecast disclosure during 
UK takeover bids, while there is little of such disclosure in routine, periodical 
contexts, suggests intuitively that the major determinants in the decision to 
disclose profit forecasts during takeover bids are themselves takeover-specific. 
The same consideration raises the question as to why, in a market generally averse 
to routine disclosure of profit forecasts, companies involved in takeovers would 
overcome that aversion and publish their forecasts. In the circumstances, it was 
not unexpected that the research would suggest that profit disclosure decisions 
were affected by takeover-context factors. The research duly confirmed that these 
factors, rather than factors suggested by prior research, such as signalling theory 
and agency theory, affected the decision to voluntarily disclose profit forecasts. 
The a priori analysis of motivations to disclosure profit forecasts, set out in 
paragraph 1.2, was based on the commonsense assumption that a decision on 
whether or not to disclose a profit forecast in the course of a takeover bid was 
likely to be profoundly influenced by a single dominant consideration - namely 
whether such disclosure would help or hinder the success of the forecaster, 
however success is defined. If success from the bidder's point of view is defined 
as completing the takeover at minimum cost, and if success, from the target's 
point of view, is defined as maximising the cost of the takeover so as to prevent it 
completely or, failing that, to maximise the return to target shareholders, than one 
would imagine a priori that any decision to disclose a profit forecast is taken 
predominantly by reference to whether disclosure will materially assist the 
forecasters' prospect of success. 
Given a pattern of very rare routine disclosure of profit forecasts, prior research, 
largely based on routine disclosure, was unlikely to assist in an analysis of 
motivations to disclose profit forecasts during takeover bids. This is not to say 
that prior research is in any way invalidated by this research, in that the data did 
not provide strong confirmation of hypotheses based on signalling or agency 
theory. On the contrary, because there is a low level of routine profit forecast 
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disclosure in the UK one might well argue that weak confirmation of signalling 
and agency theory hypotheses in this research underlines their relevance to routine 
disclosure situations. 
Moreover, the fact that there is a general culture hostile to routine disclosure of 
profit forecasts in the UK suggests that bidders' and targets' general motivation 
will be to make no disclosure unless there are very attractive or compelling 
reasons. If disclosure of profit forecasts were a routine feature of company 
behaviour, a decision to make a forecast in a takeover situation would not require 
any particularly strong motivation. Conversely, if strong motivation is needed to 
overcome a general reluctance to disclose profit forecasts, one would intuitively 
expect to find this confirmed by statistical analysis. 
The findings 
This research set out to examine five specific issues relating to disclosure of profit 
forecasts during takeover bids. Two takeover factors influenced the decision to 
disclose a forecast - type of bid and forecast horizon. Significantly more forecasts 
were disclosed in contested bids and where forecast horizon was shorter. In 
contested bids, whether the firm was a target substantially influenced whether a 
forecast was disclosed. Firm-specific factors (with some exceptions) did not 
appear to be influential. 
There was some evidence from a small sample of readings that forecasts are more 
likely when market expectations are out of line with results, especially where the 
forecast is higher than market expectations. 
No statistical evidence supports the proposition that bidders making forecasts 
influence the outcome of bids or that forecasting bidders are more likely to 
succeed than nonforecasting bidders. From the point of view of targets, there is 
clear evidence in contested bids that the use of forecasts by targets is effective in 
obtaining increased offer prices. 
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Content of disclosures in forecasts was influenced by takeover-context variables 
and by forecast-related variables. Type of bid, circumstances of making the 
forecast, forecast horizon and period forecast were significant in all (or nearly all) 
models tested. In contested bids, whether the forecaster was a target significantly 
increased disclosure of assumptions in forecasts. Firm-specific variables did not 
appear to influence disclosure content. 
There is evidence supporting the good news hypothesis that more good news is 
disclosed than bad news in forecasts. There was a clear tendency to disclose good 
news forecasts. However, some bad news forecasts were disclosed. Targets were 
significantly more likely to disclose bad news. However, when bidders disclosed 
bad news it tended to be worse, on average, than targets' bad news. 
This study underlines the inappropriateness of applying research based on general 
settings to more specialist environments. This research applied existing voluntary 
disclosure theory to the specialist setting of takeovers. Disclosure choices were 
dominated by the takeover context of the research. Two variables, type of bid and 
bid horizon, accounted for almost all the variation in disclosure. Many companies 
not normally disclosing profit forecasts were found to do so during takeover bids. 
In many cases, there was little evidence that such disclosure made a difference to 
the outcome of the bid (except for disclosure by targets in contested bids, when 
disclosure and offer price was related). 
More research of specialist contexts is needed. Now that the takeover dominance 
has been identified, a deeper and more takeover-focused analysis is needed to 
more clearly tease out the underlying takeover factors driving disclosure 
decisions. A possible avenue of enquiry might be the analysis of the relationship 
between forecast disclosure and managerial welfare during/after takeover bids. 
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Appendix 1: INTERVIEW OUTLINE 
(This interview outline was used in interviews with directors, management and 
advisors of companies involved in takeover bids. Thus, its applicability to 
different interviewees varied. The questions are cross-referenced to the 
hypotheses being tested. (These cross-references were not included in the original 
questionnaire sent to interviewees. ) 
Hypotheses Issue for discussion 
1. Outline purpose of research study. 
2. Stress confidentiality. 
3a. Were you ever involved in a bid where a forecast was 
disclosed? 
H1-H14 3b. If 'yes', why was a forecast disclosed? 
3c. Did the company have sophisticated forecasting systems? 
Hl-H14 4a. Why do bidding companies involved in takeover bids 
generally not disclose a forecast? 
H3 (i) during uncontested bids 
H3 (ii) during contested bids 
Hl-H14 4b. Why do target companies involved in takeover bids generally 
not disclose a forecast? 
H3 (i) during uncontested bids 
H3 (ii) during contested bids 
Hl-H14 5a. Why do some bidding companies involved in takeover bids 
disclose a forecast? 
H3 (i) during uncontested bids 
H3 (ii) during contested bids 
Hl-H14 5b. Why do some target companies involved in takeover bids 
disclose a forecast? 
H3 (i) during uncontested bids 
H3 (ii) during contested bids 
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Hypotheses Issue for discussion 
H2 5c. Of the companies that disclose a forecast during a takeover 
bid, why do more target rather than bidding companies 
disclose a forecast? 
6. Who/what is the most influential in the decision to disclose 
the forecast? 
" Other party to the bid 
" Board 
" Management 
H, o/Hll " Advisors 
H3 " Whether the bid is contested or not 
His " Market expectations of company profits 
" Regulations requiring a forecast 
" Other 
7a. To what extent are forecasts disclosed privately rather than 
publicly during bid negotiations? 
7b. Why, in an agreed bid, are forecasts disclosed publicly rather 
than privately? 
8. Are there any factors not already mentioned that influence 
the disclosure of forecasts during takeovers? 
9a. How influential is the fear of getting the forecast wrong? 
9b. What is most feared if the forecast is wrong? 
" Litigation 
" Reputation 
" Career/job prospects 
" The Takeover Panel 
" Other 
10. Which of the following is relevant in influencing the 
disclosure of a forecast? 
Hs " Size 
H3 " Extent of ownership of the company by management 
H7 " Leverage 
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Hypotheses Issue for discussion 
H34 " News contained in forecast 
H13 " Industry in which the firm operated 
" Sophistication of forecasting system 
" Variability of earnings 
Hl " Economic conditions in which forecast was made 
" Age of the company 
" Other 
H16-H19 11. In contested bid situations, do you think the publication of a 
forecast has a material influence on the outcome of the bid? 
H20-H33 12. What influenced the extent of disclosure of the bases and 
assumptions underlying the forecast? 
13. Who else should Niamh Brennan talk to about this research 
project? 
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Appendix 2: EDITED SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
For ease of reference, each interview comment is numbered 1 to 162, to the left 
of the text. Letters A to K refer to each interviewee. 
1. Factors influencing disclosure of profit forecasts (comments 1-103) 
Case histories 
X, plc (Forecasting target in a contested bid 
B: A large part of X, plc was held by X and we were on notice that a bid could arise. We were 
advising X, plc before the bid. X1 plc published a forecast because we advised them to. The 
company decided on a major rationalisation programme the previous year and consequently 
knew it would be under threat of takeover. The company decided to spread the cost of the 
rationalisation over a number of years. They thought that this would be a good defence 
against a takeover bid. We advised them to take the full hit in the current year and to make 
sure that they over-provided rather than under-provided for the rationalisation costs. The 
basis for our advice was that we could forecast in a defence document on a year that had the 
benefits of rationalisation and none of the costs. Nine months later the bid occurred and we 
were in a position to make a forecast. 
2 B: A number of factors influenced the decision. We were close enough to the year end to be able 
to predict the final outcome for the year. X, plc had very good controls. We were 
comfortable with making a forecast. The forecast was driven by the price being too low. 
H: The managing director indicated that Xi plc profits would touch £X million. This was 
deemed to be a forecast by the Stock Exchange. The bid document hyped this forecast up to 
£X+2 million. Initially it was just a verbal forecast. It was never reported on. It would have 
been very remiss of us not to provide a forecast, especially as the bid was contested, unless 
the forecast were to show a bleak picture. We would have to have informed the shareholders 
as to the out-turn for the year so they could make a judgement about the offer price. 
X, nlc (Forecasting target in an uncontested bid 
4 G: There were two reasons. First of all, for Stock Exchange reasons concerning the length of 
time since the last accounts were published. There is an obligation to give up to date 
information. There could have been, say, eight months since the company last published any 
information. Secondly, the shareholders needed to be put in possession of all the relevant 
facts. A lot had happened since the previous year end. We felt it necessary to provide the 
shareholders with the same information the directors and management had in making their 
judgement in relation to the bid. The market was a reasonable guide, but it wasn't enough. 
The bidder did not push for a forecast. They did not influence a forecast in any way. 
X, ulc (Forecasting bidder in an uncontested bid 
K: We approached the target with a view to merger (in effect) by means of a recommended 
offer. There was a simultaneous flotation as X3 plc was an unlisted company taking over a 
quoted company. It was a long time since we had disclosed results. We disclosed a forecast 
because we were being listed. It was driven by the flotation rather than the acquisition. The 
interim results were published and audited in the prospectus, and we rolled in with a forecast 
for an additional six months. It was very easy for us to calculate earnings and we were happy 
to do it, as there was going to be a big jump in earnings from the previous year. The areas of 
potential for movement were fewer in our company. We were making a forecast in the last 
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quarter of the year and we already had audited results for the first six months of the year. 
K: Once the terms were agreed in principle there was an expectation that the target would 
publish a forecast. It was proposed in the financial advisor's checklist that the target would 
give a forecast, but they came back saying that they did not want to give a forecast. The 
reason they gave was that they did not give a forecast when they had floated the company 
originally. That, and also that one of their non-executive directors did not want to be 
involved in a profit forecast. As it turns out, they (their advisors, accountants and merchant 
bankers) would never have been able to stand over a profit forecast. They would have had 
difficulty in producing forecast figures matching the numbers being given privately to us. 
Our financial advisors were happy to rely on brokers' estimates when a forecast from the 
target did not materialise. 
&plc (Nonforecastingtarget in an uncontested bid ) 
7 B: X4 plc had agreed a fabulous price for the company. We didn't want to issue a forecast which 
might show up the generous price offered by the other side. Issuing a forecast wasn't an issue 
in the bid. The company wanted to take the money and leave quietly. 
M DIC (Forecasting target in an uncontested bid 
8 B: XS plc was a recommended offer and probably issued a forecast to convince shareholders that 
the price was fair and reasonable, to convince the shareholders not to expect too much and to 
advise shareholders to accept the bid. It was a paper offer so the bidder's forecast was proba- 
bly to support their share price. The issuing of a forecast by X5 plc was not instigated by the 
financial advisors. The bidder would not make the bid without a forecast. 
Ic (Nonforecasting target in a contested bid 
I: A profit forecast was strongly considered. Our mentality was that, unless we could establish 
a clear benefit for publishing a profit forecast, there was no point in doing one. There was a 
lot of accountants around the table. One automatically associates a forecast with risk. And 
the automatic tendency is to stay away from a forecast unless clear benefits are obvious. If we 
had felt that a profit forecast would have led to any reasonable chance of the offer being 
increased or being overtaken by anyone else, then we would have published a forecast. But 
we believed neither. The bidder had gone to the top of its range. 
10 I: There was no pressure from the bidder to make a forecast. The bidder had what they believed 
was an exceptionally good feel for the quality of the X plc business and its profit stream. We 
gave them access to budget projections and much more financial information not normally 
available in a hostile bid. 
XZ plc (Forecasting (involuntary) bidder in a contested bid) 
11 J: There were two levels of forecast. First we gave a profit warning for the year. The reason for 
doing this was that the management accounts indicated that the profits already exceeded 
brokers' forecasts for the company. We did a lot of soul searching before issuing the profit 
warning. We were afraid it would leak out. We were correcting analysts' forecasts. At the 
bottom of the profit warning statement we made an extra comment in relation to the 
following year. We didn't focus on the consequence of this at the time. It was a nice 
statement to include. As it turns out, this amounted to a profit forecast because we 
specifically referred to further growth in revenues and profitabilities' for the following year. 
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12 J: This came back at us as the target's advisors drew the Stock Exchange's attention (we 
believe) to this statement constituting a profit forecast. This is standard practice in a bid. X10 
plc used this as a delaying tactic. It makes life more difficult. It makes the directors more 
nervous. We had to get the auditors to report, and a cost factor was involved. It was 
relatively easy to forecast the business. The directors were happy that the forecast was 
sustainable. We only had to report, and the auditors only had to verify, that profit would be 
£1 more than the previous year. As such it was a harmless forecast. 
13 J: The original statement would never have been made had the consequences been foreseen at 
the time. The paperwork involved to do a profit forecast is huge. Line management had to 
get involved in the bid. This is very disruptive to the business. There is a greater cost in 
taking up management time. 
Xtplc (Forecasting target in an uncontested bid ) 
14 A: X8 plc issued a forecast to provide shareholders with information whether to accept the bid. 
The profits were not as good as the market was expecting. 
X plc (Forecasting bidder in a contested bid) 
15 A: X9 plc had a very chequered management and profitability experience. It had gone through a 
period of very poor profitability. X had to take over as chairman just before the bid and 
hadn't had time to show the market that the company had been turned around. It was 
essential to make a forecast to show the market the improvement that had been made. The 
pre-tax profit forecast was double the previous year's profits and was three times the 
previous year's profits after tax. 
Xj n plc (Nonforecasting target in a contested bid) 
16 J: We found out afterwards when we had taken over Xlo plc that a forecast was being prepared. 
I don't know what the major stumbling block was, but it subsequently issued a defence 
document without a forecast. I guess the board wasn't happy with going with the forecast. 
X10 plc hadn't lived up to previous budgets. I don't know whether the advisors were a 
problem. I imagine the lawyers were warning the directors on their legal liabilities. 
tpIC (Forecasting target in an uncontested bid) 
17 I: A forecast was made even though the bid was not contested because X, 1 plc was well used to 
making forecasts. The forecast was not demanded by the bidder. We were doing forecasts 
every six months because of our need to raise capital frequently. The main reason was to let 
shareholders know they were getting full value for their shares. The offer was very generous. 
The forecast represented what we expected we would make and what in fact we did make in 
the end. 
Reasons for disclosing forecasts 
18 E: For the bidder the primary reason is to protect the price of securities, and the target to get 
best value for its shareholders. 
19 H: You have a fiduciary duty as a director to be sure that the shareholders get value for their 
shares. If the company becomes aware of highly price-sensitive information that significantly 
affects the value of the shares, directors are supposed to get the information out on the 
market so that there isn't a false market about the potential of the company. 
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20 H: I cannot see a company put out a forecast that shows profits falling off. That can only reduce 
the price being offered. Directors are driven to ensure that, if they recommend that 
shareholders accept the price (whether the bid is friendly or unfriendly), they must be 
satisfied that they have secured the best price. 
Reasons bidders disclose forecasts 
21 A: The bidder may want to counteract the publicity concerning the quality of its earnings or the 
value of their shares. Making a forecast may be necessary to give credibility to the desire to 
take over the company. In the case of cash bids, a forecast is usually irrelevant for bidders 
but could be important in relation to the credibility of an offer in a local situation. In paper 
offers, if the paper is under attack, the bidder will want to support its paper. There is no 
negative PR about the share price in an uncontested bid so it is less likely the bidder will 
have to make a forecast. 
22 C: This is relevant where paper is being offered. It is a way of demonstrating value in the bid. 
There can be debates about the quality of management which might come down to profit 
performance - both historical and forecast profits of the bidder compared to the offeree. 
23 D: There may be particular circumstances to do with a particular bid why bidders would 
disclose a forecast in a cash bid. It may be if the bid is contingent on the bidder's own 
shareholders approving the bid and maybe there has been some dissatisfaction expressed by 
shareholders with the bid. It is not a standard event. 
24 E: In an uncontested bid, a forecast might be disclosed to correct market perceptions that, say, a 
company appears to be paying a higher price for a target. In order to reinforce the confidence 
in the bidder, a forecast may in some circumstances help. There would be more of an 
inclination to give a forecast where there are securities or shares involved. If it is a cash 
offer, then it tends not to be a particularly important issue for the bidder. 
25 G: Forecasts are disclosed if it is felt necessary to complete the transaction or to underwrite the 
value of the consideration. A forecast might be made to shut out contest from another 
predator rather than a target. 
26 J: If their back was up against the wall in relation to relative share values, or if they thought 
the bid was going to fail, or if they were being attacked on the basis of performance, the 
bidder might publish a forecast. 
Reasons targets disclose forecasts 
27 B: It might be suggested in the negotiations that if the company makes a forecast to show its 
sincerity, the bidder will increase the price. The target might put out a forecast to entice 
shareholders to accept the bid. 
28 C: The purpose of the forecast is so that the market or the shareholders arc aware of the 
company's short term prospects. The bidder may force a target to make a forecast as a 
condition for making the offer. 
29 C: I was involved as advisor in an uncontested bid where the target published a forecast because 
a non-executive director on the board would not agree to recommend the offer. When the 
forecast was published he then agreed to recommend the offer. 
30 D: A forecast may be done as part of the price negotiation which may be subject to the offeree 
making a formal forecast. A profit forecast may be made in a hostile bid where the offeree is 
justifying a higher value for the company. A profit forecast is one of the only ways of 
communicating hard information to shareholders. 
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31 E: As far as the target is concerned, then it really doesn't matter whether it is shares or cash, 
the interest is to get the best price for the shareholders. 
32 G: There are compelling reasons in some situations why targets should make a forecast: if there 
is a material change in the business since the last published statement or if there is a long 
lapse of time since the last public disclosure. Companies are required by regulations to give 
up to date information. Forecasts are disclosed to talk up the price and possibly encourage a 
third party to the arena. Shareholders get better value if there is a contested situation. 
Shareholder value is the most important element, but it is not the only element. For example, 
the welfare of employees is important. Management and directors act in the interest of a 
range of people, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, etc. 
Reasons for not making a forecast 
33 A: In general, companies will try to avoid making a profit forecast. Firstly, it is costly and 
secondly, it is time consuming, and thirdly, it may come back to haunt them. 
34 B: A forecast might not be disclosed if the date of the bid was too far from the year end, or if 
systems were unreliable. The type of company will determine whether a profit forecast is 
made or not. Property companies will not make a profit forecast. They will be revising asset 
values. You should exclude property companies from your sample. 
35 C: If the offeree board is satisfied with the terms, there is less need for the market to be 
informed. Companies cannot, for legal reasons, give a long term forecast as there is greater 
uncertainty in the case of a long range forecast. 
36 D: This might arise because it is too early in the financial year. It might be because it is too 
difficult to forecast the profits of the company. It might be due to the exposure of the board, 
the merchant bankers, the directors. Merchant bankers may not be willing to sign off. 
37 E: I suppose mainly uncertainty. Forecasting is quite useful but it has got to be quite bullish. 
Uncertainty and bullishness tend not to sit happily together and it is probably in those 
circumstances that forecasts don't go out, or if it is not going to tell people anything that will 
enhance prospects by the parties. 
38 F: I suppose it is possible that the forecast isn't good and so they don't want to make a forecast 
which confirms the company is having some difficulty. 
39 G: If it was close to the beginning of the year, very little would have changed and I would have 
advised the company not to make a forecast because of the dangers associated with making 
such a forecast. 
40 H: Where the forecast shows a worse position than the historical earnings, or while the forecast 
shows a position better than historical profits, the profits are not sufficient on any multiple to 
match the price offered, or where the advisors cannot stand over the forecast due to lack of 
systems, a forecast will not be published. When a forecast is published, a ritual is gone 
through with the board and with lawyers to the company - every word in the forecast is gone 
through. Thus, in summary, whether a forecast is published or not is a function of what the 
forecast will say if we publish it; will it outperform the price or a multiple thereof? Have we 
got the systems to make the forecast? 
41 J: The cost of the reporting accounting, the hassle, the aggravation concerning documentation, 
problems at board level. Most directors are reluctant to be involved in a forecast. No one 
wants to be caught out publicly in getting the figures wrong. 
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Reasons bidders do not disclose forecasts 
42 B: Bidding companies do not normally make a forecast, especially if cash is offered, unless they 
want to keep the share price up or for reasons of credibility. In a paper bid, a forecast may be 
issued to support the price of the shares being offered and to value the bid higher. The bidder 
is always in control of the situation so it picks the best time to make the bid and therefore 
has less reason to make a forecast. It is a poor bidder that has to prop up its own share price. 
43 F: Bidders might disclose to persuade target company shareholders what a wonderful company 
they would be becoming shareholder of. But the Code clearly says that if there is a cash offer 
by the offeror there is no need to report on a forecast because all you are offering the target 
company shareholders is cash. You don't need to know the future prospects of the offeror 
company when cash is on offer. 
44 G: In cash bids there is no need, nor any point, in the bidder making a forecast. Where you are 
talking about a deal more akin to a merger, when both companies are large and there is a 
paper exchange, it may be necessary for the bidding company to make a forecast. 
45 H: If it is a cash bid, why would a forecast be needed? A forecast might be put out to give the 
target shareholders comfort on the value of paper, to copper fasten the paper value offered by 
the bidder. 
Reasons targets do not disclose forecasts 
46 C: In general, as advisors, we wouldn't sign a forecast with a very long horizon if we weren't 
satisfied that the forecast was reliable. If the merchant bank thinks there is too much 
uncertainty, it will not sign off on the forecast. If it is too far out for a full year's forecast, we 
will consider a six month forecast instead. 
47 G: Reasons why a target wouldn't make a forecast might be because management and the 
directors are so enthusiastic about the proposed transaction. If they feel the takeover is 
absolutely the right thing for the company, and for their own personal careers, they won't 
want any obstacle to be created to get in the way of the transaction. 
Why do more targets than bidders disclose forecasts? 
48 A: Bidding companies tend to be bigger and therefore tend to have firmer market ratings. The 
market expectations are more accurate. For a target company the takeover bid is a once off 
transaction. The target will take once off opposition to maximise value. Once taken over, the 
company is gone. If the company has good profits it will want to maximise value. 
49 B: Target companies are not in control of the situation. Issuing a forecast is one plank to their 
defence. 
Who or what is most influential in the disclosure decision? 
50 A: The advisors are the most important. They are conscious of the shareholders need to be 
advised of any significant information. Also, the advisors will be advising the board 
concerning tactics. The other party to the bid is very important. What the other party is 
doing will encourage the target to make a forecast. The board at the end of the day will 
decide. The company will end up with a committee of the board, in consultation with the 
advisors, and this committee will really be making the decision. Whether the bid is contested 
is also important. You need to add in market expectations to your list. 
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51 B: The other party to the bid. Disclosing a forecast is an element of the negotiations and is a 
test of seriousness and sincerity of the target in making the forecast. Contested bids are an 
important influence. If the bid is not contested, you can give the information to the other side 
in private. Market expectations of company profits are also influential, especially if they are 
vastly out of line. 
52 C: The advisors will have it on the agenda of things to discuss at an early stage in the process. 
If the bid is contested, a forecast is more likely. The accountants are involved in the decision 
as they give an opinion on the forecast. If the accountants cannot sign o$ they will not go 
ahead with the forecast. The merchant bankers cannot sign off without the accountants. 
53 D: The most important is the other party to the bid. Jointly the board and the advisors are 
influential. Management don't have any role except where there is overlap between 
management and presence on the board. The quality of the management affects the ability to 
deliver a profit forecast. But the management per se will not make the decision whether or 
not to disclose a forecast. In contested bids, forecast disclosure is more frequent. 
54 E: It comes back to whether it is necessary and appropriate to get the best value for the 
shareholders. It is often suggested that this sort of defence is to avoid being taken over. That 
will be a motivating factor, but the obligation/responsibility of the directors is to get the best 
deal for the shareholders, so it all comes back to that issue. 
55 F: The advisors (both merchant bankers and accountants) will put up a plan. The policy to 
defend is probably the merchant bankers. The accountants do more, what we call, rule 3 
advice - advising the shareholders and board. The accountants will get involved in the 
number crunching because, although you might think that it is a good idea to use a forecast, 
the numbers may not warrant producing a forecast. Ultimately, the decision has to be that of 
the board. 
56 G: The other party is normally not at all influential. The most influential is the board at the top 
of the tree, with the support of the advisors. I am not really distinguishing between the board 
and the management. A contested bid is a significant influence and market expectations 
could also be an influence. 
57 H: The most influential item is based on getting the best value for shareholders. The board is 
put there by the shareholders to look after their interests. The board is therefore the most 
influential. The board is required by regulations to be properly informed. Therefore, 
directors surround themselves with advisors. The board will be advised by the advisors and 
by management who will also be influential. 
58 I: Shareholder value " it must be. There must be some confident expectation of increasing 
shareholder value. All the other items you list are relevant factors, but must be subsidiary to 
the main issue of enhancing shareholder value. 
Factors within companies influencing disclosure 
59 B: Sophistication of the forecasting system, the variability of earnings, economic trends and 
industry are the most influential. All these items are interlinked. In making a forecast, the 
company will turn up every stone and get every last bit out of the forecast. It is a lot easier to 
shave up market expectations. If the market expectations of profits are increased by say 20%, 
we will only put in 15 - 17% increase in the document. If the forecast profits show a drop of 
20%, we are more likely to put in a drop of 30%. It is easier to forecast upwards than 
downwards. I don't think the extent of ownership, size, leverage are important. 
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60 D: It is not a function of size per se. Size could be a proxy for good systems. Publication of a 
forecast is a function of the quality of the management and the sophistication of the system. 
The longer a company's history, the less volatile the profits. The extent of ownership of a 
company by management is undoubtedly important. You have to be careful of vested interest 
situations. Leverage is important because a small fluctuation in turnover will have a larger 
effect on net earnings where there is high leverage. Industry, the sophistication of the 
forecast systems, the quality of management, variability of earnings, economic conditions 
and the age of the company are all relevant factors. 
61 E: The precondition of the forecast is sophistication of the forecasting system. I don't think age 
of the company will be an issue. The trade would be more important than the age of the 
company. Variability of earnings would probably be a factor of economic conditions. 
Industry factors come into that. In a very highly geared company, equity earnings will be 
subject to much greater variation and will make it more difficult to contemplate forecasting. 
I don't think the size of the company in itself is important, other than the extent to which it 
influences the sophistication of the accounting systems. There is always going to be 
nervousness where management actually own the company because clearly they have 
something to gain from the consequences of the forecast. 
62 G: Size is a factor. Agency variables are not a factor in my experience. I agree with you that the 
stewardship function relating to agency theory is not so relevant in a takeover situation. I 
don't think industry is that significant. I would link sophisticated forecasting systems and 
variability of earnings. It depends on how good your systems are in taking variable earnings 
into account, given that you are probably only forecasting for four to six months of unknown 
information. Economic conditions are tied to variability of earnings. Management would not 
normally want to risk a forecast (or a bid) at a low point of the economic cycle. Age is 
another aspect of sophisticated forecasting systems. 
63 H: Size and the extent of ownership of the company by management are influences. This 
depends on the people in question. In hostile bids, the one casualty you can be certain about 
is the management. In putting in a forecast in a hostile situation, the management would be 
wishing to put their best foot forward. The protection is the board where the board is not 
management dominated. Independent board directors are not given to putting their necks on 
the block for management. Markets don't like very variable earnings. Some companies have 
a bit of reserve accounting and smoothing. With volatile earnings a forecast is very difficult 
if not hazardous. 
64 H: You cannot use economic conditions as an excuse for not making a forecast. You can build 
some into the assumptions. If the bid had taken place during the currency crisis, a forecast 
would have been very difficult. We would have had to put in assumptions about exchange 
markets. This would not stop the making of a forecast, but might result in including as 
benign assumptions as possible in the forecast. 
65 J: Variability of past earnings was a problem for the target. They couldn't make a forecast in 
the end. Public companies only put out a forecast when they feel the market has incorrect 
information that should be corrected. All the items you listed could apply in some situations. 
66 K: Variability of earnings is the main one. Our earnings are mainly fixed. This is linked to the 
industry we operate in. 
Forecasting systems 
67 A: Reasonably good systems are essential to forecasts. There has to be a reasonably good basis 
for the directors' assertion that profits are going to be what they say they will be. You 
couldn't make a forecast in a company that doesn't have proper reporting systems. 
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68 B: With a large company, there will be good accounting systems. With better systems, it is 
much easier to make a forecast. If the systems are bad, we have to do work to make up for 
those bad systems. The influence of outside events is important, but you can cover a lot of 
things in the assumptions. We will not attach our name if the systems and controls are not 
good, unless we cover ourselves in a big way. 
69 G: The risks of being incorrect are multiplied by a huge factor in companies which don't have 
sophisticated systems. This is a good reason for not disclosing a forecast. 
70 K: Such a thing is not a requirement given the nature of our business. We had a system, but 
making a forecast was very easy. 
Advisors/accountants 
71 B: The worse the advisors, the more likely a forecast. The board are unlikely to block a forecast 
if it has been supported by the management of the company and the advisors. Management 
are a blocking mechanism if they are unable to make a forecast. Boards of companies think 
that they have a say in what happens in a bid. In fact, it is the advisors who make the 
decision and call whether to make a forecast or not. 
72 C: Merchant banks, by signing off on forecasts, take a lot of responsibility. Under the Takeover 
Code there is a lot of responsibility. Bankers don't normally like to take on additional 
responsibility for the fun of it. They are not driven by fees. The fees charged aren't 
necessarily governed by the presence of a profit forecast during a bid. I do not expect that 
you will find any relationship between the choice of advisors and whether or not there is a 
forecast. The choice of advisors normally arises from a long-standing relationship with a 
company. I do not expect that you will find, for example, a relationship between the big-six 
accounting firms and the presence or absence of a forecast. However, the fees that the 
accountants charge will increase significantly if a profit forecast is involved I expect that 
you will find that smaller firms will be just as willing to give an opinion on a forecast. 
73 D: I don't think it is true that advisors are driven by fees in recommending disclosure of a 
forecast. In a bid, there would be no extra fees specifically for a profit forecast. The fees are 
contingent on the success of the bid. A profit forecast will be used if it is helpful in this 
respect. If anything, all the advisors get from a profit forecast is increased exposure. You 
don't get paid specifically for the profit forecast. 
74 E: The decision to disclose a forecast will not be made by the accountants. It will be decided by 
the merchant banks. The final determinant on whether there can be a forecast, of course, will 
be the reporting accountant, whether he can report on the forecast. I think it is not 
uncommon for there to be quite vigorous debates on whether or not it is appropriate for a 
forecast to go in. Very occasionally, a merchant bank will be very keen for a forecast but, if 
the accountants feel that it is difficult to support a particular forecast, then it won't go ahead. 
75 F: I think it is a bit cynical to suggest that disclosure of a forecast is driven by advisors wanting 
fees. The advisors are employed to (let us keep it as a defence) to defend the company. If 
they defend the company successfully, they will have an on-going relationship with that 
company which will undoubtedly generate more fees as time goes by. I do not believe that 
disclosure is advisor prompted. 
Other influences 
76 D: It is not feasible to publish a profit forecast when it is too early in the year. 
77 G: There could be situations where a company is making significant profits from a dominant 
customer. That company would not want the dominant customer to be made aware of the 
dominant contract with them; for example, a supplier to Marks and Spencer. 
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Disclosure of private information 
78 A: In an agreed bid private disclosure is invaluable. If the forecast given privately varies 
significantly from market expectations, shareholders need to be told. 
79 B: An indication of a profit forecast can be given privately to a bidder. If a hostile bidder comes 
along later, you must also give him the same information but only if he specifically asks for 
it. A private forecast is made regularly in agreed bids. This private information may need to 
be disclosed to persuade shareholders it is a good offer. 
80 C: Under the insider dealing rules, the Stock Exchange has been clamping down on the extent 
that companies can guide analysts. No one should have information that the market as a 
whole does not have. Thus, guiding brokers is a dangerous game nowadays. 
81 D: Yes, private information is disclosed all the time, but this has implications under the insider 
trading rules. Management are also more exposed now in tipping off brokers. Look at the 
Shanks McEwan case. The company was reprimanded by the Stock Exchange for 
communicating information privately to selected analysts. Rather than steering analysts' 
expectations, companies will come under more pressure to make announcements, for 
example, quarterly trading statements. I am not sure whether this has an impact on the 
frequency of formal profit forecasts. 
82 E: There is a certain reluctance to disclose private information because, if it is disclosed to one 
party, it has to be disclosed to any other party that comes along afterwards. In an agreed 
takeover, where the possibility of another bidder emerging is regarded as remote, it is more 
likely. 
83 G: This is a tricky area. If there is a bid for a public company, generally private information 
will not be disclosed. You cannot avoid disclosing forecasts privately (although you might 
want to do so). X2 plc did not give a forecast. During the negotiations we talked of the 
potential earnings, but we were not dealing with specific figures. We had to be creative in 
talking up the earnings. There is a danger of giving people information not generally 
available to shareholders and making them insiders if they used the information. 
84 H: The board should be giving information to all shareholders and should not be discussing it 
privately. You have to give a hostile bidder any information that you have given to a friendly 
bidder, provided the hostile bidder asks specifically for that information. 
85 I: We were very conscious of the insider trading rules and also of giving information to one 
party and not disclosing it to the market in general. We created a file of information which 
we gave to every interested party. All got the same basic information and, over and above 
that, we responded to their specific queries. 
86 I: Due to the length of time discussions with the bidder went on for, they got more information 
than the others. We put the bidder on notice concerning the insider trading rules. But in our 
opinion, the information was not price sensitive. However, we made the bidder sign an 
agreement that they would not trade in the shares during the period of our discussions and 
afterwards (if the discussions led to nothing). 
87 K: The chief executive of the target essentially gave us a private forecast at an early stage, both 
before the terms of the takeover were agreed and at the meetings with the shareholders. 
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Influence of the fear of getting the forecast wrong 
88 A: The advisors will always say that it is essential to meet the forecast and will be urging 
caution. They will advise that a margin of error will be built in to make sure that the forecast 
is achieved. As far as the board is concerned, it will want to pull out all the stops and make 
the forecast as certain as possible and, also, achieve its objective of beating off the unwanted 
bid. If the target beats off one bidder and subsequently fails to make its forecast, the market 
will not believe it next time round if a new bid comes up. 
89 B: Pride and reputation are much more important than litigation. Fear of litigation is not in the 
decision to make the forecast, but affects the quantum of the forecast. It does not put one off 
making the forecast (except if systems and controls are not in place), but it will influence the 
degree of conservatism. Closeness to the year end is a very important factor. Fear of getting a 
forecast wrong has never been a reason for not doing a for =a 
90 E: Takeover really gets you much closer against the wire because the directors would be failing 
in their obligation to the shareholders if they put in a fuzzy, low forecast. So somehow you 
have got to get it right. 
91 G: There is quite a fear of litigation, but in the final analysis, if you have to make a forecast, 
you do so. You try to broaden the assumptions which are published with the forecast to get 
off the hook as much as possible. 
92 H: I don't think it looms largely. Advisors are very sensitive about it. The reputation of the 
advisors is on the line. 
93 I: Yes, the fear of getting the forecast wrong is influential. What is feared, or what the 
consequences are of not meeting the forecast, I'm not really sure of. 
94 K: It was not influential. Neither the financial advisors nor the accountants would have put 
their names to the forecast if it wasn't OK. In our type of business unless something very 
untoward happened, there was no problem with making a forecast. We pulled back a little to 
leave a buffer in case of trouble. 
What is most feared if the forecast is wrong? 
95 A: You can get the forecast wrong both ways - overforecast as well as underforecast. One is 
nearly as bad as the other. From the advisors point of view, reputation is important, and this 
is tied in with the reaction of the Takeover Panel and with litigation. From the company's 
point of view credibility rather than reputation is important. 
96 A: The management of companies under threat of takeover are in a very difficult situation. If it 
gets down to haggling over price, the management would not want to put down a forecast 
which under their new masters would not be made. 
97 B: The fear of litigation is there. But a greater fear is the fear of the Panel and the effect that a 
missed forecast will have on the business. A missed forecast may lead to a Takeover Panel 
enquiry. 
98 D: Litigation is feared, as is the reputation of the advisors. It is very rare that it could be shown 
that there has been negligence. Irrespective of negligence, there would be press commentary 
if the forecast is not achieved. It is not an individual decision to disclose or not disclose a 
forecast, so career/job prospects are relatively unimportant. The Takeover Panel is not really 
that important. 
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99 E: All the major merchant banks are extremely responsible when it comes to forecasting. One 
would not be associated with a dodgy forecast. We live in a litigious world. I think it 
probably comes down to reputation, because reputation can be affected simply by getting it 
wrong, but that has the potential consequence of litigation and being criticised by the Panel. 
100 F: Obviously before the forecast is published it is crawled over. When it is published, people 
expect it to be accurate. So whether there is a fear of litigation, I don't know. I would have 
thought they would have hoped it would have been considerably reduced. 
101 G: Advisors fear litigation as they seem to be the ones that get sued. The company fears its 
reputation, and management its job prospects. There isn't much precedent for target 
companies getting sued, as the bidder by this stage owns the target. In effect, it would be 
suing itself. Therefore you have a go at the advisors instead. 
102 H: This depends on how wrong the forecast is. Any prudent board will try to put in as many 
assumptions as possible to cover themselves. What is even as important, apart from the 
forecast, is the attack on their performance. You cannot do that unless you have a source for 
that attack. This leaves one equally open to litigation. 
103 J: Litigation is hypothetical. It is a big fear, but you don't know if it is going to happen. In 
terms of press comment vis-a-vis the board, reputation is a very high factor. Indirectly, 
career is relevant as eventually heads will roll if the forecast is bad enough. 
2. Influence of market expectations (comments 104 - 115) 
104 A: The only reason is to support/justify the share valuation. Market expectations are also 
important. If the information in the market is not accurate, you need to convince the market 
concerning the share price. This is done with a profit forecast. Any results that are very 
much out of line with market expectations need to be communicated with the market. 
105 A: Bidding companies tend to be bigger and therefore tend to have firmer market ratings. Their 
market expectations are more accurate. 
106 A: XS plc issued a forecast to provide shareholders with information whether to accept the bid. 
The profits were not as good as the market was expecting. 
107 B: The forecast was significantly higher than brokers had been led to believe and were 
expecting. X, plc had failed to meet brokers' expectations on previous occasions. We had the 
offer document and could show that the profits would be a lot higher than in the offer 
document. We knew that the extra profits forecast would blow the bid out of the water. The 
information in the offer document, in press remarks and rumours generally, will drive 
whether a forecast is made or not. 
108 D: On the offeree side there are generally two reasons for disclosing a forecast. Firstly, if its 
performance is unlikely to match that anticipated by the market, the board may recommend 
acceptance of the offer and may provide a forecast justifying reasons for accepting a low 
offer compared to expectations. 
109 E: What is the market expectation of the current position of the company? Is it important to the 
bid that that impression be changed? Will a forecast, rather than a general description and 
information, add anything to market perceptions? If the brokers' estimates are roughly in the 
right ball park, you don't need to do an awful lot to change or correct them. You could 
hypothesise that 80% of brokers' estimates are probably on the mark. Then there is no need 
for the publication of a forecast. Where the company perceives the market not to have a true 
feel for its potential, or the brokers' estimates to be on the low side, a forecast would 
certainly be something which the directors look at. 
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Reasons for not making a forecast 
110 D: To make a formal profit forecast and to get the accountants to sign off might involve too 
much of a contingency which could lead to the forecast decreasing profits relative to 
analysts' forecasts/expectations. 
111 G: The making of a forecast (especially where the bidder is much larger than the target) 
involves the forecast going out to a much larger audience of shareholders. This results in 
changing expectations of a much wider group than just the target. 
Factors within companies influencing disclosur 
112 A: The news contained in the forecast is the most relevant item. The more variable the 
earnings, the more likely they are to be out of line with market expectations, and the more 
likely there is to be a forecast. Companies with characteristics such as good PR, where the 
management are able to sell themselves, will not need to make a forecast as market 
perceptions will be generally correct. These are likely to be larger companies. So that larger 
companies are less likely to make a forecast. With variable earnings, it is more difficult to 
forecast but it is more imperative to do so. The imperativeness more than counterbalances 
the difficulty with forecasting. 
Disclosure of private information 
113 A: In an agreed bid private disclosure is invaluable. If the forecast given privately varies 
significantly from market expectations, shareholders need to be told. 
114 D: Rather than steering analysts' expectations, companies will come under more pressure to 
make announcements, for example, quarterly trading statements. I am not sure whether this 
has an impact on the frequency of formal profit forecasts. 
115 G: A company's market expectations depend on how well you guide them. This has become a 
very tricky area since the legislation relating to insider information being disclosed 
selectively to selective groups. It is much more difficult now to manage brokers' forecasts. 
This has now become a blunt instrument. How can you guide market expectations without 
giving insider information? 
3. Defensive role of profit forecasts (comments 116 - 136) 
Is the forecast an effective weapon? 
116 A: Yes, you should see higher bid premiums for targets that make a forecast. Making a forecast, 
however, does not necessarily mean that there will be an increase in premium. Which is 
cause and which is effect? I'm not sure. It is only because the forecast is a reflection of the 
underlying facts about the company which are not previously known. The forecast is 
correcting a perception, but is not changing the underlying facts about the company. 
117 A: The target is not going to make a forecast unless it is to its advantage. The objective in 
making a profit forecast is to beat off the bid or to increase the perception of value. If the 
reason for defending the bid is that the value is too low, a profit forecast is much more likely 
to prove that the bid undervalues the company. 
118 B: Yes, by the target; less so by the bidder. A company will only make a forecast if it is going to 
make a material difference. 
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119 C: Yes, it is very effective. The market effectively values a company on its view of current and 
future earnings. The bidder will leave a price increase to after the forecast. It is difficult to 
say whether the forecast made a difference because you don't know how much of the price 
increase relates directly to the publication of a forecast. The forecast is an effective weapon 
as it lets the market know what the profits are. The forecast is usually above market 
expectations. 
120 C: The target company's management hadn't performed well. The target made a forecast and 
the defence was unsuccessful. It was a long range forecast and consequently lacked 
credibility in the market. It was not as effective a weapon because of what the market 
thought of the management, and the long range nature of the forecast did not help. I say this 
with the benefit of hindsight. 
121 D: In a hostile bid, the forecast is a weapon. For example the BTR - Pilkington bid. Pilkington 
made a very robust profit forecast. BTR lapsed the bid. (There were other reasons for lapsing 
the bid. ) The trigger point was the profit forecast. The profit forecast certainly is a weapon, 
more usually in hostile situations. It is used on both sides. It is a weapon for the offeror 
where there is a share exchange. It is effective if used properly. It would be difficult to prove 
its effectiveness directly. The only way to test it is to look at share price movements 
following the announcement of a profit forecast. Look at how much focus is given to the 
profit forecast by the media. 
122 D: It is not so much the detailed information as the headline news value of the forecast that is 
most effective. It is the sentiment being communicated, not specifically the detailed 
information in the forecast. 
123 E: The publication of a forecast is more likely to have an effect on the price than on success or 
failure. In the case of a target it will be primarily driven by the desire to block out the bid, 
and if that is not successful, then getting a much higher price. If it influences the price 
sufficiently, that can actually influence the outcome. Although it may be one of the factors 
which influence the outcome, it is unlikely to be the primary influence. 
124 F: Forecasts may be disclosed infrequently because they are not seen as very effective weapons 
by the people making forecasts in those particular cases. Weapon may be an emotive word. 
There is the argument that shareholders receive volumes of information from both 
companies so there will be a number of factors which are relevant to success or failure. A 
profit forecast is one of the factors. 
125 F: It has to be the information in the forecast rather than the disclosure per se that is most 
persuasive. Any forecast is going to give certain bits of information which the shareholder 
will absorb in making the decision. 
126 G: Yes, it can be, but not always. It can be a useful weapon in leveraging up the price. That is 
its main potential advantage. 
127 H: No, I don't necessarily think that it is, unless the forecast says something really surprising. A 
forecast is generally not material and will not on its own defeat a hostile bid. It might only 
make the aggressor more aggressive. I don't know of any forecast that has defeated a bid. If I 
was the aggressor, I would attack the forecast. 
128 J: I don't know. It could affect price in a well organised situation where the forecast is made 
carefully. 
129 K: Yes, forecasts appear to be used as a reasonably successful way of sending off a bid, 
increasing the price and turninghostile bids into recommended bids. 
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Q: Some people argue that a forecast is almost useless as it is made so near the year end 
and is so short term? 
130 C: I disagree. It indicates to the market what the current trading or performance of the company 
is. Forecasts can be made up to six months before the year end. A forecast will lack 
credibility for a period any greater than nine months from the year end. 
131 E: Short term forecasts probably are of use because they put into the public domain in an 
official way the next year's profits. There will be circumstances where that is helpful. 
132 F: That's a good question because I think very few offerors would say that they are buying the 
company for one year's profits. They are obviously looking at the company as a going 
concern for many years into the future. So what relevance is one year? Well, it can depend, I 
suppose, on where in the cycle a target company, or indeed an offeror company, is. So it may 
give shareholders a feel for which way their company is moving. 
Other strategic reasons for disclosure of a forecast 
133 B: Disclosure in a takeover situation is very different to annual report disclosures. Annual 
report disclosures are disclosures of record. In a takeover situation, the disclosures are 
tactical disclosures. 
134 C: In a contested takeover there is a debate about the consideration, so the timing of the 
forecast, and the fact that a forecast is made, are bound to be driven by strategic motivations. 
A forecast can be important in the effect it has on the other side. 
135 C: The timing of the forecast depends on the circumstances. If you have a choice of arguments, 
you won't use them all at once. The shareholders will get bored after the first one or two 
documents. A drip feed approach is used which can be quite useful to keep peoples' 
attention. You issue new stories at regular intervals. During the bid, the timing of disclosure 
was measured. The forecast was not included in the first defence document. I think it was in 
about the third circular. Each circular had a different theme. We kept these themes going for 
public and shareholders' attention. We decided to keep our powder dry and to keep points 
back for the fiill period of the bid which was approximately 60 days. 
136 E: Where it is a strategic decision, it will come back to judgements as to whether or not the 
market has the right perception of the business. A strategic reason for disclosing a forecast 
can only be to correct a wrong impression in the market. 
4. Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: content analysis (comments 137-149) 
Detail in the forecast 
137 B: X2 plc's forecast contained considerable detail, thus greater protection for the advisors. We 
showed the calculations so that if the forecast wasn't achieved, there was a way out. If it was 
said that the forecast wasn't achieved, we could point to the reasons because we had 
disclosed the calculations. 
138 B: I disagree that the more detail disclosed in the forecast the better the forecast. It depends on 
the caveats that are inserted in the forecast. The only number that matters is the bottom line. 
Disclosing a lot of figures leaves you wide open to attack from the other side and is only a 
matter of optics. It suggests that a lot of work went into the forecast but, on the other hand, 
the forecast may contain a lot of caveats which reduce its usefulness. 
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139 H: I would prefer a forecast with a lot of detail. It gives a better explanation to readers and more 
protection to the forecaster. However, the more assumptions, the more excuses are provided 
for getting the forecast wrong. This affects the validity and credibility of the forecast. If I saw 
a one line forecast, I would query how that forecast was obtained and I would be a little bit 
hesitant about it. 
Assumptions 
140 B: Forecasts that contain no assumptions are of more value than those that have lots. These 
provide protection to advisors, the board and management. The press pay very little attention 
to these disclosures. Forecasts with few caveats are much more useful. Assumptions 
introduce doubt into the forecast. There are a number of very similar standard assumptions 
used in forecasts. The ones to be interested in are those specifically related to the company. 
Advisors will choose assumptions and bases that give the best result for the company. 
Specific assumptions are chosen to give particularly good results. 
141 C: Choice of assumptions is a joint decision between the company, the accountants and the 
merchant bankers. The Takeover Panel has rules on what can be assumed. A forecast with 
no assumptions is preferred, other things being equal. It gives a better impression of 
certainty that the forecast is achievable. You look to see the really sensitive assumptions. I 
prefer a more detailed forecast because I think there is less scope for fancy footwork. At the 
end of the day, what is achieved is the most important consideration. Some forecasts exclude 
items (e. g. bid defence costs). Exclusions that give the ability to load costs are an area for 
concern. 
142 E: The Stock Exchange has precise rules as to what is allowed and not allowed. There will 
always be assumptions. I would be very surprised if you can show me many that have other 
than a few bland assumptions, because the Stock Exchange permits only external 
assumptions. All the interesting assumptions are the ones that are not published. Items under 
the control of management cannot be published as an assumption. 
143 F: Where the Takeover Panel feels that the assumptions are inappropriate, we get companies to 
delete the assumptions. If there are assumptions going into the forecast that the company 
feels should be discussed with us, then certainly they do consult with the Panel. The 
assumptions, rather than the quantum, are discussed. 
144 F: I don't think the Panel is influential in the decision to disclose. We might veto use of an 
assumption but I doubt that this is a determining factor in whether or not a forecast is 
published. It may have an impact on what you can record. 
145 G: The Takeover Panel prevents you from putting in assumptions which would make a nonsense 
of the whole forecast. You can deal with key factors such as strikes, interest rates, etc. 
Factors outside your control can be put in as assumptions. There are twin influences in the 
extent of disclosure of bases and assumptions - the protection influence and the regulatory 
influence - to give people the necessary information and, at the same time, to protect the 
makers of the forecast. The advisors play a key role in deciding on the assumptions and 
bases, but the board and management know what the critical elements in driving the 
business are. It is a dialogue between those groups. 
146 H: A huge number of assumptions underlie the forecast. When you do a forecast, you don't get 
into detail as this queries the validity of the forecast. You get down to a group of items so 
basic that the company cannot know about them in advance, which will affect the forecast. 
Companies can assume the forecast out of credibility. Assumptions vary from industry to 
industry. The more assumptions (provided they are not put out to abuse the forecast) the 
better, as they enable the reader to assess the prudence/validity of the forecast. They also 
extend protection of the board. 
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147 I: We always had major problems with the advisors in this area. All our first draft forecasts 
spelled out the real material assumptions but by the time the forecast got published, these 
assumptions had become meaningless and were converted to fairly standard assumptions. 
The real assumptions affecting the company get compromised and standardised. The 
advisors go to great trouble to standardise the assumptions. This makes it very hard for 
investors to understand and appreciate the forecast. For our own security, we went to great 
lengths to spell out the assumptions in detail but the advisors watered down everything, and 
by doing so created risk. If a forecast goes wrong, one has a problem if one can't point to 
which assumptions failed. By using conservative assumptions, we could have made the 
forecast look as bad as we liked in order to persuade the shareholders to accept the bid. I 
would have more confidence in a forecast with no assumptions. I would regard no 
assumptions as being an underwriting of the forecast. Assumptions are caveats, get-outs. 
148 J: There were no real changes to the assumptions but we had to do further documentary work. 
The accountants reviewed the accounting policies and calculations. Very little was disclosed 
as far as bases and assumptions, as this was an involuntary forecast. 
149 K: We disclosed assumptions to the extent we needed to have caveats in case something went 
wrong. We looked at the variables that could have affected the forecast, especially those that 
could have affected it adversely. It was a combination of that and what the merchant bankers 
and accountants wanted. We kept the assumptions to a minimum as far as I can recall. 
5. Factors influencing disclosures in forecasts: News content (comments 150 - 162) 
150 A: The news contained in the forecast is very important. If the forecast contains bad news, it 
will not be given unless it is only fractionally down on expectations. 
151 A: If there is local opposition, it is always a good news forecast in a contested bid. Good news 
can be relative. If the market, for example, is saying that profits will be halved and if the 
drop is not so much, you might make a forecast. 
152 B: A forecast would not be disclosed if profits were going to be lower than market expectations. 
153 B: A forecast was made to show the shareholders that there wasn't a rosy future ahead for the 
company. The forecast contained bad news. Bad news was put into the forecast to persuade 
the shareholders that this was a good deal. It had nothing to do with getting a good price. 
154 C: Whether forecasts disclose good or bad news depends on whether the company has good 
news in reserve. The forecast is usually above market expectations. It is open to the other 
side to attack the profits in the forecast; for example, if the company's profit margin 
increased for no obvious reason. If the news is very bad in a contested situation, there might 
be more pressure and less inclination to make a forecast. Not disclosing a forecast casts 
doubt on the profitability. 
155 D: The news contained in the forecast is definitely important. The company will want to get 
poor performance news into the market. It might have to make a formal profit forecast 
justifying reasons why the board recommends shareholders to accept the offer. 
156 E: I think the forecast would either be giving good news, or trying to contain bad news. If there 
is such uncertainty surrounding the circumstances, then a forecast would not be the way in 
which a company would go. The company would deal with the matter through discussion of 
the actions that would be taken to contain the problem. Directors would not wish there to be 
an incorrect impression as to the true position of the company, even if there is bad news to 
be disclosed. It's a little difficult to know precisely when there is a need for the release of 
information to correct an impression in the market, because you can never be absolutely sure 
what the impression is that the market as a whole has. 
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157 E: It is a criminal offence, under Section 47 of the Financial Services Act, to create a 
misleading impression that gives rise to a false market in securities: for example, if the 
directors have (or have previously) released information that gives the impression of how 
things are going to turn out. If they now know things are going to turn out to be very 
different, they are under a legal obligation to correct that impression. So, in some cases, 
news drives disclosure of information. 
158 F: I can think of one or two cases where bad news was disclosed, where a scorched earth policy 
was adopted. Say offeror A announces an offer for company B, but needs to go to its own 
shareholders to get approval for the issue of new shares. Company B knows it is going 
through a bad time, and may indeed already have indicated something like that to its own 
shareholders. Company B comes out with a forecast which is even worse than the market is 
anticipating. The hope is that the offeror shareholders will, as a result of the forecast, 
question the judgement of their own management and not agree to the issue of new shares. It 
puts an onus on the offeror to justify why it is making the offer. It might also give the offeror 
the opportunity to invoke a material changes condition, which is one of the standard 
conditions in offer documents, which allows the offeror to withdraw from the offer if there 
has been a material change at the time of the offer. 
159 F: The only legal or regulatory obligation to disclose bad news is that a company must follow 
the continuing disclosure obligations of the listing requirements. The Code says that all 
relevant information has to be given to shareholders to enable them to make an informed 
decision. But the continuing requirements of listing really have to be the barometer which 
decides whether or not information should be disclosed. 
Reasons targets do not disclose forecasts 
160 A: You will never get a target in a contested bid making a bad news forecast. The target will be 
trying to make the best case and putting the best foot forward. 
Factors within companies influencing disclosure 
161 D: News is an influence on disclosure. Management is taking a risk unless it has signalled bad 
news to the bidder. This is especially true if management end up continuing to work with the 
bidder's organisation. 
162 H: News contained in the forecast is also an influence. There is not much point in disclosing 
bad news. 
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Appendix 3: FULL OUTPUT OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Table A3.1 Crosstabs analysis of categorical variables - forecasters and nonforecasters 
The data in this table form the basis for table 6.2 
Party to the bid 
Bidders 47 ( 25%) 654 ( 54%) 701 ( 50%) 
Targets 141(75%) 560 ( 46%) 701 5001a) 
%) 121L(ý"/o) aUw%) 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1) 54.28 Significance 0.00 
Bidders 
Forecasters Nonforecaster 




1988 20( 43%) 171 ( 26%) 43( 31%) 148( 26%) 
1989 8( 170/*) 179 ( 27%) 35 ( 25%) 152 ( 27%) 
1990 10 ( 21%) 130( 20%) 31( 22%) 109( 20%) 
1991 5(11%) 110( 17%) 19( 13%) 96( 17%) 
1992 4( 80/6) 64 ( 10%) 13 (_ 9%) 15 %) 
42 a&%) 4 (W%) 141 (W%) Q %) 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 4) 7.23 Pearson chi-square (d. f. 4) 2.23 
Significance 0.12 Significance 0.69 
Tvoe of bid 
Agreed bids 
Contested bids 
30( 64%) 512 ( 78%) 
17 ( 36%) 142 ( 22%) 
42(1QQ%) m (W%) 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1) 5.23 
Significance 0.02 
69 ( 49%) 473 ( 85%) 
72%) 87 15%) 
(IQQ%) Q (JQQ%) 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1) 81.07 
Significance 0.00 
Purchase consideration 
Cash 4( 9%) 334 ( 52%) 73 ( 52%) 265 ( 48%) 
Paper 25( 54%) 167 ( 26%) 30( 21%) 162 ( 29%) 
Cash and paper 17 ( 37%) 146 ( 22%) 37 27%) 126 23%) 
46 (1&%) 647 (jQQ%) 140 (1 Q%) 553 (IQQ%) 
Missing values 1 7 1 7 
42 OA 141 m. 4 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 2) 2.63 Pearson chi-square (d. f. 2) 3.53 




Other financial advisors 
Missing values 
20 ( 81%) 239 ( 38%) 
27 19%) 385 62%) 
41 (j Q%) 624 (14,4%) 
30 
fia 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1) 0.33 
Significance 0.56 
106( 75%) 330( 59%) 
L5 25%) 227 (4 I%) 
Lj (I%) 557 (IQQ%) 
3 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1)12.18 
Significance 0.00 
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Big-six auditors 33 ( 70%) 250 ( 73%) 
Other auditors 14 ( 30%) 91 27%) 
(I W/o) 341 (JQQ%) 
Missing values 313 
ß. i4 





38 ( 81%) 293 ( 45%) 
_2( 
19%) 361(55%) 
42 Uw%) 4 %) 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1) 22.86 
Significance 0.00 
Nationality 
UK companies 43 ( 92%) 464 ( 71%) 
Irish companies 2( 4%) 11 ( 2%) 
Other nationalities 2( 4%) 179 ( 27%) 
42 W/0) fill UW/O) 











106 ( 75%) 327 ( 65%) 
35 ( 35%) 178 35%) 
ill W/0) 505 (JQQ%) 
55 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 1) 5.42 
Significance 0.02 
141(100%) 560 (100%) 
(IQQ%) Q%) 
Not applicable 
138 ( 98%) 547 ( 98%) 
3( 2%) 11( 2%) 
0( 0%) 2 LQ%) 
(1%) Q (W/O) 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 2) 0.52 
Significance 0.77 
7( 191/6) 86( 27%) 32( 23%) 91( 19%) 
8( 22%) 30 ( 9%) 13 ( 10%) 80 ( 161/6) 
7( 20%) 81( 25%) 38( 31%) 134 ( 28%) 
6(17%) 48(13%) 10 ( 9%) 83(17%) 
8 %) 75( %) 34 27%) 97 20%) 
36 (W/o) 320 (IQQ%) 127 (1&/o) 485 (JQQ%) 
11 334 14 75 
4Z fi4 141 m4 
Pearson chi-square (d. f. 4) 6.22 Pearson chi-square (d. f. 4) 12.67 
Significance 0.18 Significance 0.01 
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Table A3.6 Full output of logit regression for bidders - including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.4 
-2 Log likelihood 87.95 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 143.88 Significance 0.97 
Model chi-square 47.27 (d. f. 6) Significance 0. 00 
Pseudo R2 0.35 
Number of observations 186 cases (22 F; 164 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -3.17 5.86 0.29 0.59 
BHOR -5.02 1.20 17.62 0.00 -0.34 
YEAR 4.60 0.33 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 2.57 5.87 0.19 0.66 0.00 
YEAR (1989) 1.30 5.88 0.05 0.83 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 1.96 5.87 0.11 0.74 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 1.14 5.88 0.04 0.85 0.00 
BID 1.69 0.59 8.14 0.00 0.21 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif. t R 
VAL 0.25 0.62 0.00 
LEV 0.09 0.77 0.00 
MO 0.11 0.74 0.00 
SSH 1.17 0.28 0.00 
CON 6.99 0.03 0.15 
CON (CASH) 4.76 0.03 0.14 
CON (PAPER) 0.01 0.92 0.00 
QUOTED 2.28 0.13 0.05 
MB 0.36 0.55 0.00 
AUD 0.14 0.70 0.00 
NAT 0.49 0.48 0.00 
IND 2.49 0.65 0.00 
IND (CAPGDS) 0.42 0.52 0.00 
IND (DURGDS) 0.17 0.68 0.00 
IND (MONDUR) 0.59 0.44 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 0.66 0.42 0.00 
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Table A3.7 Full output of logit regression for bidders - excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.5 
-2 Log likelihood 160.72 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 250.68 Significance 0.98 
Model chi-square 57.37 (d. f. 9) S ignificance 0.00 
Pseudo RZ 0.26 
Number of observations 308 cases (35 F; 273 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error Wald Signif. t R 
coefficients of 
coefficient 
Intercept -2.51 0.42 36.51 0.00 
BHOR -3.39 0.76 19.75 0.00 -0.28 
VAL 1.00-06 5.22-07 3.70 0.05 0.09 
YEAR 10.36 0.03 0.10 
YEAR (1988) 0.94 0.36 6.78 0.01 0.15 
YEAR (1989) -0.49 0.50 0.97 0.33 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 0.81 0.41 3.95 0.05 0.09 
YEAR (1991) -0.48 0.50 0.91 0.34 0.00 
BID 1.21 0.47 6.61 0.01 0.15 
CON 9.49 0.01 0.16 
CON (CASH) -1.36 0.52 7.01 0.00 -0.15 
CON (PAPER) 1.04 0.34 9.21 0.00 0.18 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif. t R 
LEV 0.30 0.58 0.00 
MO 0.32 0.57 0.00 
QUOTED 2.21 0.14 0.03 
MB 1.51 0.22 0.00 
AUD 0.00 0.97 0.00 
NAT 0.33 0.57 0.00 
IND 8.92 0.06 0.06 
IND (CAPGDS) 0.48 0.49 0.00 
IND (DURGDS) 1.43 0.23 0.00 
IND (MONDUR) 2.54 0.11 0.05 
1ND (OTHER) 0.98 0.32 0.00 
296 
Table A3.8 Full output of logit regression for targets - including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.6 
-2 Log likelihood 360.24 Signifi cance 0.75 
Goodness of fit 360.42 Significance 0.75 
Model chi-square 49.68 (d. f. 2) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.12 
Number of observations 382 cases (87 F; 295 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -1.53 0.20 55.50 0.00 
BHOR -1.10 0.46 5.74 0.02 -0.10 
BID 1.74 0.27 42.69 0.00 0.32 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif t R 
VAL 2.17 0.14 0.02 
LEV 0.00 0.97 0.00 
MO 0.71 0.40 0.00 
SSH 0.71 0.40 0.00 
YEAR 0.96 0.92 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 0.05 0.83 0.00 
YEAR (1989) 0.40 0.53 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 0.10 0.75 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 0.52 0.47 0.00 
CON 1.19 0.55 0.00 
CON (CASH) 0.46 0.50 0.00 
CON (PAPER) 0.22 0.64 0.00 
MB 0.70 0.40 0.00 
AUD 0.66 0.42 0.00 
NAT 0.21 0.65 0.00 
IND 5.66 0.23 0.00 
IND (CAPGDS) 4.03 0.04 0.07 
IND (DURGDS) 0.42 0.52 0.00 
IND (NONDUR) 1.26 0.26 0.00 
1ND (OTHER) 2.85 0.09 0.05 
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Table A3.9 Full output of logit regression for targets - excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.7 
-2 Log likelihood 456.61 Significance 0.98 
Goodness of fit 496.12 Significance 0.79 
Model chi-square 105.43 (d. f. 7) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.19 
Number of observations 530 cases (118 F; 412 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -1.66 0.19 78.19 0.00 
BHOR -1.71 0.42 16.95 0.00 -0.16 
VAL 4.83-07 2.26-07 4.55 0.03 0.07 
BID 1.89 0.25 57.89 0.00 0.31 
IND 10.26 0.04 0.06 
1ND (CAPGDS) 0.49 0.23 4.62 0.03 0.07 
IND (DURGDS) -0.17 0.30 0.34 0.56 0.00 
IND (NONDUR) 0.17 0.21 0.63 0.43 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 0.42 0.23 3.35 0.07 0.05 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif t R 
LEV 0.27 0.60 0.00 
MO 0.05 0.82 0.00 
YEAR 2.64 0.62 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 1.22 0.27 0.00 
YEAR (1989) 0.00 0.97 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 0.13 0.72 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 0.66 0.42 0.00 
CON 1.01 0.60 0.00 
CON (CASH) 0.59 0.44 0.00 
CON (PAPER) 0.86 0.35 0.00 
MB 0.26 0.61 0.00 
AUD 0.60 0.44 0.00 
NAT 0.02 0.88 0.00 
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Table A3.1O Full output of logit regression for agreed bids 
- including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.11 
-2 Log likelihood 273.47 Signifi cance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 383.32 Significance 0.91 
Model chi-square 38.16 (d. f. 2) Significance 0. 00 
Pseudo R20.12 
Number of observations 424 cases (51 F; 373 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -1.47 0.19 63.15 0.00 
BHOR -2.93 0.58 25.38 0.00 -0.27 
VAL 1.52-06 5.57-07 7.48 0.07 0.13 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif, t R 
LEV 0.00 0.98 0.00 
MO 0.27 0.60 0.00 
SSH 1.17 0.28 0.00 
YEAR 4.52 0.34 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 3.32 0.07 0.07 
YEAR (1989) 0.38 0.54 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 0.58 0.44 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 0.08 0.78 0.00 
BT 1.31 0.25 0.00 
CON 0.44 0.80 0.00 
CON (CASH) 0.17 0.68 0.00 
CON (PAPER) 0.08 0.77 0.00 
QUOTED 0.25 0.61 0.00 
MB 0.00 0.96 0.00 
AUD 0.03 0.86 0.00 
NAT 0.06 0.80 0.00 
IND 2.03 0.73 0.00 
IND (CAPGDS) 1.10 0.29 0.00 
IND (DURGDS) 0.04 0.85 0.00 
IND (NONDUR) 0.11 0.74 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 1.19 0.28 0.00 
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Table A3.11 Full output of logfit regression for agreed bids 
- excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.12 
-2 Log likelihood 394.30 Significance 1.00 
Goodness of fit 583.17 Significance 0.87 
Model chi-square 52.51(d. £ 2) Significance 0. 00 
Pseudo RZ 0.12 
Number of observations 626 cases (72 F; 554 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -1.43 0.15 91.20 0.00 
BHOR -3.10 0.48 41.14 0.01 -0.30 
VAL 8.60-07 3.06-07 7.85 0.00 0.11 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif. t R. 
LEV 0.26 0.61 0.00 
MO 0.19 0.66 0.00 
YEAR 6.08 0.19 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 3.91 0.05 0.07 
YEAR (1989) 0.27 0.60 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 0.82 0.37 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 0.31 0.58 0.00 
BT 1.56 0.21 0.00 
CON 0.52 0.77 0.00 
CON (CASH) 0.48 0.49 0.00 
CON (PAPER) 0.02 0.89 0.00 
QUOTED 0.04 0.84 0.00 
MB 0.16 0.69 0.00 
AUD 0.00 0.99 0.00 
NAT 0.17 0.68 0.00 
IND 3.23 0.52 0.00 
IND (CAPGDS) 0.46 0.50 0.00 
IND (DURGDS) 0.77 0.38 0.00 
IND (MONDUR) 0.03 0.86 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 3.01 0.08 0.05 
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Table A3.12 Full output of logfit regression for contested bids 
- including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.13 
-2 Log likelihood 186.41 Signifi cance 0.01 
Goodness of fit 144.00 Significance 0.44 
Model chi-square 7.74 (d. f. 1) Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.04 
Number of observations 144 cases (58 F; 86 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -1.19 0.36 10.94 0.00 
BT -1.09 0.41 7.05 0.01 0.16 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif. t R. 
BHOR 0.67 0.41 
VAL 0.35 0.55 0.00 
LEV 0.64 0.42 0.00 
MO 0.68 0.41 0.00 
SSH 0.75 0.39 0.00 
YEAR 2.32 0.68 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 0.51 0.48 0.00 
YEAR (1989) 0.70 0.40 0.00 
YEAR (1990) 0.47 0.49 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 0.06 0.81 0.00 
CON 1.21 0.55 0.00 
CON (CASH) 0.63 0.43 0.00 
CON (PAPER) 1.14 0.28 0.00 
MB 0.39 0.53 0.00 
AUD 0.40 0.53 0.00 
NAT 0.05 0.82 0.00 
IND 0.97 0.91 0.00 
IND (CAPGDS) 0.76 0.38 0.00 
IND (DURGDS) 0.52 0.47 0.00 
IND (NONDUR) 0.28 0.59 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 0.16 0.69 0.00 
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Table A3.13 Full output of logit regression for contested bids 
- excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 6.14 
-2 Log likelihood 259.22 Signifi cance 0.01 
Goodness of fit 211.99 Significance 0.45 
Model chi-square 22.74 (d. f. 1) Significance 0. 00 
Pseudo R2 0.08 
Number of observations 212 cases (81 F; 131 NF) 
Variables in the equation 
Regression Std. error of Wald Signif. tR 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -3.17 5.86 0.29 0.59 
BT -5.02 1.20 17.62 0.00 -0.34 
Variables not in the equation 
Score Signif. t R 
BHOR 1.95 0.16 0.00 
VAL 2.92 0.09 0.06 
LEV 0.01 0.94 0.00 
MO 0.06 0.81 0.00 
YEAR 3.39 0.49 0.00 
YEAR (1988) 0.51 0.48 0.00 
YEAR (1989) 2.09 0.15 0.02 
YEAR (1990) 0.00 0.98 0.00 
YEAR (1991) 0.43 0.51 0.00 
CON 0.71 0.70 0.00 
CON (CASH) 0.20 0.66 0.14 
CON (PAPER) 0.14 0.71 0.00 
QUOTED 0.11 0.74 0.05 
MB 0.33 0.56 0.00 
AUD 0.01 0.93 0.00 
NAT 0.07 0.80 0.00 
IND 5.48 0.24 0.00 
IND (CAPGDS) 4.33 0.04 0.09 
IND (DURGDS) 3.61 0.06 0.08 
IND (MONDUR) 1.26 0.26 0.00 
IND (OTHER) 0.88 0.35 0.00 
302 
Table A3.14 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids only 
- dependent variable ITEMS - including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.12 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 62 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -105.46 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (45 df. ) 73.16 Significance 0.01 
Pseudo R2 0.92 
Likelihood ratio test 0.47 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 0.95 Significance 0.33 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -0.14 0.98 -0.14 0.89 
BT 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.92 
CIRC -1.37 0.44 -3.14 0.00** 
PER 0.60 0.68 0.88 0.38 
FHOR -0.54E-02 0.21E-02 -2.61 0.01* 
REV 0.12 0.22E-03 0.55 0.58 
LEV -0.76 0.46 -1.63 0.10 
MO -0.36E-02 0.92E-02 -0.40 0.70 
SSH 0.69 1.02 0.67 0.50 
MB 0.25 0.37 0.68 0.50 
AUD 0.40 0.29 1.39 0.16 
DCAPGDS 0.07 0.66 0.10 0.92 
DDURGDS -0.51 0.76 -0.67 0.51 
DNONDUR -0.07 0.65 -0.10 0.92 
DOTHER 0.68 0.66 1.03 0.30 
NAT 1.12 0.69 1.61 0.11 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.15 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids only 
- dependent variable ITEMS - excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.12 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 94 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -161.81 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (78 d. f. )134.78 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.89 
Likelihood ratio test 7.57 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 15.15 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept 0.72 0.54 1.35 0.18 
BT -0.03 0.24 -0.11 0.91 
CIRC -1.17 0.31 -3.83 0.00** 
PER 0.31 0.38 0.81 0.42 
FHOR -0.37E-02 0.14E-02 -2.61 0.01 
REV 0.41E-03 0.11E-03 3.61 0.00** 
LEV -0.50 0.48 -1.03 0.30 
MO -0.44E-02 0.50E-02 -0.89 0.37 
MB 0.32 0.30 1.08 0.28 
AUD 0.07 0.26 0.26 0.79 
DCAPGDS -0.27 0.49 -0.55 0.58 
DDURGDS -0.74 0.48 -1.54 0.12 
DNONDUR -0.26 0.46 -0.57 0.57 
DOTHER 0.14 0.43 0.32 0.75 
NAT 0.20 0.52 0.39 0.70 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.16 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids only 
- dependent variable ASS - including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.13 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 62 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -113.88 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (45 d. f. ) 91.17 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.90 
Likelihood ratio test 4.40 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 8.80 Signifi cance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept 0.38 0.85 0.45 0.65 
BT 0.27 0.41 0.66 0.51 
CIRC -0.10 0.31 -0.33 0.74 
PER 0.56 0.53 1.06 0.29 
FHOR 0.01 0.18E-02 5.93 0.00** 
REV -0.13E-02 1.00E-03 -1.35 0.18 
LEV -0.35 0.60 -0.58 0.56 
MO 0.91E-03 0.01 0.09 0.93 
SSH 1.18 0.76 1.55 0.12 
MB 0.28 0.34 0.83 0.41 
AUD 0.22 0.29 0.75 0.45 
DCAPGDS -0.43 0.55 -0.79 0.43 
DDURGDS -0.51 0.60 -0.86 0.39 
DNONDUR -1.11 0.54 -2.05 0.04* 
DOTHER -1.01 0.52 -1.93 0.05* 
NAT -0.61 1.29 -0.47 0.64 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.17 Negative binomial model results for agreed bids only 
- dependent variable ASS- excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.13 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 94 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -194.71 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (78 d. f. )178.07 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.91 
Likelihood ratio test 21.86 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 43.71 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. err+or of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept 0.39 0.62 0.62 0.53 
BT 0.23 0.35 0.66 0.51 
CIRC -0.12 0.25 -0.47 0.64 
PER 0.33 0.47 0.69 0.49 
FHOR 0.90E-02 0.15E-02 5.88 0.00** 
REV -0.1OE-02 0.44E-03 -2.27 0.02* 
LEV -0.18 0.35 0.53 0.60 
MO -0.22E-02 0.62E-02 0.36 0.72 
Na 0.18 0.29 0.64 0.52 
AUD 0.23 0.23 1.00 0.32 
DCAPGDS 0.10 0.37 0.28 0.78 
DDURGDS -0.21 0.44 -0.48 0.63 
DNONDUR -0.27 0.35 -0.79 0.43 
DOTHER -0.40 0.34 -1.19 0.23 
NAT -0.67 0.90 -0.74 0.46 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.18 Negative binomial model results for contested bids only 
- dependent variable ITEMS - including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.12 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 79 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -169.94 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (62 d. f. )101.12 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.73 
Likelihood ratio test 2.96 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 5.92 Significance 0.02 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept 0.94E-02 0.81 0.01 0.99 
BT 0.76 0.51 1.49 0.13 
CIRC -1.14 0.27 -4.44 0.00** 
PER 1.46 0.47 3.14 0.00** 
FHOR -0.1OE-02 0.31E-03 -3.28 0.00** 
REV -0.79E-04 0.28E-03 -0.29 0.77 
LEV 0.06 0.68 0.09 0.93 
MO 0.72E-02 0.97E-02 0.75 0.46 
SSH -0.92 0.47 -1.96 0.05* 
MB -0.14 0.24 -0.59 0.55 
AUD -0.17 0.39 -0.43 0.67 
DCAPGDS 0.04 0.27 0.14 0.89 
DDURGDS 0.15 0.39 0.38 0.70 
DNONDUR 0.04 0.29 0.14 0.89 
DOTHER -0.06 0.32 -0.19 0.85 
NAT -0.35 1.34 -0.26 0.80 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.19 Negative binomial model results for contested bids only 
- dependent variable ITEMS - excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.12 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 111 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -266.81 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (95 d. f. ) 247.24 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo RZ 0.67 
Likelihood ratio test 42.35 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 84.69 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept 0.33 0.68 0.48 0.63 
BT 0.51 0.39 1.32 0.19 
CIRC -0.92 0.23 -4.03 0.00** 
PER 0.56 0.23 2.41 0.02* 
FHOR -0.50E-03 0.63E-03 -0.80 0.42 
REV 0.72E-05 0.52E-04 0.14 0.89 
LEV 0.07 0.61 0.11 0.91 
MO -0.43E-02 0.01 -0.38 0.70 
MB 0.03 0.29 0.11 0.91 
AUD 0.18 0.23 0.77 0.44 
DCAPGDS 0.24 0.41 -0.57 0.57 
DDURGDS 0.06 0.48 0.13 0.90 
DNONDUR 0.35 0.42 0.85 0.40 
DOTTER 0.24 0.44 0.55 0.59 
NAT -0.55 1.33 -0.42 0.68 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.20 Negative binomial model results for contested bids only 
- dependent variable ASS - including SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.13 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 79 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -193.18 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (62 d. f. )121.82 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.62 
Likelihood ratio test 4.52 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 9.05 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -0.14 0.51 -0.28 0.78 
BT 0.87 0.28 3.13 0.00** 
CIRC -1.36 0.20 -6.78 0.00** 
PER 0.53 0.23 2.27 0.02* 
FHOR 0.36E-03 0.28E-03 1.29 0.20 
REV -0.62E-04 0.24E-03 -0.26 0.80 
LEV -0.23E02 0.58 -0.39E-02 1.00 
MO 0.88E-02 0.69E-02 1.27 0.20 
SSH 0.33 0.44 0.76 0.44 
MB -0.16 0.29 -0.55 0.58 
AUD 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.93 
DCAPGDS 0.75 0.24 3.17 0.00** 
DDURGDS 0.74 0.35 2.10 0.04* 
DNONDUR 0.93 0.28 3.34 0.00** 
DOTTIER 0.80 0.26 3.12 0.00** 
NAT 0.37 0.45 0.83 0.40 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Table A3.21 Negative binomial model results for contested bids only 
- dependent variable ASS- excluding SSH 
The data from this table form the basis for table 7.13 
Size variable REV (all size variables give similar results) 
Number of observations 111 forecasts 
Log-likelihood -287.64 
Pearson chi-square goodness of fit (95 d. £) 237.28 Significance 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.64 
Likelihood ratio test 28.52 Chi-square (d. f. 1) 57.04 Significance 0.00 
Regression Std. error of t statistic P value 
coefficients coefficient 
Intercept -0.51 0.50 -1.01 0.31 
BT 0.72 0.26 2.77 0.01 
CIRC -0.94 0.20 -4.63 0.00** 
PER 0.59 0.20 2.90 0.00** 
FHOR 0.83E-03 0.24E-03 3.38 0.00** 
REV -0.44E-05 0.25E-04 -0.18 0.86 
LEV -0.13 0.55 -0.24 0.81 
MO 0.01 0.66E-02 1.80 0.07 
MB -0.05 0.33 -0.14 0.89 
AUD 0.28 0.16 1.77 0.08 
DCAPGDS 0.83 0.24 3.42 0.00** 
DDURGDS 0.98 0.34 2.86 0.00** 
DNONDUR 1.03 0.25 4.15 0.00** 
DOTHER 1.15 0.25 4.58 0.00** 
NAT 0.23 1.27 0.18 0.86 
Only one case was unquoted so QUOTED was not analysed by the program 
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Appendix 4: EXAMPLES FROM FORECASTS 
A comprehensive survey of the content of forecasts, and of sundry other forecast- 
related disclosures in the takeover documents, was carried out. This appendix 
includes 72 examples from the takeover documents as background data on 
disclosures in forecasts, and on forecast-related disclosures in takeover documents 
generally. These examples are discussed under 15 headings and are summarised in 
table A4.1. 
Table A4.1: Summary of examples 
Issue illustrated by the example 
1. Absence of a forecast 
Takeover bid (Bidder-Target, Year) 
1 Statement of reasons for absence 
2 Statement of reasons for absence 
3 Statement of reasons for absence 
4 Attack on target for absence 
5 Attack on target for absence 
6 Attack on target for absence 
7 Attack on target for absence 
2. Circumstances of disclosing forecasts 
Blacks Leisure - A. Goldberg, 1989 
Rank - Mecca Leisure, 1990 
Amshold - Amstrad, 1992 
Ladbroke - Thompson T-Line, 1989 
Iceland Frozen Foods - Bejam, 1988 
IMI -Birmingham Mint, 1991 
Grampian - Macarthy, 1991 
8 Involuntary forecast Barlo - IRG, 1992 
9 Involuntary forecast Corton Beach - Lyon & Lyon, 1989 
10 Statement not an involuntary forecast LASMO - Ultramar, 1991 
11 Repeat forecast Pernod Ricard - Irish Distillers, 1988 
12 Repeat 'estimate' Compass Group - Sketchley, 1990 
13 Change in forecast when repeated Godfrey Davis - Sketchley, 1990 
3. Methods of presenting forecasts 
14 Narrative format 
15 Statement format 
16 Attack on wording of forecast 
17 Imprecise terminology 
18 Attack on imprecise wording 
Redland - Steetley, 1992 
Elsevier - Reed International, 1992 
Sears - Freeman, 1988 
Cambridge - Xtra-vision, 1990 
Epicure - Habit Precision 
Engineering, 1989 
4. Items disclosed in forecasts 
19 Comprehensive disclosure Nestld - Rowntree, 1988 
20 Comprehensive disclosure Kingfisher - Dixons Group, 1990 
21 Comprehensive disclosure & no assumptions Kanta Enterprises - F. Copson, 1991 
22 First forecast Boots - Ward White, 1989 
23 Second `estimate' Boots - Ward White, 1989 
24 Combined forecast Elsevier - Reed International, 1992 
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Table A4.1: Summary of examples (continued) 
Issue illustrated by the example 
5. Assumptions disclosed 
Takeover bid (Bidder-Target, Year) 
25 Bases of calculation and assumptions 
26 Assumptions disclosed 
27 Attack on assumptions 
Rothmans Intnl. - P. J. Carroll, 1990 
Cornwall Trust - Highland Participants, 1989 
Sears - Freemans, 1988 
6. Accounting policies disclosed 
28 Change in accounting policy 
29 Attack on change in accounting policy 
30 Change in accounting policy 
31 Change in accounting policy 
32 Adjustment of accounting policies 
33 New accounting policy 
GC&C Brands - Irish Distillers, 1988 
GC&C Brands - Irish Distillers, 1988 
DMSWL - Magnet Group, 1989 
Arlen - Highland Electronics, 1990 
Elsevier - Reed International, 1992 
Cable and Wireless - Telephone 
Rentals, 1988 
7. Forecast profits not reported on 
34 Forecast profit not reported on 
35 Forecast revenue not reported on 
36 Forecast revenue not reported on 
37 Forecast profit not reported on 
38 Projection `not a forecast' 
39 Projection `not a forecast' 
40 Profit warranty 
Coates Viyella - Tootal, 1991 
Cable and Wireless - Telephone Rentals, 1988 
Saint-Gobain - TSL Group, 1988 
Pembridge Associates - DRG, 1989 
Norton Opax - De La Rue, 1989 
LASMO - Ultramar, 1991 
Dewey Warren - Argyle Trust, 1989 
S. Other forecasts 
41 Forecast item not reported on Sears - Freemans, 1988 
42 Forecast item not reported on ANT - Aurora, 1988 
43 Forecast item not reported on & attack thereon First Technology - Ricardo, 1989 
44 Forecast item not reported on Minorco - Consol. Gold Fields, 1988 
45 Forecast item not reported on Minorco - Consol. Gold Fields, 1989 
9. Use of third party forecasts 
46 Use of third party forecasts 
47 Use of third party forecasts 
48 Use of third party forecasts 
49 Use of third party forecasts 
50 Use of third party forecasts 
51 Use of third party forecasts 
52 Use of third party forecast information 
53 Use of third party forecasts 
54 Use of third party forecasts 
55 Use of third party forecasts 
Anglo United - Coalite, 1989 
BTR - Hawker Siddeley, 1991 
Mecca - Pleasurama, 1988 
Mecca - Pleasurama, 1988 
Wassail - Metal Closures, 1990 
Coates Viyella - Tootal, 1991 
First Technology - Ricardo, 1989 
Cable and Wireless - Telephone Rentals, 1988 
Raine Industries - Ruberoid, 1988 
Williams Holdings - Racal Electronics, 1991 
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Table 4.1: Summary of examples (continued) 
Issue illustrated by the example 
10. Attacks on forecasts 
Takeover bid (Bidder-Target, Year) 
56 Attack on forecast 
57 Attack on forecast 
58 Attack on forecast 
Mecca - Pleasurama, 1988 
Epicure - Habit Precision Engineering, 1989 
American Brands - Invergordon Distill., 1991 
11. Misleading information in forecasts 
59 Attack for misleading information 
60 Attack for misrepresentation of results 
General Motors - SD-Scicon, 1991 
Iceland Frozen Foods - Bejam, 1988 
12. Dividend forecasts 
61 Dividend forecast 
62 Dividend forecast 
63 Dividend forecast 
64 Reversal of dividend forecast 
65 Dividend forecast 
66 Attack on dividend forecast 
HSBC - Midland Bank, 1992 
Raine Industries - Walter Lawrence, 1992 
GEC Siemens - Plessey, 1989 
Robert Frazer - Dewey Warren, 1989 
Adstream - Camford, 1990 
Industrivarden - Redfearn, 1988 
13. Current trading and prospects 
67 Current trading and prospects 
68 Current trading and prospects 
Bowthorpe - Penny & Giles, 1992 
Lloyds Chemists - Macarthy, 1992 
14. Disclosure of information privately 
69 Private disclosure 
70 Private disclosure 
71 Private disclosure 
72 Private disclosure 
Coates Viyella - Tootal, 1991 
ANI - Aurora, 1988 
GEC Siemens - Plessey, 1989 
Hanson -Beazer, 1991 
1. Absence of a forecast 
A small number of companies referred to the absence of a forecast. The main 
reasons given for not disclosing a forecast were uncertainty due to volatile market 
conditions, it being too early in the financial year, and other uncertainties. 
Example 1: Statement of reasons for absence of a forecast 
Blacks Leisure - A. Goldberg takeover bid 1989 
Extract from press release A. Goldberg & Sons PLC (Target) 
Given that future results will be highly sensitive to changes in sales volume and 
margins, the Board has been advised by its financial advisers and auditors that it 
would not be practicable to provide a forecast of likely outcome for the financial 
year to March 1990. 
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Example 2: Statement of reasons for absence of a forecast 
Rank Organisation - Mecca Leisure Group takeover 1990 
Extract from letter to shareholders from Mecca (Target) 
Whilst it is too early to forecast the results for the current financial year, operating 
profits are broadly in line with your Board's expectations. 
Example 3: Statement of reasons for absence of a forecast 
Amshold - Amstrad takeover bid 1992 
Extract from the proposal for acquisition document of Amshold (Bidder) 
(e) Forecasting 
The Directors have discussed their internal budgets, projections and estimates for 
the period to 31 December 1993 with Kleinwort Benson and Touche Ross & Co. 
As a result of the uncertainty inherent in the projections, and the level of 
contingencies which would have to be included, the Directors are unable to 
present a meaningful forecast of profit or loss in the context of the Proposal. 
There can be considerable pressure on companies to disclose a forecast, 
particularly when the bid is contested. This is especially so if the company has 
referred to future prospects without making a formal forecast or is near its year 
end. 
Example 4: Attack on target for absence of a forecast 
Ladbroke - Thompson T-Line takeover 1989 
Extract from letter to shareholders from Ladbroke Group PLC (Bidder) 
Again, with some eight and a half months' trading results available to them, there 
can be no excuse for the board of any well managed company failing in the 
circumstances to inform shareholders as to its current trading performance; the 
Thompson board, however, has failed to give you this information. 
In its response to the Ladbroke Offers, the Thompson board resorted to providing 
so-called proforma annualised operating profits, prepared on differing bases. 
These are totally confusing and misleading as a representation of the actual results 
for the year to 30th April 1988 and are no substitute for a 1989 profit forecast. 
Your board must provide you with a profit forecast for the year to 30th April 1989 
by division so that you are able to make an informed judgement of the merits of 
the Ladbroke bid. 
Iceland Frozen Foods made a forecast of the target's, Bejam's, results. This did 
not have to be formally reported on as it was not a forecast of its own business. 
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Example 5: Attack on target for absence of a forecast 
Iceland Frozen Foods - Bejam takeover 1988 
Extract from letter to Bejam (target) shareholders from Iceland Frozen Foods 
Holdings plc (Bidder) 
We have already highlighted Bejam's poor trading performance, with Bejam's 
Chairman stating only last month that the disappointing 1988 results had 
continued into the current year. We therefore do not believe that your Board can 
forecast current year pre-tax profits of more than £27.1 million, a small increase 
on last year's disappointing results. 
Many companies provided dividend forecasts (which are generally not reported on 
by accountants) in place of formal profit forecasts. Only one company in the 
sample had its dividend forecast formally reported on. IM! used the absence of a 
forecast to attack Birmingham Mint's dividend forecast. 
Example 6: Attack on target for absence of a forecast 
IMI - Birmingham Mint takeover 1991 
Extract from letter to Birmingham Mint (Target) shareholders from IMI 
(Bidder) 
- Despite claims of "excellent prospects for the 1990's" your board has failed to 
publish a profit forecast to justify this claim. 
- The forecast full year dividend of 6.5p is irresponsible. It will not be adequately 
covered by earnings and will further weaken the cash position. 
There is no evidence to suggest that future dividends can be sustained at this 
level. 
Grampian attacked Macarthy for not providing a forecast. Shareholders in 
Macarthy were not convinced by this attack as Grampian's bid was not successful. 
Example 7: Attack on target for absence of a forecast 
Grampian - Macarthy takeover bid 1991 
Extract from letter to shareholders from Grampian (Bidder) 
Macarthy has not given any clear information on its current trading and still has 
not published the interim results for the six months ended 31st March 1991. As 
shareholders, you must be wondering why your Board is unable or unwilling to 
provide any indication of the results for the current financial year and whether 
Macarthy's earnings per share in 1991 will reach even last year's level. 
2. Circumstances of disclosing forecasts 
In the research, forecasts have been divided into three categories depending on 
the circumstances leading to making the forecast. Most forecasts were made 
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voluntarily. There were 27 which were made involuntarily under the rules of the 
Takeover Code. Barlo made a forecast under these circumstances. 
Example 8: Involuntary forecast 
Barlo - IRG takeover 1992 
Extract from offers document in respect of profit forecast of Barlo (Bidder) 
A statement on current trading issued on 10th February, 1992 by the Group 
included the following statement: 
"On the basis of current performance trends, the Group is budgeting, in the 
absence of unforeseen circumstances, for further growth in revenues and 
profitability in 1992/1993 financial year". 
As the above statement, which the Directors confirm is still valid, constitutes a 
profit forecast under the Code, please refer to the reports set out on page 16. 
Corton Beach disclosed a forecast involuntarily. Typically, these forecasts disclose 
little detail about profitability but include extensive assumptions. This forecast 
disclosed no items and 12 assumptions. 
Example 9: Involuntary forecast 
Corton Beach - Lyon & Lyon takeover 1989 
Extract from letter to Corton Beach (Bidder) shareholders dated 7/8/1989 
Incorporated within this letter are formal letters from Touche Ross & Co. (auditors 
to the Company) and Brown Shipley (our financial advisers) relating to my 
indication at the Annual General Meeting that, in line with the Company's 
previous record of growth in earnings per share, the earnings during the current 
financial year would show a further increase. 
APPENDIX 
Bases and Assumptions 
The forecast is presented under the historical cost convention, as modified by the 
revaluation of certain tangible fixed assets and has been prepared in accordance 
with the Group's normal accounting policies. The forecast is based on unaudited 
management accounts for the five months ended 30th June, 1989 and 
management estimates for the subsequent period and has been prepared under the 
following assumptions: 
(a) that there are no unforeseen circumstances; 
(b) that the acquisitions of Lyon & Lyon, and two other smaller acquisitions 
currently being negotiated for an aggregate initial cash consideration of 
approximately £1.2 million, will be completed as proposed; 
(c) there will be no serious industrial disputes or other disruptions of business 
directly or indirectly affecting the Group, its customers or suppliers; 
(d) there will be no significant changes in present market or economic 
conditions, rates of inflation, or interest or taxation or currency exchange 
rates; 
(e) there will be no significant change in EEC or UK legislation or other 
government regulations or policies which will affect the Group; and 
(f) no major customer or supplier will cease to trade. 
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LASMO included a note in its listing particulars that a statement made prior to the 
bid should not be construed as a forecast. 
Example 10: Statement not an involuntary forecast 
LASMO - Ultramar takeover 1991 
Extract from listing particulars of LASMO (Bidder) 
In the Wall Street Journal of 24th September, 1991, an article appeared in which 
the Finance Director of LASMO was quoted in terms which might be construed as 
a forecast as to the likely level of profits for LASMO for the year ending 31st 
December, 1991. The Finance Director had no intention of making any such 
forecast and no such forecast should be inferred from that article. The Board's 
views on current trading are set out above. 
In the case of companies subject to more than one bid, a forecast made in an 
earlier bid may be repeated in a subsequent bid. There were 13 such forecasts in 
the sample. 
I Example 11: Repeat forecast 
Pernod Ricard - Irish Distillers takeover 1988 
Extract from Pernod Ricard (bidder) offer document 
S. Forecasts of profit before tax and earnings per share 
In the document from the Chairman of Irish Distillers to Irish Distillers 
shareholders dated 7th July 1988, the Directors of Irish Distillers forecast that, in 
the absence of unforeseen circumstances, profit before taxation and earnings per 
share for the year ending 30th September 1988 would be in excess of IR£18 
million and IR23.4p respectively. 
The Directors of Irish Distillers confirm that the forecasts remain valid for the 
purpose of the Offer and that Stokes Kennedy Crowley (Chartered Accountants 
and auditors to the Irish Distillers Group), County NatWest Limited and The 
Investment Bank of Ireland Limited, who reported on the forecasts, have each 
indicated that they have no objection to their reports continuing to apply. 
Sketchley disclosed a forecast in defending a bid from Geoffrey Davis. The 
forecast was repeated in defending a subsequent bid from Compass Group. Note 
that once the forecast year end has passed the forecast is referred to as an 
estimate. The estimate below is comprehensive: eight items and five assumptions 
were disclosed. 
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Example 12: Repeat `estimate' 
Compass Group - Sketchley takeover bid 1990 
Extract from defence document dated 31/3/1990 
In the defence document dated Ist March, 1990 your Board made a profit forecast 
for the current financial year. The year end has now passed and the Board can 
confirm that it estimates the same level of profits as previously forecast. Details 
relating to the estimates are set out in Appendix I. 
Appendix I 
Profit estimates of the sketchley group 
1. Profit estimates 
The Board of Sketchley estimates that in the year ended 30th March, 1990, the 
Sketchley Group's consolidated profit before taxation was not less than £6.0 
million, after an exceptional credit of £2.2 million. After taking into account the 
estimated taxation charge of £1.2 million, the consolidated profit after taxation for 
that financial year is estimated to have been not less than £4.8 million. An 
extraordinary charge of £2.3 million after tax relief of £1.0 million is also 
estimated for that financial year leaving £2.5 million available to shareholders. 
Earnings per share are estimated to have been not less than 13.2 pence. 
These estimates compare with the results for the previous financial year ended 
31st March, 1989 of consolidated profit before taxation of £17.3 million, 
consolidated profit after taxation of £12.9 million, an extraordinary charge of £0.2 
million after tax relief of £1.7 million and earnings per share of 35.7 pence. 
2. Bases and assumptions of estimates 
The estimates of profit before taxation, exceptional items, taxation, profit after 
taxation, extraordinary items, profit after extraordinary items and of earnings per 
share in respect of the year ended 30th March, 1990 as set out above and in the 
Chairman's letter have been prepared under the historical cost convention on a 
basis consistent with the accounting policies normally adopted by Sketchley. They 
have been based on unaudited management accounts for the 47 weeks ended 23rd 
February, 1990 and the Directors' estimates for the 5 weeks ended 30th March, 
1990. 
The costs of the defence of the offer for Sketchley by Godfrey Davis (Holdings) Plc 
are estimated to be £1.2 million and this is not reflected in the above profit 
estimates. No account has been taken of any compensation payable to Mr M 
Glenn, the former Chairman of Sketchley, the amount of which has not yet been 
determined. 
A comparison of the later estimate with the earlier forecast shows that the 
assumptions changed substantially between the two. The last paragraph in 
example 12 did not appear in the earlier forecast (example 13). The rather 
standard assumptions of the first forecast (example 13) were not repeated. The 
first forecast disclosed nine assumptions compared to five in the repeat forecast. 
One of the interviewees referred to the need to be wary of costs excluded from a 
forecast. The later forecast (example 12) seems to be such a case. Steetley's 
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forecast (example 14) illustrates how high defence costs can be `... approximately 
£8.0 million in respect of defence costs associated with the Redland bid'. 
Example 13: Change in forecast when repeated 
Godfrey Davis - Sketchley takeover bid 1990 
Extract from defence document dated 1/3/1990 
2. Bases and assumptions of forecasts (extract) 
No account has been taken of the costs of the defence of the Offer. 
The principal assumptions underlying the forecasts are as follows: 
(a) the seasonal pattern of sales in previous years will be repeated and will not be 
distorted by prolonged weather conditions; 
(b) there will be no widespread industrial disputes or abnormal operating problems 
at the works of Sketchley's suppliers or customers; 
(c) there will be no adverse effects from changes in taxation or other legislation; 
and 
(d) there will be no significant changes in interest rates. 
3. Methods of presenting forecasts 
The method of forecast presentation also varied, from brief narrative statements 
to quite detailed financial statements. Steetley's forecast is in narrative format. 
Example 14: Narrative format 
Redland - Steetley takeover 1992 
Extract from Steetley (target) defence document 
1.1991 profit estimate 
The Directors of Steetley estimate that, on the basis set out in paragraph 2 below, 
the profit before taxation of Steetley and its subsidiary and associated undertakings 
(the "Group") for the year ended 31st December, 1991 was £32.5 million and 
earnings per share were 12.9p. Extraordinary charges of approximately £15.1 
million are estimated. These comprise approximately £8.0 million in respect of 
defence costs associated with the Redland bid and approximately £7.1 million (net 
of tax) in respect of withdrawal from the bulk magnesia refractory segment and 
closure of related process lines. 
Reed International presented its forecast in statement format. The forecast is quite 
detailed with nine items disclosed. 
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Example 15: Statement format 
Elsevier - Reed International takeover 1992 
Extract from proposed merger document in respect of forecast profits of Reed 
International (Target) 
D. Profit Forecast 
The Directors of Reed forecast that, in the absence of unforeseen circumstances 
and on the bases and assumptions set out below, the consolidated profit before tax 
and earnings per share of Reed for the 12 months ending 31 December 1992 will 
be not less than £239 million and 30.1p respectively. An illustrative summarised 
profit and loss account based on these forecasts together with comparative 
unaudited restated figures for the 12 months ended 31 December 1991, based on 
management accounting information, is set out below: 
Restated Forecast 
12 months ended 12 months ending 
31 December 31 December 
1991 1992 % 
£ million £ million change 
Turnover 1.578 1.665 6% 
Operating profit 226 281 24% 
Net interest expense üü 17% 
Profit before tax 190 239 26% 
27% Tax j5ý5 f7o 
Profit after tax 135 169 25% 
Minority interests and preference 
dividends 1) 
_ Profit attributable to ordinary 
shareholders before extraordinary 
items 135 168 24 
Earnings per ordinary share 24.30 30, lp 24° 
A major factor explaining the forecast of a 26 per cent. increase in profit before 
tax for the 12 months to 31 December 1992 is the stronger first quarter 
performance, where comparison is made against a prior year which was impacted 
by the Gulf War and higher restructuring costs. The SSAP 24 net pension credit 
reflected in the 1992 forecast is £27.6 million (1991: £23.9 million). 
Forecasts can be point, range or non-quantified. Various wordings are used for 
range forecasts. Sears attacks Freemans for its choice of wording. 
Example 16: Attack on wording of forecast 
Sears - Freemans takeover 1988 
Extract from letter to shareholders from Sears (Bidder) dated 14/4/1988 
FREEMANS DISMAL PROFIT FORECAST... 
1987/88 has been a year of real decline for Freemans (extract) 
With only three weeks of the financial year to run, we expected to see a firm 
forecast with a minimum profit figure (e. g. "not less than... "). Even at this late 
stage your Board has been able to do no more than forecast that pre-tax profits 
will be "of the order of £33.2 million" - i. e. profits could be even lower. 
A figure of £33.2 million is the absolute minimum required to avoid a fall in 
earnings per share. If the out-turn were lower, you would face a fall in earnings 
per share this year. 
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Previous researchers have had problems in interpreting the forecast amounts 
(Dev, 1973; Ferris, 1975; Morris and Breakwell, 1975; Platt, 1979; Hartnett, 
1990). They found that in some cases it was not clear which figure of profit was 
being forecast (normal trading profit, net profit before tax, before or after 
minority interest, before or after extraordinary items). Another difficulty is that 
the published forecast may differ from the internal forecast (by, for example, the 
application of a contingency factor - this was referred to by a number of 
interviewees (also, see reference to contingencies in example 3)). In addition, 
management may subsequently make operating decisions, or may make changes in 
their accounting methods, to minimise any deviation from the published forecast. 
Dev (1973) had problems interpreting profit forecasts and reconciling subsequent 
results reported in annual accounts. Dev examined 212 prospectus profit forecasts 
and compared these to the annual accounts of each company for the two years 
following the forecast. Companies whose profit forecasts and accounts were not 
comparable (due to takeover) were eliminated from the data. Dev found the 
wording used in forecasts to be difficult to interpret. Phrases used such as profits 
of the group' and 'normal trading profit were not clear. Other ambiguities were 
found, such as whether depreciation was calculated on current or historic values, 
and how exceptional and non-recurring items were treated in arriving at forecast 
profit. Similarly, Hartnett (1990) was unclear as to the nature of the profit figure 
forecast - whether it was an operating profit or was net of extraordinary and 
abnormal items. 
This problem is less likely in this research as the City Code was amended in 
1984/85 to require disclosure of forecasts of taxation, extraordinary items and 
minority interests, where these are expected to be significant. Xtra-vision forecast 
a `loss'. Cambridge's forecast refers to `profits' without indicating whether these 
are operating profits, before or after tax, etc. 
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Example 17: Imprecise terminology 
Cambridge - Xtra-vision takeover 1990 
Extract from recommended offers document 
Xtra-vision's profit forecast for the year ending 31 January 1991 
1. Profit forecast 
The Board of Xtra-vision is currently forecasting a loss for the year ending 31 
January 1991. 
2. Bases of calculation 
The forecast has been made by reference to: 
(a) interim results for the six months to 31 July 1990; 
(b) management accounts for the period to 30 September 1990; and 
(c) forecasts for the remaining four months of the financial year. 
The accounting policies underlying the forecast are consistent with those normally 
adopted by Xtra-vision, as set out in the audited accounts for the year ended 31 
January 1990. 
3. Assumptions 
The principal assumptions upon which the forecast has been based are as follows: 
(a) the disposal of the company's businesses in Britain, Northern Ireland and 
certain of the US operations being in line with the Board of Xtra-vision's 
estimate of costs; and 
(b) the continued support of the company's bankers. 
Cambridge's profit forecast for the year ending 28 February 1991 
1. Profit forecast 
For the year ending 28 February 1991, the Directors of Cambridge forecast that, in 
the absence of unforeseen circumstances, the level of profits for the second half of 
the year, as arrived at below, will be higher than that reported for the first half. 
2. Bases of calculation 
The forecast has been made by reference to: 
(a) the unaudited interim results for the six months ended 31 August 1990; and 
(b) forecasts for the remaining six months of the financial year. 
The accounting policies adopted in preparing the forecasts are consistent with 
those normally adopted by Cambridge. 
The profit forecast does not include the results of Xtra-vision plc. 
3. Assumptions 
The principal assumptions upon which the forecast has been based are as follows: 
(a) there will be no change in tax or other legislation which would adversely affect 
the Group's business; and 
(b) there will be no major change in interest rates. 
Epicure attacks Habit Precision for forecasting operating profit, `a meaningless 
figure for shareholders'. 
Example 18: Attack on imprecise wording 
Epicure - Habit Precision Engineering takeover 1989 
Letter to shareholders from Epicure (bidder) dated 26/5/1989 
Profit forecast (extract) 
Most unusually, your board has chosen to highlight opgratin profit in its 
forecast -a meaningless figure for shareholders. The relevant figures for 
shareholders are the forecast pre-tax profit of £1.25 million, which will be even 
less than the pre-tax profit of £1.5 million earned two years previously, and the 
forecast earnings per share of 5.9p which will be nearly 22 per cent. lower than 
two years previously. Forecast earnings per share could be even lower if Doric is 
not sold by 30th September, 1989. 
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4. Items disclosed in forecasts 
Rowntree's forecast is one of the most detailed in the study, with 20 items and 
eight assumptions disclosed therein. Few profit forecasts disclose as much detail 
in the forecast profit and loss account, let alone provide detailed notes to the 
forecast. The breakdown of profit between continuing businesses and 
discontinued businesses is now required by FRS 3 but in 1988 was rarely done. 
The segmental analysis of both turnover and trading profit is an example of good 
disclosure. 
Example 19: Comprehensive disclosure 
Nestle - Rowntree takeover 1988 
Extract from Rowntree (target) defence document dated 26/5/1988 
Profit forecast 
The detail supporting the forecast set out on page 1 is as follows: - 
Forecast Actual 
1988 1987 
Notes f'm f'm 
Turnover of continuing businesses (i) 1,295.2 1,235.8 
Cost of sales (674.2) 6(62.2) 
Gross margin 621.0 573.6 
Advertising and promotion (138.9) (128.6) 
Fixed overheads 3(44.2) 3(29.4) 
Trading profit of continuing businesses (i) 137.9 115.6 
Trading profit of snack food businesses (ii) 6 14.5 
143.5 130.1 
Interest (8.5) 1( g. 0) 
Profit on ordinary activities before taxation 135.0 112.1 
Taxation (iii) 3(0.8) 2(4.2) 
Profit on ordinary activities after taxation 104.2 87.9 
Extraordinary items (iv) 17.5 
- Retained profit 111.2 $Z2 
Earnings per share (v) 4ZQp 4Qjp 
Dividends per share 1&ßP Lup 
The accounts for 1987 set out above are abridged. Full 1987 accounts, 
incorporating an unqualified auditors' report, have been delivered to the Registrar 
of Companies. 
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Example 19: Comprehensive disclosure (continued) 
Nestle - Rowntree takeover 1988 
Extract from Rowntree (target) defence document dated 26/5/1988 
Profit forecast (continued) 
Notes 
(i) Geographical analysis of turnover and trading profit of continuing 
businesses. 
Turnover Trading Profit 
1988 1987 1988 1987 
Forecast Actual Forecast Actual 
£'m £'m £'m JC 'm Confectionery 
United Kingdom 470.8 440.5 64.5 51.2 
Ireland 24.5 24.0 2.7 2.1 
Continental Europe 312.7 300.4 15.3 11.0 
North America 213.9 214.9 22.8 23.1 
Australasia 61.4 57.1 6.3 4.7 
Rest of the world 88.8 87.6 12.5 11.7 
1,172.1 1,124.5 124.1 103.8 
Other 123.1 111.3 13.8 11.8 
Total 1.295.2 1.235.8 137.9 115.6 
(ii) Snackfood businesses 
The 1987 figures for turnover to trading profit of continuing businesses have been 
restated to exclude the results of Rowntree Snack Foods Limited, which was sold 
on 6th April, 1988 and Tom's Foods Inc., the sale of which is expected to be 
completed by 26th June, 1988. 
(iii) Taxation 
The forecast taxation charge is stated after taking the net benefit of relief for 
Advance Corporation Tax of £5.0 million in 1988 (1987: £3.8 million). 
(iv) Extraordinary items 
Extraordinary items in 1988 represent the net profit on the disposals of the 
Group's snack food businesses. 
The costs relating to the offer by Nesttb have not been taken into account. 
(v) Earnings per share 
Forecast earnings per share for 1988 are based on the estimated weighted average 
number of shares in issue during the year assuming that no further shares will be 
issued after 24th May, 1988. 
Bases 
The profit forecast has been made on the basis of the results shown by the 
unaudited management accounts for the 16 weeks ended 23rd April, 1988 and on 
the principal assumptions set out below. 
Assumptions 
General 
(i) The Group's composition, (subject to the sale of Tom's Foods Inc. referred to 
below), its present management an its accounting policies will remain the 
same. 
(ii) There will be no significant changes in legislation adversely affecting the 
Group's operations. 
(iii)Trading results will not be affected by industrial disputes in the Group's 
factories or in those of its principal suppliers. 
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Example 19: Comprehensive disclosure (continued) 
Nestle - Rowntree takeover 1988 
Extract from Rowntree (target) defence document dated 26/5/1988 
Profit forecast (continued) 
Exchange rates 
There will be no material change in foreign currency exchange rate from current 
rates. 
Interest rates 
Interest rates will not change materially from those currently prevailing. 
Taxation 
The bases and rates of taxation, both direct and indirect, will not change 
materially in any of the countries in which the Group has significant operations. 
Tom's Foods 
The sale of Tom's Foods Inc. will be completed by 26th June, 1988 at a net sale 
price of USS200 million. 
Dixons Group also presented a very comprehensive forecast, disclosing 15 items 
and 15 assumptions. Forecast profits benefited from a number of changes in 
accounting. Note (1) shows that the company changed its accounting policy for 
pensions and did not restate the previous year's results. In addition, note (7) 
discloses the release of 110m `from the release of surplus provisions in respect 
of extended warranty policies'. It would seem that assumptions (1) and (5) give 
the company plenty of potential excuses if the forecast is subsequently not met. 
Example 20: Comprehensive disclosure 
Kingfisher - Dixons Group takeover bid 1990 
Extract from defence document of Dixons Group (target) dated 9/1/1990 
PROFIT FORECAST AND DIVISIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. PROFIT FORECAST 
The Directors of Dixons Group plc forecast that, in the absence of unforeseen 
circumstances and on the bases and assumptions set out below, profit on ordinary 
activities before tax of the Group for the 52 weeks ending 28 April 1990 will be 
not less than £70 million and earnings per share will be not less than 11 pence. 
Basis of Forecast 
The profit forecast is made on the basis of the unaudited management accounts for 
the 28 weeks ended 11 November 1989 and of a forecast for the remaining period 
to 28 April 1990, including a review of actual sales and margins for the period to 
30 December 1989 and of sales to 6 January 1990. The forecast is based on the 
accounting policies set out in the 1988/89 Annual Report, except that Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice Number 24 "Accounting for Pension Costs" has 
been implemented. The prior year has not been restated. 
In preparing the forecast no account has been taken of the costs incurred as a 
result of the offer by Kingfisher, which will be treated as an extraordinary item. 
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Example 20: Comprehensive disclosure (continued) 
Kingfisher - Diions Group takeover bid 1990 
Extract from defence document of Dixons Group (target) dated 9/1/1990 
PROFIT FORECAST AND DIVISIONAL ANALYSIS (continued) 
Assumptions 
The forecast for the year ending 28 April 1990 has been prepared on the basis of 
the following principal assumptions: 
(1) The Group will remain independent and the existing composition of the 
Group, its management and its commercial and accounting policies will 
remain unchanged 
(2) There will be no significant adverse change in relevant interest, exchange or 
inflation rates or in the economies in which the Group operates. 
(3) There will be no significant adverse change in the rates and bases of taxation 
affecting the Group or in the legislative, political or competitive environments 
in which the Group operates. 
(4) The Group's results will not be adversely affected to a significant extent by 
abnormal weather conditions, and there will be no significant effect on its 
business as a result of industrial disputes or civil disturbances. 
(5) Sales, sales mix and margins will follow normal seasonal patterns having 
regard to current trends. 
2. DIVISIONAL ANALYSIS 
The Directors expect that the results by division comprising the total figure which 
has been forecast in Paragraph 1 of this Appendix will be approximately as 
follows: 
1989/90 1988/89 
£ million £ million 
UK -Retail 3 30.1 
- Retail Financial Services 37 13.5 
Total UK Retail 40 43.6 
US Retail 10 14.4 
Total Retail 50 58.0 
Property Division 20 20.4 
Profit on ordinary activities before tax ZQ Ig 
3. NOTES 
(1) The Group is implementing SSAP 24 in the accounts for the year ending 28 
April 1990. Willis Consulting Limited, the actuaries of the Group's UK 
pension scheme, have advised that there was a surplus on the scheme of £49 
million as at 6 April 1989, and amortisation of the pension surplus in 
accordance with SSAP 24 over the average remaining service period of 
current employees would result in a potential credit to profit in respect of UK 
pensions of £7.0 million; the regular pension cost would have been £3.3 
million. The Directors are, however, limiting the amount of the potential 
credit recognised in the current year by reducing the UK pension charge to 
nil. 
(2) The funding of the Group's US pension plans was considered by their 
actuary to be satisfactory at the last valuation date (1 January 1989). The 
expected charge for the full year ending 28 April 1990 for contributions to 
these plans is £0.5 million. 
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Example 20: Comprehensive disclosure (continued) 
Kingfisher - Dixons Group takeover bid 1990 
Extract from defence document of Dixons Group (target) dated 9/1/1990 
PROFIT FORECAST AND DIVISIONAL ANALYSIS (continued) 
(3) Following the acquisition of Cyclops Corporation (now Silo) and the 
subsequent disposal of the Industrial Division of that company, the Group 
retained the liability for the retirement medical benefits payable in respect of 
former employees (steelworkers) of the Industrial Division. The present value 
of the liability, after taking account of related tax benefits, and the assets to 
fund it are retained on the Group's balance sheet. The first triennial actuarial 
valuation of these liabilities since acquisition has now taken place and this 
has resulted in an overall increase of approximately £3 million in the 
liability. The increase arises principally from inclusion in the valuation of the 
estimated costs of administering the scheme. The Directors intend to account 
for this as an adjustment to goodwill. 
(4) UK Retail profit for the year ending 28 April 1990 does not include any 
profits on property disposals except for £0.1 million of profits on disposal of 
short leasehold retail premises net of associated closure costs (1988/89 £0.6 
million). 
(5) UK-Retail profit before tax includes £1.1 million from discontinued 
businesses (1988/89 £0.3 million). This represents the net surplus on 
disposal of the film processing and satellite receiver installation businesses of 
the Group together with the trading results of these businesses up to the 
respective dates of sale. 
(6) UK-Retail profit before tax for the year ending 28 April 1990 includes a nil 
net interest charge (1988/89 £1.6 million charge). US Retail profit before tax 
for the year ending 28 April 1990 includes a net interest charge of £1.2 
million (1988/89 £0.7 million). 
(7) The profit before tax of Retail Financial Services includes £10 million 
arising from the release of surplus provisions in respect of extended warranty 
policies in force as at 29 April 1989 following an independent actuarial 
review. This review has shown a total surplus of £30 million. If claims 
experience remains as currently projected, the balance of the surplus of £20 
million will be considered for release to profit in the years 1990/91 and 
1991/92). 
(8) Silo has announced its planned entry into Los Angeles through the 
acquisition of the Federated Group stores in that area. The stores will be 
refitted as Silo. It is expected that this transaction will be completed in the 
near future and that the stores will open early in the next financial year. 
Interest and occupancy costs (estimated at $2.5 million) prior to opening will 
be capitalised The total acquisition cost, including capitalised interest and 
occupancy, is not expected to exceed the fair market value of the acquired 
leases. Other pre-opening costs are being expensed and $0.4 million is 
provided in US Retail for the year ending 28 April 1990. 
(9) Profits on the sale of Currys freeholds are reported within the Property 
Division. These profits are expected to represent 13 per cent of the Division's 
gross profit for the year ending 28 April 1990 (1988/89 21 per cent). 
(10) The Group's tax charge for the year ending 28 April 1990 is estimated at 
25.5 per cent reflecting the incidence and nature of profits arising in 
different jurisdictions. 
(11) Earnings per share for the year ending 28 April 1990 have been computed on 
the basis of an estimated weighted average number of ordinary shares in 
issue in the period (383.9 million), after deducting minority interests (£0.6 
million) and dividends on convertible preference shares (L9.3 million). 
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Copson Group's forecast is unusual in that it disclosed considerable detail (13 
items) but no assumptions. Nearly all interviewees expressed a preference for no 
assumptions because assumptions reduce the certainty of a forecast being 
achieved. 
Example 21: Comprehensive disclosure and no assumptions 
Kants Enterprises - F. Copson takeover 1991 
Extract from recommended proposals document 
Estimates of results of the Copson Group for the year ended 30th April, 1991 
1. Estimate of results 
The Board of Copson estimates that, in the absence of unforeseen circumstances 
and on the basis set out below, the loss on ordinary activities before taxation, the 
exceptional items taxation and the extraordinary item for the financial year ended 
30th April, 1991 were as follows: 
Notes £'000 
Profit on ordinary activities before 
taxation and exceptional item: 
- hotels and nursing homes 376 
- builders' merchants - 
Exceptional item (a) 2(. 332) 
Loss on ordinary activities before taxation (1,956) 
Taxation (b) 1(29) 
Loss on ordinary activities after taxation (2,085) 
Extraordinary item (c) 1(. 214) 
Retained Loss (3.299) 
Loss per share (d) 17.9p 
Notes: 
(a) The exceptional charge of £2,332,000 represents the deficit arising on 
revaluation of certain of the Group's properties, further details of which are set 
out in Appendix V. 
(b) The taxation charge of £129,000 represents the write-off of irrecoverable 
Advance Corporation Tax. 
(c) The extraordinary charge of £1,214,000 represents additional losses on 
disposal and closure costs of the Group's builders' merchants activities. 
(d) The loss per share has been calculated by dividing the loss on ordinary 
activities after taxation of £2,085,000 by the weighed average number of 
Ordinary Shares in issue during the year of 11,653,000. 
There were a number of instances of companies disclosing more than one 
forecast. Ward White disclosed a forecast on 19/7/1989 and an estimate on 
12/8/1989. The forecasts were £33 million and £34.1 million profit before tax and 
11.8p and 12.2p fully diluted earnings per share. The first forecast disclosed five 
items and 13 assumptions. 
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Example 22: First forecast 
Boots - Ward White takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 19/7/1989 
Your Directors are forecasting that profit before tax for the six months ending 31st 
July, 1989 will be approximately £33 million and earnings per share will be 
approximately 11.8p, representing increases of 19.1 and 13.5 per cent 
respectively over the same period last year. Your Directors expect that the group 
tax charge will continue to be significantly below 35 per cent as a result of factors 
that include the on-going investment in new stores. The profit forecast is set out in 
Appendix 1. 
Appendix 1 
Information relating to the profit forecast 
1. Profit forecast 
The Directors of Ward White Group plc ("Ward White") forecast that, in the 
absence of unforeseen circumstances and on the bases and assumptions set out 
below, the profit before taxation and fully diluted earnings per share of Ward 
White and its subsidiary and associated companies ("the Group") for the six 
months ending 31st July 1989 will be approximately £33 million and 11.8p 
respectively. 
2. Bases of preparation 
(i) The forecast set out above is based on unaudited management accounts for 
the period ended 3rd June, 1989, supplemented by subsequent weekly data on 
sales, and on detailed forecasts for June and July. 
(ii) The forecast is presented under the historical cost convention, modified by 
the revaluation of freehold and certain long leasehold properties, and has 
been prepared in accordance with the accounting policies described in Ward 
White's latest published Report and Accounts. 
(iii) No account has been taken of expenses incurred in connection with the offers 
made by Boots. 
(iv) Fully diluted earnings per share are calculated on an assumed weighted 
average of 200.1 million ordinary shares in issue after allowing for full 
conversion rights attached to the convertible redeemable preference shares. 
The potential dilution arising from options granted under the share option 
schemes is not material. 
3. Assumptions 
The principal assumptions on which the profit forecast is based are as follows: 
(i) the Group's composition, its current management and the commercial and 
trading policies and practices of Ward White and its operating subsidiaries 
will remain unchanged; 
(ii) the Group, its customers and suppliers will not be materially affected by 
industrial action, political developments or any Governmental action, 
including changes in direct or indirect taxation; and 
(iii) the general level of interest rates, exchange rates, retail demand and inflation 
will remain at approximately present levels. 
Content of disclosures in the second estimate include more items but fewer 
assumptions (18 items, three assumptions). A segmental analysis is disclosed `in 
response to criticism'. 
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Example 23: Second 'estimate' 
Boots - Ward White takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 12/8/1989 
Estimate of interim results 
We have previously forecast Ward White's profit before taxation and fully diluted 
earnings per share for the six months to 31st July, 1989. Our full interim 
statement would normally be published on 12th September. To demonstrate the 
continuing performance of each of Ward White's divisions in this period we are 
now publishing a detailed estimate of these results, including a segmental analysis 
in response to criticism. This estimate, which is set out in Appendix 1 and is 
summarised below, exceeds our earlier forecast. 
Appendix 1 
Estimated interim results for the six months ended 31st July, 1989 
Set out below are the estimated interim results of the Ward White group for the six 
months ended 31st July, 1989 (the "estimated interim results"), together with 
comparative figures. 
Year ended Six months ended 
31st January, 31st July, 
1989 1989 1988 
£ million £ million £ million 
734.6 Turnover 405.5 342.3 
83.5 Operating profit 39.1 30.1 
0.4 Share of profit of related companies - 0.7 
(7, j) Interest (4 9) (3 1) 
76.6 Profit on ordinary activities before 34.2 27.7 
taxation 
2 3.1 Tax on profit on ordinary activities 9.7 Q4 
53.5 Profit on ordinary activities after 24.5 18.3 
taxation 
273 Extraordinary items (net of tax) (021D 17 1 
81.2 Profit for the period 24.0 35.4 
1(2.1) Preference dividends (7 2) (7 2) 
69,1 Profit attributable to ordinary 16-8 28.2 
shareholders 
10. Dividend per ordinary share 6p 3, Op 
Earnings per ordinary share: 
34.9p Basic 14.6p 9.4p 
28.5p Fully diluted 12.2p 10.4p 
Segmental estimates of turnover and operating profit 
Set out below are estimates of the turnover and operating profit of each of the 
divisions of Ward White for the six months ended 3 1st July, 1989. 
Six months ended 
31st July, 1989 31st July, 1988 
Operating Operating 
Turnover profit Turnover profit 
million £ million £ million million 
Home DIY products 181.3 19.2 133.1 15.6 
Halfords 110.2 9.7 85.3 6.2 
USA autoparts and accessories 85.0 7.8 48.2 6.1 
Other activities 29.0 2.4 757 21 
405.5 391 342.3 301 
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Example 23: Second 'estimate' (continued) 
Boots - Ward White takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 12/8/1989 
Estimate of interim results (continued) 
Notes 
(a) The estimated interim results set out in this appendix are based on 
management accounts for the period ended Ist July, 1989 and a detailed 
estimate of results for the remainder of July incorporating actual sales figures. 
It is intended that actual interim results will be prepared in due course and will 
then be sent to the ordinary, preference and convertible preference 
shareholders. 
(b) The estimated interim results are unaudited and are prepared under the 
historical cost convention, modified by the revaluation of freehold and certain 
long leasehold properties and have been prepared in accordance with the 
accounting policies described in Ward White's latest published Report and 
Accounts. 
(c) Basic earnings per share are calculated on the weighted average of 118.5 
million ordinary shares in issue during the six months ended 31st July, 1989 
and profit before extraordinary items (but after preference dividends) of £17.3 
million. Fully diluted earnings per ordinary share are calculated on the 
weighted average of 200.1 million ordinary shares in issue after allowing for 
full conversion rights attached to the convertible redeemable preference shares. 
(d) Operating profit includes profit of £2.4 million (1988 £1.2 million) relating to 
retail property and developments. This includes all profits arising from the 
active management of the group's property portfolio, which can be categorised 
as shown below. 
Six months ended 
31st July, 1989 31st July, 1988 
£ million millio n 
Net surplus on sale of retail property 2.2 0.1 
Restructuring of leases 0.3 0.8 
Development profit/(loss) (0_1) 03 
2A LZ 
(e) The tax charge reflects the expectation of the full year tax charge. The main 
factors expected to affect the charge, compared with the year ended 31st 
January, 1989 are: 
Year ending Year ended 
31st January, 1990 31st January, 1989 
Standard UK tax rate 35.0 35.0 
Accelerated capital allowances (1.5) (0.9) 
Profits sheltered by roll-over 
relief and capital losses (2.0) (2.3) 
Adjustments in respect of prior 
years' tax charges (see below) (4.2) (2.6) 
Other 1.1 . 00 
2$4 34.2 
In the current year the adjustment in respect of prior years' tax charges is 
principally due to the release of deferred tax provisions no longer required as a 
result of the considerable investment in new stores. This investment 
programme is expected to continue and the Directors of Ward White expect 
that the group tax charge will continue to be significantly below 35 per cent. 
Tax on profit on ordinary activities includes £2.9 million (1988 £2.6 million) 
in respect of overseas companies. 
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Example 23: Second 'estimate' (continued) 
Boots - Ward White takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 12/8/1989 
Estimate of interim results (continued) 
(f) Extraordinary items in 1989 primarily relate to a loss on disposal of listed 
investments, and exclude any expenses incurred in connection with the offers 
made by Boots. 
(g) The interim dividend of 3.6p per ordinary share (1988 3. Op) amounts to £4.3 
million (1988 £3.6 million). 
(h) The results for the year ended 31st January, 1989 are abridged from the full 
accounts for the period, which received an unqualified audit report and have 
been filed with the Registrar of Companies. 
Elsevier and Reed, unusually, presented a combined forecast as well as individual 
forecasts for each company. Reed's forecast is shown earlier( example 15). 
Example 24: Combined forecast 
Elsevier - Reed International takeover 1992 
Extract from proposed merger document 
Financial strength 
Reed Elsevier will be one of the world's largest publishing and information 
groups. Its scale and financial strength will create a sound basis for the 
development of new products and penetration into new markets. 
Pro forma aggregate figures £ million Dfl million 
Market capitalisation at 28 October 1992 5,872 16,089 
12 months ending 
31 December 1992 
Forecast 
Turnover 2,455 7,660 
Profit before tax 430 1,340 
Interest cover 16x 
Combined summarised pro forma financial information concerning the merged 
group and details of its basis of preparation are set out in Appendix 1. 
5. Assumptions disclosed 
Chapter 12, paragraph 12.23 of the Stock Exchange's `Yellow Book' states that 
the principal assumptions on which the profit forecast is based must be included 
with the forecast. Assumptions must relate to matters outside the control of the 
directors, must be readily understandable by investors, must be specific about the 
particular aspect of the forecast referred to and about the related uncertainty, 
must relate only to material uncertainties and must not include the business 
estimates underlying the forecast. 
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Section K of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers states that any document 
in which a forecast appears must reproduce the assumptions, including commer- 
cial assumptions, on which the forecast has been based. 
Most assumptions disclosed in forecasts follow a standard wording. One 
interviewee stated (see comment 147 appendix 2) `We always had major 
problems with the advisors in this area All our first draft forecasts spelled out 
the real material assumptions on which the forecast was based But by the time 
the forecast got published these assumptions had become meaningless and were 
converted to fairly standard assumptions followed by all companies'. An advisor 
referred to the importance of business-specific assumptions (see comment 140 
appendix 2) `There are a number of very similar standard assumptions used in 
forecasts. The ones to be interested in are those specifically related to the 
company'. P. J. Carroll's assumptions are fairly standard except for assumption 
(b). 
Example 25: Bases of calculation and assumptions 
Rothmans International - P. J. Carroll takeover 1990 
Extract from recommended cash offers document 
2. Bases of calculation 
The forecasts have been made by reference to: 
(a) the unaudited management accounts for the five months ended 31st August, 
1990; and 
(b) forecasts for the remaining seven months of the financial year. 
The accounting policies adopted in preparing the forecasts are consistent with 
those normally adopted by Carrolls, as set out in the audited accounts for the 
period ended 31st March, 1990. 
The calculation of earnings per share has been based on the profit after taxation 
attributable to Carroll's Ordinary shareholders and the weighted average number 
of Carrolls Ordinary shares in issue during the year ending 31st March, 1991 of 
74,393,163 on the assumption that no further Carrolls Ordinary shares are issued. 
Earnings per share would not be materially affected by the exercise of all 
outstanding options. 
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Example 25: Bases of calculation and assumptions (continued) 
Rothmans International - P. J. Carroll takeover 1990 
Extract from recommended cash offers document 
3. Assumptions 
The principal assumptions upon which the forecasts have been based are as 
follows: 
(a) For the period from Ist September, 1990 to 31st March, 1991 the revenue from 
and gross margin on tobacco sales will be approximately the same as those 
experienced in the period from Ist September, 1989 to 31st March, 1990. 
(b) The recent severe mortality problem, which is so far affecting only the 1990 
crop of salmon smolts will revert to normal industry levels by mid-November, 
1990. Should the mortality problem continue at the present level beyond that 
time, without compensating remedial action being effective, the loss of IRLO. 6 
million for the Aquaculture Division for the year ending 31st March, 1991 
included in the forecast would increase at the rate of approximately 1R£0.9 
million per month up to a maximum of 1R£3.9 million in the event of a total 
loss of the 1990 crop of salmon smolts; any such further losses would qualify 
for taxation relief at a rate of approximately 10 per cent. 
(c) Other salmon stocks will not be materially affected by mortalities or abnormal 
weather conditions. 
(d) Trading arrangements with principal suppliers, agents and customers will 
remain uninterrupted and no major suppliers, agent or customer will fail to 
meet its commitments. 
(e) Operations will not be materially affected by industrial disputes or breakdowns 
within the Carroils Group or its major suppliers, agents or customers or by 
litigation or changes in legislation. 
(f) There will be no material change in the bases and rates of excise duties and 
other taxation, or in economic conditions, interest rates or exchange rates. 
(g) The executive management of Carrolls, its policies and operational activities 
will remain unaltered prior to the publication of the audited accounts for the 
year ending 31st March, 1991. 
The assumption disclosed by Highland Participants concerning shiprepair, 
shipbuilding and oil bunkering is very detailed and very company-specific. The 
wording used creates considerable uncertainty about the forecast. 
Example 26: Assumptions disclosed 
Cornwall Trust - Highland Participants takeover 1989 
Extract from recommended offer document 
Highland profit forecast for the year ending 31 December 1989 
1. Profit Forecast 
The Directors of Highland forecast that, in the absence of unforeseen 
circumstances and on the bases and principal assumptions set out below, the 
Group's consolidated profit before tax and extraordinary items for the year ending 
31 December 1989 will be approximately £6.9 million. The Directors estimate that 
the tax rate for 1989 will be approximately 36 per cent. and that net extraordinary 
gains will be £3.0 million (principally relating to the Proposed Disposal). The 
forecast earnings per share for the year is 12.2p; based on 36,299,651 ordinary 
shares in issue. This forecast takes no account of investment income generated 
from the proceeds of the Proposed Disposal. 
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Example 26: Assumptions disclosed (continued) 
Cornwall Trust - Highland Participants takeover 1989 
Extract from recommended offer document 
Highland profit forecast for the year ending 31 December 1989 (continued) 
a. Bases and principal assumptions 
This forecast is based on the unaudited management accounts of the Group for the 
nine months ended 30 September 1989 and on the Directors' forecast for the three 
months ending 31 December 1989. This forecast has been prepared using the 
accounting policies normally adopted by the Group. 
Shiprepair, shipbuilding and oil bunkering are volatile businesses. The nature of 
these businesses requires the Directors to estimate the likely levels of labour 
utilisation and man-hour rates in shiprepair and shipbuilding, and trading 
volumes in oil bunkering. Variations in the level of these assumed factors will 
affect the income receive by the Group. There is no assurance, therefore, that the 
assumed levels will be achieved. In addition, the Group's operations are becoming 
more concentrated in the property market. Therefore, the Group's profit is 
increasingly sensitive to fluctuations in this market. The forecast includes a profit 
of £1 million on a property disposal which is anticipated to be completed before 
the year end. 
The forecast for the three months ending 31 December 1989 assumes the 
following levels of activity for the shiprepair, shipbuilding and oil bunkering 
businesses of Highland: average labour utilisation levels and man-hour rates in 
shiprepair and shipbuilding activities are similar to those achieved in the last 
quarter of 1988 and oil bunkering volumes increase at a rate similar to the rate of 
growth experienced in the first nine months of 1989. The Directors believe that 
the estimates for these variables upon which their forecast is based will be 
achieved 
This forecast assumes that there will be no strikes, disasters, natural or otherwise, 
or changes in current legislation. 
Sears attacks Freemans for its choice of assumptions. 
Example 27: Attack on assumptions in forecast 
Sears - Freemans takeover 1988 
Extract from letter to shareholders from Sears (Bidder) dated 14/4/1988 
FREEMANS DISMAL PROFIT FORECAST... 
1987/88 has been a year of real decline for Freemans (extract) 
The forecast is based on the assumptions that there will be no bad weather or 
disruption of distribution (problems which have already occurred earlier this 
year) and relies on an unusual assumption - that stocks which Freemans holds for 
Spring/Summer 1988 prove to be "in accordance with the levels in previous 
years". Given the errors made by your Board in the current year - too much stock 
in June, too little stock in October - this injects further uncertainty into the 
forecast. 
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6. Accounting policies disclosed 
The Stock Exchange's `Yellow book' requires the reporting accountants to state 
that the profit forecast is presented on a basis consistent with the accounting 
policies of the company or group in question. 
Note 1(c) of Rule 28.2 of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers states that the 
reporting accountants must satisfy themselves that the forecast, so far as 
accounting policies and calculations are concerned, has been properly compiled on 
the basis of the assumptions made. Most forecasts state that consistent accounting 
policies are followed. Dixon's forecast (example 20) includes two changes of 
accounting policy/estimate. In its forecast, Irish Distillers changed its accounting 
policy, to capitalise interest for the first time. In contested bids, companies 
changing accounting policies for the purpose of a forecast run the risk of being 
attacked by the other side. Such was the case for Irish Distillers. 
Example 28: Change in accounting policy 
GC&C Brands - Irish Distillers takeover bid 1988 
Extract from Irish Distillers (Target) defence document 
1. Profit before tax and earnings per share forecasts (extract) 
The accounting policies adopted in preparing the forecasts are consistent with 
those normally adopted by the Group, as set out in the audited accounts for the 
year ended 30th September, 1987, other than a change in accounting policy to 
include interest on designated loans in maturing whiskey stocks. 
Maturing whiskey stocks at 30th September, 1988 will be valued on the basis 
adopted hitherto but, instead of excluding all interest from overheads, interest on 
designated loans directly related to maturing whiskey stocks will be attributed to 
those stocks that are within their normal maturation period. On the previous basis, 
the profit before taxation and earnings per share now forecast would have been 
lower by 1R£848,000 and 1.21p respectively. For the year ended 30th September, 
1987, the profit before taxation on the new basis would not have differed 
materially from the published figure. 
Example 29: Attack on change in accounting policy 
GC&C Brands - Irish Distillers takeover bid 1988 
Extract from GC&C Brands (Bidder) letter to Irish Distillers (target) 
shareholders dated 12/7/1988 
The Board's latest profit forecast (the second in six weeks) is helped by a timely 
change in accounting policy and once-off rationalisation benefits. These cannot 
disguise the continuing poor trading performance. 
Shareholders should note that more than 75 per cent. of the forecast increase in 
pre-tax profits is due to the reduction in costs following last year's redundancy and 
rationalisation programme and to a material change in accounting policy. 
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Magnet changed its accounting policy for depreciation to the benefit of forecast 
profits even though the bid was not contested. 
Example 30: Change in accounting policy 
DMSWL - Magnet Group takeover 1989 
Extract from recommended offers document forecasting net assets of Magnet 
(Target) 
Bases of Estimate 
The estimate has been prepared on the basis of the accounting policies consistently 
adopted by Magnet, save that the Magnet Group has discontinued the provision of 
depreciation of freehold and long leasehold buildings, it being the Magnet Group's 
policy to maintain them in such condition that the estimated residual values are at 
least equal to the net book values in the accounts. The charge under the previous 
policy for the year to Ist April, 1989 would have been approximately £250,000. 
The Group has continued its policy of deferring certain store opening expenses 
and is amortising these costs over two years. A formal accounting policy for this 
procedure will be defined in the accounts to Ist April, 1989. 
Highland Electronics changed its accounting policy, not to fight off the bid, but to 
be consistent with policies adopted by the bidder, Arlen. 
Example 31: Change in accounting policy 
Arlen - Highland Electronics takeover 1990 
Extract from listing particulars 
2. Basis of profit estimate (extract) 
In preparing the financial information on the Highland Group in Part V of these 
Listing Particulars and the estimates of the Highland Group's profit before 
taxation and of extraordinary charges for the year ended 30th April 1990, the 
same accounting policies have been used as those normally adopted in the 
preparation of the statutory accounts of the Highland Group save that, in order to 
bring the principal accounting policies into line with those of the Arlen Group, the 
accounting policy of the Highland Group relating to research and development 
expenditure has been changed so as to write off development expenditure as 
incurred. Consequently, development expenditure of approximately £121,000 
incurred during the year ended 30th April 1990 has been written off to the profit 
and loss account in arriving at the Highland Group's estimated profit before 
taxation for that year. 
Elsevier, a Dutch company, stated that the accounting policies normally followed 
by the company were adjusted to convert Dutch generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) to UK GAAP. 
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Example 32: Adjustment of accounting policies 
Elsevier - Reed International takeover 1992 
Extract from proposed merger document 
D. Profit Forecast (extract) 
The forecasts of consolidated profit before tax and earnings per share have been 
prepared using accounting policies normally adopted by Elsevier, as adjusted to 
conform with presentation under U. K GAAP. They are based upon the published 
unaudited interim results for the six months ended 30 June 1992, the results 
shown by unaudited management accounts for the three months ended 30 
September 1992 and forecasts for the three months ending 31 December 1992. 
The restatement of Elsevier's profit after tax from Dutch GAAP to U. K GAAP for 
the two years ending 31 December 1992 is shown below: 
RECONCILATION FROM DUTCH to UK GAAP Forecast 
1991 1992 
Dfl million Dfl million 
Profit after tax under Dutch GAAP as shown in 
Appendix 2, section B (1991 only) 380 442 
Reclassification of extraordinary items (12) (14) 
Profit after tax under U. K. GAAP as shown above M 42 
Telephone Rentals used merger accounting, rather than the more usual acquisition 
accounting, to include the results of a newly acquired subsidiary. Group profits 
were adjusted upwards as a consequence. 
Example 33: New accounting policy 
Cable and Wireless - Telephone Rentals takeover 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 16/11/1988 
1. Profit forecast (extract) 
The results of Sound Systems p1c, acquired on 29th July 1988, have been 
accounted for on a merger accounting basis. 
Notes: (extract) 
(g) The graphs on pages 2 and 3 of this document have been derived from the 
published accounts of Telephone Rentals, together with the profit and dividend 
forecasts contained in this document. 
The group pre-tax profit figures for 1985,1986 and 1987 have been restated to 
reflect the consolidation of Sound Systems plc on a merger accounting basis, as 
follows: 
As originally published 
As adjusted 
There is no effect on reported earnings 
1985 1986 1987 
(£OOOs) (L000s) (£OOOs) 
15,659 17,236 19,626 
15,915 17,391 19,902 
share in respect of 1986 and 1987. 
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7. Forecast profits not reported on 
Many takeover documents refer to future profitability which, without amounting to a 
formal profit forecast, intimates information concerning future results. Tootal refers to 
expected improvement in profitability `over and above ... this year's profit forecast'. 
This appears to be a forecast and yet has not been treated as such or reported on by 
accountants in the takeover document. 
Example 34: Forecast profit not reported on 
Coates Viyella - Tootal takeover 1991 
Extract from defence document dated 27/4/1991 of Tootal (Target) 
Tootal's action to improve profitability for the future 
In each of its core businesses, Tootal has a number of specific projects whose 
contribution to profitability is expected to improve next year by some £7.5 million. 
This is over and above any contribution from these projects to this year's profit 
forecast and does not include the effects of a general improvement in trading 
conditions. As described on pages 6 and 7, the investments for these projects are 
either in place or at a sufficiently advanced stage of implementation to offer clear 
prospects of improved profitability in 1992/93. 
A number of specific projects are being implemented in each of Tootal's core 
businesses which are expected to improve profitability. Some of these projects will 
begin delivering benefits during the current year -a total of £2.5 million of trading 
profits is included in the forecast for this year. Whilst it is not possible at this 
stage to forecast profits for 1992/93, it is expected that the contribution to 
profitability from these projects will further improve by some £7.5 million in that 
year. In addition, other opportunities for improved profitability will arise from 
normal sales and marketing initiatives, minor investments and any increases in 
overall demand resulting from the expected upturn in the textile cycle. 
The information for Telephone Rental's graph of annual rent receivable comes 
(according to the sources of information note) from the management accounts. 
Telephone Rentals disclosed a forecast for the year to 31/12/1988, but this 
forecast did not include forecast rent receivable. Thus, the graph includes data 
which has not been reported on by accountants. 
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Example 35: Forecast revenue not reported on 
Cable and Wireless - Telephone Rentals takeover 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 24/10/1988 
The following graph demonstrates TR's success in replacing its income from the 
declining market for internal telephone systems with income from the liberalised 
market for external systems. 
Annual Rent Receivable - UK Telephones 
(As at 30th September) 
16 
10 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
  Internal 
systems 
  External 
systems 
9. Sources of information 
The graphs and accompanying commentary on pages 5 and 8 of this document, 
and the chart and accompanying commentary on page 6 of this document and 
references to the turnover or trading profits in individual activities of subsidiaries 
of TR, are based on the following information derived from the management 
accounts of TR: 
Annual Rent Receivable - UK Telephones (as at 30th September) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
(£000s) (£OOOs) (£OOOs) (£OOOs) (£OOOs) 
Internal Systems 9,147 7,449 6,068 4,790 3,923 
External Systems 1,129 
0 
3,385 5,713 




15 2 8 . 276 1 Rental Base in the UK (as at 31st 
-834 1.7 1 1 December) 
1 . 011 - 4 
1982 1987 
(£000s) (£000s) 
Telephones External -- 8,777 
Data 
Communications 1,582 4,295 
Maintenance 341 3,974 
Telex -- 2,755 
Broadcast (including 
Personal Call) 4,693 5,960 
Time & Security 5,381 7,488 
Telephones Internal 10.348 4,672 
37 921 
Overseas Turnover (y 
. 22.345 
ears ended 31st December) 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
(£000s) (£000s) (£000s) (£000s) (£000s) 
Europe 11,120 12,219 12,690 12,957 14,921 
North America 2,609 3,231 3,949 5,923 6,811 
South Africa 1,694 2,005 2,863 3,672 4,565 
15.423 17.455 19.502 22.552 26.297 
Overseas Turnover has been translated at the rates of exchange ruling at 3Ist 
December 1987. 
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Saint-Gobain also disclosed `management estimates' which were not reported on. 
Example 36: Forecast revenue not reported on 
Saint-Gobain - TSL Group takeover 1988 
Extract from recommended cash offer document 
Management estimates of the results of Quartz & Silice for 1987 show turnover of 
FF235.5 million (L23.5 million) and profit before tax of FF22.7 million (£2.3 
DRG refers to estimates of expected profits over the next eight years. Although a 
certificate of valuation of the properties is provided, this does not seem 
appropriate where profits are being forecast. 
Example 37: Forecast profit not reported on 
Pembridge Associates - DRG takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 31/10/1989 
Our programme of disposals is expected to generate profits, after costs and tax, 
AT TODAY'S PRICES, of about £90 million over the next 8 years (1990-1997) of 
which at least £50 million will be realised over the next 5 years (1990-1994). 
Some companies included projections in the takeover documents which were 
specifically referred to as not being forecasts (and therefore were not reported 
on). The extract below from De La Rue's defence document illustrates the point, 
as does example 49 father on. 
Example 38: Projection `not a forecast' 
Norton Opat - De La Rue takeover bid 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 9/9/1989 
For illustration only, the table below sets out the arithmetic effect on Norton 
Opax's earnings of the implementation of the Norton Opax Final Offer for De La 
Rue. It is based on (i) the 1988 published audited consolidated accounts of Norton 
Opax as adjusted to eliminate the impact of the benefits of the pension holiday (in 
accordance with Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 24 in respect of 
accounting for pension contributions) and an exceptional item. The resultant profit 
before taxation has been increased from 1988 by 0,15,20 and 25 per cent, per 
annum respectively; and (ii) the Norton Opax estimate of De La Rue's (post 
Crosfield) earnings, adjusted for assumed cost savings less acquisition interest 
(adjusted for projected disposals) for 1990, increased by 0,15,20 and 25 per cent. 
respectively for 1991 (see paragraph 6 of the Appendix). 
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Example 38: Projection `not a forecast' (continued) 
Norton Opa: - De La Rue takeover bid 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 9/9/1989 
THESE FIGURES ARE NOT TO BE TAKEN IN ANY WAY AS PROFIT 
FORECASTS 
Illustrative 1990 
Illustrative growth in profits 0% 15% 20% 25% 
£m £m £m £m 
Profit before taxation of the 
enlarged group 76.1 85.3 88.7 92.2 
Taxation (22.8) (25.6) (26.6) (27.6) 
Minorities (3, Z) (2, Z) L3,2) (1,2) 
501 5i 2 61.4 
Fully diluted number of ordinary 
shares following the Final Offer 392.4 million 
Earnings per share (p) 12. $ 1AA L .4 lid Illustrative 1991 
Illustrative growth in profits 0% 15% 20% 25% 
£m £m £m £m 
Profit before taxation of the 
enlarged group 76.1 98.1 106.4 115.3 
Taxation (22.8) (29.4) (31.9) (34.6) 
Minorities (3.2) (1,2) (3 8) (4, Q) 
501 ý. ý. Q 2Q1 2Z 
Fully diluted number of ordinary 
shares following the Final Offer 392.4 million 
Earnings per share (p) 12.8 1Lfi JIQ 12.1 
Although Uhramar stresses that the `possible outcome' is not a forecast, it is 
difficult to see the distinction between it and a forecast. 
Example 39: Projection `not a forecast' 
LASMO - Ultramar takeover 1991 
Extract from document dated 28/11/1991 from Ultramar (Target) 
Prospects for 1992 and measures to improve cash flow 
The prospects for 1992 are encouraging. Although it is difficult to make a forecast 
in respect of a year which has yet to start, your Board wishes to provide 
shareholders with as much guidance as it reasonably can. We have therefore 
combined a forecast for our upstream businesses with a projection of what might 
be achieved by our downstream businesses as more normal business conditions 
return. This implies net profit after exceptional items and earnings per share for 
1992 of £126 million and 34p, respectively. It must be stressed that this is not a 
forecast; it illustrates what is possible as more normal business conditions return. 
Adding this to the forecast post-tax operating profit for the upstream businesses, 
and after adjusting for group items, interest, minorities and exceptional items, as 
set out in Appendix III, implies net profit for the Group after exceptional items for 
1992 of £126 million and earnings per share of 34p. This is not a forecast of what 
will happen in 1992 but an illustration of the possible outcome as more normal 
business conditions return. 
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Example 39: Projection 'not a forecast' (continued) 
LASMO - Ultramar takeover 1991 
Extract from document dated 28/11/1991 from Ultramar (Target) 
Guidance on 1992 
" It is clearly difficult to make a forecast in respect of a year which has yet to 
start. However, your Board wishes to provide shareholders with as much 
guidance as it reasonably can. 
Upstream 
" Our upstream businesses continue to perform well and record levels of 
production are expected in 1992 before taking account of any disposal of the 
Indonesian interests. Based on the assumptions set out in Appendix III, and in 
the absence of unforeseen circumstances, your Board forecasts post-tax 
operating profits for the upstream businesses in 1992 of the order of £68 
million. 
Downstream 
" The results of our downstream businesses are particularly difficult to predict a 
long way ahead because they are very sensitive to business conditions and the 
weather, as well as crude oil prices. They are especially affected by refinery 
and retail volumes and margins, which management can only influence to a 
limited degree in the short term. Past experience can, however, provide some 
guide to the future. The following table sets out volume and margin data for 
the downstream businesses in Eastern Canada and California over the period 
1989-1991 with our forecast for the fourth quarter of 1991 and a projection of 
what is possible for 1992, as more normal business conditions return: 
Eastern Canada California 
Product Product 
sales Profit sales Profit 
(million per barrel (million per barrel 
barrels) (US$) barrels) (US$) 
1989 45.4 2.83 43.9 1.82 
1990 44 3.63 4 2.28 
1991 Q1 11.1 (0.32) 10.3 (0.27) 
Q2 11.9 9.5 (2.25) 11.0 4.2 0.16 
Q3 13.2 1.02 11.4 1.25 
Q4 (forecast) 13.3 1.27 11.5 0.95 
1992 (projected) 51.6 2.44 43.4 2.00 
Note: Profit in the above table is 
Argyle Trust made a forecast for 1988 which was not reported on and which, 
most unusually, included a `profit warranty' from the chairman in respect of 
1989. Legally, the value to shareholders of this warranty is questionable, 
especially in view of the limitation on Mr. Oppenheim's personal liability. 
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Example 40: Profit warranty 
Dewey Warren - Argyle Trust takeover 1989 
Extract from recommended offers document 
You will, however, note that Mr. Oppenheim has (subject to certain conditions) 
given an irrevocable undertaking to accept the Offer in respect of the 3,610,000 
Argyle Shares owned or controlled by him (representing approximately 16.9 per 
cent of the present issued share capital) and has personally warranted (subject to a 
maximum liability on him of £500,000) that the pre-tax profits of Argyle for the 
year ending 31st December, 1989 will be not less than £3,000,000. Further details 
of the profit warranty are set out in Part 8 of the Particulars Card. 
S. Other forecasts 
Future orientated information, not in the nature of a formal forecast (and 
therefore not reported on by reporting accountants/merchant bankers), was 
included in offer documents in some cases. Estimates of oil and gas reserves, 
estimates of net asset values, estimates of copyright valuation, estimates of patent 
valuation and estimates of embedded values were found which were reported on 
by independent experts such as accountants, engineers, mining consultants, 
chartered surveyors, merchant bankers and actuaries. However, there were even 
more examples of forecast items which were not independently reported on. 
Takeover documents frequently include forecasts of non financial items. Without 
making a profit forecast, Freemans attempts to create the impression of improving 
results by forecasting `active agents'. 
Example 41: Forecast item not reported on 
Sears - Freemans takeover 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 11/1/1988 of Freemans (Target) 
1988: Prospects (extract) 
We start 1988 from an absolutely sound base. We expect to have 730,000 active 
agents at the start of the new financial year - an increase of almost 6 per cent over 
the past 12 months. 
It is not uncommon to see takeover documents include reference to the size of 
companies' order books to give the impression of improving profitability without 
disclosing a formal forecast. 
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Example 42: Forecast item not reported on 
AN! " Aurora takeover 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 22/11/1988 
The Group's order book has increased by more than 70 per cent. since the 
beginning of the year and now stands at £42 million. 
Extract from defence document dated 30/11/1988 
Aurora has excellent future prospects, as demonstrated by its order book which 
now stands at £42 million, an increase of more than 70 per cent. since the 
beginning of the year. 
Ricardo's estimate of its order book was attacked by First Technology, the bidder. 
Example 43: Forecast item not reported on and attack thereon 
First Technology - Ricardo takeover bid 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 10/3/1989 
The offer is wholly inadequate (extract) 
It does not reflect the value of Ricardo's order book of over £21 million and its 
excellent prospects. 
Extract from increased and final offer document of First Technology (Bidder) 
Ricardo order book 
Considerable play was made by Ricardo in their defence document of their record 
order book. They said: 
"Our order book, including the substantial Russian contracts, now 
stands at over £20 million, the highest that we have ever had. " 
It is interesting to recall that Ricardo's broker in a note dated 8th September, 1988 
stated: 
"The order book is very full at present and totals over £30 million". 
There seems to be some question of just what constitutes a record order book. 
Furthermore, an article in Investors Chronicle, dated 18th February 1988, spoke of 
Russian contracts totalling £14 million. This underlines a very heavy dependence 
on the Eastern block. 
Gold Fields projects increased interest (not defined) in gold production. Some 
information is provided on how these projections are arrived at. 
Example 44: Forecast item not reported on 
Minorco - Consolidated Gold Fields takeover bid 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 15/10/1988 
Sharply rising gold production (extract) 
Gold Fields interest in gold production has increased by 21 per cent. over the past 
three years to 1.4 million ounces. By 1991 it is projected to rise by a further 44 per 
cent. to over 2 million ounces. This growth is the direct result of successful 
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Example 44: Forecast item not reported on (continued) 
Minorco - Consolidated Gold Fields takeover bid 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 15/10/1988 
Bases and sources of financial information (extract) 
(f) The projections of Gold Fields interest in gold production contained on pages 2 
and 3 are derived from internal estimates prepared by the relevant members of 
the Gold Fields Group and are based on operating plans which assume gold 
prices in 1991 of US$431 per ounce, AS599 per ounce and R48,400/kg 
respectively for US, Australian and South African operations. 
Gold Fields repeated its forecast of gold production in a subsequent bid from 
Minorco. The forecast did not change but the explanation of its calculation did. 
Most notable is the change in the rate of exchange used, which dropped from 
US$431 to US$ 400 per ounce. This drop in exchange rate did not, however, 
change the projections. 
Example 45: Forecast item not reported on 
Minorco - Consolidated Gold Fields takeover bid 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 9/3/1989 of Cold Fields (Target) 
What has this meant for you? 
Gold Fields total beneficial gold production has risen 21 per cent. over the last 
three years to 1.4 million ounces per annum. Over the next three years, it is 
planned to rise a further 44 per cent. to over 2 million ounces. 
Notes: 
(r) The projections of Gold Fields total beneficial gold production on page 7 are to 
its proportionate interest in the production of its subsidiaries and associates. 
The projection on page 3 of Newmont Gold's gold production in 1989 and the 
projections of Gold Fields total beneficial gold production for 1991 have been 
derived from internal estimates prepared by the relevant members of the Gold 
Fields Group and are based on operating plans which assume gold prices in 
1991 which reflect the operation on a 1989 gold price of USS400 of internal 
assumptions as to local inflation and exchange rates for the period 1989 to 
1991. 
9. Use of third party forecasts 
Takeover documents frequently include forecast information of third parties such 
as brokers' forecasts. Coalite used brokers' forecasts in lieu of making its own 
forecast. 
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Example 46: Use of third party forecasts 
Anglo United - Coalite takeover 1989 
Extract from offer document 
Coalite is expected to announce earnings per share of 32.9p for the year ended 
31st March, 1989 (consensus of brokers' forecasts May, 1989 Earnings Guide). 
This represents a compound increase in earnings of only 2 per cent per year over 
the last three financial years (after making an adjustment for inflation). 
The Offer represents a price earnings multiple of approximately 13.6 times (based 
on pre-tax profits of £45.5 million of Coalite) for the period ended 31st March, 
1988 and approximately 12.9 times (based on the above brokers' forecasts of pre- 
tax profits of £48.1 million) for the period ended 31st March, 1989. 
Analysts' forecasts can be used to attack the other side's profitability. 
Example 47: Use of third party forecasts 
BTR - Hawker Siddeley takeover 1991 
Extract from offer document 
Hawker Siddeley's future prospects 
Nothing in these results suggests that Hawker Siddeley's present senior 
management team will prove any more successful than its predecessors. An 
average of financial analysts' recent forecasts predicts that Hawker Siddeley's pre- 
tax profits will fall to £119.9 million in 1991. 
Pleasurama's forecasting ability was attacked for failing to meet its own broker's 
forecast. 
Example 48: Use of third party forecasts 
Mecca - Pleasurama takeover 1988 
Extract from document dated 26/9/1988 from Mecca (Bidder) 
Pleasurama's results for each of the last two years have fallen significantly below 
market expectations, and failed to meet forecasts made by its own broker less than 
six weeks before the end of each trading year. 
How reliable, therefore, are forecasts or predictions relating to the future 
performance of Pleasurama? 
Mecca used brokers' forecasts to make its own projections of Pleasurama's 
profitability (conditional on the takeover going ahead). 
347 
Example 49: Use of third party forecasts 
Mecca - Pleasurama takeover 1988 
Extract from document dated 5/10/1988 from Mecca (Bidder) 
For illustration only, the table below sets out the arithmetic effect on Mecca's 
earnings of the implementation of the Final Offers. It is based on the consensus 
profit projection for 1989 for Pleasurama, including Hard Rock, shown in the 
Earnings Guide for September, 1988; Mecca's forecast earnings per share 
(excluding property profits) for 1988 increased by 0,10 and 20 per cent. 
respectively, and, incorporating illustrative levels for synergy benefits of 8,9 and 
10 per cent of the combined group's profits before tax. 
These figures are not to be taken in any way as profit forecasts. 
Illustrative growth in Mecca's 1989 
earnings per share compared with 1988 
forecast of 14.4p 0% 10° 20° 
Earnings per share 14.4p 15.8p 17.3p 
Earnings enhancement or dilution in enlarged 
Group with synergy benefits before tax of. 8% +6% -1% -7% 
9% +7% 0% -6% 
10% +8% +1% -5% 
The use of brokers' forecasts can be very selective. Some firms use consensus 
forecasts from, say, The Earnings Guide. Other companies use fewer (as low as 
one) brokers' forecasts. Wassail explained why it used only one brokers' forecast. 
Example 50: Use of third party forecasts 
Wassail - Metal Closures takeover 1990 
Extract from offers document 
James Capel's estimate of Metal Closures' pre-tax profits for the year to 31 
December, 1989 is £5.7 million. If this proves accurate, these profits will be nearly 
25 per cent. below the 1988 level and actually lower than those achieved in 1978, 
1979,1981,1983,1984 and 1987. 




6  Metal Closures 
4 prelax profit 
s 
0 
18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 
74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 
6. Sources and bases for calculations (extract) 
7. Forecast pre-tax profits of Metal Closures 
James Capel, Morning Meeting, 6 September, 1989. (James Capel are the only 
broker named in The Earnings Guide, November, 1989 edition in respect of 
Metal Closures. ) 
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Coates Viyella made very full disclosure of how it calculated its consensus 
brokers' forecast. The note, however, does not say why those particular brokers' 
estimates were chosen. However, there is good explanation of why one broker's 
estimate was excluded from the calculation. 
Example 51: Use of third party forecasts 
Coates Viyella - Tootal takeover 1991 
Extract from recommended offers document from Coates Viyella (Bidder) 
Consensus of analysts' estimates of Tootal's earnings per share 
for the year ended 31st January, 1991 
Date Name Earnings per share 
27th February, 1991 James Capel & Co. Limited 4. Op 
15th February, 1991 SG Warburg, Akroyd, Rowe & 
Pitman, Mullens Securities Limited 3.7p 
8th February, 1991 Hoare Govett Investment Research 
Limited 4.4p 
21st February, 1991 Barclays de Zoete & Bevan 
Research Limited 3.9p 
February, 1991 UBS Phillips & Drew 4.2p 
11th February, 1991 Carr Kitcat & Aitken Limited A ,. 2p Average 41p 
In addition, in February 1991, Henry Cooke, Lumsden plc published an estimate 
of 6.3p for Tootal's earnings per share for the year ended 31st January, 1991, but 
stated that its revised estimate assumes no change in accounting practices 
following the management changes. As the estimate has been compiled on a basis 
which Coates Viyella believes to be inconsistent with the estimates which 
comprise the consensus estimate, it has not been included. If its estimate were 
included, the consensus estimate would be 4.4p. 
First Technology used brokers' forecasts to attack Ricardo's forecasting ability. 
Example 52: Use of third party forecast information 
First Technology - Ricardo takeover bid 1989 
Extract from increased and final offer document 
In judging any forecast for the current year, please consider the problems 
Ricardo's own broker had in forecasting last year's outcome: 
James Capel's forecasts for the year June 1988 
Date offorecast Pretax profits (£m) 
Sep 1986 3.7 
Feb 1987 3.0 
Jun 1987 2.2 
10 Feb 1988 1.8 
17 Feb 1988 1.3 
Actual 1.1 
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Sundry forecast information from other sources is used in takeover documents. 
Example 53: Use of third party forecasts 
Cable and Wireless - Telephone Rentals takeover 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 16/11/1988 
The Claims The Facts 
Cable and Wireless claims With 50,000 UK installations, TR 
that TR would benefit from has a substantially larger business 
Mercury's customer base. customer base than that 
represented by Mercury's reported 
9,000 business customers. 
3. Sources of information (extract) 
(a) The estimate of business customers of Mercury used on page 5 is derived from 
a report in the Daily Telegraph of Ist September 1988 relating to the launch of 
Mercury's customer compensation scheme. 
Ruberoid used a forecast by the Building Materials Producers Association to 
forecast increase in business. 
Example 54: Use of third party forecasts 
Raine Industries - Ruberoid takeover bid 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 10/8/1988 
Ruberoid derives substantial business from commercial and industrial building 
which are forecast by the Building Material Producers Association, to enjoy 
increases in 1989. 
Bases for information (extract) 
(7) The reference on pages 6 and 8 to the forecasts by the Building Material 
Producers Association is taken from the 1988 report by the National Council of 
Building Material Producers. 
Racal Electronics used third party forecasts to attack the business of the other 
side. 
Example 55: Use of third party forecasts 
Williams Holdings - Racal Electronics takeover bid 1991 
Extract from defence document dated 28/11/1991 
Williams sales of fire protection equipment to the civil aviation market are 
exposed to the forecast decline in aero engine deliveries. 
Notes (extract) 
(viii) Page five: The reference to the forecast decline of aero engine deliveries is 
taken from The Airline Monitor, July 1991, over the period 1991-2000. 
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10. Attacks on forecasts 
Profit forecasts are frequently attacked in contested bids. This, to some extent, 
affects forecast content as the forecaster must consider what the other party's 
reaction to the forecast will be. Pleasurama attacked Mecca's forecast because it 
excluded losses of a subsidiary. 
Example 56: Attack on forecast 
Mecca - Pleasurama takeover 1988 
Extract from defence document dated 12/10/1988 
MECCA'S GROWTH: 24 OR 10 PER CENT.? 
Mecca forecasts growth in earnings per share of not less than 24 per cent. (before 
exceptional property profits). This forecast includes the one-off benefit from the 
timing of the acquisition of Ladbroke Holidays. The exclusion of 3 of Ladbroke 
Holidays' loss making winter months is estimated to have saved £1.5 million and 
next year's results will bear the full impact of these losses. Pleasurama 
estimates that if this benefit had not been available and financing for the 
acquisition had been in place for the full year, the pro forma growth in 
earnings per share (before exceptional property profits) would have been 
less than 10 per cent. (assuming that Mecca's profit forecast for the year ended 
30th September 1988 is exactly achieved). 
Epicure attacked Habit Precision for its choice of interest rate. 
Example 57: Attack on forecast 
Epicure - Habit Precision Engineering takeover 1989 
Letter to shareholders from Epicure (bidder) dated 26/5/1989 
Profit forecast (extract) 
The profit forecast assumes no increase in interest rates. Base rate has 
subsequently risen by one per cent. to add to the interest costs of £650,000 on an 
unacceptably high level of borrowings and gearing. 
Accounting methods may also be attacked. Embedded value accounting, 
treatment of costs as extraordinary, below the line, items rather than exceptional 
items (and vice versa in the case of revenues), capitalisation of costs, release of 
unused provisions to forecast profits, accounting for subsidiaries acquired and 
disposed of, and treatment of pension costs are all accounting methods that were 
attacked. 
351 
American Brands attacked Invergordon Distillers for the sudden increase in 
forecast profits compared to brokers' forecasts. The forecast was attacked for 
manipulation of stock levels, production levels and marketing spend to the benefit 
of the forecast. The possible once-off release of provisions was also attacked. 
Example 58: Attack on forecast 
American Brands - Invergordon Distillers takeover bid 1991 
Extract from increased and final cash offer document 
1991 profit forecast 
" The Board of Invergordon has failed to explain to shareholders why its 1991 
profit forecast is suddenly so much higher than its own broker and other 
analysts were recently forecasting, particularly when first half turnover was 
significantly below brokers' forecasts. 
Shareholders need answers to the following questions 
- Stock 
How much of the forecast profit increase is the result of accelerating the sale 
of stocks of maturing whisky or switching from bought-in stock to cheaper 
company-produced stock - resulting in an unsustainable rate of profit growth? 
- Production levels 
Is your Board boosting profits by not adhering to its previously stated policy 
that it would cut production substantially this year? If so, more severe 
production cuts are likely in 1992. 
- Marketing expenditure 
How much of the forecast profit increase is the result of a reduction in much 
needed brand development and advertising expenditure thereby increasing 
Invergordon's vulnerability by allowing its small branded market share to 
continue to stagnate? 
- One-off release of provisions 
How much of the forecast profit increase is the result of the one-off release of 
balance sheet provisions? 
1992 profits 
" Invergordon boasts that its forecast profit is a year ahead of expectations but 
says absolutely nothing about prospects for 1992. In the light of 1991 forecast 
profits possibly boosted by one-off items and with challenging market 
conditions ahead, will Invergordon achieve any real growth in its operating 
profit in 1992 and beyond? 
11. Misleading information in forecasts 
Some companies were attacked for using misleading information in their forecast. 
Example 59: Attack for misleading information 
General Motors - SD-Scicon takeover 1991 
Extract from document dated 5/7/1991 from General Motors (Bidder) 
SD-Scicon multiplies its forecast profits by other software company price earnings 
multiples. This is misleading. 
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Bejam was attacked for presenting misleading comparative figures. 
Example 60: Attack for misrepresentation of results 
Iceland Frozen Foods - Bejam takeover 1988 
Extract from document dated 18/11/1988 from Iceland Frozen Foods (Bidder) 
The statistics quoted by your board on Bejam's profits disguise the all important 
difference in the underlying trends of our respective companies - which show 
Iceland is growing rapidly and Bejam is static or declining - this results from 
Bejam's highly selective choice of presenting only a one year comparison. 
12. Dividend forecasts 
In lieu of a profit forecast, many companies disclose dividend forecasts which do 
not have to be reported on. A forecast of dividends is not normally considered to 
be a profit forecast, but it will be where it is accompanied by an estimate of 
dividend cover (City Code, Rule 28.6 (f)). 
Example 61: Dividend forecast 
HSBC - Midland Bank takeover 1992 
Extract from listing particulars 
S. HSBC Holdings' 1991 final dividend and 1992 dividend forecast (extract) 
On 10 March 1992, the Board of HSBC Holdings stated that, in the absence of 
unforeseen circumstances, the Directors expect to recommend dividends for 1992 
of not less than HK$2.00 per share (equivalent to 14. Sp at the current exchange 
rate), an 8.1 per cent. increase over the dividends for 1991. The Board of HSBC 
Holdings reaffirms this forecast which applies both to the new HSBC Holdings 
shares and to the existing HSBC Holdings shares. 
Example 62: Dividend forecast 
Raine Industries - Walter Lawrence takeover 1992 
Extract from proposed acquisition document by Raine Industries (Bidder) 
Current trading and prospects of Raine, and dividend forecast (extract) 
The Board of Raine intends to recommend, in the absence of unforeseen 
circumstances, payment of a final dividend in respect of the financial year ending 
30th June, 1992 of 4. Op (net) per share on the ordinary share capital of Raine, 
including Raine ordinary shares issued pursuant to the rights issue and the Offers. 
Plessey felt unable to make a formal profit forecast but did make a dividend 
forecast. 
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Example 63: Dividend forecast 
GEC Siemens - Plessey takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 2/9/1989 
Dividend Forecast 
At this early stage in Plessey's financial year and given the complications of the 
GPT structure, your Board feels it would not be appropriate to make a formal 
forecast of Plessey's profit for the year to 31 March 1990. At the same time, your 
Board is fully confident regarding the Company's prospects and firmly believes 
the future strategy for the Company, already explained to you, should produce 
significant benefits for shareholders. 
As a measure of this confidence your Board has decided that, in the absence of 
unforeseen circumstances, it intends to recommend a total net dividend for the 
current year of 9.19p, representing an increase of 20'/0 over last year. Since 1985 
increases at the rate of 15% per annum have been achieved and taking account of 
the forecast dividend the income on your shares will have more than doubled over 
this period. This dividend forecast signifies the determination of your Board that 
the benefits of the Company's strategy should flow through to shareholders and its 
belief in the future quality of the Company's performance. 
The dividend forecast is almost invariably accompanied by the wording `in the 
absence of unforeseen circumstances'. Dewey Warren did not use this phrase 
and, when the bid did not proceed, it reversed its dividend intentions. 
Example 64: Reversal of dividend forecast 
Robert Frazer - Dewey Warren takeover bid 1989 
Extract from proposed acquisition document 
Dividends 
The Board intends, shortly after completion of the Acquisition, to declare a special 
interim dividend on the ordinary share capital of the Company calculated by 
reference to anticipated earnings in the period prior to completion of the 
Acquisition. The Board anticipates that this special dividend will be 6.5p net per 
Ordinary Share. No interest will be payable on the New Stock by reference to that 
special dividend. 
In addition, your directors currently intend to recommend a final dividend of not 
less than 5p net per Ordinary Share for the period ending on 30th June, 1990. 
These proposed dividends represent a gross annualised yield of not less than 8.8 
per cent (see paragraph 15 of Part 10). 
Thereafter, it is the present intention of the Board of Dewey Warren to adopt a 
policy of distributing by way of dividend the majority of its profits available for 
distribution to shareholders. 
Agreement not to proceed document dated 2/9/1989 from Dewey Warren 
(Target) 
Accounting reference date and future dividend policy 
In view of the termination of the proposed Acquisition, the Company's accounting 
reference date will remain 31st December, and your Board no longer intends to 
recommend a final dividend for the period ending on 30th June, 1990, as had been 
indicated in the circular dated 20th September, 1989. The Company's future 
dividend policy is being reviewed by your Board. 
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Camford Properties devoted an entire page in its defence document to the 
forecast dividend. 
Example 65: Dividend forecast 
Adstream - Camford takeover 1990 
Extract from defence document dated 15/3/1990 
Forecast New Property Dividends 
As funds are released from our property resources, Camford will invest the 
proceeds initially in the money markets and then in our growing engineering 
businesses. Additionally your Directors intend in future to distribute to 
shareholders a proportion of our property gains and the income generated 
therefrom. Your Board forecasts that Camford will, in the absence of unforeseen 
circumstances, pay annual property dividends amounting to 
15 pence net per Camford share 
for at least the next three financial years. The new property dividends will be in 
addition to the normal dividends to be paid out of earnings from Camford's 
engineering businesses. 
It is intended that these property dividends will be paid in two equal instalments of 
74 pence net each, usually coinciding with our normal dividend payments. The 
first payment, an interim in respect of the year ending 30th September, 1991, will 
be made in December 1990. The second payment, a further interim for that year, 
will be made in July 1991. 
After three years, we shall review our property dividend payments in the light of 
our progress in realising Camford's surplus property assets and of the returns 
obtained from reinvesting the realised proceeds in our engineering businesses. It 
would be the longer term aim of your Board that our aggregate dividends would be 
at least maintained thereafter. 
The dividend forecast is rarely attacked. 
Example 66: Attack on dividend forecast 
Industrivarden - Redfearn takeover 1988 
Extract from document dated 23/11/1988 from Industrivarden (Bidder) 
A defensive dividend increase 
Shareholders could be forgiven for being sceptical about the size of the increase in 
the final dividend proposed by the Redfearn Board. At the half year, in the light of 
the disappointing results, the Board did not see fit to recommend any increase in 
dividend. However, despite the fall in earnings per share, it has now proposed an 
increase in the dividend for the year as a whole of nearly one half. This results in a 
much lower level of dividend cover than the Board has, in recent years, considered 
appropriate. Moreover, the dividend cover figure published in the Redfearn 
defence document benefits substantially from the particularly low tax charge in the 
financial year just ended. 
Would this dividend have been declared in the absence of our offer? Can this 
be described as prudent? 
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13. Current trading and prospects 
Most companies include a paragraph in the takeover document on current trading 
and prospects. Without making a formal forecast, boards can give shareholders an 
indication of companies' performance. Penny & Giles' chairman did not give 
shareholders reason to be optimistic. 
Example 67: Current trading and prospects 
Bowthorpe - Penny & Giles takeover 1992 
Extract from recommended offer document 
Current trading and prospects 
In the interim announcement released in November 1991, I stated that we had 
revised our plans for growth due to difficult market conditions. Since then there 
has been no improvement in the principal markets in which Penny & Giles 
operates. 
Despite this difficult trading environment, sales have held up well and market 
shares have been maintained. This has been achieved through the introduction of 
a number of new products and concentrated marketing effort, but at the expense of 
some further pressure on margins, despite actions taken earlier in the year to 
reduce costs. 
Lloyds Chemists were much more upbeat. 
Example 68: Current trading and prospects 
Lloyds Chemists - Macarthy takeover 1992 
Extract from proposed acquisition document from Lloyds Chemists (Bidder) 
Future prospects for the enlarged Lloyds Chemists 
We believe that the prospects of the enlarged Lloyds group are excellent. Both 
Macarthy as well as existing Lloyds shareholders can expect to benefit from the 
commercial and financial strengths and future growth of the enlarged group. 
The enlarged group will be a significant force in the health care industry, being 
the second largest chain of chemist stores, the second largest chain of drugstores 
and the largest specialist health food retailer, as well as having interests in 
pharmaceutical and veterinary products, and the wholesaling of toiletries. 
Lloyds' results for the current financial year will reflect our strong trading, and 
will also include benefits from the businesses which we acquired in 1991, 
including Kingswood-GK and Holland & Barrett. 
14. Disclosure of information privately 
The research tests whether substantial shareholdings are relevant to disclosure 
because it is easier to inform a small number of large shareholders privately. 
Interviewees also referred to disclosure of information privately. The following 
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extracts support the evidence that information is disclosed privately. Coates 
Viyella refers to information disclosed at a meeting with a member of the board. 
Example 69: Private disclosure 
Coates Viyella - Tootal takeover 1991 
Extract from increased and final offer document 
4. Bases of calculations and sources of information (extract) 
(g) Page 9 (extract) 
The reference to pre-tax profits indicated by Tootal for the year ended 31st 
January, 1990 is derived from contemporaneous notes of a meeting with a 
member of the Board of Tootal in May, 1989. 
ANI states that a profit forecast was disclosed privately to it and to other major 
shareholders. 
Example 70: Private disclosure 
ANI - Aurora takeover 1988 
Letter to Aurora (target) shareholders from ANI (bidder) dated 26/11/1988 
When we met Aurora in October 1988 to discuss an offer for your company we were 
given a profit forecast for 1988 and an asset revaluation estimate. This information 
was also given to Aurora's other major shareholders, including Electra. Shortly 
thereafter, Electra sold to us its entire holding of 19.1 per cent. at the Offer price. 
Plessey refers to meetings with larger institutional shareholders. 
Example 71: Private disclosure 
GEC Siemens - Plessey takeover 1989 
Extract from defence document dated 2/9/1989 
Since our circular to shareholders was posted on 21 August, senior executives of 
Plessey have met with most of your Company's larger institutional shareholders to 
reinforce the message that this bid should be rejected You will appreciate that it 
has not been possible to make personal contract with all shareholders. Plessey does 
have a large number of private shareholders who collectively own a significant 
proportion of the Company. If you are a private shareholder, I would like to take 
this opportunity to emphasise how important your support has been and continues 
to be to the Company. 
Beazer had to disclose management forecasts and estimates, solely because this 
information had been disclosed to Hanson. This example illustrates the dangers of 
disclosing private information. As is brought out in the interviews, private 
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information must be disclosed to other interested parties if they request it. It is 
not clear why this information did not have to be reported on when subsequently 
disclosed. 
Example 72: Other future orientated information 
Hanson - Beazer takeover 1991 
Extract from the recommended offer document of Hanson (Bidder) 
Certain financial information regarding future operations of Beazer 
Beazer does not as a matter of course make public forecasts or projections as to 
future revenues or results of operations. However, during the course of 
negotiations, Beazer provided certain confidential information to representatives 
of Hanson. See "Certain Considerations - Background of the Offer". Such 
information included the estimates by Beazer's management of Beazer's future 
financial performance that are set forth below (the "Beazer Information"). 
Year Ending June 30 Sales Pre-Tax Profits(1) Net Income 
(Pounds sterling - millions) 
1992 2,055.8 43.7 17.5 
1993 2,356.1 76.1 37.0 
1994 2,627.6 128.9 71.6 
1995 2,974.1 159.8 92.0 
1996 3,269.8 201.0 118.4 
1997 3,591.6 250.6 150.9 
(1) Pre-tax profit is income before income taxes, minority interests and 
extraordinary items. 
The Beazer Financial Information was prepared in good faith solely in connection 
with the negotiation of the Master Facility Agreement and not with a view towards 
public disclosure or complying with either the published guidelines of the 
Commission regarding projections or forecasts or the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants' Guide for Prospective Financial Statements or the 
rules of the City Code. The Beazer Financial Information was not audited and is 
included in this document in compliance with US legal requirements. 
The Beazer Financial information, while presented with numerical specificity, was 
based upon various estimates and assumptions (some of which are referred to in 
the following paragraphs) which are inherently subject to significant business, 
economic and competitive uncertainties, contingencies and risks, all of which are 
difficult to quantify and many of which are beyond the control of Beazer. 
Accordingly, there can be no assurances that the financial performance set forth in 
the Beazer Financial information will be realized and it is likely that Beazer's 
future financial performance will vary from that set forth above, possibly by 
material amounts. 
The Beazer Financial Information was prepared by Beazer management during 
the spring of 1991 and provided to Beazer's banks in connection with the 
negotiation of the Master Facility Agreement. The Beazer Financial Information 
was based on management judgements at the time utilizing a number of internal 
sources, including historical financial information, annual plans, strategic plans 
and other business plans. The Beazer Financial Information was predicated upon, 
among other things, improved economic conditions in the UK and the US 
commencing in late 1991 or early 1992, the ability of Beazer to complete an 
aggregate of S175 million in planned asset dispositions in the next three fiscal 
years, the lack of the incurrence by Beazer of significant additional expense 
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Example 72: Other future orientated information (continued) 
Hanson - Beazer takeover 1991 
Extract from the recommended offer document of Hanson (Bidder) 
related to environmental liabilities and the absence of any material changes to the 
business, operations and assets of Beazer (and, in particular, no sale of CHB 
Group). In addition, the Beazer Financial Information also assumed, among other 
things, that foreign exchange rates for the US dollar would be £1.00 - $1.80 and 
Beazer's effective average interest rate on borrowings would be 11%. 
Neither Beazer nor Hanson presently intends to update or otherwise publicly 
revise the Beazer Financial Information presented herein to reflect circumstances 
existing or developments occurring after the preparation of such information or to 
reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events. The Beazer Financial Information 
is included in thia Prospectus solely because such information was provided to 
Hanson. The Beazer Financial Information has not been independently verified by 
Hanson, Lehman Brothers, County NatWest or Rothschild. Inclusion of the Beazer 
Financial Information in this Prospectus should not be regarded as a 
representation by any person that the results will be achieved. 
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Appendix 5: FULL LIST OF TAKEOVER BIDS IN THE STUDY 
Source: Acquisitions Monthly January 1989,1990,1991,1992,1993 
Ref Year Bidder Target 
1 1988 Nestle S. A. (Swiss) Rowntree (No. 1) 
2 1988 British Petroleum Britoil 
3 1988 Lloyds Bank Abbey Life 
4 1988 Daily Mail & General Trust Associated Newspapers 
5 1988 Mecca Leisure Group Pleasurama 
6 1988 British Coal Pension Trust TR Industrial & General Trust 
7 1988 Sears Freemans 
8 1988 Lowdnes Harris Queensway 
9 1988 St. Paul Companies (US) Minet Holdings 
10 1988 British & Commonwealth Atlantic Computers 
11 1988 British Gas Acre Oil (No. 2) 
12 1988 Blue Circle Birmid Qualcast (No. 1) 
13 1988 Williams Holdings Pilgrim House Group 
14 1988 Cable & Wireless Telephone Rentals 
15 1988 Wereldhave (Holland) Peachey Property 
16 1988 Wickes Hunter 
17 1988 Glowtrack Virgin Group 
18 1988 BBA Group Guthrie Corporation 
19 1988 Pernod Ricard (France) Irish Distillers Group (No. 3)(Irish) 
20 1988 Iceland Frozen Foods Bejam 
21 1988 BAA Lynton Property & Revisionary 
22 1988 Coloroll John Crowther (No. 1) 
23 1988 Kelt Energy Carless 
24 1988 Trafalgar House Chase Property Holdings 
25 1988 British & Commonwealth Abaco Investments 
26 1988 Atlantic Richfield (US) Tricentrol (No. 2) 
27 1988 Trusthouse Forte Kennedy Brookes 
28 1988 Plessey Hoskyns Group 
29 1988 British Aerospace Rover Group 
30 1988 Sandell Perkins Travis & Arnold (No. 1) 
31 1988 Leisure Investments LandLeisure 
32 1988 Tarmac Ruberoid (No. 2) 
33 1988 ANI (Australia) Aurora 
34 1988 Kelt Concorde Energy 
35 1988 Ward White AG Stanley 
36 1988 AMEC Matthew Hall 
37 1988 Pergamon Prof. & Financial Services AGB Research 
38 1988 Campbell Soup (US) Freshbake Foods 
39 1988 Glynwed International Amari 
40 1988 Granada Group DPCE Holdings 
41 1988 DMWS 99 Invergordon Distillers 
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Ref Year Bidder 












































































































Compagnie G6nerale des Eaux (France) 
GENCOR (S. Africa) 
Godfrey Davis Holdings 
Wagon Industrial Holdings 










British Coal Pension Funds 
William Baird 
TT Group 
Air Products & Chemicals (US) 
San Serif 
Guinness 
Erskine House Group 
Skandinavisk (Denmark) 
Bass 








City Merchant Developers 
Dubilier International 
Henderson Group (No. 2) 




Estates Property Investment Co. (No. 2) 
Jersey General Investment Trust 
Hard Rock International 
Phoenix Properties & Finanace 
Redfearn 
Essex Water Company 
Glass Gover Group 
Burford 
Inoco 
Ellis & Goldstein (No. 2) 




Moorgate Mercantile Holdings 
Smallbone 







Ronald Martin Groome 









East Anglia Water Company 
Alfred Preedy & Sons 
Marcol 
County Properties 





















































S. Casket Group 
Adia (Swiss) 
McLeod Russel Holdings 







Compagnie G6ndrale des Eaux (France) 
Symphony Corporation 
LIT Holdings 
Red Rose Radio 





Bolton House Investments 
Consortium 
Moss Brothers 
Mr T. Bryan &MrJ. Bryan 
600 Group 
Holmes & Marchant Group 







Select Country Hotels 
Bassett Foods 
F&C Eurotrust 
Apron (S. Africa) 
Community Hospitals 
Floyd Energy 




Capital & Investment Securities 
NCV Group 
Target 
Graham Motor Group 
Newage Transmissions 
Kingsley & Forester Group 
Task Force 





Wigfalls (No. 2) 
Lorlin Electronics 
Joseph Webb 
North Surrey Water 



















Ecobric Holdings (No. 2) 
Camotech 
Jacksons Bourne End 
Jamesons Chocolates 
Nordic Investment Trust 
Telematrix 
West Yorkshire Independent Hospitals 
New Darien Oil Trust 

































1988 Cambridge Electronic 
1988 Aims Homes 
1988 Mr B. C. Oates 
1988 Lubbock Nominees (Australia) 
1988 Sanda 
1988 Biwater Supply 
1988 Robert Lowe 
1988 Consortium 
1988 Chalford Communications 
1988 Apricot 
1988 Phipps & Sons 

























































Health Care Services 








Mr C. Richards & Mr P. Baker 
Company Pension Fund 
Minorco (Luxembourg) 
Jacobs Suchard (Swiss) 
Barker & Dobson 
Goodman Fielder Wattie (Australia) 







GC &C Brands 





Gandalf Technologies (Canada) 
Zurich Group 
Peachey Property Group 
Berkertex 
Target 
Infared Associates (US) 
Lifecare International 
Futura Holdings 
Clogau Gold Mines 
Waverley Cameron (No. 1) 
East Worcestershire Waterworks 
Babygro Holdings 
Oilfield Inspection Services 
Crown TV Productions 
Sigmex 
Headlam, Sims & Coggins 
BTS Group 
Brewmaker 
Andrb de Brett 
Swindon Private Hospital 
Portsmouth Water Company 
Cifer 
Fergabrook Group 
North British Steel Group 
Chemical Methods Associates (US) 




Ariel Industries (10%) 
Consolidated Gold Fields (No. 1) 
Rowntree (No. 2) 
Dee Corporation 
Ranks Hovis McDougall 
Scottish & Newcastle 
Suter 
Acre Oil (No. 1) 
Irish Distillers (No. 2)(Irish) 
Birmid Qualcast (No. 2) 
John Crowther (No. 2) 
Travis & Arnold (No. 2) 
Irish Distillers (No. 1)(Irish) 
Tricentrol (No. 1) 
Rubcroid (No. 1) 
Ryan International (No. 1) 
Stead & Simpson (No. 1) 
Henderson Group (No. 1) 
Case Group (No. 1) 
Ecobric Holdings (No. 1) 
Estates Property Investment Co. (No. 1) 
Ellis & Goldstein (No. 1) 
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Ref Year Bidder Target 
22F 1988 Strong & Fisher Pittard Garner 
23F 1988 Dobson Park Industries MS International 
24F 1988 Telfos Holdings Walter Runciman 
25F 1988 Crown Industrial Group Cundell Group (No. 2) 
26F 1988 Cookson Group Wolstenholme Rink 
27F 1988 Ferry Pickering Group Cundell Group (No. 1) 
28F 1988 Allied Textile Companies Hugh Mackay 
29F 1988 Bennett & Fountain Wigfalls (No. 1) 
30F 1988 Blick Multitone Electronics 
31F 1988 Caird Group Wistech (No. 1) 
32F 1988 Nimex Resources Monument Oil & Gas 
33F 1988 Flavell Communications Waverley Cameron (No. 2) 
1 1989 Smithkline (US) Beecham 
2 1989 Hanson Consolidated Gold Fields (No. 3) 
3 1989 Isoscles Gateway Corporation (No. 1) 
4 1989 GEC Siemens Plessey (No. 2) 
5 1989 Ford Motor (US) Jaguar 
6 1989 AMP (Australia) Pearl Group 
7 1989 Deutsche Bank (German) Morgan Grenfell 
8 1989 Cilva Holdings Avis Europe 
9 1989 Boots Ward White 
10 1989 Pembridge Associates (US) DRG 
11 1989 DMWSL 033 Magnet 
12 1989 Financibre Richmont (Swiss) Rothmans International 
13 1989 Carlton Communications UEI 
14 1989 Anglo United Coalite Group 
15 1989 News International William Collins (No. 1) 
16 1989 Bowater Industries Norton Opax 
17 1989 Bettrams Investment Trust Pentland Industries 
18 1989 MB Group Caradon 
19 1989 Rolls-Royce Northern Engineering Industries 
20 1989 Marketchief Imry Merchant Developers 
21 1989 Peel Holdings London Shop 
22 1989 Otkem (France) Coates Brothers 
23 1989 Fletcher Challange (NZ) UK Paper (No. 2) 
24 1989 British Aerospace Athington Securities 
25 1989 JMB Realty (US) Randsworth Trust 
26 1989 Ladbroke Group Thomson T-Line 
27 1989 Hambros Hambros Investment Trust 
28 1989 Hunting Gibson Hunting Associated Industries 
29 1989 Textron (US) Avdel (No. 2) 
30 1989 Omnicom (US) Boase Massini Pollitt (No. 2) 
31 1989 Clayform Properties Stead & Simpson (No. 2) 
32 1989 Priest Marians Local London Group 
33 1989 Charles Church Holdings Charles Church Development 




















































Bank of Yokohama (Japan) 
Banner Industries (US) 
Bank in Liechtenstein 
Yeoman International (Irish) 
Emerson Electric (US) 
Cadbury Schweppes 
Evode Group 
General Oriental Investments 
Ford Sellar Morris Properties 
Midland Bank 
Conrad Holdings 





Unotec Holdings (Swiss) 
Steelcase Strafor (French) 









Miss World Group 
Lyonnaise des Eaux (French) 
Scott & Robertson 
Lyonnaise des Eaux (French) 
Triplex Lloyd 





Fuchs Petrolub (German) 
Charterhall 
Raine Industries 
Associated British Ports 
Emess 
Anglo Investments 
Elf Aquitaine (French) 
Target 
Ross Catherall Group 
Kenyon Securities 
Guinness Mahon 




Bassett Foods (No. 2) 
Chamberlain Phipps (No. 1) 
Anglo Leasing 
Brookmount 
Billingsgate City Securities 
Mader Estates 
James Neill Holdings 
Illingsworth Morris 
Cambrian & General Securities 
Highland Participants 
Ryan International (No. 2) 
Cambridge Instrument Company 
Gordon Russell 
Smaller Companies International Trust 




British Syphon Industries 




Newcastle & Gateshead Water 
Alida Holdings 
Sunderland &S Shields Water 
Christy Hunt 
Cundell Group (No. 3) 
MIL Research Group 
CSL Corporation 






































































































Aviva Petroleum (US) 















Wiscoak Group/Belmont Homes 
Bowater Industries 
















Guardian & Manchester Evening News 
Severn 





Compagnie Gdndrale des Eaux (France) 
Biwater 
Ferrari Computer Services 
Sidlaw Group 
Target 
Property Company of London 
Viking Resources Trust 
Argyle Trust 
Johnson Fry 










Bournemouth & District Water 
Anglo-Eastern Plantations 
Mid Sussex Water 
Reliant Group 
Viking Packaging 





1TL Information Technology 
SMAC Group 
Miller & Santhouse 
Lyon & Lyon 
Laidlaw Thomson Group 
Bardscy 
M6 Cash & Carry 
Splash Products 
Health Care Services 
Jacksons Bourne Industries 
Business Mortgages Trust (No. 2) 
Broadcast Communications 
Ratclifs (Great Bridge) 





Tendring Hundred Waterworks 




Ref Year Bidder Target 
127 1989 J Saville Gordon London & Overseas Land 
128 1989 Twigrealm Meat Trade Suppliers (No. 2) 
129 1989 Regal Hotel Group Rivoh Cinemas 
130 1989 Sidlaw Group Transrap Holdings 
131 1989 Charterhall Textured Jersey 
132 1989 Epicure Holdings Habit Precision Engineering 
133 1989 Audit & General Holdings Humberside Electronics 
134 1989 Offertest Wistech (No. 2) 
135 1989 Apricot Computers DDT Group (No. 2) 
136 1989 Wassail Hille Ergonom 
137 1989 Bouygues (French) West Kent Water (No. 1) 
138 1989 Kooperativa Forbundet (Swedish) Chambers & Fargus 
139 1989 ERI Alva Investment Trust 
140 1989 Bromsgrove Industries Delmar Group 
141 1989 Parris/European Trust Jantar 
142 1989 Adamas (Swedish) RW Toothill 
143 1989 Brook AJ Worthington 
144 1989 James River (US) William Sommerville 
145 1989 City & Westminster Financial A&M Group 
146 1989 Ferrari Holdings UCL Group 
147 1989 Abdullah Trusts SI Group (No. 2) 
148 1989 Pentland Group Accord Publications 
149 1989 Investor Group GF Lovell 
150 1989 Lynx Holdings Lynx Group 
151 1989 CRT Group R Smallshaw (Knitwear) 
IF 1989 Anglo Group/Hoylake BAI Industries 
2F 1989 Minorco (Luxembourg) Consolidated Gold Fields (No. 2) 
3F 1989 Newgateway (US) Gateway Corporation (No. 2) 
4F 1989 GEC Siemens Plessey (No. 1) 
SF 1989 Rodamco (Dutch) Hammerson Property Investment 
6F 1989 Norton Opax De La Rue 
7F 1989 Groupe de la Cite (French) William Collins (No. 2) 
8F 1989 Coates Viyella Took 
9F 1989. Metsa-Serla (Finnish) UK Paper (No. 1) 
lOF 1989 Blue Circle Myson Group (No. 2) 
11F 1989 Yale & Valour Myson Group (No. 1) 
12F 1989 Lilley Tilbury Group 
13F 1989 Wiliam Low Budgens 
14F 1989 BDDP (French) Boase Massimi Pollitt (No. 1) 
15F 1989 Banner Industries (US) Avdel (No. 1) 
16F 1989 British Empire Securities Schroder Global Trust 
17F 1989 Meggitt United Scientific Holdings 
18F 1989 Atlas Copco (Swedish) Desoutter Brothers (No. 1) 
19F 1989 Bowater Industries Chamberlain Phipps (No. 2) 
20F 1989 Wardle Storeys Armstrong Equipment (No. 1) 
21F 1989 Local London Group Marina Development Group 
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Ref Year Bidder Target 
22F 1989 IEP (Hong Kong) Molins (No. 1) 
23F 1989 Procordia (Swedish) Bassett Foods (No. 1) 
24F 1989 Blacks Leisure A Goldberg 
25F 1989 Sally UK Holdings Red Funnell (No. 1) 
26F 1989 First Technology Ricardo Group 
27F 1989 Robert Fraser Group Dewey Warren Holdings 
28F 1989 Alpha Gamma Meat Trade Suppliers (No. 1) 
29F 1989 National Home Loans Holdings Business Mortgages Trust (No. 1) 
30F 1989 Clydesdale Investment Trust Bailie Gifford Technology 
31F 1989 Peter Black Holdings Lambert Howarth Group 
32F 1989 Southern Water Authority/AIPF Folkestone & District Water (No. 2) 
33F 1989 Vistec DDT Group (No. 2) 
34F 1989 Southern Water Authority/AIPF West Kent Water (No. 2) 
3SF 1989 Kembrey Group SI Group (No. 1) 
36F 1989 Moneytab Ketson 
1 1990 Northern Telecom (Canada) STC 
2 1990 British Coal Pensions Funds Globe Investment Trust 
3 1990 Brierley Investments (NZ) Mount Charlotte 
4 1990 P&O Chelsfield Laing Properties 
5 1990 SPP (Swedish) London & Edinburgh Trust 
6 1990 Rank Organisation Mecca Leisure Group 
7 1990 Fletcher Challange (NZ) UK Paper (No. 2) 
Excluded - doubled counted byAcquisitions Monthly. Bid is included as 23-1989 
8 1990 Booker Fitch Lovell 
9 1990 Cap Gemini Sogeti (French) Hoskyns Group 
10 1990 Fisons VG Instruments 
11 1990 Burmah Castrol Foseco 
12 1990 Compagnie Generale des Eaux (France) AMI Healthcare Group 
13 1990 Blue Circle Industries Myson Group (No. 3) 
14 1990 GAN (French) General Portfolio 
15 1990 BET Hestar (No. 2) 
16 1990 Jameel Group (S. Arabia) Hartwell (No. 2) 
17 1990 Transatlantic Holdings Continental & Industrial Trust 
18 1990 Queens Moat Houses Norfolk Capital Group 
19 1990 Buhrmann-Tetterode (Dutch) Robert Home Group 
20 1990 Interpublic Group (US) Lowe Group 
21 1990 Rothmans International (Swiss) P. J. Carroll and Company 
22 1990 ADT (Bermuda) Brittania Security Group 
23 1990 Brierley Investments (NZ) Western Motor Holdings 
24 1990 Etablissement Funtal (French) Dukeminster 
25 1990 Atlas Copco (Swedish) Desoutter Brothers (No. 2) 
26 1990 Brierley Investments (NZ) Tozer Kemsley & Millbourn 
27 1990 Bear Brand Leisure Investments 
28 1990 Jorraban Really Useful Group 
29 1990 European Leisure (Irish) Midsummer Leisure 


































































































Asea Brown Boveri (Swiss) 
Norfolk House Group 
International Marine Holdings (US) 
CTP Communications (French) 




Compagnie Gendrale des Eaux (France) 
Wassail 
United Engineers (Malaysian) 
LAWS Group (Irish) 
Gartmore EP Investment Trust 
Healthcall Group 
Maxwell Foundation (Liechtenstein) 
Co-Steel (Canadian) 





Jardine Matheson Holdings (Hong Kong) 
Glunz (German) 
Heron (Swedish) 
Compagnie Generale des Eaux (France) 
Hillsdown Holdings 
York Trust Group 
Anglo Group 
Yule Catto 
L Bartley Holdings 
Ricardo Group 
Fastighets Ab Accura (Swedish) 
CGE (French) 
Hambros Bank 
Asahi Industrial Company (Japan) 
Thyssen (German) 
Voltex Holdings (S. Africa) 
Lilley 
Wurth Holdings (German) 
Emess 
Nobel Industries (Swedish) 
Soc Generale de Surveillance (Swiss) 













Colne Valley Water Company 
Metal Closures Group 
Kinta Kellas Investment 
R&H Hall (Irish) 




Monotype Corporation (No. 1) 







Rickmansworth Water Company 
Strong & Fisher 









Davies & Metcalfe 
Bennett & Fountain 
Hatfield Estates 
Monks & Crane 
Royal Sovereign 
Continental Microwave 























































































Brauerei Eichhof Group (Swiss) 
Suter 





Mark IV Industries (US) 
Scapa 
Franke Holdings (Swiss) 
Reader's Digest Association (US) 
Outline 























Rowe Evans Investments 
Northumberland Trust 
AS Perloff'/Panther Securities 
Document Solutions International 








International Colour Management 
Chemoxy International (No. 2) 
Optim Group 
Early's of Watney 
Priest Marians Holdings 
Parkway Group 
Cooks Industries 
Klark - Teknik 
Just Rubber 
Carron Phoenix (No. 2) 
David & Charles 

























British Kidney Patients Assoc. Investment 
Multitrust 
Systems Connections 

























































































ISS (Danish) Mainmet Holdings 
Compagnie Generale des Eaux (France) Lee Valley Water 
Geoffrey Davy Knobs & Knockers 
Excluded - target previously taken over (8 5-1989) - private company at time of this bid. 
Kingfisher Dixons Group 
Jameel Group (S. Arabia) Hartwell (No. 1) 
Adia (Swiss) Hestair (No. 1) 
YJ Lovell Higgs & Hill 
Godfrey Davis Holdings Sketchley (No.! ) 
Compass Group Sketchley (No. 2) 
Leucadia National Corporation (US) Molins (No. 2) 
Severn Trent Caird Group 
Headington Investments Monotype Corporation (No. 2) 
Glynwed International Alumasc Group 
Vishay Intertechnology (US) Crystalate Holdings (No. 2) 
Sea Containers (Bermuda) Isle of Man Steam Packet 
MTM Chemoxy International (No. 1) 
East of Scotland Industrial Investments Saltire Insurance Investments (No.! ) 
Etablissements Bene (French) Carron Phoenix (No.! ) 
Heart of Midlothian Football Club Edinburgh Hibernian 
Mr D. C. A. Bramall Sanderson Murray & Elder 
BTR Hawker Siddeley Group 
LASMO Ultramar 
Williams Holdings Yale & Valor 
Hanson Beazer 
Union Ass Paris/Transatlantic Holdings Sun Life 
Coates Viyella Tootal Group 
BTR Rockware Group 
Thorn EMI Thames Television 
General Motors (US) SD-Scicon (No. 2) 
Shanks & McEwan Group Rechem Environmental Services 
London Merchant Securities Westpool Invesment Trust 
Trafalgar House Davy Corporation 
Evered Bardon Group 
Neste (Finnish) Sovereign Oil & Gas 
Tilbury Group Robert M Douglas 
Veba (German) Memec 
Sankyo Seiko (Japan) DAKS Simpson Group 
Headington Investments First Tokyo Index Trust 
BSN (French) W&R Jacob (Irish) 
Greencore (Irish) Food Industries (Irish) 
Auricom Beteiligungs (Austrian) Telfos Holdings (No. 2) 
Mayne Nickless (Australia) Interlink Express 
Au Printemps (French) Empire Stores 
Simon Engineering Robertson Group 






















































Franz Haniel (German) 
Hopkinsons Group 
Jupiter Tarbutt Merlin 
Aegis Group 
Whittington 
Cambridge Electronic Industries 
ACT Group 
Marrell (French) 
Alan Cooper Holdings 
Wyevale Garden Centres 
Hospital Corporation International (US) 
Southern Radio 
Unotec Holdings (Swiss) 
Scottish Cities Investment Trust 
Stirling Group 
Compagnie de Suez (French) 
East Midlands Electricity 
MJ Gleeson Group 
IIvf 
Computer Sciences (US) 
Caparo Group 
Berkeley Group 
Bank of Yokohama (Japan) 
EMAP 
Jupiter Tarbutt Merlin 







Alan Sugar/Terry Venables 
Cambridge Electonic Industries 
Triplex Lloyd 
Conroy Petroleum (Irish) 
Bank of Scotland 
Rutland Trust 
Publicis (French) 






















Anglo Scandinavian Invest. Trust (No. 1) 









Radio City (Sound of Merseyside) 
Vantage Securities 
Third Mile Investments (No. 2) 
Kingsgrange (No. 1) 
Thurgar Bardex 
Handley-Walker Group 
Saltire Insurance Investments (No. 2) 
Quiligotti 
Touchstone Group (No. 1) 
Tottenham Hotspur 
Goring Kerr (No. 1) 
Dunstall Park Holdings 
Atlantic Resources (Irish) 
Bank of Wales 
Harcourt Group 
Geers Gross 
John J Lees 
Brompton Holdings 
F Copson 
















































Pearson Analysis Holdings 
Jefferson Smurfit (Irish) Finlay Packaging 
EIS Group Flightspares 
Wilton Group Cowan de Groot (No. 1) 
ECsoft (Dutch) Synapse Computer Services 
Rapallo PML Group 
Microvitec Logitek 
Hays Citybond Storage Services 
Anglo-Park St James Estates 
Waverley Cameron BTS Group 
Giltrap Motor Holdings Malaya Group 
Holywell Property Dunton Group 
Time Products Apollo Watch Products 
West Industries Audit & General 
Listcause Bexbuild Developments 
Kimball International (US) Herrburger Brooks 
Groupe Boulet Dru Dupuy Petit (French) Broad Street Group 
European Financial Network Holdings Wyndham Group 
SCOA (French) CPU Computers 
Leon Andrews-Zannetou/Rex Williams Scottish Ice Rink Company 
Excluded - telephone conversation with Mr Leon Andrews-Zannetou ascertained that 
transaction reported in Acquisitions Monthly did not take place 
Williams Holdings Racal Electronics 
American Brands (US) Invergordon Distillers 
Southend Property Holdings Froginore Estates 
Ocean Investment Corporation Etam 
Boddington Group JA Devenish 
Cray Electronics SD-Scicon (No. 1) 
Grampian Holdings Macarthy (No. 1) 
Lloyds Chemists Macarthy (No. 3) 
Unichem Macarthy (No. 2) 
William Cook Telfos Holdings (No. 1) 
NMC Group API Group 
Thermo Electron Corporation (US) Tace (No. 3) 
Stac Partners Corporation (US) Tace (No. 2) 
ASIT Investment Trust Anglo Scandanivian Inv. Trust (No. 2) 
Dowding & Mills 
TT Group 
Dewhirst Group 
Anglo Scandinavian Investment Trust 




Estonia Venture Inc (Swiss) 
Consortium 
Torday & Carlisle 
Magnetic Materials Group (No. 1) 
Kingsgrange (No. 2) 
Lancashire & London Investment Trust 
Goring Kerr (No. 2) 
Touchstone Group (No. 2) 
McLaughlin & Harvey 
Cowan dc Groot (no. 2) 
Merlin International Properties 
Third Mile Investments (No. 1) 
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Ref Year Bidder Target 
25F 1991 Corporate Services Group Ibex Holdings 
1 1992 HSBC Holdings Midland Bank 
2 1992 Elsevier (Dutch) Reed International 
3 1992 Tomkins Ranks Hovis McDougall (No. 2) 
4 1992 Redland Steetley 
5 1992 Franklin Resources (US) Templeton Galbraith & Hansberger (CI) 
6 1992 TI Group Dowty Group 
7 1992 Transatlantic Holdings Capital & Counties 
8 1992 Lloyds Chemists Macarthy (No. 4) 
9 1992 Blockbuster Entertainment (US) Cityvision 
10 1992 Robert Bosch (German) Worcester Group 
11 1992 Carlton Communications Pickwick Group 
12 1992 First National Bank S. Africa (S. Africa) Henry Ansbacher Holdings 
13 1992 BM Group Thomas Robinson Group 
14 1992 TSB Group TSB Bank Channel Islands 
15 1992 Bowthorpe Holdings Penny & Giles International 
16 1992 Yorkshire Television Tyne Tees Television 
17 1992 Yattendon Investment Trust Marina Developments 
18 1992 Jameel Group (S. Arabia) Trimoco 
19 1992 Raine Industries Walter Lawrence 
20 1992 AAH Holdings Cahill May Roberts Group (Irish) 
21 1992 Merchant Navy Officers Pension Fund Ensign Trust 
22 1992 Throgmorton 1000 Smallest Cos Trust Throgmorton 
23 1992 Corning JS Pathology 
24 1992 Management team BHH Group 
25 1992 Jack Chia (Singapore) Boustead 
26 1992 Meggitt Micrelec Group 
27 1992 Barlo Group (Irish) IRG (Irish) 
28 1992 Brambles Industries (Australia) Security Archives 
29 1992 Hospital Corporation International (US) Bioplan Holdings 
Excluded - double counted byAcquisitions Monthly. Bid is included as 38-1991 
30 1992 TR Property Investment Trust New England Properties 
31 1992 Dainippon Ink & Chemicals (Japan) Usher-Walker 
32 1992 Bromsgrove Industries GW Thornton Holdings 
33 1992 First Charlotte Assets Trust Clydesdale Investment 
34 1992 Spring Ram Corporation Stag Furniture Holdings 
35 1992 Antares Group Harrison Industries 
36 1992 TT Group Magnetic Materials Group (No. 2) 
37 1992 Polyfinance (French) Polymark International 
38 1992 Herring Son & Daw Holdings Baker Harris Saunders Group 
39 1992 Abbot Group Blystad Group 
40 1992 AFE (French) Cronite Group 
41 1992 United Energy AmBrit International (No. 2) 
42 1992 Prontaprint Continuous Stationery 
43 1992 Broadland Properties New Cavendish Estates 


















































Hong Leong/Hume Industries (Malaysia) 
Sipa Resources International (Australia) 














Brierley Investments (NZ) 
Martin Currie Pacific Trust 
Pittencrieff 





British Building & Engineering Appliances 
NMW Computers 
Wilding Office Equipment 
Ramus Holdings 
Burmin Exploration & Development (Irish) 
BLP Group 
Sintrom 
Simpsons of Cornhill 
Grosvenor Terrace Developments 
Children's Medical Charity Invest. Trust 
Celtic Basin Oil Exploration 
Malaya Group 
Associated Energy Services 







Pacific Horizon Investment Trust 
AmBrit International (No.! ) 
Tuskar Resouces (Irish) 
Appendix 6: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ANOVA Analysis of variance 
d. f. Degrees of freedom 
F Forecasters (except in appendix 5 where F= Failed) 
GAAP Generally accepted accounting policies 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GLS Generalised least squares 
IPO Initial public offering 
LIBOR London inter-bank overnight rate 
m Millions 
MCRV Making corporate reports valuable 
N/A Not applicable 
NF Nonforecasters 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
p. a. per annum 
PR Public relations 
SUR Seemingly-unrelated-regressions 
WLS Weighted least squares 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
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